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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the policy process behind the distribution of Emergency 
Contraception (EC) in Chile during the administrations of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 
and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). For more than ten years, this policy process was 
marked by a series of political and legal battles at the centre of which were women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights. The legalisation and distribution of EC had the effect of 
alerting conservative and religious groups opposing EC for its alleged abortive effect. 
What could have been considered a minor policy issue by many political analysts 
became a particularly visible and influential issue, especially once Michelle Bachelet, 
Chile’s first female president, took power in 2006. Feminists, the Catholic Church, 
lawyers and doctors became the main players in front of tribunals supporting or 
opposing the public policy. The main concern of this research is to understand why the 
EC policy was such a contentious issue in Chile and elucidate which were the main 
factors affecting the advancement of this progressive social policy and its final gendered 
outcome. The central research question driving this study is what does the EC policy 
process tell us about the role of institutions in the advancement of women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights in Chile? The thesis shows that both formal and informal institutions 
played a major role in the policy environment in which feminist and sexual and 
reproductive health and rights advocates had to engage. The role of formal institutions 
such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the power held by the executive were matched 
by the power of informal institutions such as the consensus rule, the role of judges and 
informal lobbying by social actors, as well as the presence of the first female president. 
Bachelet’s profile as a doctor, feminist and woman mixed with her presidential power 
provides an important explanation to the positive outcome of the policy process. 
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i 
Glossary 
ACHM Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades (Association of Municipalities 
of Chile) 
APROFA  Family Planning Association of Chile, formerly known as Asociación 
Chilena de Protección a la Familia, member of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) 
CEMERA Centro de Medicina Reproductiva y Desarrollo Integral del 
Adolescente, Universidad de Chile (Centre for Reproductive Medicine 
and Integral Development of Adolescents, University of Chile) 
CIBISAP Centro de Investigaciones en Bioética y Salud Pública, Universidad de 
Santiago (USACH) (Centre for Research on Bioethics and Public 
Health, University of Santiago) 
CONFUSAM Confederación Nacional de Funcionarios de Salud Municipalizada 
(National Confederation of Municipal Health Civil Servants) 
CORSAPS Corporación de Salud y Políticas Sociales (Health and Social Policy 
Corporation) 
Decreto 
Supremo 
Supreme Decree 
EC Emergency Contraception 
FIGO International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
FLACSO Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American 
Faculty of Social Sciences) 
Foro Salud 
or ‘Foro’ 
Foro Red de Salud y Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos (Network 
Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights) 
ICEC International Consortium for Emergency Contraception 
ii 
ICMER Instituto Chileno de Medicina Reproductiva (Chilean Institute of 
Reproductive Medicine) 
IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federation 
ISP Instituto de Salud Pública (Institute of Public Health) 
MIDEPLAN Ministerio de Planificación (Ministry of Planning) 
MINED Ministerio de Educación de Chile (Ministry of Education of Chile) 
MINJU Ministerio de Justicia (Ministry of Justice) 
MINSAL Ministerio de Salud de Chile (Ministry of Health of Chile) 
ODEPLAN Oficina de Planificación Nacional (National Planning Bureau), which 
later became known as MIDEPLAN 
Optinor Third brand of Emergency Contraception Pill authorised in Chile, 
produced by the Indian pharmaceutical company ICON based in the 
UK 
Postday A Colombian brand of Emergency Contraception Pill authorised in 
Chile, produced by the pharmaceutical company Lafrancol 
Postinal First brand of Emergency Contraception Pill authorised in Chile, 
produced by the pharmaceutical company Silesia 
Postinor-2 Second brand of Emergency Contraception Pill authorised in Chile, 
produced by the pharmaceutical company Grünenthal 
PUC Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (Pontifical Catholic University 
of Chile) 
RSMLAC Red de Salud de Mujeres de América Latina y el Caribe (Women’s 
Health Network for Latin America and the Caribbean) 
SEGPRES Secretaría General de la Presidencia (The Presidency’s General 
iii 
Secretary (The Executive’s Coordinating Body)) 
SERNAM Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (Women’s Affairs Ministry of Chile) 
SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
TACE A brand of Emergency Contraception Pill commercialised by the 
pharmaceutical company Recalcine 
TC Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Tribunal) 
ULA Universidad de los Andes (University of the Andes), belonging to the 
Opus Dei 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
WHO World Health Organisation 
Political Parties 
PDC (or 
DC) 
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party) 
PPD Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy) 
PRSD Partido Radical Social Demócrata (Radical Social Democrat Party) 
PS Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) 
RN Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) 
UDI  Unión Demócrata Independiente (Democratic Independent Union) 
iv 
Brief timeline for the EC legal and political process 
1998  Scoping research is carried out by Dr Díaz and ICMER to identify the need for EC and acceptability by the population. 
 The Frei Administration launches the ‘Guidelines for the Treatment of Victims of Sexual Violence in Emergency Health Services’, which originally include the distribution of EC, but is excluded in the final version. 
2000  Ricardo Lagos becomes president. 
2001  The ISP authorises the production and commercialisation of EC in Chile. The first EC brand, Postinal, is produced by pharmaceutical company Silesia. 
 The Church immediately denounces EC for its alleged abortifacient effect. 
 Pro-life groups launch the first legal claim against the ISP and Silesia, successfully blocking EC distribution as Postinal. 
 The ISP with pharmaceutical company Grünenthal launch an alternative EC brand, Postinor-2, avoiding the impact of the earlier ruling. 
2002  The pro-life lobby brings a new legal claim against EC by attacking Postinor-2. 
 Civil society and SRHR advocates work on the update of the “National Fertility Norms.” 
2003  The court rules in favour of the pro-life petitioners and prohibits the distribution of Postinor-2. 
2004  A court of appeals revokes the first sentence against the distribution of Postinor-2. The pro-life lobby brings case to the Supreme Court. 
2005  Presidential election campaign. 
 Infante, Sub-Secretary of Health, announces that the Norms are ready to be published and will include the distribution of EC to all women. Infante is forced to resign immediately. 
 The Supreme Court rules against the pro-life petitioners, reaffirming that it is not the role of judges and courts to decide on scientific matters. 
2006  Bachelet becomes president. 
 Barría, Minister of Health, announces the planned launch of the Norms, which include the distribution of EC. 
 The anti-EC lobby, supported by 36 Parliamentarians, brings a case against the President to the Constitutional Tribunal. 
v 
2007  Bachelet signs a Supreme Decree to launch the Norms, thereby precluding any potential claim regarding the unconstitutional right to the distribution of EC. 
 The anti-EC lobby once again brings the case to the Constitutional Tribunal with the support of Parliamentarians. 
2008  Municipal elections campaign. 
 The Constitutional Tribunal rules against the distribution of EC through the national health system based on “a reasonable doubt” about the abortive nature of EC. 
 EC remains available in pharmacies because of a legal loophole. 
 Mass protests take place led by feminist organisations and the Movimiento por la Anticoncepción. 
 Government decides to distribute EC through municipal health system. 
 Opposition parties challenge the municipal distribution of EC and bring case to the Contraloría. 
2009  Presidential and Parliamentarian elections campaign. 
 The Contraloría rules that EC is legal but cannot be distributed by municipal health services, producing a legal vacuum and popular uproars including civil society and politicians. 
 Bachelet sends the Fertility Bill to Congress with “urgency”. It is approved in Parliament through cross-party support. 
2010  Bachelet promulgates the “Law for the Regulation of Fertility…” in the last weeks of her mandate. 
   
vi 
Visual timeline and description of the stages of the judicialization process 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
In January 2010, during the last month of her presidential mandate and on the day after 
her political coalition the Concertación was defeated for the first time in twenty years, 
Michelle Bachelet signed the “Ley sobre Normas sobre Información, Orientación y 
Prestaciones en Materia de Regulación de la Fertilidad (Law on Information, 
Orientation and Services for Fertility Regulation Issues) (Biblioteca del Congreso, 
2010). This watershed law came about to put an end to the ten year old “saga”1 
surrounding the policy efforts for the distribution of emergency contraception (EC) in 
Chile. Under the Lagos and Bachelet administrations, EC became one of the most 
contentious issues and controversial debates in Chilean society regarding women’s 
reproductive health and rights. Ultra-conservative sectors of Chilean society in alliance 
with the Catholic Church spent the first ten years of the century fiercely opposing both 
the legalisation and free distribution of EC to women by the government. 
This research analyses the policy process behind the distribution of EC between 2000 
and 2010, under the administrations of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet. The study 
shows that the political and institutional environment in which the policy for the 
distribution of EC was set explains the gradual politicisation of the role of the courts 
                                               1 The term was coined by Lidia Casas who has produced a detailed account of the legal challenges that surrounded the legalisation and distribution of emergency contraception in Chile (Casas Becerra 2008). 
2 
and judges, also known as a process of judicialisation.2 This had important implications 
for all actors3 involved in the policy process.4 
The research uses a Feminist Institutionalism (FI) approach to analyse why specific 
institutions and actors are given more weight more than others during the policy-making 
process for the advancement of women’s sexual and reproductive rights. The analysis 
aims to unveil how power is sometimes invisible in these processes which are deeply 
gendered. Thus, the main question driving the research is: What does the EC policy 
process tell us about the role of institutions in the advancement of women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights in Chile? 
The thesis addresses these issues by looking at institutions,5 in particular judicial ones, 
and the impact these have on feminist demands regarding sexual and reproductive 
health and rights (SRHR) policies. The institutionalist approach used includes a 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) component to show that the historical background of the 
transition to democracy in Chile has not only affected the capacity of civil society in 
general to act but has also shaped the ways in which feminists can access spaces to 
produce policy change regarding SRHR. The thesis also analyses the judicialisation 
                                               2 I follow Pilar Domingo’s (2004) definition of judicialisation as the “greater involvement by judges in law-making and social control”. Domingo highlights the increasing presence of “judicial processes and court rulings in political life”, and how this is probably a manifestation of the fact that an increasing number of political, social and state-society conflicts are resolved in courts. Social actors in fact seek the arbitration of judges to advance their interests, especially to hold the state accountable for citizens’ rights (2004, 1–2) 3 Policy actors are defined in this thesis as both individuals and groups involved directly or indirectly, formally and informally in the efforts to influence the policy process. They can include politicians, grassroots’ activists, the Church, judges, civil servants, unions, etc. 4 By “policy process” I understand the diverse and complex type of stages, institutions and actors involved in the making of public policy. Here I refer more to the work of Paul Sabatier who proposes a more integrated model of policy process analysis in the form of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible 2006; Sabatier 1991). 5 The thesis uses the definition of institutions understood as the “rules of the game” or set of formal and informal rules and norms that dictates our lives (see Ch. 3), and are part of a shared understanding in society with clear sanctions attached to them. Thus institutions can be social, economic or political, etc.   
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process and the role of courts and judges under the administrations of Lagos and 
Bachelet through a FI lens which gives equal importance to formal and informal 
institutions. In so doing, the thesis also provides new insights on why other crucial 
reproductive issues, such as the right to abortion have not been reinstated in Chile since 
1989. 
This thesis looks at the specific features of the context in which the policy process 
behind the emergency contraception policy took place through the following sub-
questions: How did formal and informal institutions influence the EC policy process, in 
particular during the judicialisation process? How did actors see their ideas reflected or 
ignored during the policy process? What was the impact of ten years of legal and 
political battles for the distribution of EC on feminists and other civil society groups? 
What do we learn about their capacity to mobilise and the efficacy of women and 
feminist networks trying to influence the SRHR agenda in Chile? How did the presence 
of a feminist and first female president impact on the outcomes of the policy process? 
Michelle Bachelet’s administration is of particular interest from a feminist perspective. 
Her election in December 2005 represents one of the most important political 
milestones for women in Chile and Latin America, since she was the first woman in 
South America to reach this leadership position through her own political career rather 
than other factors such as family ties. As Marcela Ríos Tobar explains: 
… she was no ‘ordinary woman’, but a long-time socialist militant, a recognized 
agnostic, and a divorced mother of three whose father had been imprisoned and 
killed during the military dictatorship and who had herself, together with her 
mother, survived torture, imprisonment and exile. (Ríos Tobar 2009a: 1) 
It has been argued that Bachelet’s arrival to power responds more to political factors 
than cultural or social ones; this implies that she was more the product of the 
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Concertación parties’ manoeuvres to stay in power for another presidential term and to 
incite the media’s curiosity and excitement, than the result of a major change in Chile’s 
political culture allowing a female to become president for the first time. Her leadership 
was questioned to the extent that she was defined as a “lame duck” in international 
media (Webber 2007). 
Despite the political decision to have a female candidate by Concertación, Bachelet’s 
appeal was a mix of her well-known biography and her gender (Siavelis 2010). 
Bachelet’s election heightened expectations of change for women’s citizenship amongst 
women of different socio-economic backgrounds due to her well-known commitment to 
gender equality. However, this was particularly true amongst feminists who thought she 
would tackle the most outstanding gender-equality issues in the country (Borzutzky and 
Weeks 2010: 20). Michelle Bachelet also represented a surprise as much as a mystery 
for many who tried to understand this political “phenomenon” of having a female 
president in a country considered so conservative and chauvinistic. As Ríos Tobar 
mentions, despite the importance of women and feminists in the transition to 
democracy: 
… neither the mainstream media nor the male political establishment had ever paid 
so much attention to questions of women’s political representation, women’s 
leadership, and gender relations as they did during this election. (Ríos Tobar 
2009a: 2) 
The thesis thus analyses the importance of having Bachelet as the first female president, 
and shows that her profile made her a champion at the top of the political pyramid for 
the advancement of women’s rights. The analysis contrasts Bachelet’s political 
attributes with those of Ricardo Lagos and the way in which they each confronted the 
issue of emergency contraception and reproductive rights. The research shows that 
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despite the political logic that brought her to office to maintain her political coalition in 
power, Bachelet used all presidential prerogatives – from Supreme Decrees to the 
presidential power to legislate – to ensure the distribution of emergency contraception. 
Contribution of the thesis 
Although a substantial amount of literature on abortion in Chile is available, this thesis 
contributes to the gender and politics and SRHR literature by being the first to focus 
exclusively on emergency contraception. Based on elite and key informant interviews, it 
provides an in-depth understanding of the judicial processes and the actors and 
institutions involved. The research is based on a network analysis of the advocacy 
coalitions in favour and against EC, their influence, and use of both formal and informal 
institutions to achieve their goals. This thesis is also the first to look at the EC 
judicialisation process through a gender lens, contributing to the literature on FI and 
judicialisation. 
The thesis and EC 
This research focuses on the specific social policy to distribute EC, differentiating itself 
from most studies on legal initiatives on the issue of abortion and SRHR available until 
now (Blofield 2006; Haas 2006; Htun 2003; Shepard and Casas Becerra 2007; Shepard 
2006). 
The EC policy process is particularly interesting because of its origins and the contexts 
in which it evolved from a regular internal initiative within the Ministry of Health to a 
major debate brought to the courts via judicialisation, and eventually reached Parliament 
as a bill. In this process the emergency contraception policy was at the centre of 
influence and battles between different formal and informal institutions and actors. This 
thesis gives particular emphasis to the political and judicial battles at the Constitutional 
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Tribunal (2006-2008) since these battles represent a unique gendered political struggle, 
with an important outcome for gender rights. The arguments advanced to defend and to 
oppose the distribution of emergency contraception reveal the deep ideological 
divisions within Chilean society, which until now were rather blurred by Chile’s image 
as simply a conservative country. This research’s focus on the policy process, the role 
of actors, ideas and beliefs, as well as political and judicial institutions, provides a more 
nuanced reality and sheds light on the power struggles involved in policy-making. 
The study engages with three main bodies of literature to which it aims to contribute: 
gender and politics and women’s movement in Latin America; new institutionalism and 
judicialisation; and the more recent and ever-growing body of literature of Feminist 
Institutionalism. Chapters 2 and 3 include an introduction to these three bodies of 
literature in relation to the research, as well as discussion on how they create an 
appropriate conceptual framework. 
Emergency contraception in Chile 
The introduction of emergency contraception in Chile in 1998 was the result of a health 
policy initiative to reduce the rate of teenage pregnancies in the country – one of the 
highest in Latin America – by making it available to all women above the age of 14, as 
well as to victims of sexual violence. This initiative was the result of the work of NGOs 
and civil society groups aiming to update the “Normas nacionales sobre la regulación de 
la fertilidad” (National Guidelines for the Regulation of Fertility) (MINSAL et al. 2006) 
used by the Ministry of Health, and to bring a language of rights to Chile’s reproductive 
health services in line with the international legal framework defining SRHR since the 
1990s (see Ch. 7). 
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Chile has a longstanding tradition of social policy regarding maternal health and family 
planning dating from the 1930s, but in particular since the 1960s when reproductive 
issues and birth control methods were introduced through family planning policies with 
little controversy, and in fact with the Church’s tacit support (Rojas M. 2009) (see Ch. 
4). The thesis shows that many of the actors and institutions involved with health 
policies at that time are still present nowadays, including the feminists, with some new 
social actors such as conservative militant groups (see Chs 4, 5 and 6). 
There is in this sense a similarity in the approach to the distribution of EC. Doctors and 
government officials defined EC as a priority for public health, just as abortion was 
framed in the 1960s, although in official documents EC was described in the language 
of sexual and reproductive rights. The strategy of putting medical emphasis on this issue 
means that since 2000 it was not SERNAM but rather the Ministry of Health 
(MINSAL) that was in charge of the distribution of EC, opening up a new arena of 
negotiation for doctors and feminists wanting to advance SRHR. The following chapters 
show that during this period (2001-2010), feminists felt less at ease working in a 
medical framework compared to previous policy initiatives including violence against 
women (VAW), which were located within SERNAM, the ministry in charge of 
advancing gender equality. The research shows how this posed specific challenges for 
feminists and their capacity to frame and negotiate the terms behind the distribution of 
EC. It also shaped which alliances they needed to forge to influence the policy agenda. 
Concerned about retaining control over the policy process, feminists were reluctant to 
engage under these conditions. 
Emergency contraception has had the surprising effect of reopening a long-postponed 
debate in Chilean society – the right to abortion. EC awakened the fear in conservative 
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sectors that its distribution could open the door for the reinstatement to the right to 
abortion. Thus, from very early on, conservative sectors of society – belonging to 
networks linked to the Catholic Church – led an organised opposition to the legalisation 
of EC in Chile on the presumption that the emergency contraception pill was abortive. 
What started as a simple judicial challenge against the drug in 2001 eventually evolved 
into a series of political and judicial battles, which ended with a case in the 
Constitutional Tribunal against Michelle Bachelet as president.6 Over the ten years of 
judicial and political confrontations, the debate was permanently centred on the right to 
abortion and the right to life. Yet as the issue became more political and visible, it 
eventually evolved into a wider debate on women’s rights and sexual and reproductive 
autonomy, as well as poverty, inequality and justice. 
Abortion in Chile 
Chile is one of the few countries in the world where abortion is still illegal and 
penalised under any circumstances; it is a criminal offence for both women seeking the 
service and those providing it. This was not always the case; in fact, therapeutic 
abortion7 was legal and available from 1931 until 1989, when Augusto Pinochet’s 
military regime decided to modify Chile’s health code during its last months in power 
through a rather rushed and covert process. This was done in the context of many other 
constitutional reforms included in the pact made between the military and newly elected 
civilian government in order to reinstate democracy (see Ch. 4). 
                                               6 This thesis refers to the “Constitutional Tribunal” since this is the closest translation for Tribunal Constitucional, which is the way the court is referred to in Spanish 7 This generally includes the right to seek a medical induced abortion in cases of danger for a pregnant woman’s life, and when the foetus is not viable due to any malformation of pathology.  
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Good access to mother and child medical care as well as low rates of maternal mortality 
and deaths due to abortion over the last decades may have given the statistical 
impression that Chile had no need for particular initiatives on the SRHR front.8 
However, it is estimated that the rate of abortions in Chile is 50 per 1,000 women, 
which would represent around 160,000 abortions per year – one of the highest in Latin 
America – according to the latest studies dating from the 1990s (Faúndes and Barzelatto 
2007; Henshaw, Singh, and Haas 1999). In 2000, a quarter of the deaths recorded as 
maternal mortalities were still consequences of complications of backstreet abortions, 
making abortion the primary cause of maternal mortality in Chile (C. Dides et al. 
2007).9 
As explained by Guzmán and Seibert, “Sexual and Reproductive Rights constitute the 
most prominent area of political confrontation between the Catholic Church and 
progressive movements” (2010: 3). In the case of Chile, this and the close relationship 
between the Catholic hierarchy and the economic and political elite of the country, has 
given the Church a certain advantage and influence in policy-making since democracy 
was re-established in 1990. 
The policy and institutional environment defining policy-making in Chile 
This research is located within the current debate over feminism and institutionalism 
and the way in which the relationship between women’s movements, the state and 
institutions are all perceived as interlinked. Sustaining this approach is the belief that if 
the political environment and policy process behind any policy-making initiative are 
                                               8 The rate of deaths as a direct consequence of abortion between 1960 and 2000 went down from 10.7 to 0.5 deaths for every 10,000 new-borns (Departamento de Estadística e Información de Salud 2001 cited in Dides et al. 2007; Schiappacasse et al. 2003). 9 Although this no longer the case, most abortions still remain either unsafe or clandestine (the case of poor women) or happen in private clinics where there are no records of these procedures (in the case of wealthier women).  
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gendered, the outcomes of any policy – whether a social policy, a law or the discourse 
surrounding it – will necessarily also be gendered (Htun and Weldon 2010). 
New Institutionalism (NI) has shown that the political and institutional environments of 
a country are pivotal when analysing any policy process, as well as initiatives and 
strategies by advocacy coalitions and political actors (see Ch. 3). In Chile, the policy 
process will necessarily be shaped by the political system surrounding it. The transition 
to democracy in 1990 marks the beginning of a new democratic institutional framework 
in which both the state’s actions and civil society’s participation were framed within the 
parameters of the inherited political agreements and pacts between the departing 
military regime and the newly elected democratic government. As Waylen has shown, 
the transition was a highly gendered process in which the women’s movement found it 
difficult to translate their efforts and their influence into greater gains (Waylen 2007). 
Angell has described Chile as a “very constitutionally minded country” (2003), which in 
his opinion has allowed Chile to have a peaceful transition to democracy, forcing 
Augusto Pinochet to abandon power respecting the agreements taken with the 
opposition. But its long transition from dictatorial regime to democracy has been highly 
questioned over the past decade by Chilean scholars for its incapacity to enable and 
support the full participation of citizens. 
Indeed, Chile’s democracy has recently been portrayed as an elitist democracy in nature 
and practice (Delamaza 2010). The evident weakness of civil society despite its active 
role, in particular through social policies, has left it with limited power to influence 
wider political debates or discourses (Delamaza 2005). As Navia (2010) explains, 
although Chile’s political system is now more inclusive and consolidated, its 
foundations lie on the 1980 Constitution shaped by former dictator Augusto Pinochet. 
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This leads Navia (2010) to highlight that although the transition had initially accepted 
some limits to democratisation in regard to human rights and justice – what was known 
as “justice to the extent possible” – it would seem that Chile has adopted a model of 
“democracy to the extent possible”. This was already raised by Motta (2008) who saw a 
danger in the politics of “consensus” as a way to “disarticulating dissent to neo-liberal 
hegemony in Chile”. 
 
Altman argues that it is surprising to observe the unusual longevity of Concertación 
governments, probably one of the few party coalitions in the world to stay in power and 
share in turn the role of executive (Altman 2006). The first three presidents of the 
Concertación – Aylwin, Frei and Lagos – maintained a pattern of government based on 
the close relationship with the party elites and the attempt to avoid any conflicts that 
could trigger “an authoritarian reversal” (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006). 
Bachelet’s election on the other hand marked a strong change in this line of 
Concertación political continuum. Not only was her election a surprise because she was 
the first female elected without any family ties to a male politician and because of her 
personal profile as a woman, but mostly because she brought the idea of a renewal in 
the leadership of her centre-left coalition and of citizen participation (Valenzuela and 
Dammert 2006). 
Feminist scholars and political analysts have also started debating if Bachelet’s ascent 
to power was due to a major cultural change (T. Valdés 2010) or if it was the result of 
political calculus or circumstances. Most tend to agree that Bachelet came to power due 
to political reasons (Morales Quiroga 2008; Ríos Tobar 2006). As many have affirmed, 
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Bachelet became president despite the party elites of the last fifteen years of 
Concertación power, although clearly helped by the fact that feminists had asked 
Ricardo Lagos to name more women in his cabinet and he eventually included Bachelet 
(Ríos Tobar 2009a). This shows that the institutional environment is directly affected by 
actors and their strategies, and in Chile feminists have been working hard to influence 
electoral and institutional processes which feminists have denounced as strongly 
gendered. 
The policy process, policy-making and the feminist critique of New Institutionalism 
The literature focusing on the analysis of policy-making has seen a progressive shift 
from the emphasis on the role of the state and social evolution towards interest in the 
role and agency of actors involved in the policy process, and their ideas and beliefs as 
source of their actions. This new research orientation therefore focuses on the cognitive 
aspects of policy processes, highlighting “the importance of values, ideas and 
representations in the study of public policy” (Surel 2000). 
Feminist critiques of comparative politics and New Institutionalism (NI) (see Ch. 3) 
highlight the way in which neither theory has focused on sex equality and women’s 
rights as a major topic (Htun and Weldon 2010). Htun and Weldon have argued that the 
main approaches of comparative politics are strongly biased towards men’s activities 
and political participation, which has led feminists to consider the necessity to 
“formulate new theories of change in women’s rights” by “moving gender from the 
margin to the centre of comparative politics” (2010: 208). 
This is also something highlighted by feminist scholars working in the field of Feminist 
Institutionalism who are reclaiming a gender-neutral strand of political science. 
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Mackay, Kenny and Chappell (2011) highlight the way in which NI conceptions of both 
structure and agency are often limited, and “remain an ongoing debate in the field”. The 
authors also highlight the deficit in the study of power within NI, with strands of 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) for example often putting too much emphasis on “the 
power that past decisions hold for future developments” (Mackay et al. 2011: 579). 
Power remains at the core of any gender analysis, and feminist notions of agency refute 
any static notion of power relations whether on the side of actors or the structures and 
institutions. In this sense, new research has been carried out by authors like Thelen 
within a HI framework, “arguing that institutional development and change are driven 
by ongoing political conflict and contestation” (Mackay et al. 2011: 579). Behind these 
initiatives is the concern to not only understand how institutional change occurs, but 
also how that change is gendered (Waylen 2013). One way to achieve this is by looking 
at the “often ‘hidden’ aspects of political institutions – in particular, the informal 
aspects of the executive, legislative, bureaucratic, legal and constitutional arenas – to 
highlight the influence informal rules and practices have on institutional design and 
outcomes” (Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
The literature shows that much research has been done on women and the state in Latin 
America (see Ch. 2), especially within the context of transitions to democracy in the 
1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately this type of research leaves out many factors that may 
sit outside the binary relationship between feminists or women’s movements and the 
state. Something similar happens with citizenship studies which also give great 
importance to the binary relationship between state and citizens, and certainly 
complements the previous approach by looking at power and authority beyond 
traditional state boundaries (Molyneux 2000). The studies on citizenship in fact give 
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more visibility to the power struggles coming from citizenry and the way they produce 
and redefine both citizen’s entitlements and citizenship in front of authorities 
(Franceschet and Macdonald 2004). It is therefore imperative to pay more attention to 
institutions and look into a wider network of influences, as well as power relations 
affecting gendered outcomes in both political and policy processes. 
Among the recent initiatives to use a FI and HI approach is the work of Waylen, who 
has reviewed our understanding of gender outcomes within the transitions to democracy 
different countries have experienced (Waylen 2007). According to Waylen (2007), post-
transition polities do not begin “with a blank slate” and therefore the status quo 
affecting gender rights in place during a transition, as well as the institutional legacy of 
the non-democratic regime, shape the opportunities actors have to change gender rights 
in post-transition periods. This creates specific opportunities or limits for women’s 
rights advocates in particular when the legacy of a previous regime is institutionalised 
as in the case of Chile. 
Regarding institutions and reproductive freedom in Chile, most authors have focused on 
abortion and the status quo surrounding its legal status banning the practice under any 
circumstance (Blofield 2006; Htun 2003; Macaulay 2006; Waylen 2007). It is 
interesting to note that outside of feminist scholarship, the issue of EC has begun to be 
highlighted in the analysis of other scholars looking at Concertación governments and 
especially at Bachelet’s government (Couso and Tohá 2009; Funk 2009). This shows 
that reproductive rights and health have extended beyond a feminist agenda to become a 
central part of the agenda of human rights, and EC has come to occupy an important 
place next to the abortion debate. 
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Therefore, this thesis seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the emergency 
contraception policy process in order to contribute to the knowledge on gender change 
to promote SRHR. The judicialisation of EC permits a different approach to institutions 
by giving insight into the gendered practices of judicial institutions and actors. Blofield 
and Haas (2005), who have carried out work looking at institutions in Chile, argue that 
Chile is an ideal case for analysing policies and institutions due to the country’s 
stability, its non-democratic institutional structure, its anachronistic legal framework 
where the rights of women have been upheld by a women’s movement pressuring for 
change, and the presence of political parties willing to join that fight. 
Most studies on gendered policy initiatives have focused on the analysis of policy-
making through the study of legal initiatives (Blofield and Haas 2005; Blofield 2006; 
Htun 2003). This research is original in that it focuses on a social policy measure 
emanating from the executive via the Ministry of Health which produced a 
judicialisation process. The policy eventually evolved into an inter-ministerial issue, 
which was supported by other executive branches such as SERNAM, to finally become 
a bill by presidential initiative as a way to provide the policy with a strong legal and 
political legitimacy. This raises questions regarding the role of different institutions, 
both formal and informal, within different political and judicial contexts, as well as the 
impact of different sets of actors, such as the Church and conservative groups, the 
courts and judges, the medical lobby, lawyers and feminists. 
Outline of the thesis 
This chapter introduced the topic of this research – that is, the policy process for the 
distribution of emergency contraception. It introduced the Feminist Institutionalist lens 
used for this research that focuses on the role of formal and informal institutions during 
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the judicialisation process and their gendered impact for women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights and women’s political participation. This chapter also highlighted 
the importance of looking at the role of Bachelet as a female president and her 
institutional role and power during the process. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review, introducing the main works available on EC 
and putting the Chilean case in context with the international debates on EC and SRHR. 
The review highlights the political, social and cultural debates affecting SRHR and EC 
nationally and internationally. The chapter contrasts the apparent availability of medico-
scientific and legal sources with the lack of gendered feminist and political analysis on 
EC available until very recently. The chapter links the literature on EC and SRHR to the 
literature on women’s movements and SRHR, gender and politics, and gender and the 
state. The chapter ends by discussing how feminists and women’s movements have 
engaged with sexuality and reproduction in the last two decades and how institutional 
approaches have given much attention to the issue of abortion, thus providing a good 
framework of analysis and raising important questions to analyse EC. 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and introduces the methodology. It 
evaluates the way in which the literature on FI, judicialisation and policy process have 
helped this analysis to look in-depth at the EC policy process and provided an 
innovative account of the power dynamics among actors and institutions underlining the 
ten-year-long policy “saga”. It reviews current discussions around new institutionalism 
and feminism and the necessity to look at institutions with a historical perspective in 
order to better approach the analysis of policy-making, as well as women and feminist 
organising. The utility of Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework for the research is 
discussed in relation with NI and FI debates. The final section presents the methodology 
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and justification for the plan of inquiry and data collection, while also discussing their 
limitations. 
Chapter 4 presents a gendered historical institutionalist analysis of SRHR and family 
planning issues in Chile since the 1960s. It puts particular emphasis on the immediate 
pre- and post-authoritarian regimes periods to highlight how the seventeen years of 
Pinochet’s brutal rule had a major impact on the shaping of social and political 
institutions present in democracy. Using a HI focus, the chapter shows how SRHR and 
women’s rights were directly affected by the legacy of the post-authoritarian 1980 
Constitution. The chapter shows how the first two democratic Aylwin and Frei 
administrations addressed SRHR through the enforcement of the “consensus rule” 
imposing a self-censorship on these issues within state institutions such as SERNAM 
and amongst politicians and policy-makers. The chapter also shows the limits of the 
constitutional reforms of the Lagos administration for SRHR. 
Chapters 5a and 5b introduce the pro-SRHR and anti-SRHR advocacy coalitions using 
Sabatier’s ACF and the concepts of “deep core” and “policy core” to highlight the 
linkages between different actors and between the advocacy coalitions. The chapter 
analyses these advocacy’s strategies and belief systems, and actions during the policy 
process to evaluate their influence on the process. Chapter 5a focuses on the 
conservative actors and their profiles, as well as their links with political parties, 
showing the influence of the Catholic Church’s doctrine in their belief-system. 
Chapter 5b focuses on the SRHR advocates, policy-makers and the feminist movement 
and its impact on policy-making regarding SRHR. The chapter analyses the process 
behind the SRHR Bill to illustrate how these actors struggle to maintain long-lasting 
strategic alliances to defend SRHR. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 review the judicialisation of the EC policy process under the Lagos 
and Bachelet presidencies. These chapters show how the post-authoritarian legacy of the 
judicial institutions, the criminalisation of abortion and the historical background of the 
transition process shaped the manner in which actors and institutions interacted. Both 
chapters pay particular attention to the role of judges and their beliefs and actions as 
informal institutions of the policy process. Using primary materials and interviews to 
bring out rich details, the chapters illustrate the way in which feminists were often cast 
aside and how at other times they marginalised themselves from the main processes due 
to a historical disenchantment with the political system. It shows that Chile’s transition 
has affected civil society’s mobilisation more than might be expected. There has, 
however, been a great deal of feminist organising within civil society. SRHR advocates 
and in particular the biomedical lobby appear as key actors of the policy process. The 
chapters also contrast the way in which Lagos and Bachelet engaged with the EC, 
showing how Lagos’ close ties with the political elite of the Concertación meant he had 
no hesitation to put a halt to the EC policy to maintain the consensus. Bachelet, on the 
other hand, as Minister of Health and then as president, granted the most crucial 
political backing to the issue of EC for more than ten years as part of her wider 
commitment to gender equality. 
Chapter 8 discusses the sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal against EC and its 
political and legal consequences. The chapter shows how the decision by the 
Constitutional Tribunal to put a halt to the distribution of EC was highly ideological. 
The conservative ruling had the clear purpose to maintain the status quo regarding 
women’s rights in the country. The chapter highlights the importance of feminists in the 
mass mobilisation against the ruling of the Tribunal and in the way emergency 
contraception was reframed as a policy in the public domain to highlight the injustice 
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against women and the violation of their rights. The evidence also shows that the short-
lived experience of the movement for the defence of EC is closely linked to internal 
disputes within the women’s movement that is divided along political and generational 
lines. Finally, the chapter shows how the approval of the Fertility Bill in Congress was a 
major success for the constant support granted by Bachelet to EC and how the political 
and legal battles for its distribution permitted a change in the discourse affecting 
women’s and sexual and reproductive rights. 
The last chapter presents the conclusions to my initial questions regarding the roles of 
both actors and institutions. It evaluates how the original hypothesis coming from the 
literature review applies to the case of EC and the subsequent policy process. 
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CHAPTER 2: Locating and Contextualising the Research 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the main literature available on emergency contraception, in 
particular in relation to the Latin American and Chilean contexts. A significant amount 
of the recent literature on EC has emerged from Latin America, showing the increasing 
importance of EC for the struggle to promote sexual and reproductive rights as women’s 
rights in the region. This review focuses on the political, social and cultural debates 
affecting the public health policies advanced by SRHR advocates to make EC available 
to women nationally and internationally. The Chilean case is of particular interest since 
the challenge to EC has been constant since the end of the 1990s when the issue first 
appeared on the political agenda. In the Chilean case, studies find strong similarities 
with the scientific, legal, moral and political controversies surrounding EC at the 
regional and international levels. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the main studies and moves into the main issues 
and gaps in the literature. It contrasts the apparent availability of medico-scientific and 
legal sources with the lack of gendered feminist and political analysis up until very 
recently. The first section focuses on EC itself, whereas the final section concentrates on 
the literature on women’s movements and SRHR in Latin America and Chile. It seeks to 
understand how feminists and women’s groups have engaged with sexuality and 
reproduction issues. The review places the Chilean context within the regional context 
in an effort to show how, at times, similar debates have led to different outcomes. In 
doing so, it locates this research within the wider literature on SRHR and women’s 
rights in Latin America. 
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This chapter argues that there are elements in the literature on feminism, gender, 
sexuality and reproduction that are useful to the analysis of the role of feminists and 
women’s health advocates during the EC battles, yet the literature lacks studies focusing 
on the importance of policy initiatives to distribute EC for the feminist agenda in Chile 
and the region. This thesis contributes to the literature precisely by addressing this void, 
and by looking into the links between the participation of feminists and women’s 
movements in the EC battles and the role of doctors, lawyers and the Church in Chile. It 
pays particular attention to the strategic alliances between feminists and doctors, the 
Church and the medical lobby, as well as to the importance of institutions for feminist 
participation and discourses on sexuality and reproduction in Chile and the region. 
General overview of the literature 
Until the mid-2000s most international research on EC, including in Latin America – 
unlike most research on SRHR and abortion – was located within the medical and legal 
scholarship rather than the gender and politics, or feminist literature. Scientific 
publications principally dealt with the mechanism of action of Levonorgestrel, the main 
component of EC. The first body of articles showcases the results of experiments that 
demonstrate that EC is not abortifacient, while others include fierce debates and 
scientific discussions via letters to the journals of those questioning the results of such 
experiments (Croxatto 2007b; Durand et al. 2001; Noé et al. 2010, 2011a; Novikova et 
al. 2007; Puccetti et al. 2012). 
A second strand of articles and publications discusses the importance of EC for SRHR 
and women’s bodily autonomy found in journals such as Contraception, Health and 
Human Rights, International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, Revista 
Panamericana de Salud Pública, and Population (Cardenas 2009, 2010; Cook et al. 
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2001; Croxatto and Díaz Fernández 2006; Díaz et al. 2003; Hevia 2012; ICMER 
(Instituto Chileno de Medicina Reproductiva) 1999; Novikova et al. 2007; Principal et 
al. 2003; Wynn et al. 2011). The obvious scientific and medical component of the 
debates and research on EC explains its importance from a public health point of view 
to promote reproductive health. The apparent missing feminist gendered analysis on EC 
may be explained by Germain and Liljestrand’s (2009) argument suggesting that it is 
often national societies of obstetrics and gynaecology that have led most initiatives on 
SRHR worldwide. 
The exceptions to this lack of gendered perspectives are to be found in articles 
published, for example, in Reproductive Health Matters, an international journal 
committed to supporting and promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights. The 
journal brings together the voices of medical, legal, and women’s rights practitioners 
and advocates working on these issues, highlighting the role of alliances between these 
actors. For instance, Heimburger et al. (2003) focus on the strategic advocacy carried 
out by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) – the international 
umbrella organisation of family planning agencies – to promote EC within health 
reforms taking place in Latin America. They highlight how in Colombia, for example, 
the alliances with feminist groups contributed to a positive final outcome for the 
legalisation and distribution of EC. 
A similar point is made by Chávez and Coe (2007) who discuss how in Peru – a USAID 
aid-recipient country – from 2001 onwards, the US government tried to promote its 
conservative agenda despite the fact that EC was part of a policy by the Peruvian 
government. It imposed the adoption of a “neutral” position on EC on the NGO 
recipients of aid, and pressured the Peruvian government to remove EC from its SRHR 
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norms. This directly affected both women’s accces to this contraceptive method and the 
work being done on the ground by feminist organisations to make it more available. 
Alliances between national and international coalitions, including women’s health and 
biomedical organisations, proved important when pressuring the US government to 
review its position and defending EC at the Supreme Court, as well as at the Women’s 
Rights Ombudsman. 
Faúndes et al. (2007) and Heimburger et al. (2002) have also highlighted the role of 
alliances between the medical establishment and other civil society groups, including 
women’s health advocates, within the work of the International Consortium for 
Emergency Contraception (ICEC), an international “umbrella organisation” gathering 
“feminist and organisations at the national and local level [to] provide grassroots 
support for emergency contraception, the regional bodies give scientific and 
professional credibility to the arguments national and regional governmental and non-
governmental organisations working to promote EC and SRHR” (Faúndes et al. 2007: 
133). Faundes et al. highlight the important role “played by the research institutions and 
individual researchers who have provided the scientific evidence” who sometimes have 
gone beyond their scientific research role and “have also played an important role in the 
defence of access to emergency contraception” (2007: 133). 
Despite mentioning feminism and women’s health advocates, these types of articles 
remain located within a public health analysis of the EC policy process, contributing 
mostly to an understanding of the role of institutions such as the ministries of health and 
the medical lobby around EC distribution. In contrast, this study seeks to address the 
lack of research on the role of feminists and women’s health advocates as key actors of 
these policy processes. By paying closer attention to the roles played by feminists and 
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women’s advocates in forming these alliances, we can obtain a clearer vision of the 
interactions of actors and the institutional frameworks they face. 
Since 2010, gendered political contributions on EC are to be found in recent 
publications by UNRISD and in Third World Quarterly where authors have shown a 
renewed interest in the role of religion and religious institutions in the policy-making 
process affecting the promotion of women’s rights. Using a gender and politics focus, 
Guzmán and Seibert (2010) analyse the way in which the issue of EC has been affected 
by the influence of the Catholic and Evangelical churches in policies aimed at 
improving women’s autonomy to exercise their sexual and reproductive rights in Chile. 
Guzmán et al. (2010) also look at emergency contraception, and the issue of sexual 
education to measure the influence of the Catholic and Evangelical churches on policies 
related to the advancement of women’s rights in Chile’s political arena, and highlight 
the role of different actors and their ideological and power positions. They conclude that 
with time the government has become increasingly inclined to resist the Catholic 
Church’s influence, and this is probably due to a political context where the 
authoritarian enclaves of the past dictatorship, present for more than twenty years, have 
started to fade and society has become more liberal. Their analysis is optimistic, and 
highlights that the SRHR movement has been fortified within the feminist movement 
and, “the appearance of different discourses and social practices with regard to family 
and sexuality have and will further debilitate the hegemony of the Catholic Church” 
(Hurtado and Dides 2004 cited in Guzman et al. 2010: 984). 
Finally Razavi and Jenichen (2010) have carried out a global comparative analysis on 
the influence of religion as a political force affecting the struggles for gender equality in 
diverse political and social contexts around the world. Their assessment concluded that 
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democratisation processes have sometimes empowered feminist groups and women’s 
advocates seeking reform, while in other contexts they have reinforced the power of 
religious institutions opposed to the advancement of gender equality and feminist 
discourses. This research engages with their argument by showing how the post-
authoritarian institutional framework still in place within the judiciary has helped 
conservative forces to hold on to their last power strongholds. 
The works mentioned above represent a growing concern for feminists struggling to 
promote women’s rights, and in particular sexual and reproductive rights in the face of 
organised opposition by fundamentalist religious groups in the national and 
international agendas. Sexuality and reproduction have indeed become crucial “sites of 
intense public contestation between conservative religious actors wishing to regulate 
them based on some transcendent moral principle, and feminist and other human rights 
advocates basing their claims on pluralist and time-and-context specific solutions” 
(Razavi and Jenichen 2010: 833). Therefore, this research takes into consideration this 
renewed interest on the plurality of actors and institutions involved in the policy 
processes affecting women’s SRHR by paying specific attention to the confrontation 
between feminist perspectives and the Church dogma and their allies in Chile. 
In this sense, the recent work on abortion by Reuterswaerd et al. is particularly 
insightful for the case of EC. The authors’ proposition to look at the state and its judicial 
arena in order to better grasp the complexities of policy processes regarding sexual and 
reproductive rights and the way feminists navigate these spheres of power is especially 
relevant (Reuterswaerd et al. 2011). They also highlight the importance of looking at 
strategic alliances and analysing women’s groups and feminists as one group of actors 
among many others, to get a better sense of their participation in the process. Their 
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work is an important contribution to research focusing on EC from a legal perspective. 
This research aims to provide a gendered political analysis of the policy process behind 
the distribution of EC with a specific emphasis on judicial processes as key components 
for our understanding of gender policy reform and feminist activism worldwide. 
The legal view on women’s SRHR and the judicialisation of EC 
In the past twenty five years there has been increasing opposition by conservative 
groups worldwide to the very notion of sexual and reproductive rights. Due to their 
nature, and their redefinition as “rights” since the 1990s at the Beijing and Cairo UN 
Conferences, sexuality and reproduction issues are likely to be challenged in court more 
frequently in future by their opponents. In fact, feminists have highlighted the 
connection between SRHR and social justice (Berer 2004), as well as citizenship, which 
are both deeply gendered concepts (Lister 1997; Mouffe 2005). The way feminists have 
approached sexual and reproductive rights has involved looking at these rights beyond 
an individualist tradition to redefine them as “social rights” (Corrêa and Petchesky 
1996), coupled with the move by countries in recent years to incorporate reproductive 
rights into their constitutions and legal codes (Fellmeth 2000). This implies in feminist 
terms that there has been growing recognition of a woman’s right to choose – the initial 
meaning of reproductive rights (Berer 1988: 24). However, in practice the right of 
women to control their reproductive lives has been, and is increasingly being, 
challenged in courts, posing problems for their access to health services (Cook and 
Dickens 2009). 
There is a regional and worldwide context of judicial battles regarding the access to 
reproductive health services and contraceptive methods that influenced the 
judicialisation of the process in Chile, just as has happened elsewhere. In many 
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countries in Latin America (Amuchastegui et al. 2010; Cardenas 2009, 2010; Faúndes et 
al. 2007; Heimburger, Gras, and Guedes 2003), in the US and Canada (Davidoff and 
Trussell 2006; Wynn et al. 2011), as well as in Europe (Cook 2011) conservative and 
religious groups have opposed EC’s distribution and approval as an authorised drug via 
the courts. 
Chile and Argentina were among the first countries where the controversy between 
religious ideology and scientific knowledge in this field emerged, and where similar 
judicial tactics were used to prevent the distribution of EC (Heimburger, Gras, and 
Guedes 2003). In both countries the influence of the Catholic Church is strong and their 
proximity probably helped the sharing of information amongst opponents and 
supporters of EC. Brazil and Colombia have also been used as examples of effective 
health policy advocacy and reform promotion in the region (Heimburger, Gras, and 
Guedes 2003). Heimburger et al. (2003) explain that in both countries EC was easily 
included as part of health norms by the authorities and its distribution faced little 
opposition. This was partly due to the decentralisation of health services in Brazil, and 
the health reforms that started in 1993 in Colombia, leading to a rights-based approach 
to health within the universal care system allowing women’s groups and advocacy 
organisations to monitor the compliance of the Colombian state with its international 
commitments on SRHR (Heimburger et al. 2003). 
What is particular to Latin America, as is the case with Chile, is that a common attack 
on EC is centred around the promotion of laws to protect human life from conception, 
and claims that EC is abortifacient (Cook et al. 2001). This has led to a significant shift 
in the abortion debate and the “right to life” to the arena of contraception (Cook 2011), 
challenging longstanding rights acquired by women. The legal research by Rebecca 
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Cook et al. (2001) in this sense represents an important contribution, since they 
highlighted very early on the political elements behind the legal challenges to EC, 
especially in Latin America, in particular the use and promotion of the legal status of the 
unborn as a counteraction against women’s bodily autonomy and rights. Cook et al. are 
persuasive in arguing that abortion has been linked to contraception. Therefore, we 
cannot understand the current battles surrounding EC without linking them to previous 
and ongoing abortion battles in Latin America. In the case of Chile, this is especially 
relevant since abortion is forbidden under any circumstances. The research therefore 
aims to link the findings on EC to a wider understanding of the processes and debates 
affecting the liberalisation of abortion in Chile. 
This research shows there is a strong ideological component in the legal strategies of 
conservative and religious lobbies against EC. A good example is the legal argument 
used in Chile by the Constitutional Tribunal – and which had been used elsewhere in 
Latin America – called “duda razonable” (reasonable doubt) (Cardenas 2010), which 
allows judges to justify their opposition to not uphold women’s reproductive rights 
under constitutional law. This ideological battle on the constitutional understanding of 
the right to life, the rights of the unborn and the way life is defined, shows the power of 
culture and religion in legal debates. Judges in Chile, in this sense, played a key role in 
the way they decided to engage with reproductive rights and women’s rights. This 
highlights the importance of focusing on the judicial politics surrounding women’s 
rights and of questioning the limits of judges’ impartiality within specific gender 
regimes. This is the focus of the rich literature on judicialisation (see Ch. 3) that since 
the mid-2000s has begun to engage with SRHR issues, and is composed of a mixture of 
published articles and conference proceedings (Casas Becerra 2004a; Melzi 2005; Peñas 
Defago 2009; Ruibal 2011). 
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The EC “saga” in Chile 
The introduction of EC in Chile – dubbed by Faúndes et al. (2007) as the most “furious” 
struggle for EC in the region – was the result of a health policy initiative to reduce the 
rate of teenage pregnancies in Chile. Teenage pregnancy has been related to poverty and 
discrimination issues, and, as suggested by Valdés and Guajardo (2007: 61), despite 
efforts has become a public health issue since it has not been reduced over the last two 
decades, following a regional trend (ECLAC and UNICEF 2007: 5). The policy aim 
was to make EC available to all women above the age of 14, as well as to victims of 
sexual violence to prevent unwanted pregnancies. The fertility guidelines published 
under the Bachelet administration, contain an explicit acknowledgement of the 
contribution of a rights-based approach which positions women as “active social 
subjects, with autonomy, and who due to the social construction of the feminine still in 
place, perform multiple roles in society” (MINSAL et al 2006 : 7). 
Chilean scholars have produced a large amount of publications on this topic as the legal 
battles for EC have developed over the last decade. The work by the lawyer Lidia Casas 
on EC is without doubt one of the most important sources of detailed information on the 
legal stages and challenges faced by the supporters of EC during the ten years of legal 
challenges (Casas B. 2001; Casas Becerra 2004a, 2008; Casas and Contesse 2006) , for 
which she coined the term “the saga” of EC (Casas Becerra 2008). She shows the long 
and often contradictory ways in which the courts and the opponents to EC distribution 
built their legal strategies. Casas has substantial experience working on SRHR and 
women’s rights in Chile, and particularly abortion.10 She has also been an important 
                                               10 Her publications on abortion and the criminalisation of women in Chile have become unavoidable references (Casas Becerra 1997; Shepard and Casas Becerra 2007).  
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contributor to networks working on EC and SRHR in the region.11 In this sense she has 
contributed to linking what happened to EC in Chile with similar litigation strategies 
and tactics used in Peru and Mexico, such as the common use of “conscientious 
objection” by conservative opponents (Casas 2009). Her emphasis on promoting 
women’s reproductive freedom and autonomy has been a constant theme in her work, 
denouncing the way in which laws maintain a certain gender order and limit women’s 
control over their bodies (Casas Becerra 2004b; Casas 2008). 
Casas sustains that since the restoration of democracy in 1990, there has been “a 
constant state of tension between those who want greater autonomy for women and 
those who continue to fight family planning programs in effect since the 1960s” (Casas 
Becerra 2004b: 428). Casas denounces the new democratic government’s indecisiveness 
in recognising “the full citizenship for women and ending the constraints imposed on 
them by outdated traditions and laws” (Casas Becerra 2004b: 428). This has been 
reinforced by the moral crusade carried forward by the political right and economic elite 
that has been permeated by extremist Catholic groups such as the Opus Dei and 
Legionnaires of Christ (Casas Becerra 2004b: 428). According to Casas, the success of 
these groups’ strategy has been the ability to limit “the political debate by focusing on 
technical issues, such as the approval of dedicated emergency contraception” (Casas 
Becerra 2004b: 428). They were also successful in mounting resistance from 
pharmacists arguing “conscientious objection” to EC, and also threatened 
pharmaceutical companies wanting to sell EC to the Ministry of Health (Casas Becerra 
2008). These are tactics that were also used by pro-life and conservative groups 
                                               11 She has also been a contributor together with other crucial advocates of EC in Redes Laicas, the secular network working on reproductive issues in Latin America (Schiappacasse et al. 2003). 
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elsewhere in Latin and North America (Faúndes et al. 2007; Fenton and Lomasky 2005; 
Wynn et al. 2011). 
Casas questions the extent to which the women’s movements and feminist groups have 
been able to influence the reproductive rights agenda in Chile. She is openly critical of 
their limited capacity to forge alliances and mobilise with other actors: 
The ability to mobilize women in this area was limited, owing perhaps to a marked 
inability to forge alliances and a keen readiness to needlessly label all those who 
do not share their views. (Casas Becerra 2004b: 429) 
For Casas, alliance building is therefore closely related to the belief-system of the 
actors trying to work together. However, she also acknowledges that reproductive 
issues are sensitive for most political and social actors: 
Most public figures tread very carefully on the issue of reproduction, particularly 
abortion. This is true of traditional political actors and members of the academic 
community who acted in defiance of the progressive position Chileans consistently 
stated in opinion polls. (Casas Becerra 2004b: 429) 
Although Casas’ work provides the most detailed account of the legal battles and 
challenges faced by human rights, biomedical and women’s health advocates in their 
quest to support the distribution of EC between 2001 and 2008, most of her contribution 
remains in the sphere of legal analysis. The legal nature of her work does not provide a 
deeper analysis on the impact of feminism and women’s health advocates on the EC 
policy process of which she is very critical. The importance of feminist discourses, 
however, cannot be underestimated, especially when this discourse is the engine of a 
rights-based discourse. Wynn et al. (Wynn et al. 2011) compare the discourses used to 
support the distribution of EC in Canada and the US and highlight how the “harm 
reduction” argument used in public health is not sufficient to advance women’s rights in 
the long-term: 
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Reframing the debate around rights and toward a positive view of women, their 
sexuality, and their right to make informed decisions about their reproductive and 
sexual health abruptly shifts the perspective… The language of fair and equitable 
access to health care services and products may be less hegemonic than that of 
health and science, but it is less vulnerable to co-optation. (Wynn et al. 2011: 262-
263) 
This research endeavours to build on Casas’ work and contributes to the missing 2008-
2010 period during the judicial process at the Constitutional Tribunal. In the first 
instance the EC policy process followed a regular internal policy process despite the 
fact that, as stated by Casas, previous efforts – namely, the sterilisation guidelines a few 
years before – had proved to have a limited impact on reproductive rights. This was due 
to changes in political leadership within the government, and the fact that the issue was 
kept away from a public opinion debate (Casas Becerra 2004b: 440). 
The sociological work by the Chilean scholar Claudia Dides also complements the work 
by Casas and brings to light the power of ideas and beliefs. In her research on the 
conservative discourses surrounding the debate on emergency contraception, Dides 
(2006) highlights how “science” and the “scientific discourse” were instrumentalised by 
conservative forces to legitimise their worldviews and therefore ultimately becoming a 
key source of power. She also highlights the role played by human rights, women’s 
rights and SRHR advocates in a political context where conservative groups have a 
clear advantage in the access to mass media and therefore the channels to inform and 
influence public opinion on these debates. 
Thus, according to Dides, the EC legal battles have become a symbol of a much deeper 
politico-ideological struggle that has been taking in place in Chile since the 1990s 
regarding SRHR (2006: 12). As she explains, this transition was marked by the constant 
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tension between modernising efforts and conservative resistance in a society trying to 
come to terms with new understandings of sexuality and reproduction (Dides Castillo 
2006). Thus, the way in which Dides inserts the debates surrounding EC within the 
transition to democracy in Chile is particularly useful for this study (2006: 13). 
It has been well-documented that the transition to democracy had a major impact on 
Chilean institutions and social movements, in particular the women’s movement, due to 
the gendered component of such transition (Waylen 2007, 2010). Yet we do not have a 
clear account of how this played out during the ten-year legal battles on EC. 
Unfortunately the research by Dides only covered the years between 2001 and 2005, 
therefore the second part of the judicialisation of EC at the Constitutional Tribunal 
under Bachelet’s administration remain unexplored. This research supplements this void 
in the literature to contrast and explore how conservative and progressive discourses 
were affected by this new series of legal battles, shaped by different actors and 
institutions, religious or not. 
Finally, publications by doctors and members of the biomedical lobby contribute the 
most up-to-date scientific evidence and arguments to support this public health policy. 
From the very beginning members of the biomedical establishment carried out research 
on the acceptability of EC among the target population for the policy from a gender 
perspective (Díaz et al. 2003; Vidal Pollarolo 2002). This mirrors what had been done 
internationally and in developed countries to support EC distribution (Ellertson et al. 
2000). The result was an overwhelmingly positive reception for this new contraceptive 
method. 
In Chile this work was carried out by the Chilean Institute for Reproductive Medicine 
(ICMER), which was a key advocating organisation for EC, and a close partner of the 
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Ministry of Health from the beginning until the end of the policy process. There, Dr 
Horacio Croxatto’s work was published in parallel to the majority of purely scientific 
research on the mechanisms of action of EC carried out by an international team of 
scientists of which Croxatto was a member (Croxatto 2007a; Noé et al. 2010, 2011a, 
2011b; Novikova et al. 2007). 
Dr Croxatto and Dr Díaz, co-founders of ICMER, published jointly on the importance 
of supporting EC from a human rights perspective, and issued public statements based 
on the existing evidence that EC is not abortifacient (see Croxatto and Ortiz 2006). 
Croxatto also wrote in a well-known theological journal criticising the unfounded 
claims and challenges against EC by conservative groups and the way they dismissed 
evidence-based arguments without having evidence themselves to sustain their claims 
(Croxatto Avoni 2004). This ideological battle within the Chilean scientific community 
was intense and often took the form of exchanges of letters, not only in international 
academic journals but also in well-known local newspapers where they could be read by 
the public. As Wittig (2005) argues, scientist members of conservative groups often 
avoid the well-established rules of engagement for serious scientific debate and conflict 
resolution, and instead resort to strategic resources or “movidas falaces” (treacherous 
moves) to avoid acknowledging the sound arguments advanced by their opponents. As 
will be discussed in Ch. 7, this took place during the sessions at the Constitutional Court 
and in previous legal processes, putting the medical lobby at the centre of the technical 
debates. 
The EC pill and the controversy surrounding it 
The current problem faced by the proponents of EC is that it is being challenged 
internationally by different conservative forces, and in particular by the Catholic Church 
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whose take on sexuality and reproduction is simply opposed to the ideals of individual 
freedom, bodily autonomy, gender equality and women’s empowerment – this is, all 
moral stances that support the international SRHR agenda (Cardenas 2009). As 
explained by Croxatto and Díaz, allowing those conservative voices “appealing to moral 
values that are not universally shared in pluralistic societies” restricts the choice of 
women and men to control their fertility and violates not only people’s freedom of 
conscience but also their human rights (2006: 311). 
The Catholic Church’s international mobilisation against SRHR and EC 
The Vatican has launched a worldwide campaign against SRHR to oppose most forms 
of family planning and sexual education, including in the fight against HIV and AIDS, 
abortion and the advancement of homosexual rights, with a special emphasis over the 
last decade on emergency contraception, including in contexts where it is desperately 
needed, such as in post-conflict situations12 (Radford Ruether 2008: 189). 
The opposition of the Catholic Church to EC is part of a belief whereby sexuality and 
reproduction cannot be separated and must be considered a matter for married couples 
since “marriage and in its indissoluble unity [is] the only setting worthy of truly 
responsible procreation” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987). This 
justifies the Church’s opposition to any rights of adolescents to confidentiality and 
access to SRHR, as well as the concept of bodily autonomy and women’s right to 
choose. 
Catholicism contains set views on gender relations. Craske (1999) has highlighted how 
in Latin America this is visible in the weight of Marianismo in society. Marianismo 
                                               12 The Catholic Church voiced its opposition to refugee women in Kosovo who had been raped, and Pope John Paul II asked these Bosnian Muslim women to “accept the enemy into them” and carry the pregnancies to term (Radford Ruether 2008: 190). 
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defines the ideal of womanhood as self-abnegating motherhood (Craske 1999: 12) and 
this focus on motherhood “is a potent cultural symbol” reinforced by the Catholic 
Church (Craske 1999: 196). Craske (1999) explains that motherhood on occasions had 
been “a strategically useful mobilizing point” and therefore it had been politicised as a 
means to advance women’s demands. Marianismo hence has played an important role in 
the definitions of policies aiming at expanding women’s rights (Craske 1999). Yet some 
have argued that despite the weight of Marianismo, “women’s cultural roles in the 
region are in flux” (Drogus 1994), creating new spaces for the interaction between 
religion and gender issues, including SRHR. 
The Vatican forging international alliances and the resistance of global civil society 
The international success that the Vatican has had in hindering the advances of the 
SRHR agenda through negotiations and through “the construction of a hegemonic 
discourse on abortion and contraception, has confirmed its importance and 
presence as a political actor” (Sjorup 1999) at the local, regional and global levels. 
The Catholic Church has been particularly successful in establishing its 
understanding of “life” and “life’s beginning” from fertilisation. A fertilised egg 
represents for the Catholic credo a potential life that needs protection from its 
conception. This puts the Church in the position of opposing anything that can 
affect the development of the fertilised egg. For the Church, despite all the recent 
scientific evidence, EC is abortive and therefore is illegal. As clearly stated by the 
Pontifical Academy of Life (2000): 
… the proven “anti-implantation” action of the morning-after pill is really nothing 
other than a chemically induced abortion. It is neither intellectually consistent nor 
scientifically justifiable to say that we are not dealing with the same thing… those 
who ask for or offer this pill are seeking the direct termination of a possible 
pregnancy already in progress, just as in the case of abortion. Pregnancy, in fact, 
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begins with fertilization and not with the implantation of the blastocyst in the 
uterine wall…  
Linking EC to abortion has important implications. On abortion – as the Holy See 
indicated in its position paper addressed to women during the Beijing conference in 
1995 – the Church has the view that “[a]bortion is not a problem uniquely concerning 
women; it also involves men and society” (Priests for Life 1995). This sustains their 
direct challenge to feminist views on bodily autonomy or even privacy and self-
determination arguments. 
Kissling has noted how “the oppositional role to the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) played by conservative religious groups, 
especially the Vatican… has not diminished since the conference took place in 1994” 
(2009: 211). The Vatican has also found a key ally in the US government, under the 
Bush administration (Radford Ruether 2008: 189), forging unexpected alliances to 
oppose the SRHR agenda.13 It has also benefited in the rise of an international 
conservative lobby against sexual and reproductive rights, which has been legitimised 
since 2001 within the US government’s foreign policy at the UN conferences and 
meetings in particular (Germain and Liljestrand 2009: 186). 
The Bush administration’s opposition meant the international community of SRHR 
advocates had to concentrate their efforts on protecting the advances gained over the 
previous decade rather than furthering the SRHR agenda internationally and nationally 
(Germain and Liljestrand 2009; Radford Ruether 2008). Girard argues that considering 
the incessant and well-orchestrated opposition to SRHR since the mid-1990s, “activists 
                                               13 The Vatican has also found unexpected allies in international fora to sustain its attacks on the SRHR agenda, this includes right-wing Protestants and Muslims, including countries such as Iran, Libya and Sudan (Girard 2002; Radford Ruether 2008). 
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can take pride in the fact that the ICPD and Beijing agreements have been preserved. 
Women’s health advocates and progressive governments weathered the storm, and 
successfully pushed back attacks on sexual and reproductive health” (2009: 181). 
For Kissling, the “vehemence and sometimes viciousness with which conservative 
religious groups still struggle against public policies that support the rather modest 
reproductive health objectives developed at the ICPD is a primary obstacle to improving 
services and creating political will in favour of sexual and reproductive health and rights 
worldwide” (2009: 211). This has prompted resistance from global civil society and in 
particular women’s rights groups. 
Women’s groups among Catholics, for example, have launched international campaigns 
to oppose the monopoly of the Church’s views in these debates (Radford Ruether 2006). 
This is allowing Catholic women all over the continent to articulate an opposition to the 
Church’s teachings and dogma (Radford Ruether 2008). Working from a feminist 
theology point of view, groups like Catholics for a Free Choice have challenged the 
doctrine of the Church regarding abortion and reproduction (Hurst 2004; Red 
Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir 2007), denouncing the influence 
of the most fundamentalist groups within the Church such as Opus Dei (Catholics for a 
Free Choice 1997), and most importantly have highlighted the contradiction in the 
bishops’ opposition to EC while most Catholics support its distribution (International 
Consortium for Emergency Contraception and Catholics for a Free Choice 2011). 
Resistance from within the Catholic community is important because, as Sjorup (1999) 
has shown, in Latin America and in Chile in particular, there has always been space 
within the Catholic doctrine to challenge the top-down messages of the Vatican, and 
Catholic women worldwide have historically negotiated their relationship with 
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feminism (Ecklund and Howard 2003). This breaks a static or path-dependent view on 
the politics of reproduction and sexuality and provides a space for the agency of women 
and other actors in a Catholic-dominated context. 
The Church and SRHR in Chile 
With the Catholic Church having established itself as a main political player in the 
transition to Democracy, and the left having conceded an overrepresentation to 
conservative forces in Congress, the space for negotiation on these issues was minimal. 
As explained by Guzmán and Seibert, “Sexual and Reproductive Rights constitute the 
most prominent area of political confrontation between the Catholic Church and 
progressive movements” (2010: 3). In Chile, the Catholic hierarchy is closely linked to 
the economic and political elite who identify themselves as practising Catholics and 
belong to very selective Catholic groups (Thumala 2007). These strong alliances 
through a new understanding of religion for the elite have erased the presence of 
popular Catholicism – in particular the theology of liberation and Jesuit influence that 
favoured more progressive debates in the 1960s (Craske 1999; Sjorup 1999) – giving 
the Church the upper hand to influence policy-making since democracy was re-
established in 1990 (Blofield 2006). 
The attack on scientific evidence and evidence-based health policies 
A crucial aspect of the EC controversy and the struggles for SRHR is how conservative 
groups and in particular the Catholic Church have constantly tried to dismiss scientific 
knowledge and evidence-based arguments when they contradict their faith-based beliefs 
(Faúndes et al. 2007; Martin 2004). As argued by Buse et al., “[p]olitical factors are 
often pivotal in the policy process” to counter this challenge since: 
They can determine which sexual and reproductive health issues are included in 
national policy agendas, which evidence is examined (or excluded), which policy 
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alternatives are considered (and ultimately adopted), and the degree to which they 
are implemented. (2006: 2101) 
The pro-choice medical establishment and civil society groups working on EC that 
founded the ICEC in 2000,14 came together to establish international and regional 
alliances to face the assault on scientific evidence in the legal and political challenges 
around EC (Martin 2004). ICEC allowed these actors to organise and share information 
and experiences to counter the conservative attack on EC, as well as disseminating their 
opinions and scientific findings to support their position, bringing together academics, 
scientists, parliamentarians, and civil society groups (Faúndes et al. 2007; Martin 2004). 
ICEC was particularly successful in the first years when many countries quickly 
adopted a formal policy on EC and had legalised the drug (Martin 2004). In Chile, the 
national section of ICEC from very early on brought together biomedical organisations, 
lawyers and even feminists groups (Díaz and Schiappacasse 2012). 
In some circumstances, the challenge to evidence-based policies has taken the form of 
scientific exchanges in scientific journals such as Contraception and Human 
Reproduction where the existing research carried out by doctors working on EC has 
been openly challenged by fellow scientists, often linked to Catholic institutions or the 
new conservative right in the US (H. Croxatto 2007b; Mena 2005; Noé et al. 2011b; 
Puccetti et al. 2012). This shows the level of sophistication and visibility that the lobby 
against EC has obtained, something also observed with other reproductive issues in the 
last decade (Fenton 2006). 
                                               14 The ICEC is known in Spanish as Consorcio Latinoamericano de Anticoncepción de Emergencia (CLAE) and was founded in October 2000. Since then it organised many regional conferences that allowed a closer relationship between all actors working on the issue and especially information sharing and dissemination as a strategy.  
41 
This means the anti-choice lobby has diversified and is able to pursue sophisticated 
legal strategies regarding sexual and reproductive rights in the courts. The fact that 
current battles taking place at the courts all over the continent are of an ideological 
nature means religious ideas and beliefs are permeating institutions seeking to structure 
the way reproductive rights are defined and upheld. Casas argues that in Chile judges 
are particularly susceptible to conservative views when it comes to reproduction (Casas 
Becerra 2004b), something that confirms what is sustained in the judicialisation 
literature on the conservatism of the judicial power in Chile in general (Scribner 2011). 
This matters because feminists have long-argued and shown that “[p]ower operates 
through discourse to fix a certain construction of gender relations as dominant and 
marginalize or exclude counter-discourses, therefore constraining and bounding the 
agency of female actors, including feminists” (Mackay 2011: 192). 
The role of the medical establishment 
Health professionals and scientists can be strong defenders of sexual and reproductive 
rights, but at times they have also joined the ranks of anti-choice coalitions. This poses 
new challenges for feminists in particular since doctors have historically dominated the 
debates regarding reproduction – in particular abortion (Engeli 2009) – and are 
increasingly doing so in current legal debates around issues such as assisted 
reproduction (Engeli 2009; Fenton 2006). 
The Catholic Church in particular counts on the support of numerous health and legal 
professionals via its universities, hospitals and research centres in many countries, 
which were at the forefront of the opposition to EC by the Church in the late 1990s 
(Faúndes et al. 2007). Chile’s experience in this sense is no different to the rest of the 
region (Blofield 2006; Dides Castillo 2006a; Haas 2010). Even the presence of 
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proactive new pro-life NGOs and groups linked to US pro-life movements opposing EC 
is a common pattern (Faúndes et al. 2007). 
The literature shows that divisions within the medical profession may affect the success 
of progressive laws and policies. For Engeli, “the strong coherence within the medical 
community explains a great deal of the variation between reproduction policies” (2009: 
64). The literature seems to indicate that congruence among physicians would lead to 
more restrictive laws based on self-regulation established by doctors, while division or 
“fragmentation” would allow for more permissive policy-making (Varone et al. 2006 
cited in Engeli 2009: 67). This is sometimes due to the fact that when faced with a 
polarised or fragmented medical profession, the state cannot rely on physicians to settle 
a controversy and produce a clear policy (Engeli 2007 cited in Engeli 2009). 
The question is whether in contexts where we know physicians are divided due to 
strong religious influences, yet are actively involved in lobbying – such as in the case of 
Chile with EC – the cohesion or division of the medical establishment, including 
doctors, scientists and science or medicine-related advocates, will affect its capacity for 
impact during the policy process and its relation with other actors and institutions. If 
one takes the case of a Catholic country such as Italy, the literature tends to highlight 
that the positive effect of fragmentation amongst doctors does not apply (Engeli 2009; 
Fenton 2006). Doctors in Italy where Catholicism is very influential are not a cohesive 
group with one clear and united set of beliefs (Varone, Rothmayr, and Montpetit 2006). 
In the case of assisted reproductive technologies, they are highly fragmented along the 
religion versus secularity lines, giving the Church the upper hand in influencing law-
makers and State institutions and producing a highly restrictive law (Fenton 2006). 
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It is therefore crucial to look at the role of physicians in the policy process and within 
alliances. Mala Htun’s seminal “Sex and the State”, a comparative study on abortion, 
divorce and family laws in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, highlights the role played by 
“‘issue networks’ – elite coalitions of lawyers, feminist activists, doctors, legislators, 
and state officials – in bringing about policy change” (2003: 5). Htun (2003) argues that 
sometimes members of issue networks, such as lawyers, are not necessarily feminists 
yet can play decisive roles in gender policy outcomes. She also emphasises that doctors 
have forged an important “network” around reproductive issues, in particular abortion, 
often at times when women’s groups were not particularly active or united (Htun 2003). 
The role of strategic alliances in promoting SRHR 
The literature shows that alliances and strategic litigation have proved key in advancing 
the SRHR agenda (Cabal, Roa, and Sepúlveda-Oliva 2003). This was the case in 
Colombia at the Constitutional Court to legalise abortion (Reuterswaerd et al. 2011), 
and internationally and nationally to implement sexual and reproductive health and 
rights’ agreements (Germain and Liljestrand 2009). Although the literature highlights 
how, since the 1980s, biomedical and health institutions, as well as researchers working 
on these issues, have become key allies of women’s health advocates, it also points to 
the fact that these alliances are not always easy to achieve internationally or nationally 
(Fenton 2006; Germain and Liljestrand 2009). In fact, at times disagreements have been 
too significant and these groups have refused to work with each other (Germain and 
Liljestrand 2009). This poses specific challenges for those women’s advocates and 
feminist groups promoting and defending reproductive rights across the Latin American 
region where often the initiatives around SRHR have been led by national societies of 
obstetrics and gynaecology (Germain and Liljestrand 2009). 
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Feminists have historically entered the arena of SRHR from a different perspective to 
health professionals, scientists and lawyers. Since the 1980s and 1990s, feminist views 
on sexuality and reproduction have been inserted in the context of democratisation, and 
are therefore often linked to struggles around citizenship which defines the body as a 
new public space of political struggle  (Ávila 2001; Escobar & Harcourt 2005, cited in 
Conciencia Latinoamericana 2006: 42). This new optic on the “political body” was 
supposed to allow them to build and widen alliances with other social movements and 
actors (Conciencia Latinoamericana 2006: 43). 
In this context, therefore, the relationship between feminists and other groups working 
on matters of reproduction and sexuality, in particular doctors, has often been 
accompanied by distrust towards the biomedical, religious, and state frameworks around 
the body and gender equality (Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir-Conciencia 
Latinoamericana 2006). A good example of this historical tension is the struggles for 
the legalisation of abortion in the 1970s which had to do with the de-medicalisation of 
birth and promoting more respect for women’s bodies especially from the medical 
profession (Fenton 2006). 
The existence of the ICEC confirms a tendency to work together, but the experience of 
working jointly at the local level has not been systematically explored. This is important 
because the reticence to create real joint strategies and alliances may be affecting the 
way in which women’s health advocates and feminist groups engage with the medical 
profession and other important players in the field such as lawyers. This research 
explores if such alliances were created in Chile, what their nature would be and whether 
the different actors of the pro-SRHR coalition would work effectively or not on the 
ground during the EC policy process. In doing so, the research engages with the 
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argument advanced by Casas that the inability of feminists and women’s groups in 
Chile to forge stable and strategic alliances limited their effectiveness and ability to 
have an impact on the EC debates in the 2000s. 
Pharmaceutical companies and pharmacists 
A no less important aspect of the battles for the distribution of EC is the way the private 
sector, in particular pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies, has been targeted as 
part of an international strategy to prevent EC distribution (Casas Becerra 2008); this 
has led to groups such as the Consortium for EC working with local NGOs to support 
small pharmaceutical companies to produce the drug to make it available to women in 
all countries in the region (Faúndes et al. 2007). Pharmaceutical companies can 
therefore be key actors or victims in the process of EC distribution. The impact they can 
have in the effective and easy access to EC cannot be underestimated. In the US 
between 2005 and 2010 pharmacists were proactive in opposing EC and invoked their 
right to “conscientious objection”, while in Canada in 2005, where conscientious 
objection cannot be invoked by corporations (Wynn et al. 2011), they opposed the 
barriers being imposed on women to access EC and the violation of privacy and 
confidentiality in their work (Eggerton 2006). As explained by Wynn et al.: 
The comparison between two neighbouring nations highlights the extent to which 
discussions of the ethics of reproductive health care are culturally and politically 
specific, despite the deployment of naturalizing terms such as “health” and 
“science” and universalizing terms such as “rights”. (2011: 253) 
Although one of the first tasks by advocates of EC in Chile was to carry out studies on 
the attitudes of people and health workers towards EC (Schiappacasse and Diaz 2006), 
they did not involve the attitudes of private sector workers such as pharmacists whose 
conservative reaction proved a surprise for the political establishment and public 
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opinion. Attitudes and beliefs of individuals, whether political, ethical, or religious, can 
play an important role as barriers to access, as shown by more recent studies carried out 
in Chile and Argentina (ANDÍA et al. 2010). 
The politics of sexuality and reproduction in Latin America and Chile 
Over the last three decades, most literature on gender and politics in Latin America has 
focused on women’s movements, women’s representation and women’s interaction with 
the state, developed in the context of the study of democratisation. In the 1980s, most 
political and social researchers working in Latin America focused on the rise and fall of 
democracies, and particularly on the breakdown of authoritarianism by looking at the 
consequent transition and consolidation periods, often lacking a gendered perspective 
(Waylen 1994, 1996b). In the mid-1980s and from the beginning of the 1990s, feminist 
가cademics quickly joined this line of research to show that all these political processes 
were gendered (Alvarez 1990, 1994; Alvarez et al. 2003; Chuchryk 1989, 1994; Craske 
1999; Feijoó and Nari 1994; Feijoó 1989; Franceschet 2005; Jaquette 1989, 1994; 
Molyneux 1986; Safa 1990; Waylen 1996b). 
However, women’s movements in the region have also worked hard over the last 40 
years, even during dictatorship periods, to advance women’s sexual and reproductive 
rights. Feminists have been key actors in advancing the SRHR agenda since the 1990s, 
as part of their involvement and commitment to the UN conferences, which captured the 
essence of the close relationship between sexuality, bodily autonomy and reproduction 
for women’s rights (Haussman 2005). They made their appearance in the international 
legal arena bringing a new way of reconceptualising the basic freedoms of human 
beings, regarding their reproductive capacity and sexual lives, promoting a whole new 
set of duties for states to uphold these rights and promoting adequate health policies. 
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Women’s health movements in the region have therefore gained a strong reputation in 
promoting progressive agendas and having political impact as part of their struggle for 
equal citizenship (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Alvarez 1990; Franceschet and 
Macdonald 2004; Petchesky and Judd 1998). 
Although numerous organisations in Latin America have been working on these issues 
since the 1990s, abortion was already on many organisations’ agenda since the late 
1980s (Saporta Sternbach et al. 1992). Openly embracing abortion, however, was not 
easy for many of them. There was originally a strong resistance and concern in adopting 
what was perceived as “bourgeois” and “bad feminist beliefs” by working class sectors 
on the left (Saporta Sternbach et al. 1992: 402). This did not stop the Latin American 
feminist movement from creating umbrella organisations providing coordination and 
advocacy support to national NGOs advocating in favour of abortion rights.15 The 
region-wide feminist meetings known as Encuentros “helped forge a regional feminist 
identity” and “facilitated the emergence of dozens of region-wide issue- or identity-
based feminist networks” (Alvarez 2000: 1). 
At the same time the SRHR agenda was disaggregated by issues and impacted by what 
Alvarez (Alvarez 1999) called the NGOisation of feminism. Back in 1999, Alvarez was 
very critical of the effects that the professionalisation and institutionalisation of feminist 
organisations under the form of NGOs could have for feminist activism and their 
autonomy, in particular due to their high dependence on international and national 
funding. In 2009, however, Alvarez reviewed her opinion and acknowledged the 
“ambiguities and variations in and among NGOs” and the “dual or hybrid identity of 
                                               15 The Campaña 28 de Septiembre, CLADEM and the Red de Salud de Mujeres de Latinoamerica y el Caribe (RSMLAC) are good examples of the main regional organisations working on SRHR but more specifically on the issue of abortion, both to legalise and expand its access. 
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feminist NGOs, their two facets, as technical professional organizations that are at once 
integral parts of feminist movements” (2009: 175). 
Many women’s movements originated under oppressive regimes, which led them to 
identify “as oppositional and anti-state” while also making autonomy “a principle of 
political organisation” (Molyneux 2001), leading to much tension between feminist 
“autónomas” (autonomous) and “institucionales” (institutionals, within parties or state 
bureaucracy) which only began to diffuse in the early 2000s to allow for the 
heterogeneity and diversity of the movement to become more visible (Alvarez et al. 
2003). Molyneux argues that while “autonomy has long been a principle of feminist 
organisation, in practice women’s movements have been associated with a variety of 
forms of political linkage, within as well as outside the institutions of party and state” 
(2001: 3). In the past decade, class, race, and ethnic divisions have become more 
apparent (Jaquette 2009: 5); and a late comer, sexual diversity, has also challenged the 
understandings of Latin American feminism (Friedman 2009). Ríos Tobar (2009a) has 
also highlighted the presence of generational conflicts, something that echoes with the 
complicated relations between younger and older feminists in the US with the 
appearance of third-wave feminism (Ewig and Ferree 2013: 447-448). 
Craske noticed that the 1990s had been “a period of consolidation” and women’s 
movements were not so visible at the national level but were “still there, becoming 
smaller and more focused on specific issues which are of the interest of the activists 
concerned” (1999: 190). Recently Jaquette has also argued that as social movements, 
women’s movements have stopped being the significant actors they once were in the 
region, and despite the existence of active groups and actors belonging to different 
feminisms, they “rarely achieve the level of coordination and consensus that the term 
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movement implies” (2009: 6). Yet the definition of women’s movement is often at the 
centre of debate among scholars. 
Molyneux has argued that there are “contrasting views on what constitutes a women’s 
movement” and questioned Alvarez’s “criteria involving the pursuit of women’s 
interests and independent self-activity” for it conflates the issue of “organisational 
autonomy and ‘women’s interests’” (2001: 146). For Molyneux, “a women’s movement 
does not have to have a single organisational expression, and may be characterised by a 
diversity of interests, forms of expression and spatial location. Logically, it comprises a 
substantial majority of women, where it is not exclusively made up of women” (2001: 
144). Molyneux in fact suggested looking at associational linkages where “independent 
women’s organisations with their particular goals and institutional autonomy choose to 
form alliances with other political organisations with which they are in agreement on a 
range of issues” (2001: 148). 
Questioning the supposed decline of both feminist activities and incidence due to a 
perceived invisibility of women’s movements, as well as incorporating an idea similar 
to associational linkages, Ewig and Ferree have suggested looking at “feminist 
organizing” (2013). Starting from the premise that “feminists are individually on the 
move, in and out of institutions, offices and political engagements, but also their 
collective mobilizations”, feminist organising includes “efforts led by women explicitly 
challenging women’s subordination to men” differing from both” women’s movements 
(a wider notion of women looking for social change), and feminists (the concern with 
women’s empowerment, not necessarily collectively organised) (Ewig and Ferree 2013: 
437). This recalls Craske who argues that the “growth of feminism” can be “judged in 
the way that the language of equal opportunities has permeated most levels of politics” 
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(Craske 1999: 190). Therefore it is with this understanding of feminist praxis that we 
need to explore the case of Chile and how the women’s and feminist movements 
operate and address SRHR. 
The women’s movement and feminists in Chile 
An important part of the literature on gender and politics in Chile addresses the 
problems that both feminists and the women’s movement have faced since the transition 
to democracy (Chuchryk 1989, 1994; Franceschet 2003, 2005; Guzman, Seibert, and 
Staab 2010; Haas 2006; Ríos Tobar 2003a, 2009a; Woitowicz and Pedro 2009). The 
transition meant that “for the first time in decades [feminists] were confronted with 
having to interact with the state, state actors, an professional politicians, and to 
negotiate their political role with respect to the political parties now dominating the 
public sphere” (Ríos Tobar 2009a: 28). 
There is an overall impression that since the early 1990s, the women’s movement has 
become invisible and lost its capacity to influence and frame policies and to mobilise 
support (Ríos Tobar et al. 2003; Ríos Tobar, 2003), giving “origin to real fractures 
between the different expressions of contemporary feminism” (Ríos Tobar et al. 2003: 
310). Others consider that rather than disappearing, the women’s movement(s) has 
evolved and adapted strategically to the political conditions they face (Franceschet 
2005), or that despite its internal limitations and institutional political barriers, feminists 
in particular have been able to make important policy changes for women’s rights and 
make feminist discourse present in the legislative arena (Haas 2006, 2010). Yet it seems 
that despite its relative success in pushing laws and initiating policies to improve 
women’s status in society, the Chilean women’s movement remains divided and weak. 
Feminism in particular does not seem able to overcome the extreme polarisation and 
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diversity that impedes any form of joint strategy; nor has it managed to establish closer 
links with popular organisations, limiting its capacity for mobilisation and its voice in 
public debates (Ríos Tobar 2009a). Ríos Tobar (2009) explains that autonomy remains 
one of the main sources of conflict among feminists. The internal dynamics of the 
movement in this sense explain much about the shortcomings of feminists as a 
movement “and despite the importance of structural factors the transformation of the 
feminist movement cannot be understood as a mere by-product of these structural 
processes” and thus: 
… Any analysis of its reconfiguration must necessarily consider the internal 
dynamics of the movement, its links with the political system, alliances with other 
civil society actors, as well as its capacity to react and adjust to new social and 
political conditions. It is precisely the interaction between these macro and micro 
levels, which characterizes the specificity of feminist action and distinguishes it 
from similar experiences by other social actors. (Ríos Tobar 2003: 258) 
This research engages with Marcela Rios Tobar’s most recent portrayal of Chile’s 
feminist movement as composed of scattered yet numerous active institutional spheres 
and organisational structures – including NGOs, feminist collectives, women’s studies 
programmes at universities, thematic networks, small media initiatives, etc – divided by 
a thematic division rather than pursuing a broader political platform for gender equality, 
which affects its capacity to influence wider political debates (2009a: 28-29). 
The research finds particularly relevant Ríos Tobar’s argument that there is an 
increasing number of young feminists claiming a feminist identity who want to have 
more of a voice (2009: 31), but are often relegated by the older and more influential 
members of the feminist movement. This was particularly visible during the legal and 
political battles surrounding EC under the Bachelet administration, raising questions for 
the future of the movement. 
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The SRHR agenda in Chile 
The development of a feminist and progressive work and discourse on SRHR in Chile 
was a direct consequence of the participation of women’s organisations in the UN 
conferences in the 1990s (Valdés and Busto 1994) and follow-up conferences and 
gatherings at the regional and international level. This discourse has nonetheless tended 
to stay within a circle of specialists working on social policy, reproductive health and 
politicians. In Chile, sexual and reproductive rights have not been discussed, either in an 
open and extensive manner in public opinion nor the media, with the exception of 
specific moments regarding the status of abortion and the debate on sexual education 
(Shepard 2006). According to Shepard (2000), Chile like the rest of Latin America is 
affected by the existence of a “‘double discourse system,’ which defends repressive or 
negligent public policies while privately tolerating unofficial and often illegal 
mechanisms that expand private sexual and reproductive choices. 
Abortion remains a major concern from both a feminist and public health perspective, 
but since it is illegal, collecting data on the real extent of unsafe abortions is very 
difficult for the government (Shepard and Casas Becerra 2007). Without clear evidence 
and data, it is a challenge to try to make the case for the legalisation of abortion and the 
issue remains a source of heated debates. It is clear, however, that the legal ban 
produces and reinforces the socio-economic discrimination of poor women and young 
girls, and all women unable to pay for the private services to get a confidential and safe 
abortion. 
Although Chile had a strong and visible women’s movement that fought to topple 
Pinochet’s brutal dictatorship, feminists and women’s groups have not been able to put 
the issues of SRHR as a priority in the agenda of Concertación governments who led the 
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country between 1990 and 2010. Despite the known reality of abortion, this has not 
been taken on board by those political parties who have been in power since 1990 
(Maira Vargas, Santana Nazarit, and Molina Sáez 2008). Grassroots women’s groups 
working with pobladoras – women from low-income settlements – have made advances 
in creating spaces for women to debate and redefine their rights as citizens, in particular 
SRHR (Willmott 2002). 
As explained by Siavelis (2000), coalition politics in the transition to democracy has 
meant that parties avoid issues affecting the strength of political alliances. In Chile, the 
double militancy of women in civil society and parties has been a cause of tension to 
promote a feminist agenda (Franceschet 2005). Women’s groups and feminists remain 
divided on the issue of abortion (Memoria Encuentro Nacional Feminista 2005), with 
women’s NGOs exercising self-censorship (Shepard 2006: 25), and since 1990 those 
closely involved in party politics having accepted not to raise the issue so as not to harm 
their political community, or the consecutive governments of the Concertación’s centre-
right coalition, in power since 1990. 
In Chile, many NGOs have worked directly or indirectly on abortion issues. A core of 
organisations is generally seen as supporting legal initiatives or producing materials on 
the topic, but many suffer from a lack of resources and numbers to mobilise and be 
more visible. As the literature on Latin American feminist NGOs has explained, the 
professionalisation of these organisations – also known as “NGOisation” (Alvarez 
1999) – has meant that they are now more distant from more popular movements or 
associations while being more integrated regionally and internationally. This has created 
elites of feminists and women’s rights advocates who often work on specific policy 
advocacy initiatives separately from a wider women’s network. This is no different in 
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Chile: “the public presence of the women’s movement, including feminist 
organizations, has gradually disappeared as a political force in post-transition Chile” 
(Ríos Tobar 2003: 257). This means that it is difficult for feminists located in different 
organisational spaces to come together and act for a single reformist agenda, affecting 
issues such as abortion or EC which should be part of a wider SRHR agenda. 
SRHR, the state and institutions 
Chile figures prominently in the literature focusing on gender and politics, and gender 
and the state in Latin America due to its well-known transition after 17 years of 
dictatorship and the role women played in demanding the return of democracy (Baldez 
1997, 2002; Blofield and Haas 2005; Blofield 2006; Casas 2009; Craske 1999; 
Franceschet 2003, 2005; Htun 2003; Macaulay 2006; Power 2004; Richards 2005, 
2006; Rosemblatt 2000a; Schild 1994; Waylen 1996a, 2007, 2010). Nevertheless, Chile 
is also one of the few countries worldwide where abortion is illegal under any 
circumstance, and penalised by law. This has attracted research on the issue over the last 
decade, in particular through a feminist lens of citizenship (Franceschet 2005), 
institutions (Haas 2010; Htun 2003; Macaulay 2006; Waylen 2007), but also from the 
point of view of socio-economic inequalities (Blofield 2006). Most authors have used 
the case of abortion as a way to look at progress in the area of reproduction in their 
wider analysis of gender policy outcomes. 
SERNAM and feminist policy-making 
An important part of the literature on women and the state in Chile has shown how 
feminists within the feminist movement and within the State and political parties 
succeeded in creating a women’s machinery built with the aim of leading the work for 
gender equality: SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer; National Women’s 
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Service). SERNAM has in fact channelled most gender or women’s issues and legal or 
policy initiatives over the last twenty years (Blofield and Haas 2005; Franceschet 2003, 
2005; Haas 2006; Macaulay 2006; Waylen 1996a, 2000). 
Together with feminist politicians and civil society, SERNAM has shaped the way in 
which feminist policy-making and gender-equality initiatives were framed (Haas 2006, 
2010). Most literature agrees, however, that SERNAM promoted gender issues within a 
conservative framework built around the institutions of family and motherhood, 
especially in the early 1990s (Haas 2006; Macaulay 2006; Waylen 2000). Thus, 
SERNAM’s official mandate never included promoting sexual and reproductive health 
and rights on which it imposed “self-censorship” (Macaulay 2006: 177). However the 
politics behind the transition strongly influenced the success and development of 
SERNAM (Macaulay 2006; Waylen 1996b). 
Besides the many gender-sensitive policies put in place or supported by the executive 
through SERNAM, many legal initiatives were born in Congress to ensure women’s 
legal equality and uphold their rights (Blofield and Haas 2005; Haas 2006, 2010). 
According to Haas (2006), the overall record of initiatives is positive and shows the 
slow permeation of feminist ideas in mainstream politics. Despite a well-known 
historical dominance of the legislative initiative by the executive, there is increasing 
competition with Congress in policy development, but this poses a challenge for 
SERNAM, women’s NGOs and feminist representatives in Congress who struggle to 
cooperate (Haas 2010). This research looks at the tensions present during the EC policy 
process and how these groups tended to work. 
In the area of SRHR, Haas for instance shows that SERNAM refused to support 
congressional efforts to reinstate and decriminalize therapeutic abortion leaving 
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parliamentarians on their own to carry forward the legal process and face a 
Conservative backlash. Interestingly, the feminist movement did not grant its support 
either to the congresswoman leading these efforts considering that feminists had not 
been duly consulted or included in the process of drafting the bill (Haas 2006). 
Feminists and the executive v legislative battle 
The relationship between the executive and legislative powers remains shaped by the 
disproportionate powers given to the executive to control the legislative agenda and 
give priority to some initiatives over others. Contrary to the assumptions in most of the 
literature, feminists do not automatically cooperate to promote feminist policy (Haas 
2010). This is not only to do with the notion of autonomy defended by many groups, but 
also with the capacity of feminists to forge alliances. This research therefore engages 
with Haas’ argument for caution regarding the mistaken assumption that feminists will 
automatically join efforts to promote feminist policy. 
The SRHR Bill 
The only comprehensive bill on SRHR introduced to Parliament so far – Ley Marco 
Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos – was initiated by the feminist movement, who 
obtained the wide support of a diverse range of civil society organisations, and by 
feminist and politicians committed to gender and women’s rights issues in Congress (C. 
Dides 2002). Despite this wide support, it has never been discussed and has remained 
entangled in the internal political procedures of Congress. This bill and EC were part of 
Bachelet’s presidential programme and gender commitments agreed with the women’s 
movement and the civil society organisations working on these issues (SERNAM 
2008). This research discusses the process of that bill since the actors involved in it are 
similar to the ones behind the EC policy process (see Ch. 6). 
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SRHR policy-making: Actors, class, institutions and the state 
 At the end of the 1990s, feminist scholars started focusing on the state as part of their 
wider work on gender and politics (Chappell 2000; Dore and Molyneux 2000; Dore 
2000; Molyneux 1996, 2000, 2001; Waylen 1998). The emerging work then was 
disaggregating “the state to consider the way different political institutions shape and 
are shaped by engagement with feminist actors” (Chappell 2000), and the way the 
different types of states shaped feminist and women’s engagement (Molyneux 2001). 
Many authors have focused on gender, institutions and the state in Chile, and the way in 
which they influence the promotion of women’s rights and policies (Blofield and Haas 
2005; Blofield 2006; Franceschet 2001, 2004, 2005; Haas 2010; Htun 2003; Macaulay 
2006; Waylen 2010, 2000, 2007). The works of Htun (2003), Blofield (2006), Macaulay 
(2006), Waylen (2007) and Haas (2010) are particularly relevant for this research since 
they directly engage with SRHR and the issue of abortion. 
Htun (2003) works from an institutionalist point of view giving particular relevance to 
the role of ideas and beliefs in policy-making. Through her historical analysis of legal 
and policy initiatives by institutions in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, Htun highlights that 
“gender rights” are “not one issue but many” (2003: 5). Htun focuses on the way gender 
issues such as family laws, divorce, abortion are taken on by states, and argues that we 
must disaggregate gender issues because they produce different political dynamics 
which lead to differentiated results in terms of gender reforms. Moreover, she highlights 
that possibilities for policy change depend on how elite issue networks are “able to hook 
into state institutions” (2003: 5). Abortion, in her opinion, is the issue that in Chile had 
the most difficult dynamic, and therefore has made fewer advances. Htun highlights that 
a “major factor shaping issue networks’ success was the relationship between the 
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Church and the state”, where Church-state conflict can create a “window of 
opportunity” for networks’ access to influence a policy (2003: 6). She also emphasises 
that the authoritarian legacy in Chile was stronger than in Argentina and Brazil, due to 
the “‘authoritarian enclaves’ in the political system and coalitional dynamics among 
governing parties” (2003: 8) 
By treating gender issues in a differentiated manner, Htun (2003) identifies the need to 
look at the institutions where the policy and political negotiations happen and the “elite 
networks” that are at the origin of lobby and public interest. Htun, in fact, downplays 
the role of economic development and class in explaining these policy and legal 
changes to give more relevance to “elite issue networks” and their ability to effectively 
lobby around specific issues. This research follows Htun’s argument by placing 
alliances and the behaviour of elite networks and their interaction with the state and 
institutions at the centre of the analysis. 
Blofield (2006) in her comparative study on divorce and abortion in Argentina, Chile 
and Spain, focuses on economic power as linked to political power to explain the power 
differentials between the members of “issue networks” or policy elites. The author pays 
much attention to the power of the Catholic Church in Chile and the organised 
conservative lobby and their financial access as a way to explain policy outcomes. 
Blofield asserts that the class nature of issues such as abortion and divorce, matters 
more, and that access to resources of actors will be the key determinant of the success or 
failure of any policy initiative on the issue. 
Both Htun (2003) and Blofield (2006) are interested in the analysis of gender issues in a 
broader sense and coincide in comparing abortion and divorce in countries similar to 
Chile. Both their approaches are comparative. By focusing on elite networks, Htun does 
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not allow much space for non-institutional actors such as women’s rights groups and the 
media, while Blofield’s emphasis on the socio-economic differential risks produce a 
rather static account of the power differentials in society, denying civil society and 
feminists, as well as other actors such as the executive much agency. 
Macaulay’s research (2006) compares the role of parties in gender outcomes in national 
and local policymaking in Chile and Brazil. Her research is innovative in that it looks at 
the often forgotten institution of the party system. Macaulay provides an analysis of the 
workings of gender policies in political agendas and highlights the strategic role of 
parties, which are “complex beasts, directed not just by their ideology, but also by their 
histories, leaders, members and organizational cultures” all of which influence the 
“response to the institutional environment” (2006: 182). On abortion, Macaulay 
explains that parties have left the issue outside the political agenda of Concertación 
because it was perceived as a factor causing division within the wider political coalition, 
and the “conservatives’ assertive veto and agenda-setting role succeeded in restricting 
both SERNAM’s substantive mandate and institutional reach and resources, and created 
an environment of politicised morality more radical than public opinion, in the face of 
which the secular Left, especially the still class-based Socialists, remained reactive” 
(2006: 177). 
Macaulay’s work in this sense gives a detailed account that complements Htun and 
Waylen’s views on the importance of the transition and the way political institutions 
were shaped by it. Macaulay shows the rational prioritisation of parties when excluding 
all issues that could represent a threat to the political power of the government alliance. 
The double militancy of feminists has made them very aware of this point, and they also 
may be more inclined to accept this position coming from their own parties. Macaulay’s 
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research needs to be complemented by taking into account the way the “consensus” has 
evolved or dissolved over the years within the Concertación parties. As suggested by 
Borzutzky and Weeks, when Bachelet came to power in 2006, she “inherited a 
consensus that was starting to show wear” (2010: 12). 
Waylen’s work (2007) is part of recent initiatives by feminists to use historical 
institutionalism to explain gender outcomes within the transitions to democracy in 
different countries. The author asks why women’s movements that were important in 
pre-transition settings were not able to obtain “greater gains in the immediate post-
transition period?” (2007: 1). For Waylen, it is important to look at institutions within a 
historical frame because “new polities in post-transition polities do not begin with a 
blank slate” (2007: 47). Both the gender rights’ status quo at the time of transition and 
the institutional legacy of the non-democratic regimes contribute to the size of the 
policy window for gender reform open to actors in the post-transition period. The speed 
and openness of the transition, as well as the balance of forces at the point of transition 
affect the institutional legacy left by the outgoing non-democratic regime (Waylen 
2007). 
Waylen’s argument is particularly convincing for the case of Chile that experienced an 
important pacted transition to democracy, a process that was crucial in shaping the way 
the democratic institutions have been working for the past twenty years or so. Waylen 
suggests focusing on the interaction of “structure and agency” (2007: 38) by looking at 
multiple factors and beyond the exclusive role of women’s movements and feminists, to 
explain the gender outcomes of policy-making and role of actors within specific 
institutional contexts. 
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Finally, in a similar line to the institutional approach of Htun and Waylen, Haas’s 
review of “Feminist Policymaking in Chile” (2010) introduces the notion of dynamics 
in the political environment affecting policy-making in order to evaluate how successful 
feminists have been in passing laws belonging to their agenda. Haas provides a good 
model of analysis of strategies used by the feminists by looking at the micro-level as 
well as the macro-level when for example engaging with the women’s machinery or 
parties. 
Two components of Haas’s analysis are particularly convincing: the way she looks at 
institutional structures and the power incentives and disincentives they create, as well as 
the presence of Bachelet as President within the very rigid and sometimes static Chilean 
political system. As Haas explains, feminist strategies and civil society’s actions matter 
because “while institutional structures may remain static for long periods, the larger 
political environment remains surprisingly dynamic and responsive to political tactics. 
In other words, politics matter” (Haas 2010). 
Haas’s approach is closer to the one used in this research, giving visibility to both pro- 
and anti-SRHR advocacy coalitions, while looking at their strategies, tactics, and the 
way this interaction with formal power evolves over the ten years of political and 
judicial processes, with particular attention to Bachelet’s government and her role as 
president. This research therefore distances itself from Blofield’s over-emphasis on 
socio-economic conditions as the main explanation for the failure of feminist influence 
in the political arena. This research considers that it is in their political engagement as 
feminists, as well as part of a wider coalition that we can see how effective feminists are 
at framing an issue and advancing their own agenda. 
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An important aspect of feminist policy-making in Chile has been the learning process 
represented in the long-fought battles for women’s rights. According to Haas, feminists 
have learned two main lessons in the process of legislating to reinstate therapeutic 
abortion: “the futility of attempting to legislate on such a controversial issue, in the 
absence of public support for policy reform. Feminists also gained experience framing 
their proposals to try to overcome conservative opposition” (Haas 2006: 218). 
Haas (2006) shows how the limits to strategic framing and negotiation of feminist 
proposals has taught feminist parliamentarians to pre-empt criticism and hostility by 
framing their initiatives in a pro-family language and public health perspective. This is 
understandable since as explained in the literature on SRHR, by suppressing or 
marginalising the “sexual” in official policies related to sexuality in favour of a low-
profile “public health” discourse, advocacy groups sometimes create opportunities for 
important legal changes (Cáceres, Cueto, and Palomino 2007). 
Htun and Weldon (2010) have proposed a framework to analyse the probabilities of 
policy change for women’s rights. They argue that sex equality policies can be 
regrouped in two groups: a) those that alleviate gender-based class inequalities; and b) 
those that challenge the doctrine of organised religion. Htun and Weldon explain that 
policies that have a high doctrinal component and class-based component requiring 
financial means to promote the policy are the ones that will face stronger opposition. 
Here the question remains whether the framing or the nature of an issue matters more. 
The Chilean government – in the same way it addressed abortion in the 1960s – pursued 
a rather gender-neutral policy, justified as a public health policy to distribute EC. This 
research analyses how the framing of the issue evolved over the 10 years of policy 
process and how this affected the outcome of the policy initiative. 
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Finally, Ríos Tobar (2009b), who reviewed the evolution of feminism in Chile over the 
1990s, sustains that although the structural political factors regulating state/society 
relations are extremely important, we must look into the internal dynamics of the 
feminist movement. This recalls Haas’ view on micro and macro processes. For Ríos 
Tobar national processes have shaped the evolution of feminism in Chile, and like 
Waylen, she maintains that: 
… the transformation of feminist politics has at the same time coincided and been 
shaped by the change in political regime. In the case of Chile, this transition had a 
negative impact on the ability of social actors to mobilize politically and represent 
their interests in the public sphere (Garretón 1995; Moulián 1997; Drake and 
Jaksic 1999). The newly installed regime has not only failed to strengthen the 
development of civil society, but its very existence has made previous forms of 
organization and mobilization obsolete. (Ríos Tobar 2003a) 
The institutional analysis required for this research must therefore incorporate these 
changes at the macro level of the institutional environment and rethink in which way 
feminist praxis has evolved. This is closely related with Waylen’s focus on structure 
and agency and the importance of formal and informal institutions that the next chapter 
will discuss. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main literature available on EC, SRHR, women’s 
movements, gender and politics and gender and the state as related to Latin America 
and Chile in particular. 
There is an increasing interest in the literature regarding the role of alliances for the 
effectiveness of advocacy efforts to promote SRHR. The literature has started looking at 
the role of doctors and medicine as an institution in these debates. This recalls Htun’s 
argument on the importance of elite issue networks in policy-making. 
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In the case of the judicialisation process, the role of lawyers and doctors seems 
particularly relevant. There is, however, a void in the literature regarding the details on 
the way in which these and other actors, including feminists, enter alliances and 
organise at the local level to promote a SRHR agenda. By looking at EC in the context 
of judicialisation processes, we can determine to which extent these actors succeed in 
being influential for policy-making through alliance building. This research therefore 
raises the question on the role of actors and alliances and elite issue networks during the 
EC process in Chile. 
The literature is concerned by the extent to which women’s movements and feminists 
are present as political actors in post-transition settings. Following the concept of 
“feminist organizing” and the ever-evolving feminist praxis, this research seeks to look 
at feminist participation within the context of policy-making processes where multiple 
actors are involved and interact. In doing so it pays attention to the internal dynamics of 
the feminist movement and asks whether the issues that seem to cause much division 
amongst the feminist movement worldwide are also present in the case of Chile, and 
how this affects their capacity to influence policy-making around SRHR. 
The development of the literature on gender and the state has led to an increasing focus 
on institutions. In the case of SRHR issues, and more particularly EC, there is an 
increasing interest in these issues from a legal perspective due to the increasing 
judicialisation of SRHR in the continent and worldwide. This leads to new questions 
regarding the type of institutions involved in the judicialisation of EC, making Chile 
and the EC policy process particularly relevant as a case study. 
The literature finally reveals a lack of feminist and gendered political analysis on EC 
compared to the available literature on abortion, as well as gender and the state. This 
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research attempts to fill this void. Given the increasing importance and relevance of the 
more institutional approaches for a gendered political analysis of change, this research 
provides new empirical material for debate. 
The next chapter presents the conceptual and methodological frameworks, introducing 
the ever-growing literature on feminist political science and judicialisation, which I 
believe are the most adequate for the analysis in my research and builds on the literature 
reviewed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
How did formal and informal institutions influence the EC policy process, in particular 
during the judicialisation process? How did actors see their ideas reflected or ignored 
during the policy process? What was the impact of ten years of legal and political 
battles for the distribution of EC on feminists and other civil society groups? What do 
we learn about their capacity to mobilise and the efficacy of women’s and feminist 
networks trying to influence the SRHR agenda in Chile? How did the presence of a 
feminist and first female president impact on the outcomes of the policy process? 
The research questions guiding my thesis require taking a closer look at the literature 
explaining the role played by actors, ideas and institutions in the policy process, with 
particular attention to the judiciary. I am therefore particularly interested in the growing 
literature on Feminist Institutionalism (FI), its concern with transitions and the state, as 
well as the literature on judicialisation, preoccupied with the increasing politicisation of 
judicial processes and institutions. 
The aim of this chapter is to define the conceptual framework I consider appropriate for 
analysing the EC policy process by explaining the different theories, concepts and 
empirical work available, as well as the most relevant variables for my analysis coming 
out of these works. The thesis’ analysis draws from a FI framework and therefore the 
first part of the chapter engages with the main concepts coming out of the literature on 
New Institutionalism (NI) and FI. It then examines the concepts linked to the literature 
on policy process and judicialisation. The second part of the chapter presents the 
methodology used and the challenges faced during the research process. It explains the 
research design, which included semi-structured open-ended interviews based on a non-
probabilistic purposive sample to reach saturation (see App. 1). The interviews were 
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prepared following Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework analysis, complemented 
by a press review and when possible by participant observation and the review and 
analysis of archival documents. 
Institutionalism: New and Feminist 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of debate among feminists in political 
science concerning the role and eventual necessity for feminist political science (FPS) to 
engage with NI (Driscoll and Krook 2009; Gatens 1998; Kenny and Mackay 2009; 
Krook and MacKay 2011; Kulawik 2009; Lovenduski 2008; Mackay et al. 2011; 
Mackay et al. 2009; Waylen 2009). 
Feminist scholars have evidenced that FPS and NI overlap on a series of core topics: the 
interaction between social actors and institutions; the interplay between formal rules and 
informal practices; the concern with gender neutral analysis of norms and values; and 
the need to focus on power asymmetries. But these links or relationships have neither 
been easy nor obvious. Institutionalism for a long time was considered limited and 
dominated by rational choice theory (Burnham et al. 2008; Peters 2005). 
However, institutionalism, like any other school of thought, has evolved through its own 
constant internal critical revision, producing new and different strands within it. This 
renewal movement that brought about NI seems to provide feminists with new entry-
points into the wider political science discipline and the study of gender and politics. In 
fact some authors argue that if feminists want to make an impact, engaging with 
dominant political theories is not only a matter of choice but also a necessity (Gatens 
1998). 
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New Institutionalism 
New Institutionalism puts institutions at the centre of power analysis. The main concern 
for feminist political scientists has then been whether NI needs a gender concept and in 
that case which and why (Krook and Mackay 2011). The answer has been positive and 
FI has established itself as a new variant of research within NI (Mackay et al. 2011). 
It is generally agreed that NI is composed of three main strands: a) Historical 
Institutionalism; b) Societal Institutionalism; and, most recently, c) Discursive 
Institutionalism (Peters 2005: 2). These new components are born from the intention of 
scholars to respond to the shortcomings of the behavioural and rational choice 
approaches in old institutionalism, in particular their focus on individual behaviour as 
independent from institutions (Burnham et al. 2008: 25; Peters 2005: 1). 
What the three strands of NI have in common is their concern with a specific kind of 
institution – that is, political institutions (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 4). If we accept 
the notion that politics is power, and power is present beyond formal institutions and 
government organisations, then we understand that political institutions are about how 
different sets of formal and informal rules and norms that dictate our lives maintain and 
reproduce specific power dynamics (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 4-5). This is where NI 
and FI overlap: FI is interested in unveiling the way gender norms operate within and 
outside institutions and in this way explain how institutional processes construct and 
maintain gender power dynamics, and how we can gender change. 
According to Lowndes and Roberts, since the early 2000s there has been a progressive 
process of convergence and consolidation to define institutions among these three 
strands of NI (2013: 40), especially around key concepts such as rules, practices and 
69 
narratives which are the three modes of institutional constraint on actors’ behaviour 
(2013: 46). Rules can be formally written, for example as laws, regulations, protocols, 
etc. The study of laws and constitutions remains extremely important for 
institutionalists since “the enduring importance of formal rules in structural behaviour 
remains” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 55). Yet for NI the informal aspects of their 
enforcement or creation matter just as much as their content: 
… the proper subject matter of third phase institutionalism is the specific 
combination of formal and informal mechanisms that constrain political behaviour 
in different settings, and which may be both the object and the subject of attempts 
at change (however imperfect). (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) 
Practices are the close companions of rules. They often complement each other, 
although “these are often not formally recorded or officially sanctioned” and their mode 
of transmission is through “demonstration”. For NI these are political conducts, but it is 
important, however, not to confuse practices with values or culture (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013: 57-62). 
Finally, narratives are “stories” developed by institutions which embody values, ideas 
and power, and are transmitted via the spoken word (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 63). 
Narratives secure compliance by “establishing as ‘taken-for-granted’ certain framing 
devices, explanatory categories and normative understandings” and in this way secure 
institutional stability over time (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 64). In the case of Chile 
one could say that the institution of “consensus” set by Concertación and the opposition 
became a crucial narrative for public policy. 
Feminist Institutionalism 
The study of political activity from a gender perspective has represented important 
challenges for the political science establishment. Feminist scholars emphasise the use 
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of “‘gender’ as an analytical category, expanding existing definitions of ‘politics’, and 
generating insights that may be used to pursue some degree of political change” 
(Driscoll and Krook 2008: 4), while rational choice theorists would tend to focus on: 
… connecting micro-level interactions to macro-level processes and events, paying 
attention to how individuals make choices within constraints and often in relation 
to projections about the probable actions of others. (Ferejohn 2002 cited in Driscoll 
and Krook 2009: 239) 
By using gender as a central pillar of their analysis, feminists shift the focus from 
biological sex and break the binary relationship between the social construct of men and 
women, replacing in this way the exclusive concern on women by a deeper 
understanding of femininities and masculinities (Childs and Krook 2006a cited in 
Driscoll and Krook 2008: 5). 
NI increased its focus on the role of actors and their influence on institutions, and in this 
way brought power back to the centre of its analysis. As explained by Joni Lovenduski: 
… feminists use institutionalist approaches to answer questions about power 
inequalities in public life. When feminists adopt institutionalist research strategies 
that include gender, they seek to illuminate and change the status of women. 
(2011: vii) 
Therefore feminists consider that political institutions, just like gender norms, are 
human made, and therefore there are no gender-neutral institutions, rather institutions 
have “gendered effects” on human relations (Mackay 2011: 181-182). In other words, 
institutions matter because they: 
… are the rules that structure political and social life… Political institutions 
express and necessarily contain a normative element – the norms, principles, and 
ideas that hold a given institutional structure together and provide the ‘compass’ 
for the assessments of attempts at change. This order consists of collectively 
constructed values and principles that are protected and maintained by accepted 
rules of the game. (Lovenduski 2011: viii) 
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This recalls Connell’s gender regimes, which are the “historically produced state of play 
in gender relations within an institution” (1990: 523). It implies looking not only at the 
state and its external structure but also the internal ones. This is why feminists “confer 
an equal status on formal and informal institutions”, recognising that both are gendered 
and it is in their interaction that political outcomes are shaped (Mackay 2011: 183). 
Feminist scholars have highlighted that institutionalism can benefit from feminist 
analysis for it “can show that assumptions central to rational actor versions of 
institutional design unwittingly obscure the specificity of women’s social situation” 
(Gatens 1998: 2). This has led feminist political scientists to propose a “Gendered 
Institutionalist” framework of analysis (GI), focusing both on processes and outcomes 
for a better understanding of the role of institutions for women’s rights and substantive 
representation (Franceschet 2011). 
FI has also expanded the scope of NI by demonstrating that one cannot only look at 
political institutions. Rather one must also take into account the interconnections 
between political and non-political institutions by “looking at how political rules, 
practices and narratives interact with those institutions that structure wider social and 
economic life” such as “institutionalized practices and narratives about caring 
responsibilities” which originate in the domestic arena and influence the “development 
and interpretation of political institutions” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 165). 
Women’s agency and Feminist Institutionalism 
Another important aspect of a feminist and gendered approach to institutional analysis 
is that feminist literature has highlighted the way women are not passive recipients of 
policy-making and state decisions, but active political subjects with agency. As stated 
by Mackay, women show agency: 
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… as institutional and extra-institutional actors working in, through and against 
state and political institutions to effect social and political change, but they 
exercise their agency within institutional, cultural, and discursive constraints. 
There is a need to take in account multiple forms of rationality (around interests, 
norms, and cognition) and complex forms of agency and structure. (2011: 190) 
Thus we observe an overlap between NI and FI since both attribute a special importance 
to the role of informal institutions. Gatens explains that, like NI, “feminist theories 
argue that individuals are formed in culture through various institutions, governed by 
norms, which constrain forms of behaviour and restrict options for action” (1998: 3). 
Both NI and FI stress “the agency of social actors, as well as the structures within which 
they act”, and “understand institutions to be the historical outcome of past human 
action” (Gatens 1998: 3). This means ideas and actors matter for the analysis of policy 
processes and outcomes. This brings back the focus on the interaction of “structure and 
agency” (Waylen 2007: 38) and requires mapping out the different actors and ideas 
involved in a specific policy process. 
Historical and Discursive Feminists Institutionalisms 
Feminist scholars have been debating the need for a feminist strand of institutionalism 
and what it should look like. Emerging from these discussions are two dominant lines of 
thinking within FI – Feminist Historical Institutionalism (FHI) and Feminist Discursive 
Institutionalism (FDI). 
Probably the main example of FHI is Georgina Waylen’s Engendering Transitions: 
Women’s Mobilization Institutions and Gender (2007). Waylen considers that HI can 
serve as an important tool for feminist political scientists trying to explain how and why 
institutional change occurs (2009: 2). In Waylen’s opinion: 
… HI approaches can solve some of the problems that currently hamper feminist 
political analysis in answering some big questions such as how certain institutions 
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and regimes are gendered, how they came into being, and how change can come 
about as well as understanding the relationship between different actors and the 
institutional context. (2009: 246) 
One concern with HI is that it is perceived to be biased towards structures and 
institutional continuity (Waylen 2009). However, this can also represent an opportunity 
because “the importance of developmental pathways mean that institutions are not 
always replaced and redesigned… institutions are reconfigured and evolve as a result of 
endogenous factors” (Waylen 2009: 5). By using the HI and a path-dependent lens, we 
unveil patterns of political change and continuity (Mazur and McBride 2010), and we 
bring the analysis of actors and institutions together, acknowledge the strategic 
motivations of actors, and can therefore make visible the way in which “structures limit 
actor’s choices at ‘choice points’ or critical junctures… emphasizing the ways in which 
institutions operate not just as constraints but also as strategic resources for actors” 
(Waylen 2009: 5). 
Discursive institutionalism (DI) is another strand of analysis feminist scholars are 
considering in their discussions. The importance of DI for feminists is that “through the 
lens of discourse, problems are no longer taken as given but perceived as a result of 
interpretation” (Kulawik 2009: 266). Kulawik considers “[b]oth historical 
institutionalism and discourse analysis have merits and limitations, and both 
perspectives complement each other and offer solutions to their respective deficiencies” 
(Kulawik 2009: 262). In fact, both HI and DI “research designs start from real-world 
puzzles and are problem-driven rather than aiming at a general theory” (Thelen 1999; 
Torfing 2005 cited in Kulawik 2009: 263). 
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As we have seen, feminist scholars working in the field of FI are reclaiming a gender 
neutral strand of political science and their space within policy-making studies, where 
feminist policy-making studies and their concern with a gendered analysis of policy-
making are simply not recognised (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2011). Mackay et al. 
(2011) highlight the way in which NI conceptions of both structure and agency are often 
limited, and remain an ongoing debate in the field. Power remains at the core of any 
gender analysis, and feminist notions of agency refute any static notion of power 
relations whether on the actors’ side or the structures and institutions. 
Recent research on EC in the US shows how the different strands of FI can contribute to 
looking at the same problem and explaining gender change (Haussman 2013). 
Haussman in fact shows how the concepts of fixing, bending, shrinking and stretching 
used by FDI scholars Lombardo et al. (2009),16 “line up well with some of the gradual 
historical institutionalist models of Streeck, Thelen and Hacker” (Haussman 2013: 12). 
Finally FI introduces an important question: how do we explain gender change? In the 
same way that NI aims to explain Institutional Change, the aim of FI is to explain 
gender change as a key component of our understanding of institutional change. Most 
NI literature has focused on the persistence of institutions and the difficulty for change 
(Mackay et al. 2011: 577). Yet change happens and its analysis can be done in different 
ways depending on which end of the institutional analysis we are in. As argued by 
Mazur and McBride: 
… gendering institutional analysis is complex and multifaceted. It ranges from 
bringing in gender-specific institutions as objects of analysis, to posing gendered 
                                               16 The authors explain how specific concepts are discursively built and how their original meaning is broadened, reduced or fixed affecting the initial intention behind them. For more information, see Lombardo et al. 2009.  
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institutions as drivers and outcomes, to examining how institutions affect 
feminists’ engagements with the state, to testing theories of institutional change 
with gendered political process over time. (2010: 220) 
Waylen (2013) also argues that bringing gender into the analysis of change allows us to 
understand why institutional change does not always happen, in particular since the 
informal role of institutions is often ignored. 
Informal institutions: The definition challenge 
The most recent work by Chappell and Waylen (2013) engages with NI’s concern with 
informal institutions, and more specifically the impact of gender norms and practices in 
the interaction between formal and informal institutions. These authors have highlighted 
the difficulty faced by political scientists to define what an informal institution is. Yet 
they strongly believe that adding “a gender power dimension to NI reveals not only who 
has the power to make institutional design decisions but also why some unexpected 
outcomes occur and why some reforms are more difficult to achieve than others” (2013: 
600). 
For Chappell and Waylen, whether formal or informal, an institution will have a 
gendered effect (2013: 606) because of their interaction with a wider set of rules, 
meaning that the institutional environment in which formal and informal rules work 
matters. Moreover, actors who work with these rules also produce a gendered impact, 
whether “rule-makers, breakers or shapers” (2013: 606). 
In the gendered analysis of institutions and actors we must also remember that 
“informal institutions and gender norms, and the hierarchical relations in which they 
exist, are not ‘wiped out’ by changes in formal rules” (Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
Therefore for this research one could ask if the passing of a bill to resolve the impasse 
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of the judicialisation process on EC was enough to produce a major gender change in 
the country or, if this was not enough, considering the power of gender norms and 
informal rules in practice. 
Sabatier and the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Feminist scholars (Chappell 2006; Connell 1990; Driscoll and Krook 2009; Kenney 
1996; Kenny 2007; L. Krook and MacKay 2011; Lovenduski 1998, 2011; F. Mackay, 
Kenny, and Chappell 2011) have criticised mainstream institutionalism for its lack of 
focus on agency and gender regimes, and therefore for not paying enough attention to 
the role of both formal and informal actors, different power locations to advance their 
interests and further substantive representation. 
This research uses Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalitions Framework (AFC) (1999), which 
brings to the centre of policy analysis, not only the wider institutional frame in which 
policy-making happens, but also the role and influence of a series of actors. Sabatier’s 
framework emphasises actors’ diversity and capacity to join forces to promote policy 
change (Sabatier 1988). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that the best manner 
to understand policy change is to look at the “policy sub-system” affecting the policy 
change. This means going beyond the governmental institution involved in the policy to 
broaden the analysis and include: 
… those actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively 
concerned with a policy problem or issue… actors at various levels of government 
active in policy formulation and implementation as well as journalists, researchers, 
and policy analysts who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and 
evaluation of policy ideas. (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 146) 
Although part of the rational model used in most theories looking at the policy process, 
the ACF allows for the expansion of the “institutional” and “top-down” focus on actors 
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affecting the policy process to include a bottom-up and more diverse set of actors. It 
allows for different sorts of interest groups to be accounted for as part of the coalitions 
influencing the policy process, as well as actors at all levels of government active in the 
policy formulation and implementation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 119). 
The AFC works with the premise that in order to understand the process of policy 
change, one must use a perspective of a decade or more (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 
2008: 178). Sabatier’s focus on a policy over time to allow for advocacy coalitions’ 
work and initiatives to evolve seems particularly relevant to analyse how the actors of 
the EC policy process converged at the different stages of the 14-year policy process 
and how they reacted to the transforming political, economic and social conditions 
affecting their institutional environment. 
Advocacy coalitions within the policy sub-system are composed of actors (individual or 
institutional) who share a set of “normative and causal beliefs” and “engage in 
nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 
120). But what really binds together this set of actors is what Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith define as the “belief system”, which is composed of two levels of closeness: the 
first is the deep core or “the basic ontological and normative beliefs… very resistant to 
change – akin to a religious conversion”; and the second is the policy core beliefs, 
“which represent a coalition’s basic normative commitments and causal perceptions 
across and entire policy domain or subsystem. They include fundamental value 
priorities… and its principal causes and strategies for realizing core values” and as the 
authors explain, this is the real “glue of coalitions because they represent basic 
normative and empirical commitments within the domain of specialization of policy 
elites” (1999: 121-122). 
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As policy core beliefs “are less rigidly held” and may evolve over time as a product of 
the external changes in the socio-economic environment in which the policy subsystem 
evolves, they are also assumed “to be more readily adjusted in light of new data, new 
experience, or changing strategic considerations” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 
122). These “cores” are the level of closeness in beliefs shared by people in advocacy 
coalitions, where some will share deep core “views on society” and others will only 
share more pragmatic beliefs at the implementation level of the “policy advocacy”. This 
emphasis on the belief systems of advocacy coalitions allows for a deeper analysis and 
understanding of why some policy advocates form stronger or weaker coalitions with 
differentiated success in the policy process. I find this framework useful for the analysis 
of the policy for the distribution of EC, since as I will show, there are deeply embedded 
worldviews in each camp involved in the policy process between 2000 and 2010. 
Judicialisation 
The judicialisation of politics in Latin America – defined as the increasing political role 
played by courts in democracies – is a phenomenon that has attracted much attention in 
the last decade (Couso and Hilbink 2011; Couso et al. 2010a, 2010b; Couso 2004; 
Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008; Sieder et al. 2005). 
Indeed, as highlighted by Sieder et al., there has been a change “in the nature and 
character of judicial involvement in political matters since the 1980s and ever greater 
recourse to the courts is now a marked feature on the region’s contemporary 
democracies” (2005: 1). The authors also highlight that this is related “to a process by 
which a diverse range of political and social actors increasingly perceive advantage in 
invoking legal strategies and resorting to courts to advance their interests” (2005: 1), 
thus: 
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… the judicialization of politics is not only about judicial review. A broader 
definition of judicialization encompasses the increased presence of judicial 
processes and courts rulings in political and social life, the increasing resolution of 
political, social, or state-society conflicts in the courts. (2005: 1) 
Judicialisation literature, although originating from the sociology of law, is also strongly 
influenced by HI and NI and the need to give more attention to the role played by the 
interaction between informal and formal rules of the game, practices and narratives, as 
well as unveiling the role of formal and informal actors through the analysis of power 
dynamics not visible to the naked eye. The legal and judicial arenas present the 
researcher with key spaces to study the way in which norms and actors interact within 
specific institutional environments. The role of judges and courts is just as important as 
the impact of the written law. 
Processes of judicialisation are in fact studied from different lenses including the 
literature on democratisation, governance and accountability, and citizens’ participation. 
The process of judicialisation can be activated from the top-down by rulers, or from the 
bottom-up by and from society, as well as sometimes “from abroad” (Sieder et al. 2005: 
4-5). As Domingo explains, in the case of judicialisation due to “rulers relinquishing 
law-making power to judges”, it allows for “horizontal accountability” mechanisms to 
be activated (2005: 23). 
Moreover, the judicialisation of politics is also linked to the increasing level of judicial 
activism in a country and is closely related to the transfer of difficult issues from the 
political sphere to the judicial arena. As explained by Sieder et al., “judicial activism 
can lead to a judicialization of politics – when lawmaking and policy implementation is 
increasingly displaced from the executive and congressional branches toward the 
judiciary” and this can be initiated by a range of actors, including “opposition parties, 
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particularly those in a minority within legislatures, who may use the legal route to try to 
block certain policies, for example by appealing against the constitutionality of a 
particular government initiative” (2005: 5-6). 
Judicial activism, which is defined by Epp as the process by which a constitutional 
court “creates or expands a host of new constitutional rights” (Epp 1998: 2), is strongly 
linked to the role of judges and the dominant political environment in which courts and 
judges have to rule. As Domingo argues: 
… the decision to invoke judges’ oversight functions (or to abide by their rulings) 
by political actors may not be motivated by a genuine commitment to limited 
government, but may instead be the outcome of short-term strategies responding to 
electoral pressures, to a legitimacy crisis or to the attempt to delegate unpopular 
decision making on political and social matters to courts. (2005: 24) 
An important aspect of the judicialisation process and its positive impact for the 
advancement of people’s rights is the role of courts in judicial review, particularly 
constitutional review. The courts’ more proactive or passive attitude towards judicial 
review seems to depend on their historical evolution and role within the state’s structure 
(Couso 2011). Epp also emphasises that rights consciousness is not enough for a rights 
revolution, rather the growth of support structures for legal mobilization – including 
material resources to access professional legal expertise is a key factor in this process – 
together with litigation strategies by social actors (1998, 25, 43). This implies the active 
role of civil society groups and movements with the support of lawyers and the access 
to resources and knowledge to access the courts. 
The judicialisation of politics in Chile 
Couso (2005) argues that the judicialisation of Chilean politics has resulted in the 
“Rights Revolution that Never Was”. By this he means that once democracy returned, 
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Chilean courts did not actively engage in the creation or expansion of rights through 
their powers for constitutional review.17 This was despite the fact that Chile counted on 
a strong judiciary and legal culture as well as the resources and support structures for 
legal mobilisation linked to the presence of lawyers in the defence of human rights and 
the presence of many NGOs and public interest lawyers. This is surprising considering 
that this could have represented a radical change in the power and role of the courts: 
Through this veto power courts can block policy initiatives, and depending on the 
degree of leadership and activism of the courts, they can contribute to the 
development of policy initiatives that have been ignored by the political process. 
(Couso 2005: 107) 
On the other hand, the literature that has analysed the historical evolution of the 
judiciary and its institutions in Chile highlights that from very early on the creation of 
the judiciary responded to the economic interests of the elite (Faundez 2007: 8) and 
therefore never played a progressive role for citizens’ rights. Hilbink goes further and 
asserts that focusing on the period 1964-1994, the courts played a role that she defines 
as consistently illiberal under both democratic and authoritarian regimes (2003: 65). 
Hilbrink adds: 
Chilean leaders constructed the judiciary to serve more as “ballasts for the 
executive” than as a defense against the abuse of citizens’ rights (Adelman 
1992:292), and Chilean judges have generally been true to this role. (2003: 86) 
Couso (2010) argues that there has been an important transformation of the 
constitutional discourse in Latin America, and this cultural shift could explain the 
judicialisation of politics, including in Chile where legal scholarship has called for a 
move from a formalist attitude toward legal interpretation to one where human rights 
                                               17 For Couso: “The power given to courts to enforce the constitutionality of legislation and administrative acts, including the ability to declare them void when they are deemed to violate the constitution, constitutes one of the most significant developments in the political structure of constitutional democracies in recent years” (2011: 71). 
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provision of the Constitution – including international human rights standards – can be 
invoked by judges. The hope is that this change in ideology could lead the “legal elite to 
respond to demands of individuals and groups attempting to use the courts to further 
their policy preferences (Couso 2010: 158). This matters because such cultural change 
could represent a crucial change in the access to justice by different social groups 
including women and feminists. This legal progressive shift would represent a unique 
opportunity for women’s social mobilisation in defence of their rights, as well as for the 
status of international law and frameworks on women’s rights within the Chilean justice 
system. 
Linking EC with judicialisation and Feminist Institutionalism 
From the literature review, we know that there has been important research regarding 
women’s reproductive rights in Chile, in particular abortion, and the way women’s 
movements have actively promoted those rights via legal initiatives, how the state has 
historically dealt with the issue, and how parties have also addressed the issue (Blofield 
and Haas 2005; Blofield 2006; Haas 2006, 2010; Htun 2003; Macaulay 2006). 
However, none of this research looks specifically at the judicial system and the role of 
the courts, since the EC issue is the first reproductive debate to be dealt with in the 
courts. 
If one accepts the notion of gender regimes established by O’Connell (1987) to define 
the way in which a certain gender order prevails within institutions, then the role and 
personal beliefs of actors can be considered part of the informal institutions, while their 
legal decisions and laws surrounding them can be considered as the formal ones. But in 
a context where judicialisation has been identified as a new trend and constitutional 
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adjudication has been brought forward as a way to expand citizens’ rights, one must 
question the gendered nature of the legal framework as well as the judiciary. 
Feminists have not paid significant attention to the constitutional/legal arena compared 
to the electoral and state/bureaucratic arena (Waylen 2006). However, looking at the 
judicial power within the state and its institutions from a feminist perspective matters, 
since we know that “constitutional engineering” represents an important step for 
democratisation and participation of citizens, in particular women (Waylen 2006). For 
feminists in particular this represents a new area of focus since: 
… constitutions lie at the core of the institutional structure and legal system of a 
state and define the relationships between the state and its citizens as well as 
among the citizens themselves, they play an important role in codifying gender 
rights. (Waylen 2006: 1210) 
In Chile, the transition to democracy was done through the acceptance of democratic 
parties of the authoritarian Constitution of 1980, which contained many undemocratic 
enclaves. Of those, one was particularly gendered – the introduction of the “right to life 
of the unborn” in the Constitution, which was eventually matched by the last-minute 
derogation of the right to abortion in the health code by the military. These changes 
were made in the context of many other constitutional reforms included in the pact 
made between the military and newly elected civilian government in order to reinstate 
democracy in the country. 
Constitutions, however, may only be a starting point and other laws and policies may be 
required to ensure women’s effective access and claim to their rights. There is a belief 
that a “culture of rights and a judicial system that facilitates legal challenges, for 
example through the presence of feminist judges and sufficient resources” are just as 
important (Waylen 2006: 1220). This is why a FI approach must look beyond formal 
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institutions and outcomes to also examine the processes and ideas that prevailed in a 
specific policy process and judicial battle. 
Courts and transitions therefore matter, especially in a post-authoritarian context. Courts 
respond to the institutional environment, through which judges who have the power to 
interpret the law and rule on specific matters, and this involves the legal culture and 
institutional environment as much as their own beliefs. They will probably respond in a 
gendered manner to the advancement and promotion of women’s reproductive rights if 
both laws and the legal culture are shaped by a gendered understanding of rights. 
Methodology and data collection 
As FI scholars have explained, if the political environment and policy process behind 
any policy-making initiative are gendered, the outcomes of that policy will also be 
gendered. This is why it is so important to gender the methods with which we research 
in order to unveil the hidden power differentials and gender power dynamics. This 
poses specific challenges for the choice of methods and data collection. As some 
authors have recently explained, the main obstacle one faces is that “[i]nformal rules 
and practices are notoriously difficult to unravel and research” (Chappell and Waylen 
2013: 600). This is particularly difficult for political scientists who have to venture out 
of their “comfort zone” to adopt new adequate methodological approaches coming from 
other disciplines, while facing issues of confidentiality and access to uncover links 
between formal and informal rules (Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
Subjects and rationale 
The first methodological concern for this research was the rationale for the selection of 
the research subjects. By “subjects” I understand the participants whether individuals 
and, or, organisations that are crucial to carry out the study (Rudestam 2007: 89). The 
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research had to take into account the different set of actors and spaces behind the legal 
and political processes that surrounded the public policy to distribute EC. Primary and 
secondary materials related to the organisations and institutions involved in the policy 
process were also included in the research plan, as well as a review of the press for fact-
checking and to help the mapping out of actors and institutions. 
This research used Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to map the actors 
of the EC public policy process and in this way bringr actors and their beliefs to the 
centre of policy analysis (see Chs 5 and 6). The AFC emphasises actors’ diversity and 
their capacity to join forces to promote policy change (Sabatier 1988). This means 
people should be the primary source of information and the diversity of the subjects 
should guide the selection of participants as well. The research thus started by mapping 
out the policy sub-systems affecting the policy surrounding the distribution of EC in 
Chile, thereby attempting to give a clear overview of the way these policy sub-systems 
varied and evolved over the 14 years since EC was first discussed. 
This was particularly important for this research since the diversity of actors and their 
spatial locations in the political arena varied over time and this may not seem obvious at 
first glance. I paid particular attention to the power differentials that may be hidden 
behind “formal” institutional rules and discourses affecting reproductive autonomy. 
These power differentials are seen within the context of the post-transition in Chile 
keeping in mind the accounts that feminist political scientists have provided of the 
gendered regime change from a historical institutionalism perspective (Waylen 2008). 
Finally, the AFC is useful for the analysis of EC policy, considering the strong set of 
beliefs that guided the actors involved. These “cores” are the level of closeness in 
convictions shared by people in advocacy coalitions, where some will share deep core 
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“views on society” and others will only share more pragmatic beliefs at the 
implementation level of the “policy advocacy”. This emphasis on the belief systems of 
advocacy coalitions allows for a deeper analysis and understanding of why some policy 
advocates form stronger or weaker coalitions with differentiated success in the policy 
process. This allowed the mapping of a restricted number of people within each 
advocacy coalition, and belonging to a wide range of institutions. 
Sampling 
The research used a non-probabilistic purposive sampling in line with the results 
provided by the mapping of the advocacy coalitions trying to give a clear overview of 
the way these policy sub-systems varied and evolved over 14 years. This included 
policy-makers, parliamentarians, members of feminist and biomedical NGOs, 
autonomous feminists, scientists and academics, owners of pharmacies and 
pharmaceutical companies, journalists, judges and lawyers at the Constitutional 
Tribunal, members of the Church and lawyers linked to religious movements. 
I started by identifying and giving priority to those participants who could know and 
recommend additional potential participants in order to produce a snowball effect.18 
This had the “boomerang” effect of validating my mapping of the advocacy coalition, 
giving me the confidence that my purposive sampling was going in the right direction. 
Moreover, as explained by Beamer, when dealing with informal policy networks, this 
way of proceeding permits to shed some light on actors one could not have identified 
otherwise; this evolving process eventually completes the sample (2014: 91). 
                                               18 “Snowball sampling” has been defined in different manners since the terminology was first used (Handcock and Gile 2011). Here I use the concept of snowball sampling to refer to the non-probabilistic selection of initial participants who are asked to identify other participants and in this way permit access to hard-to-reach populations or simplify access to a tight network of people.  
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In the context of Chilean society, with a small elite and even smaller policy advocacy 
coalitions, and considering the highly politicised environment surrounding EC, it was 
important to ensure that the initial interviews would open the door to other participants 
while providing me with a trusted profile in front of potential interviewees. I was well 
aware that some people might feel suspicious of the fact that they were being contacted 
by a Chilean researcher who was not linked to any local organisation. During an 
electoral year, it was important not to let any potential subject think that I was a 
journalist in disguise. 
The appropriate number of participants was the result of a saturation19 effect and 
consistent with the mapping of the advocacy coalitions. Thanks to the mapping, I had an 
initial idea of how many people were important and relevant for the research, and as the 
interviews progressed they covered most overarching themes and topics needed for the 
study. I reached what I determined a saturation point at around 32 people when it was 
clear that additional interviews were not contributing additional insights and the 
gathered information became repetitive. 
I also took into account that 2009 was a difficult year for interviews due to the political 
context of an electoral year. Later, in 2011, 2012 and 2014, after reviewing the material 
I had gathered during my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to interview five more people 
who I thought could provide additional information. I did this during my vacations and 
through personal contacts. This gave me a larger pool of participants on whose views I 
was able to draw conclusions. 
                                               19 The concept of “saturation” has been at the centre of debates and it is hard to find clear guidelines on how to estimate the size of samples, in particular for non-probabilistic sampling (Guest 2006). I have used a similar definition to Guest et al., which they define as “the point in data collection and analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook” and in which one reaches a sense of “thematic exhaustion” (2006: 65, 78).  
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Instrumentation/measures 
I opted for a qualitative methods approach when I realised my research would require 
focusing on both formal and informal actors and formal and informal institutions. This 
resulted in a research approach primarily based on interviews, supported by the review 
of primary and secondary source materials. 
Following the rationale of the sampling and the objectives of my research, I decided the 
more appropriate tools were semi-structured and open-ended interviews. These types of 
interviews are common in political science, with elite interviews20 being the most 
common type (Leech 2006). Aderbach and Rockman have explained that elite 
interviews are particularly useful if one is interested in a subject’s political attitude, 
values, and beliefs (2002: 673). As argued by Lynch: 
Well-conducted interviews give access to information about respondents’ 
experiences and motivations that may not be available in the public or 
documentary record; they allow us to understand opinions and thought processes… 
(2013: 37) 
Yet it is important to bear in mind the challenges posed by open-ended interviews. The 
researcher must have the flexibility and the capacity to work through “active listening” 
due to the conversational nature of the interview process. This in concrete terms means 
that the “interviewer ‘allows the interviewee the freedom to talk and ascribe meanings’ 
while bearing in mind the broader aims of the project” (Noaks and Wincup 2004: 80 
cited in Silverman 2011: 110). 
Some people are concerned with the flexibility given by semi-structured interviews, for 
example in the lack of order or sequence of questions, as well as their openness. But the 
                                               20 For the purpose of this research, the term elite refers to people in key positions of power and influence, either within government or other state institutions, academia, the Church, NGOs, etc.  
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“rambling” that can ensue from using open-ended questions can also result in a 
rewarding final product. Indeed, despite taking more time and demanding high levels of 
attention from the interviewer, the flexibility, together with the “conversational flow 
and depth of response can outweigh the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering” 
(Aderbach and Rockman 2002: 674). 
Moreover, since an interview is a process in which both sides are actively participating 
and shaping the outcome of the encounter, it is therefore collaboratively produced and 
interviewers have an active participant’s role (Rapley 2004 cited in Silverman 2011: 
112). Thus, the product resulting from an interview process is “a particular 
representation or account of an individual’s views or opinions” (Byrne 2004: 182 cited 
in Silverman 2011: 117). The use of open-ended questions provides respondents with 
the freedom to express these representations in their own terms and thus can increase 
the validity of their answers, as well as make more educated respondents more 
comfortable to articulate their views in the case of elite interviews (Aderbach and 
Rockman 2002: 674). 
Feminists have highlighted how excluded groups, including women, have seen their 
voices and experiences silenced by quantitative approaches often perceived as 
scientifically more “objective” (Epstein Jayaratne and Stewart 2008: 51-52). This thesis 
follows FI’s premises and is interested in showing how feminists engaged and were 
actors of this policy process and needed to record their account of the events. 
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the advocacy coalitions, I was also aware that some 
of the interviews would be elite interviews and in other cases I would need to use a 
more general approach, composed of key informant interviews mixed with participant 
observation techniques. Indeed, many feminist organisations and advocates that come 
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from grassroots movements are often more comfortable in group interviews with their 
colleagues and with a more informal approach to interviewing. I was lucky to be invited 
to many events organised by feminist groups and NGOs as well as other organisations 
and individuals working on SRHR, including Parliamentary sessions on EC and the 
protests staged against the Contraloría by feminists. During these events where I was an 
active participant I recorded most data through written notes, during and after informal 
exchanges with the attendants. When possible I used video or audio recording, trying to 
remain as non-invasive as possible in my role as observer. 
Finally the interviews followed a semi-structured form guided by a general outline 
made of a list of 10 topics that needed to be covered in every interview, which I 
identified as key to collecting the information relevant for my research question (see 
App. 2). 
This interview plan allowed me to keep a consistent general structure among interviews, 
even if I adapted the opening questions and their content according to the specific 
characteristics of the subject (individuals, NGOs, lawyers, doctors, politicians, 
feminists, etc.). What remained fully consistent was my initial presentation and the 
description of my work, as well as the recurrent request to tape and offer to give 
confidentiality if the interviewees wanted it. Most interviews started with general 
introductory questions giving space for the interviewee to lead on the subject – also 
known as “Grand Tour” questions (Leech 2006). Additionally I used the topics list to 
provide me with planned prompts to intervene at key moments during the interview to 
either go more in-depth or shift the conversation to an area not being covered 
spontaneously by the participant. 
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Other materials 
The initial research of materials was done by carrying out a press review of articles 
covering the EC policy legal and political battles between 1998 and 2010 (see ‘Other 
Data’ section). The documents’ revision then focused on the collected materials 
obtained via interviews and visits to organisations. The press review was done before 
and during fieldwork, via internet and through the collection of local newspapers. It 
provided a key background context to the issue, and helped with the mapping of key 
actors and potential interviewees. 
Timeframe and procedures 
I collected most primary source materials for my research over the five-month period I 
spent in Chile between March and July 2009. I tried to be as thorough as possible in my 
data collection of the coverage of the policy from 2000-2010. However, because the 
work on EC at the medical level had started back in 1996, my interviews with key 
actors on this aspect of the issue tried to cover that four-year gap as well. 
While in Chile I was mostly based in Santiago, the capital, but had the opportunity to 
travel frequently to Valparaiso where the Congress is located. As Chile is a country with 
a highly centralised economic and political system, I did not need to travel more than 
this. In fact most subjects and organisations offered to meet either in Valparaiso or 
Santiago. 
I was also hosted by the institution where I did my undergraduate degree, the Institute 
of Political Science (ISP) at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. The ISP’s 
director was kind enough to extend an invitation to me as visiting researcher there, 
which granted me open access to the university’s libraries in Santiago, the opportunity 
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for informal chats with academics and increased my credibility to approach potential 
interviewees. 
The interview process 
I interviewed 37 actors belonging to the different advocacy coalitions (see Chs 5 and 6) 
involved in the EC policy process including government officials, former ministers, 
Parliamentarians, one judge at the Constitutional Tribunal, feminists in NGOs and part 
of the wider movement, doctors working on reproductive medicine in universities and 
NGOs, as well as lawyers and academics involved in the judicial processes on both 
sides of the issue (see App. 1). Whenever it was possible I taped the interviews using a 
small, non-intimidating recorder. I also took written notes that were supplemented by 
my own personal notes immediately after the end of the meeting to record atmosphere, 
personal impressions as well as comments that might have been made off the record. 
Thirty-five out of 37 interviewees agreed to be taped. The interviews varied between 45 
minutes and two hours. 
Communication with interviewees 
Despite using contacts to get access to key initial participants, all participants were 
contacted via a formal email stating the purpose of my research and letting them know I 
was a PhD student from London University. As these initial emails were often not 
successful I had to follow-up via a new email and, or telephone call stating my relation 
to a person both I and the potential subject knew. This approach via personal 
recommendation worked the best, confirming my decision to work through a snowball 
process. Interviewees were often generous and spontaneously offered to put me in touch 
with other people they considered to be key actors in the process. 
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Despite the efforts to approach people in a sensitive and professional manner, I faced a 
strong sense of suspicion from the conservative actors belonging to the anti-EC 
advocacy coalition. Most of them requested to be kept anonymous. Despite using my 
contacts in high positions within academia it was almost impossible to obtain an 
interview with most judges at the Constitutional Court and conservative 
Parliamentarians. This could be explained by the fact that the press had suddenly 
become very keen on covering the EC debate and in part by the overlap of my fieldwork 
with the beginning of the presidential electoral campaign, where Concertación’s 
candidate, Eduardo Frei (PDC), tried to position himself as progressive by putting 
abortion and EC on the electoral agenda. 
In general, anti-EC advocacy members, whether in politics, members of the Church or 
independent professionals, behaved in a defensive manner when approached. A key 
lawyer I eventually managed to interview immediately asked me as I entered his office: 
“How did you track me down? I am normally very discreet.” The second time I was in 
his corporate office he refused to be taped. Others showed a sense of curiosity, which 
opened the doors of key interviewees in high positions. A member of the Catholic 
Church told me: “Of course I am curious and I am willing to give one hour of my time 
when a young Chilean woman studying in London, doing a PhD while she could be 
doing other things wants to interview me.” 
Finally some refusals were more direct and aggressive in their tone, bordering on 
rudeness. A female Parliamentarian sent the following reply to my formal email 
requesting an interview (see App. 3 for full exchange of correspondence): 
Estoy en total desacuerdo con la promoción de los Derechos Reproductivos. 
Incluyen El Aborto y estoy por “LA VIDA”. 
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This email was an exception yet I found it very informative about the feelings the 
issue was provoking in the conservative advocacy coalition. From thereon I was 
more careful and strategic when contacting key informants, relying more heavily 
on personal referrals to bring down the barriers of suspicion that I was facing. 
Limitations of the methods and interview process 
My research presents a limitation in my analysis concerning conservative positions 
on EC considering that most subjects in the anti-EC advocacy coalition who 
declined or ignored the interview requests came from the conservative sector. I 
was unable to obtain an interview with most Constitutional Tribunal judges; 
however, the one judge who spoke to me played a crucial role in the process and 
ruling of EC, which I believe compensates for the absence of the others. Also, it 
was easy for him to speak about his colleagues and people who supported and 
shared his views since there are only seven of them. I therefore tracked any form 
of scholarly article, interview in the press and official opinions regarding the 
ruling (including all official documents by the Constitutional Tribunal) to get a 
fuller picture of the other judges’ worldviews and beliefs. In the final stages of the 
research I had the opportunity to speak with two lawyers who were closely 
involved in the legal process within government or the Constitutional Tribunal 
who helped me triangulate much of the information. 
Something similar happened with one of the lawyers who led the conservative 
lobby against EC who did not reply. Nonetheless I was able to speak to one of his 
fellow co-petitioners at the Constitutional Tribunal who explained both their 
positions on the EC issue. The senior official of the Church I was able to interview 
also gave a clear view of the Church’s beliefs and modus operandi on this matter, 
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since he was the “in charge” for this agenda during the whole process. I used these 
interviews to triangulate the written information I had found and the key elements 
coming from the interviews of other members. Although it is impossible to 
establish full certainty on their beliefs and views, I am confident that I did 
everything in my power to avoid the bias of unreliability of the information 
obtained and was able to reach the adequate saturation point in my interview 
process. I believe the saturation point would have been similar had I had the 
opportunity to speak to more conservative actors since the main topics coming out 
of the interviews with conservative actors were similar to those topics present in 
the interviews with the pro-SRHR actors. 
Positioning myself as a researcher 
As discussed above, there are specific challenges to conducting research on sensitive 
topics, and both the political context and the way in which a researcher is perceived can 
affect access to information. If we accept that power is present at every stage of the 
research process it is extremely important to position oneself. 
In carrying out my research I paid particular attention to the positioning of my roles as 
both researcher and feminist, as well as being Chilean carrying out research within my 
own society, while being resident abroad. As I mentioned previously, it was difficult to 
escape the gaze of my interlocutors and their questioning me back during our 
encounters. This is something I expected since as some authors have highlighted: 
Power shapes the process of the interview research from beginning to end, from 
the initial formulation of the research question to the final dissemination of results. 
(MacLean 2013: 67) 
Abortion and SRHR are sensitive topics to discuss when the interviewee may hold 
particularly strong views on these topics. Both feminists and Catholics approached the 
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debate in a passionate manner, in which I sometimes felt I was wearing an activist hat, 
and at other times a researcher hat, allowing me to look in a detached manner at the 
work of people I strongly agreed or disagreed with. 
As explained by MacLean: “Even if not completely objective or neutral, the 
researcher’s theoretical and often comparative perspective as an outsider is also quite 
valuable” (2013: 71). Therefore, I always tried to be as open as possible on my research 
and never refused to answer any questions, even personal ones regarding my 
background. Most importantly I never hid when confronted with the question that I was 
a feminist and had previously worked in NGOs defending SRHR. Often, luckily, these 
questions came at the end of interviews and my interviewees found it amusing or 
actually provided further information. Also, I always offered and sometimes received a 
spontaneous demand to see the final product of my research by the informants. I kept a 
record of this and plan to share this thesis with them once it is finalised. 
The “chameleon” dilemma 
Following Sidney Tarrow’s views on the interview process with political actors, I saw 
“my respondents as both informants and participants” within the communication 
sharing process and also within their own changing identities according to the role 
played in the policy process (Little 2008). Tarrow suggests that “the social scientist 
needs to find a way of being engaged with his or her informants or participants in an 
interactive way” (Little 2008), which to me was translated in the use of my “multiple 
identities” during the interview process, leaving most of the control and methods for 
interviews to the analysis process. 
I tried to approach my interviews with an open mind knowing that due to cultural 
practices specific to Chile, an adequate time to introduce myself and to allow some 
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rambling was necessary. I was right in doing so since this was crucial to allow the 
interviewee to relax before the interview itself. In some cases, however, this only 
happened after I was asked many questions about myself, about studying and living 
abroad, about my family including trying to make connections (non-existent) between 
my last name and people some interviewees knew. This type of screening and power 
relations is probably something a foreign researcher would not face, and it meant that I 
needed to be prepared to have a standard speech for each category of interviewees. If 
they were academic, talking about academia in the UK was key, and if NGO and 
activists, my own past working in those spaces and activist identity was useful. 
This happened mostly during elite interviews where the power balance between the 
interviewee and me was often in their favour. This also translated in them telling me 
where and when to meet, changing dates or cancelling at the last minute, interrupting 
the interview to take a phone call or asking me to stop the recording of our 
conversations to make some comments off the record. The situation was totally different 
with activists and members of NGOs and social movements. They often offered me 
flexibility and time for my interviews and were open to my presence in a more relaxed 
manner establishing a horizontal relationship. 
In order to compensate for the power differentials in these different interview settings, I 
modified my dress code accordingly as well as my body language and speech pattern. 
With elites I dressed formally, spoke in a very formal language referring to theoretical 
concepts they were keen to engage with, and I also shook their hand. In contrast, with 
other interviewees, my dress code was more casual, I would kiss people on the cheek to 
greet them and I would use a more colloquial language to engage. Often these 
interviewees also chose more casual places to meet such as cafes and public spaces, 
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which allowed us to walk, or sit comfortably and have a more casual chat. With the 
youngest interviewees it was hard to conduct a “formal” interview since they considered 
my open and casual behaviour essential to being able to trust me. 
Finally, I also discovered that being a female and “young”21 researcher put me in a very 
paternalistic power differential with male elite interviewees who spoke to me as they 
would have with their daughters or grand-daughters. This translated into something 
common in Chilean society called “mijiteo”, where the elder person addresses you as 
“mijita”, which is a colloquialism derived from the contraction of “mi hijita” (my 
daughter) and reinforces their alleged wisdom and knowledge over yours. It also 
happened on numerous occasions with some female interviewees, in which case it took 
a maternalistic and more protective tone. This was something I mostly used to my 
advantage, letting them carry on treating me as if I was naïve, which allowed space to 
ask questions they would not have answered so easily otherwise. 
Other data 
The data I collected also covers a wide range of sources and materials: government 
documents and declarations, NGO publications and communications, press releases and 
public statements by the Catholic Church, legal documents and judicial records, audio-
visual materials from conferences and symposia, newspaper articles, my own pictures 
and videos from events. I felt extremely lucky to be met with great generosity by most 
people I met. I rarely left an office empty-handed. 
I carried out a press review of the issues of abortion and EC from 1996 until 2010 
mostly through printed press and more recently digital and radio media. The four main 
                                               21 This in Chile means generally under 40 years old. 
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newspapers I used were the far-right conservative El Mercurio and La Segunda,22 the 
centre-right La Tercera, and because Chile does not have a left-wing publication with a 
wide circulation, I opted to use the government-funded La Nación, which in my opinion 
better reflected the Concertación views on most political events. It should be noted that 
the majority of the printed press is in the hands of just two financial conglomerates in 
Chile: the first is the Edwards family, representing generally the views of the far-right 
and known for being close to the Church; and COPESA, which is considered a slightly 
more liberal right-wing sympathiser. I also reviewed audio-visual materials such as talk 
shows and television interviews with key characters involved in the EC debates and 
legal and political processes. I transcribed their declarations and opinions in videos 
(five) and radio interviews (three) when I found it necessary to use them as evidence. 
In order to complement my interviews and press review, I also attended some meetings 
of feminist groups and conferences as a way to use participatory observation in a 
triangulation exercise. This approach was adopted to create a better and more relaxed 
rapport with the subject. It also allowed me to listen more in detail to the debates 
affecting feminist groups. This was done both in Santiago and Valparaiso. Among the 
meetings I attended was one regarding the use of an anonymous mobile phone line 
providing advice on abortion to women. These meetings allowed me not only to meet 
different leaders and organisations but also to interact with feminists of all ages and 
backgrounds. In July 2009, I was invited by contacts from the women’s movement to 
join a caravan of buses rented by APROFA to take people from Santiago to the 
Congress in Valparaiso to attend the session on the Fertility Bill. I am most thankful to 
the people who allowed me to attend such an interesting and lively historic event. 
                                               22 This is a paper printed in the afternoons that targets civil servants, politicians and policy-makers and has an open conservative agenda. 
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I mostly focused on the interaction of all advocacy groups and within the same 
coalitions. Therefore I often tried to triangulate information given by different actors 
belonging to the coalitions. Chapters 5 to 8 are based primarily on the interviews and 
their analysis. I traced the origins and evolution of the policy process through the 
combination of the analysis of the interviews and other primary source materials. 
Finally, it was important for me to document the processes I witnessed through more 
intimate materials. I used personal photography and video to record events and talks I 
found essential to capture for my analysis. I strongly felt I needed to immerse myself in 
the spirit of the debates to fully understand the complexity of the political and cultural 
struggle that was taking place in Chile at the time of my fieldwork, which coincided 
with a crucial electoral year. 
Data analysis 
The open-ended interviews I conducted were analysed taking into account the 10 
themes I used as a pattern for all interviews. I transcribed all interviews, as well as all 
personal notes taken during my fieldwork. During this initial process I took note of all 
the emerging themes coming from the interviews and informants’ answers, while 
connecting them with the main topics I had established for the interview process. I 
proceeded to select the main ideas coming from the recurrent themes from which I 
coded the themes and searched for any emerging patterns. 
I did not use any software for this part of the work, preferring to use a pen and paper 
coding process, which provided a more direct contact with the material, hand-written 
notes and the possibility to keep control over the process. This was time-consuming but 
also rewarding and stimulating. With other materials, such as press materials, I carefully 
categorised the articles according to topics and actors involved to trace the timeline and 
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map the main events and actors behind the policy process. Visual and audio materials 
were all interviews so once transcribed they were treated like the main data set of 
interviews. 
The analysis process was done over different stages, starting with an initial analysis 
during the fieldwork to identify the main themes coming out from the interviews and to 
start establishing the amount of interviews needed (“saturation” process). Once back in 
London the transcription time was consuming but allowed me to immerse myself to 
analyse carefully the answers received from the interviewees. The advantage of taping 
is that not only was the information available but also the tones and figures of speech 
used by the interviewees to communicate the meaning they assigned to the topics were 
addressed. 
Although Sabatier’s ACF was useful for grouping people’s views as advocacies and 
gain new insights into the policy process and the nature of the advocacy coalitions, as 
well as the relational aspects of actors interactions and their power dynamics, I needed 
to go back to FI to gain more analytical insights into the role of formal and informal 
institutions in shaping the policy process. 
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CHAPTER 4: Sexual and Reproductive Health in Chile since the 1960s: Actors and Institutions 
Using a HI approach, this chapter reviews the evolution of reproductive health 
initiatives in Chile since the 1960s. In doing so, it aims to identify the level of presence 
or absence and influence of women’s and feminist groups in policy debates around the 
provision of reproductive health services in Chile over the last century, and more 
particularly since the 1960s. HI pays particular attention to critical junctures and long-
term processes to make visible the importance of institutions for policy-making. The 
chapter thus focuses on the creation of family planning policies and services in the 
1960s and 1970s and the institutions and actors involved in the field since then. It then 
looks at the impact of the dictatorship on these policies with the aim of identifying the 
institutions and policy actors who have played a major role in advancing women’s 
sexual and reproductive health in the decades prior to Chile’s return to democracy. 
The discussion briefly reviews the initiatives taken by the left-wing governments 
between the 1930s and 1950s to respond to the needs for better maternal and infant 
healthcare. The chapter then turns its attention to the 1960s health initiatives by the 
Christian Democrat government of Frei Montalv, which first introduced family planning 
services, supported by the medical profession and policy-makers and tacitly by the 
Church. The chapter then contrasts the international and national contexts of the 1970s 
and 1980s under Allende and Pinochet’s dictatorship, which affected the continuity of 
family planning. The chapter shows that socialist and authoritarian governments 
reproduced patriarchal structures while ignoring women’s rights in their initiatives to 
provide fertility control services, although one can identify a few incipient progressive 
initiatives under Allende. More importantly, women’s health movements and women’s 
rights discourses on health can be traced to the years of struggle against the dictatorship. 
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Finally the chapter analyses the transition to democracy and the role played by the 1980 
Constitution in setting the new rules of the game for any initiative regarding SRHR. 
This chapter argues that the circles of scholars, specialists, practitioners, activists and 
policy-makers working currently on SRHR issues are overall the same since the 1960s. 
The institutions framing the work and debates on SRHR, including the role of medicine 
on SRHR policies, the importance of religion, and the formal institutional environment 
created by the 1980 Constitution on women’s rights and the criminalisation of abortion, 
have also remained influential, reinforcing the rules of the game for those wanting to 
promote a progressive agenda for SRHR and women’s rights. 
Sexual and reproductive health in Chile in the first half of the 20th century 
Public policies and the provision of sexual and reproductive health services in the early 
1900s were strongly influenced by positivist approaches to social policy, including 
eugenics and hygienist visions of sanitary services. The importance of emerging 
scientific methods and techniques to produce policies from the state – and their promise 
to give humans control for the first time over natural phenomena they had no control 
over previously – gave a prominent role to professionals such as doctors, lawyers and 
scientists in policy-making (Htun 2003). Women’s bodies and reproductive health, and 
in particular contraception, family planning and abortion, were at the centre of health 
policy debates. 
Positivism and its followers benefited from the fact that from the end of the 19th 
century, but especially during the 20th century, the state started to play an “increasingly 
significant role in the ordering of social economic life […] through law, social welfare, 
and economic and social policy, as well as through attempts to regulate the norms of 
public culture” (Molyneux 2000: 36-37). Health in particular was one of the areas of 
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human life where the state played an increasingly influential role over the last century. 
This often resulted in top-down approaches to public policies with included almost no 
participation of women. Women therefore at the turn of the century “were becoming the 
objects of state regulation” (Molyneux 2000: 49). 
Abortion in Chile was introduced within the Criminal Code in 1875. Chile’s 1875 
abortion law applied not only to women seeking or having an abortion, but also to 
doctors performing them. Doctor’s liability was only modified by President Ibañez’s 
reform of the Health Code in 1931, which introduced the criminal exemption for 
doctors performing abortions to save a mother’s life (Htun 2003). This created the 
possibility of therapeutic abortion in Chile, which remained legal until 1989. 
In Chile, between 1900 and 1950 the first state health institutions were formed. In 1924 
President Alessandri created the first Ministerio de Higiene, Asistencia y Previsión 
Social (Ministry of Hygiene, Assistance and Social Provision) (Arellano 1985: 28). In 
1938, the Frente Popular governments launched prevention health services for the 
workers, followed in 1952 by the Servicio Nacional de Salud (SNS), Chile’s first 
National Health Service extending healthcare coverage to the whole family as a way to 
protect mothers and children (Arellano 1985: 31). 
Frente Popular governments were committed to improving the health of workers and the 
poorest sectors of society, and in particular women and children, even if this did not 
challenge the patriarchal structures affecting women, and actually reinforced the image 
of a “woman worker and mother” (Rosemblatt 2000b). In fact, the new sexual and 
political morality of the Frente Popular governments was reinforced by the centrality of 
the family in the socialist discourse against capitalism, which they saw as the major 
threat to that unit by not giving the means to workers to take care of their families’ 
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material needs (Rosemblatt 2000b: 209). In doing so, leftists thus neutralised women’s 
opposition to male dominance and “re-encoded patriarchy as capitalism” (Rosemblatt 
2000b: 209). 
The creation of the new state health institutions marked a milestone in the way women 
and feminists could engage with the state in the future regarding their health needs. 
Women now faced a more coordinated set of policies and policy-makers behind 
decisions regarding their bodies and health. In fact, in 1935, the first organised group 
advocating for the regulation of fertility and equality of women in Chile, the 
Movimiento Pro Emancipación de las Mujeres de Chile (MEMCH), was born. 
MEMCH quickly became a visible and active feminist militant force gathering women 
of all social strata (Jiles 1994: 131) and was an active supporter of the Frente Popular’s 
campaign from 1936 to 1938 (Rojas Mira 1994: 192). Thus from very early on, 
MEMCH demanded that women be freed from the burden of forced pregnancy through 
a wider access to free contraception and a legal framework allowing abortion in specific 
cases within the state’s health system (Jiles 1994: 131). 
MEMCH lobbied the minister in charge of health issues at the time – Salvador Allende 
– through letters asking the authorities to urgently intervene on behalf of the 
“proletarian mother and child” (Maira Vargas, Santana Nazarit, & Molina Sáez, 2008: 
19). Initially MEMCH did not question the model put in place by the Frente Popular, 
which saw women primarily as “mother-workers” and kept linking children’s care to 
women’s reproductive rights as workers (Rosemblatt 2000a: 81). MEMCH in its letters 
openly requested “the recognition and legalisation of abortion to be practised 
scientifically” (Antología del MEMCH cited in Maira Vargas et al. 2008: 19), which 
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was maybe the first official demand by women to widen the right to therapeutic 
abortion to legalise abortion due to socio-economic reasons and mental health. 
Together with the SNS, the Frente Popular also created important social protection 
packages, which included family/child benefits and unemployment benefits as well as 
maternity benefits (Arellano 1985: 32). This can be considered a success for a very 
persistent feminist lobby at the time. The feminist movement through MEMCH played a 
major role in lobbying for better healthcare for women as well as social protection of 
women workers and their children. Albeit not challenging dominant gender roles, they 
demanded the right to maternity benefit and paid maternity leave to be extended to 
women working in agriculture (Rojas Mira 1994: 194). On the other hand, despite 
having the backing of the SNS, no steps were taken to respond to MEMCH’s demands 
for birth control advice and services (Rojas Mira 1994: 195), nor was there a change in 
the abortion law. 
Since the end of the 19th century, access to contraceptive methods in Chile had been 
minimal and had led to high rates of abortions. Social policy discourses rarely had 
women’s interests and rights in mind when considering the control of reproductive 
health, reinforcing already existent gender norms. The creation of the SNS was 
therefore one of the landmarks for women’s reproductive healthcare, at a time when the 
main health issues were related to mother-child healthcare (MINSAL et al. 2006: 6). 
Health authorities in Chile dealt with the incredibly high numbers of abortions for many 
years showing that abortion was not a taboo within the medical arena. By 1960 abortion 
became a major public health priority that policy-makers had to face. 
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1960s: The Christian Democrats and the birth of family planning 
The 1960s marked a break from the previous decades in many ways. The first was the 
growing concern for social issues as the rural–urban migration started to pose new 
problems regarding the living conditions of the population. This was also a period of 
consolidation of the growing demands of left-wing and working-class sectors through a 
reordering of the political system, which included the birth of the Partido Demócrata 
Cristiano (the Christian Democracy Party (PDC)) and many other movements with 
strong emphasis on social justice and the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. 
The 1960s also marked an increase for the first time in women registered to vote, 
reaching 63.2%. Women played an important role in giving the PDC and Eduardo Frei 
victory in the elections of 1964 (Rojas Mira 1994). This increasingly growing political 
activity and influence of the female vote had an unprecedented impact on politicians 
(Rojas Mira 1994: 186). As explained by Rojas Mira, “once women constituted 
themselves as an electoral power, political parties started to pay attention to them, and 
the daily problems they experienced became public policies” (Rojas Mira 1994: 186). 
Most parties “took up the woman’s issue” and “abortion and family planning – until 
then relegated to the private sphere – became issues of social relevance” (Rojas Mira 
1994: 186). 
As indicated by MINSAL, “at the beginning of the 60s, maternal mortality and in 
particular, mortality due to abortion, was still high, causing around 35 to 40% of all 
maternal deaths” (2006: 13). In hospitals almost half of all patients in maternity wards 
were women receiving post-abortion care (Mardones S. et al. 2008). Abortion being 
illegal, it was impossible for them to seek help in hospitals after suffering from 
backstreet and home-made abortions. This explains why the 1960s marks the 
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commencement of new initiatives regarding reproductive health and women’s 
reproductive rights, which started with the “pioneering work of a small but influential 
group of medical practitioners concerned with high maternal and neonatal mortality 
rates and infant malnutrition” (Casas 2004: 429). 
International events, such as the creation of the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (IPPF) (1952) and the Third International Conference on Family Panning 
(1952), as well as the US international aid initiatives at the time concerning birth control 
and poverty reduction, created a new global context for family planning. In 1962, prior 
to the Fourth Conference on Family Planning in which Chile participated, the IPPF had 
requested the Chilean government to provide a report on the practice of fertility control 
in Chile (Rojas Mira 1994). 
The report clearly stated that since the 1930s influential female doctors took the 
initiative to introduce many methods in key health services although at a small scale 
(Rojas Mira 1994: 195). Another unit of doctors working on these issues had also 
worked on contraceptive technology over the 1950s, focusing mostly on the 
development of hormonal contraception but also on the very early versions of IUDs 
(intrauterine devices). Moreover, many doctors in private practice were prescribing 
contraceptive methods on a regular basis (Rojas Mira 1994). So despite the fact that the 
SNS had no official policy on birth control or family planning, the initiatives especially 
by doctors were growing. 
Family planning and the birth of APROFA 
According to Rojas Mira (1994) it was due to this important medical expertise and the 
presence of a well-established health system together with the possible arrival of the 
Christian Democrats to power, that Chile was perceived by the US as a perfect 
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laboratory to implement a pilot programme to make family planning a formal state 
policy with a wide outreach for its population. The US, via its aid programme Alliance 
for Progress, and the IPPF would provide important financial and technical support to 
both the Chilean and its own national health system (Rojas Mira 1994). 
Although Chile did not have overpopulation issues, the idea of introducing birth control 
was quickly accepted by policy-makers.23 This is how in 1964, when Frei Montalva and 
the PDC came to power, the Asociación Chilena de Protección de la Familia 
(APROFA) was created “by a small, private association of health providers”, and would 
later become the local family planning association to join the International Planned 
Parenthood Association (IPPF) (Casas Becerra 2004: 430-431). 
Since its creation the APROFA would work very closely with the SNS and its technical 
division to implement a widespread programme of fertility control in the country (Jiles 
1994: 132-133). In the mid-1960s, APROFA played a key role in presenting the 
numbers and studies on the impact of abortion on the high level of maternal mortality in 
Chile, helping to make the case for tackling what was considered an epidemic at the 
time. It was the APROFA that in 1964 reported that 70,000 women had been 
hospitalised for infections arising from abortion (APROFA 1987: 4 cited in Rojas Mira 
1994: 197). 
In 1967, the Ministry’s Family Planning Policy, after identifying the need to reduce 
morbimortality due to unsafe abortion in the population, decided to incorporate fertility 
control initiatives to programmes of mother-to-child care, trying to uphold each 
family’s right to “have only the number of children that can be raised in a 
                                               23 Interview with Gloria Maira, well-known feminist, coordinator at Red contra la violencia 06.04.09. 
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comprehensive manner…]guaranteeing the respect of people’s conscience and their 
dignity” (MINSAL et al. 2006: 7). 
The Catholic Church and the Christian Democrats 
Considering the conflict that EC caused in Chile over the last 15 years, it is surprising to 
observe that in the 1960s there was almost no resistance to the implementation of the 
rather vanguard family planning policy. In spite of representing a Catholic electorate, 
the Christian Democrats were able to put in place the most progressive and far-reaching 
policy of fertility control the country had known until then. Even the APROFA was 
established without challenge, confirming the PDC’s historical and privileged 
relationship with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. There was almost no public 
debate on the topic because most decisive conversations took place privately between 
health officials and the bishops over a series of meetings (Mardones et al. 2008). 
Abortion was so widespread that it represented a major challenge for the newly created 
national health system, leaving little space for any opposition.24 Cardinal Silva 
Henríquez would have told the Christian Democrats at the time “to go ahead” and “not 
to worry”.25 The Cardinal, known for his open-minded attitude and commitment to 
social issues discussed and negotiated the issue directly with Francisco Mardones – 
director of the SNS at the time (Mardones et al. 2008) – confirming his support of the 
government’s family planning policy which the Church considered a lesser evil (Rojas 
Mira 1994: 209). 
Without opposition from the Church family planning programmes could be rolled out 
more easily, and taking advantage of the increasing presence of the health system across 
                                               24 Ibid. 25 Interview with Teresa Valdés, well-known feminist, director of Observatorio de Género, 17.06.09. 
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the country, the APROFA assumed a strategic role in the training of doctors and 
“midwives around the country” on contraception and birth control.26 According to 
Galán the APROFA joined the IPPF and in this way was “able to receive IUDs and the 
pill”, which it “then provided free of cost to the national health system to implement its 
contraception programme”.27 APROFA wanted to ensure “that the IUDs and pills were 
distributed free of cost to the population who really needed it, and that this was done 
ethically”. 28 
Midwives thus played a key role in making contraception available in as many places as 
possible in the country. As Galán explained, doctors were not always present in remote 
regions of the country since the SNS had only just started its greatest geographical 
expansion, however most communities were assigned midwives who “were trusted by 
women”.29 
This close technical and advisory support role given to the APROFA was essential for 
reaching out to people and health professionals in an indirect manner from the SNS. 
However, the family planning programme was created and maintained outside 
government, since the private and independent position of APROFA is what guaranteed 
the arrival of free contraceptive methods to the country via the IPPF. This independence 
also allowed APROFA to do things the government could not have done out of fear of 
appearing to be interfering in an ideological manner and changing the deeply-rooted 
traditional gender structures of Chilean society. 
                                               26 Interview with Dr Guillermo Galán, former President of APROFA, 24.06.09. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 
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This was the case with medical students, who often only received a fraction of the 
education on contraception that midwives were receiving.30 During this time, it was 
APROFA that trained most young doctors in public hospitals to learn to insert and 
remove the IUDs before they were sent out to different regions of the country. In this 
manner the government did not need to make changes to the curricula of faculties of 
medicine to include family planning.31 
So although the government had the support of the Church, the “deal” seems to have 
been to keep family planning within a targeted group and to use a very technical 
approach. For doctors, more than the idea of giving women control over their lives, their 
greatest concern was making sexual and reproductive health a priority topic for the 
whole population and reducing the amount of deaths due to abortion. Women therefore 
remained the target of family planning policies even if there was an attempt to address 
sexuality and reproduction within the couple, letting couples decide when, how many 
and how often to have children. Despite this, women’s early and unwanted pregnancies 
remained at the centre of attention of the medical profession combining family planning 
with mother–infant healthcare. 
The Vatican and contraception 
At the end of the 1960s Chile was not impervious to international influences and ideas 
and many were following the sexual and reproductive health debates taking place in 
Europe, including the campaigns of women’s movements for the right to abortion. 
Contraception was openly discussed in Paula, a progressive publication on women’s 
issues at the time (Vergara 1967). But a whole new international context would start to 
                                               30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 
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take shape regarding reproductive and sexual issues with the publication in 1968 of the 
Vatican’s Encyclical Humana Vitae. The Encyclical came to reaffirm the official and 
most conservative teachings of the Church on abortion and contraception. 
In 1968, four years after the government had launched its family planning programme, 
some sectors of the Church would voice their concern about the access of young 
adolescents to contraception. At the time, Chile was the only country besides Canada 
where the contraceptive pill could be bought without prescription (Cot 2001: 2). Despite 
these isolated debates, the Church in Chile did not carry out a negative campaign on the 
government’s policy. 
Nonetheless, since the Encyclical was addressed not only to individuals within the 
Church but also Catholic governments, the PDC declared, through its coordinator for 
family planning Dr Lucía López quoted in Paula that year, that the encyclical was “not 
an obligation for those non-Catholic”, and that the SNS being a state institution it would 
respect all beliefs, adding: “… the policy has always been applied from a health 
perspective and specifically to avoid a great number of abortions” (Revista Paula, 
No.17, Agosto 1968 cited in Cot 2001: 4).  
This secular and progressive declaration reinforced the health policy rationale and 
exploited the divisions within the Church that was composed then of many groups with 
different theological positions. When the Encyclical Humana Vitae was published, it 
was not accepted unanimously within the Church. The Jesuits, who were then a very 
influential group within the Catholic hierarchy, openly declared they did not consider 
the Encyclical infallible (Pieper 2009: 87-89). The Jesuits became the most outspoken 
group sustaining this vision because they “supported a due regulation of births, 
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especially in developing countries” and also considered issues of “poverty, lack of 
resources and the possibility to give a decent place in the world to a child” (Cot 2001). 
The Unidad Popular (UP): Allende, the doctor and the socialist 
The arrival of Salvador Allende to power in 1970 led to important changes for health 
policies in the country. Being a doctor, Allende from very early on not only cared about 
the coverage of health policies but also the quality of the care provided and the labour 
conditions of health workers (Jiles 1994). According to Pieper, “as president, Allende 
continued to believe that health care represented a basic human right. He promised to 
reorganize public health in conjunction with his administration’s reorganizing the 
capitalist system” (Pieper 2009: 121). 
Allende and the UP were keen to appeal to women after the success the Christian 
Democrats had had capturing the female vote. Allende campaigned with promises 
targeting women, including: 
… to expand protections for Chilean mothers, promote women’s education, and 
defend the rights of female workers. Women were called upon to become 
protagonists in the struggle for social change, assume leadership roles, and enter 
the workforce. (Tinsman 2002: 212) 
Tinsman explains that the “tension between the UP’s goal to empower women and its 
claim to defend the Chilean family surfaced in its approach to birth control and sex 
education” (2002: 221). On the one hand, they promoted knowledge and access to the 
methods “to counteract the sexual hypocrisy and coercion of bourgeois capitalism”, 
trying to distance themselves from the Christian Democrats’ focus on maternal–infant 
health, while on the other they built on the existing policies left by the previous 
administration (Tinsman 2002: 221). In fact, the UP policies maintained the Christian 
Democrats’ family planning focus on the well-being of women and couples while 
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declaring family planning to be a right for women (Jiles 1994; Pieper 2009). And 
although the UP did not challenge the fact that the use of contraceptives by women was 
still dependent on the husband’s consent (Tinsman 2002), it introduced the notion of 
“integral health”, bringing together all reproductive health services (Rojas Mira 1994: 
205). 
Allende’s Health Director, Infante, made very clear that the coverage of family planning 
would be extended to all women of fertile age, but unlike the previous government it 
did not aim to reduce the number of children per family (Rojas Mira 1994: 205). It also 
progressively incorporated the provision of reproductive services to single and 
adolescent women, including “a candid sex education program for youths, and a 
tolerance of abortion” (Tinsman 2002: 229). 
Sexual education received much attention since it was part of a “much broader and more 
ambitious effort to link all education to revolutionary liberation”, which translated the 
UP’s conviction that the new socialist society they wanted to build required “profound 
cultural transformation, and they saw education as the chief engine for such change” 
(Tinsman 2002: 229). Showing institutional learning, this initiative was the product of 
working closely with APROFA, and through the new format of health initiatives carried 
out at the community level it became an important vehicle to address many issues, 
including abortion (Rojas Mira 1994). The idea was that between 1972 and 1974, 
30,000 community leaders would be trained to be able to promote “responsible 
parenting” (Rojas Mira 1994: 208). The sexual education initiative also included for the 
first time the idea of allowing couples to separate sexuality and reproduction, having the 
potential of making a great impact on the way people lived their sexuality, especially 
women with access to the pill. 
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In the middle of the Cold War years, however, the UP faced many pressures from 
abroad due to its commitment to the “Chilean way to socialism” via democratic 
elections. The US openly boycotted the UP’s economy, including family planning aid 
leading to some wanting to cut all ties with the US. Pieper explains that “disagreements 
over birth control pitted political leaders against health officials on the highest levels”, 
and APROFA’s head Benjamín Viel, “a personal friend of President Allende”, using his 
international contacts tried “to prevent foreign donors, who began to consider Chile an 
unreliable ally under the new government, from cutting off supplies” (2009: 107). 
The supplies eventually stopped arriving and APROFA found itself with “a shortage of 
hormonal contraception”.32 The contraceptive methods of many women were affected 
by this situation but “IUDs were still available” as scientists in Chile had been 
producing them.33 As explained by Galán: 
... midwives already knew how to use the IUD and so in that period the use of 
IUDs increases and even us on the eastern side of Santiago [richest areas] we had 
75% of our female users on IUDs and only 25% on the pill.34 
The disputes over Allende’s handling of family planning reflected a strong 
confrontation between the power that the scientific and biomedical lobby had acquired 
over the years and the ideological power that politics had achieved in the early 1970s. 
Although Allende had appointed a few key specialists on population issues to strategic 
positions in government35 showing his willingness to continue the work on family 
planning in the country, eventually some of these experts, such as Viel, left the country 
                                               32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Allende appointed Mario Requena as chief planning officer, Aníbal Faúndes as adviser to the ministry’s Mother-Child program and Carlos Concha as Mother–Child program director (Pieper 2009: 107). 
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dissatisfied with the UP government’s weak commitment to family planning (Pieper 
2009).36 
As illustrated above, the UP wanted to tackle abortion through sexual education and the 
wellbeing approach of health services to women. Nevertheless the government also 
made clear its intention to legalise abortion in order to put an end to the business made 
from backstreet abortions and clandestine abortions with doctors in private clinics 
(Rojas Mira 1994: 207). One of the most surprising elements of this frank approach to 
abortion was also the support that the Hospital Barros Luco, a pioneer in contraceptive 
issues, received to start a programme of menstrual regulation, abortion induction using 
Rivanol and “curettage” for those women for whom contraception had not worked 
(Rojas Mira 1994: 207). The programme was led by Dr Faúndes, adviser to the 
ministry’s Mother–Child programme, confirming that the UP government had an open 
abortion policy and in fact “significantly curtailed its criminal prosecution” (Tinsman 
2002: 227). 
By the end of the UP, Hospital Barros Luco was providing legal abortion on demand to 
women within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy (Montebruno and Delgado 2003). 
Allegedly, in the last six months of the UP government, the staff had performed 3,000 
legal and free abortions thanks to the “Máquina”, the first suction or vacuum system 
machine for safe abortions used in Chile (Montebruno and Delgado 2003). Women 
from all social backgrounds, and from all over the country came to the hospital, which 
generally served a working-class population. Although no legal reform had been passed, 
the hospital staff was committed to providing this service to women, and had been 
approved to do this in a general assembly that took place in March 1973, exactly six 
                                               36 Viel left to join the IPPF in New York (Pieper 2009:107). 
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months before the Coup that would put an end to the UP government (Montebruno and 
Delgado 2003). 
Despite these progressive reproductive health policies, Pieper (2009) sustains that 
although Allende referred to women’s rights in speeches, in the end he also replicated 
patriarchal models. He mixed patriarchal views with socialist beliefs that women’s 
participation in the revolution would liberate them, although the leader of that 
revolution would remain the male worker (2009: 113). Allende’s government proposed 
“a number of policy changes for the benefit of women – and their families” of which the 
most “extensive proposal was the foundation of the Ministerio de la Familia (Family 
Ministry)” in 1971 that unfortunately “stalled” in Congress (Pieper 2009: 113-114). For 
Pieper, “despite this proposal’s failure, it revealed Allende’s goal of increasing legal 
equality between women and men in the family” and showed that: 
Through the Family Ministry, Allende hoped to secure the rights of single mothers 
and their children, acknowledging the double standard that judged men and 
women’s moral behaviors differently. (Pieper 2009: 113-114) 
Although the record of the UP was mixed, it did give continuity to reproductive and 
sexual health policies despite a wider international context unfavourable to the UP’s 
ideological position. As the government could not finish their plans for a community 
health approach or develop their pioneer work on abortion to more hospitals around the 
capital and the country, we will probably never know the real impact the UP could have 
had on women’s sexual and reproductive rights beyond healthcare. 
The Coup, the military and population: The end of an era for family planning and women’s reproductive health 
The Coup in September of 1973 put a violent end to Allende’s Unidad Popular 
government and its “Chilean way to socialism”, replacing its popular and participatory 
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democracy with a drastic and bloody repression to impose the military’s doctrine of 
national security. On the day of the Coup and the following days all government offices 
and hospitals were raided and taken over by the military. Many doctors and UP officials 
were persecuted, arrested, disappeared or exiled, including Aníbal Faúndes who was 
head of the abortion programme at Hospital Barros Luco.37 
The Coup also represented a departure from the emancipatory reproductive health 
policies put in place by the Frei and Allende administrations. In the aftermath of the 
Coup many policy documents of the previous government were seized and destroyed. 
Among those was the policy on sexual education prepared by the Ministry of Education 
of the UP. This resulted in the loss of policy-making knowledge and from 1973 until 
almost 1993 no major steps were taken on sexual education which, like most sexual and 
reproductive issues, remained untouched (Radio Universidad de Chile 2005). 
From the beginning the Junta’s doctrine of national security defined family planning 
and birth control as a threat both to society and the family by putting the country at risk 
by reducing its population. In the narrative established by the Junta, women were 
considered the guarantors of morality of the motherland, responsible for the 
preservation of traditional institutions, in particular the family (Grau 1997: 259). The 
agenda on reproductive health and access to birth control methods was therefore 
important to the military dictatorship, and has been described as a “quintessential 
expression of patriarchy” (Valenzuela 1986 cited in Ríos Tobar 2003: 130). The Junta 
had a clear vision of a gender order they wanted to impose, and for this they needed to 
                                               37 Dr Faúndes travelled to the United States to a conference on September 13, after spending the Coup and the following day at the Hospital Barros Luco. While abroad he was declared dangerous and was not allowed to go back to Chile until 1984 (Montebruno and Delgado 2003). 
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reinforce institutions such as the traditional Catholic family and the dependent role of 
women who were to be defined by motherhood (Ríos Tobar 2003). 
The Junta started pursuing an open policy of pro-natalism and, among their first 
measures in 1974, the military regime ordered an expert commission to evaluate the 
policies on family planning – the Comisión Nacional de Planificación Familiar y 
Paternidad Responsible (Pieper 2009: 136 fn 9). The commission included military 
experts but also civilian experts, including members of APROFA. In 1979, the planning 
agency Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN), published a document in which 
it openly criticised the family planning or birth control policies carried out during 
previous governments, with a particular focus on the free distribution of contraception 
to poor women (Grau 1997). Based on this, ODEPLAN published new guidelines for 
the Ministry of Health and for its work in service provision (Grau 1997). 
The publication of this report and the new position of the military regime regarding 
family planning started to be supported in the media by Catholic conservative voices 
referring to the teachings of the Church, which at the time was shifting its focus on 
morality and the sanctity of life (Grau 1997a). The Church, despite welcoming the 
ODEPLAN guidelines, expressed its regret that the use and distribution of IUDs was 
not banned since they considered IUDs to be abortive (Grau 1997). 
Between 1979 and 1985, the regime followed a “pro-natalist population policy and 
obstructed physicians’ delivery of family-planning” while private doctors no longer 
made contraceptives available to women (Pieper 2009: 143). Yet according to Galán, 
121 
“when the military government comes to power… we suddenly started receiving all 
types of contraception methods again”.38 
APROFA and the military 
As a direct consequence of the ODEPLAN’s guidelines during the 17-year-long 
dictatorship, and in particular in the 1980s, APROFA operated in a very limited manner. 
Rolf Behncke, Pinochet’s advisor on population and family protection issues, openly 
accused APROFA and the SNS of not complying with the regime’s guidelines by 
distributing and refusing to remove women’s IUDs, which in his view were abortive 
(Grau D. 1997b). 
Despite APROFA’s low profile, Mónica Madariaga, Minister of Justice of Pinochet 
tried on different occasions to close APROFA, albeit without success.39 APROFA was 
accused of being responsible for the reduction of Chile’s population and supporting 
foreign interests.40 As explained by Dr Galán, the junta wanted “the Chilean population 
to increase” because of potential conflicts with Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, and they 
needed “more arms to carry weapons”, and thus declared “the family planning 
programme is over” while “doctors were forbidden to make any publicity on family 
planning or to promote sterilisation”.41 Yet they could not stop the programme “because 
women already knew about it!”:  
Women had… appropriated that knowledge about contraception… knew that if 
they gave birth they could ask for the IUD”… women gave each other advice on 
the IUD despite the absence of any open promotion, and that is why Madariaga… 
                                               38 Op. cit. 26. 39 Ibid.  40 APROFA was accused by the military regime of responding to the imperialist interests of the government of the United States or private interests of transnational pharmaceutical companies (Grau 1997a). 41 Op. cit. 26. 
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could not close APROFA. Because APROFA was still providing the Ministry with 
contraceptives.42 
Women and the barriers to access family planning 
The dictatorship provided unexpected spaces for women to start questioning “their life 
conditions, their historical invisibility as political actors, and the dictatorship’s 
ideological project” (Ríos Tobar 2003: 130). Pieper highlights how it is under 
dictatorship that we observe a move from mother’s rights to women’s rights within the 
women’s movement and feminist discourses, producing “unexpected debates on gender 
and sexuality allowing women to contest the uncompromising, top-down traditional 
model of gender relations that the military aimed to impose” (2009: 136). 
The progressive feminisation of poverty (Barrientos 1993) led to an increasing 
opposition to the military regime with a gendered face. Women in fact started running 
“soup kitchens, collective shopping groups, and workshops, and arose largely in the 
poblaciones and poor neighbourhoods” and these groups “later provided a vehicle for 
more political forms of organisation by women” (Barrientos 1993: 38). 
After 1979 healthcare faced significant cuts in its budget,43 which were followed by a 
profound restructuring of the health system, especially at the primary care level. This 
was in line with the policies implemented within the health sector “aimed at reducing 
the role of the state, expanding the private sector in provision and financing” (Gideon 
2007: 241). The decentralisation of primary healthcare and its municipalisation resulted 
in the impoverishment of the health services and a substantial decrease in the quality of 
care, especially for family planning services which were not considered a priority and 
                                               42 Ibid. 43 The expenditure on health went down from 3.21% of GDP in 1974 to 2.6% in 1980, and 2.33% in 1987 (Miranda 1994 cited in Gideon 2007: 242). 
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fell “at the bottom of the list” after emergency care and maternal–child assistance 
(Pieper 2009: 143). 
With “fewer health-care personnel available, women seeking information on family 
planning often returned from health-care centers without having any of their questions 
and concerns addressed” (Pieper 2009: 143). Women from popular sectors started to 
face serious problems accessing birth control methods; some of them had their IUDs 
removed without consent by doctors who supported the views of the regime. At the 
community level, in women’s centres, poor women were told to stop using birth control, 
and the pill and IUDs were singled out as going against religious and moral norms 
(Pieper 2009: 142). In addition to these restrictions to access reproductive health, the 
military decided to enforce for the first time the laws regarding abortion, making it very 
risky for doctors and nurses to treat patients who arrived into emergency rooms and 
forcing them to denounce them if they suspected abortions were self-induced, leading to 
an increase in the number of poor women jailed over the years (CRLP and 
Reproductivos 1998). 
During the 1980s popular movements started defining their problems outside the 
ideology of motherhood, albeit with an emphasis on a class-based analysis and often 
with the help of the church (Pieper 2009: 157). As explained by Pieper, “self-help 
strategies through collective organizing, and the critique of the double oppression 
through dictatorship and patriarchy also shaped the mobilization of poor women” 
(Pieper 2009: 157). 
During this period, as women’s groups were growing in force to oppose the regime and 
mobilise, in particular at the grassroots level, organisations such as APROFA were not 
involved in that process. Women’s rights groups perceived the work of APROFA and 
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other policy-makers negatively, creating a distance between the biomedical lobby and 
the women’s movement. For Galán this was partially explained by the fact that in order 
to be able to continue to carry out its work the APROFA had claimed “to respect the 
country’s legal status on abortion”.44 They worked hard to criticise the military regime’s 
policies on family planning in policy circles and through the press (Grau 1997b) but 
mostly because of the impact these had for the “modernization agenda” promoted by the 
Junta (Pieper 2009: 148). APROFA used the case of teenage pregnancy as a flag for 
their campaign which was considered by health officials from the perspective of 
children born to teenage mothers and the social and economic impact on them (Pieper 
2009). This confirmed the way mother–child understandings of health were still 
strongly engrained amongst policy-makers. 
Hence the discourse between the biomedical lobby and women’s groups were far apart. 
APROFA’s behaviour responded to a clear strategy of institutional survival in a hostile 
political context while women were launching a deeper critique of the regime’s social 
and economic model through their understanding of women’s rights. Women’s distrust 
of the medical profession also had to do with the numbers of doctors who supported the 
regime’s pro-natalist and ultra-catholic views, and participated in the removal of IUDs 
in women who had not given their consent, forcing them to become pregnant (Pieper 
2009: 142). The amount of cases of violation of women’s privacy and reproductive 
rights were never fully reported but were enough to be considered more than anecdotes 
(Pieper 2009: 142) and alarmed women from the poorest sections of society. This had 
                                               44 Op. cit. 26. 
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the negative impact of keeping women away from any healthcare services, affecting 
their overall physical and mental health.45 
The changing role of the Church during the dictatorship 
The Church went through important changes during the seventeen years of dictatorship. 
Cardinal Silva Henríquez was still at the head of the Church in the initial years of the 
dictatorship, from where he led the resistance for the defence of human rights which 
gave the Church a unique position of legitimacy and trust within Chilean society 
(Blofield 2006). Silva Henríquez became a very controversial figure due to his 
outspoken stance against the regime’s violence and persecution of opponents to the 
regimes. He founded the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, which protected many opponents 
and had direct confrontations with Pinochet. The ultra-conservative elite in Chile 
nicknamed Silva Henríquez the “red priest” (Thumala 2007). 
The Vatican under John Paul II considered that the Chilean Church was being too 
militant and politically involved and put pressure on Silva Henríquez to resign, which 
he eventually did in 1983. At the time John Paul II had started to replace key members 
of the hierarchy in many places around Latin America with more conservative 
characters (Thumala 2007). Silva Henríquez’s successor Cardinal Fresno was a well-
known conservative. This change to the hierarchy of the Church during the 1980s 
coincided with the rise of the Opus Dei within the Chilean Church, but also through the 
presence of Catholic fundamentalists in government, such as Jaime Guzmán, the closest 
advisor to Pinochet. 
                                               45 Ibid. 
126 
Since the 1970s, the appearance of the Opus Dei and other elitist movements such as the 
Legionnaires of Christ and Schoenstatt has been crucial to define the ethos of the 
Chilean elite and to establish the new relationship of the upper classes with the Church 
(Thumala 2007: 33-36). In this way the elite has reclaimed and redefined Catholicism in 
line with their beliefs (Thumala 2007: 36). This new Catholic elite has played a crucial 
role in modifying the social and political structures of Chilean society by permeating all 
spheres of power in the private and public sector, and using institutions such as 
universities to prepare the new young leaders under their ethos. 
The religious elite and the 1980 Constitution 
The role of this elite was evident during the construction of the most important 
institutional legacy of the military dictatorship: the 1980 Constitution. The Constitution 
was the most ambitious project to change the rules of the game within the country and 
create a new institutional framework for Chile’s future political system. The process of 
changing the Constitution was a meticulous one in which conservative and Catholic 
forces greatly influenced the reform’s content and language. The Constitution was built 
with the aim of maintaining a certain hegemony of conservative forces which has 
prevailed since then: 
… the 1980 Constitution was preceded and shaped by a revived natural law 
discourse rooted in a conservative version of Catholic doctrines. […] Relying on 
natural law ideology, a group of conservative lawyers was able not only to 
radically transform the Chilean legal order during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-
1990), but also has been able to maintain its hegemony over constitutional norms, 
even after losing power in 1990… (Muñoz León 2014: 129) 
With regard to women’s rights and reproductive rights, for the first time in Chilean 
constitutional history the 1980 Constitution included an explicit mention of the right to 
life (Muñoz León 2014: 130), reflecting how the most conservative Catholic ideology 
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had permeated the Junta. As explained by Muñoz León, this may have been “consistent 
with the official Catholic position proclaimed in Paul VI’s Of Human Life, but a 
paradoxical innovation coming from a murderous dictatorship” (Muñoz León 2014: 
130). This also raised the paradox of a dictatorial regime that wanted to appear modern 
yet was still strongly grounded in the most conservative religious teachings of the 
Church. 
The real meaning of the inclusion of the “right to life” in the constitution became 
evident when three months before leaving power in 1989, the Junta passed a package of 
constitutional reforms negotiated with the opposition. The right to abortion was erased 
from the Sanitary Code (Código Sanitario) that had been in place since 1931. Abortion 
was perceived as “a dangerous opening through which left-wing political sectors could 
legislate a complete liberalization of abortion laws” (Haas 2010: 125). In this way 
abortion became illegal under any circumstances. 
The inclusion of the right to life in the Constitution, with the subsequent derogation of 
the right to abortion (albeit limited since 1931), can therefore be considered the 
gendered authoritarian enclave of the transition to democracy and a direct result of the 
same conservative lobby that shaped the 1980 Constitution. Jaime Guzmán himself was 
known for his views against abortion even when the life of the mother was a stake. 
Haas argues that the “criminalization of abortion by the military government was made 
possible because policy reform was not subject to democratic debate” and it has not 
been decriminalised in democracy due “to the successful reframing of the issue by 
political conservatives” (2010: 124). This is because “once the military government 
outlawed abortion on moral grounds, this became the default political frame for the 
issue” (Haas 2010: 124). 
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The early 1990s democratic governments: Women’s rights, SERNAM and the international conferences 
Both Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei Ruíz Tagle (1994-1998) had an 
important role to play in rebuilding a democratic society in Chile after 17 years of 
dictatorship. The women’s movement that emerged under dictatorship and fought for 
democracy tried very hard to influence the transition process as the re-emergence of 
political parties became evident. Abortion and divorce were among the first issues they 
raised after the plebiscite in the electoral campaign, yet parties identified abortion in 
particular as a politically “dangerous” issue, leading to much tension with the most 
conservative factions within Concertación. 
The Church in democracy 
The Church established itself as a key political player in the transition to democracy 
(Blofield 2006) thanks to the courageous work of its most progressive members who 
defended human rights. Moreover, the Church played an important role supporting the 
demands of social movements, including pobladoras’ demands for social justice under 
the military regime (Drogus 1994). The Church often financed grassroots organisations 
that mobilised against the Pinochet regime (Barrientos 1993). Yet all these efforts 
coming from the progressive wing of the Church benefited the conservative hierarchy 
put in place after the resignation of Silva Henríquez. This had an important impact on 
the relation this new conservative Church established with civil society and the political 
elite in democracy. 
The Christian Democrats 
As discussed previously, the Christian Democrats are historically linked to the Catholic 
Church. They maintained this close relationship under dictatorship despite the changes 
that brought a more conservative hierarchy of the Church controlled by elitist groups. 
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Back in democracy, the more progressive Catholic factions of the PDC, as well as many 
left-wing politicians, felt a strong loyalty and debt to the Church because of the role it 
played in the protection of human rights. Through the work of the Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad, the Church saved the lives of many politicians who were now officials and 
leaders of the centre-left government coalition Concertación (Shepard 2000: 117). 
During the years of dictatorship many political leaders, particularly from PDC and UDI, 
were educated in elite universities where the Church had a great influence.46 Back in 
democracy and reflecting the importance given by the new Church’s new hierarchy to 
morality discourses (Thumala 2007), these same leaders from very early on censored 
the issues referring to sexuality and reproduction. This was in sharp contrast to the 
progressive Catholic views of the 1960s, which allowed the distribution of birth control 
for example. 
The “politics of consensus” was a trademark of the bottom-line negotiation of the DC to 
join the Concertación in order to maintain a status quo (Franceschet 2010). This 
developed a democracy “de los acuerdos” (agreements) which has been based on the 
use of informal institutions to set the rules of the game and their sanctions (Siavelis 
2006). It also involved a minimalist agenda on women’s rights which did not upset the 
Church, thus excluding major reforms to SRHR (Guzmán and Seibert 2010). 
Feminists in democracy: SRHR and SERNAM 
Feminists and the women’s movement secured an important guarantee for a gender 
agenda in the newly-built democratic institutional framework through the inclusion of 
                                               46 During the 1960s the Pontifical Catholic University was strongly under the influence of the Christian Democracy and progressive Catholic groups following the Social Doctrine of the Church. They were quickly displaced after the Coup by the far-right Gremialismo movement of Jaime Guzmán, which later gave birth to the UDI. 
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most of its political agenda’s demands by the government of Patricio Aylwin (Valdés 
and Fernández 2006: 11). Probably the most visible gain was the creation of SERNAM 
– the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer – which in the 1990s quickly became one of the 
most important women’s machineries worldwide (Valdés and Fernández 2006: 12). 
However its very existence was questioned by conservatives and the influence of 
Christian Democrats in shaping SERNAM limited its scope from the outset (Macaulay 
2006). SERNAM’s mandate specifically ruled out sexual and reproductive rights to 
avoid breaking the consensus of the newly-built ruling coalition, and this led to self-
censorship on these issues (Macaulay 2006). 
The creation of SERNAM was not just that of a Ministry, it was the first time women 
and feminists were officially represented within the state and policy arena. SERNAM 
came to alter the institutional context in which the women’s movement had to act to see 
its demands acknowledged (Franceschet 2003). In fact, unlike the previous decades 
where women were never the main interlocutors with the state on policies affecting 
them, this time women entered the public space ready to engage with the state from a 
women’s rights’ perspective. This was possible due not only to the solid gender critique 
of state policies born under dictatorship, but also because of the “empowerment 
triangle” composed by the women’s movement, femocrats and political women (Valdés 
and Fernández 2006: 13). 
Indeed, women from the women’s movements went on to occupy different positions in 
society as Parliamentarians and civil servants while others remained in NGOs that 
would work closely with SERNAM or at the grassroots level. Initiatives like “Grupo 
Iniciativa” that coordinated the preparation for women’s rights’ NGOs for the Beijing 
Conference in conjunction with SERNAM are a good example of the new engagement 
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of the women’s movement and feminists with the state. Women’s organisations and 
feminists both from civil society and political parties in Chile joined the government 
delegation to all the major UN conferences of the 1990s. These transnational 
interactions at the United Nations opened up new arenas for dialogue and debate among 
civil society delegates, including on SRHR. However, new ideas, in particular those 
regarding women’s rights and human rights, were met by fierce resistance. Htun 
explains that “the greater embrace of principles of individual rights and citizen equality 
produced a tension with models of family life and gender relations upheld by religious 
doctrine, patriarchal traditions, and conservative and nationalist movements” (2003: 2). 
This was the case with the ratification of the Beijing Platform of Action by the Congress 
in Chile due to the concern of conservatives on the follow-up implementation to the 
CEDAW, considered a way to legalise abortion. 
Abortion 
Because SERNAM gave priority to the insertion of women in the labour force and 
domestic violence while excluding SRHR, these issues would start to be postponed 
within state policies affecting the work of the women’s and feminist movement. 
Although feminists made a conscious decision not to fight for the right to abortion in 
order to help their parties maintain the political consensus, the SRHR agenda was high 
on their priorities. 
Since the return to democracy there have been legal initiatives to try to reverse the 
dictatorship’s legacy on abortion (M. Blofield 2006, 2008; Haas 2010). Some have tried 
to reduce the penalties considered by the law, but none have successfully brought the 
issue to Parliament to be officially discussed and reverted. In fact, most bills on the 
topic have stalled; all attempts for legal reform have been “unmitigated failures” (2010: 
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119). This has left a challenge for feminists to “reframe abortion as an issue of public 
health, women’s equality and human rights” (Haas 2010: 124). 
Most issues regarding women’s sexual and reproductive rights fell into the agenda of 
MINSAL or the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), where feminists and left-wing 
parties did not have the same amount of influence they had in SERNAM. During the 
Aylwin and Frei administrations, MINEDUC would often be controlled by Christian 
Democrats where all the initiatives to create a programme on sexual education within 
the school curriculum was met by fierce resistance and not a single initiative had been 
successful (Shepard 2006). As for MINSAL, the expertise in the Ministry would give 
priority to doctors over civil society groups, and biomedical groups would have a closer 
relationship with the Ministry. 
Interestingly MINSAL, from the early days of Concertación, reverted to the pre-1973 
focus for the provision of family planning to women and couples, reflecting the 
enduring institutional memory of policy-makers. In 1990, through its Maternal Health 
program, MINSAL started producing posters targeting women and couples and 
encouraging them to attend primary healthcare centres to obtain contraception, 
including IUDs, the pill and condoms (Jiles 1994). However, sterilisation remained 
under the same norms from 1975, requiring the consent of the husband for women to 
undergo the surgery (Jiles 1994). 
APROFA and the new SRHR advocates 
In 1990 the old civil society actors like APROFA were rapidly joined in their work on 
sexual and reproductive issues by new biomedical research and advocacy groups such 
as ICMER and CORSAPS. As Chile had ceased to be considered a priority country at 
the international level to receive free contraception, the APROFA during these years 
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lost part of its influence and close ties with the state. It went through reorganisation 
after many years of working in a limited manner under the dictatorship, to become 
independent and continue to support the work on SRHR in the country by expanding its 
discourse to SRHR.47 This had the effect of opening the door for more interaction with 
women’s groups and coalition-building efforts after many years of self-sufficient 
behaviour by the organisation.48 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the evolution of the policies regarding reproductive and 
sexual health in Chile since the 1960s. It has shown how women have mostly been 
considered in their role as mothers by policy-makers working on reproductive health 
issues. The family planning initiatives in the 1960s responded more to foreign 
influences than national demand, and certainly not women’s demands. Due to the high 
rate of abortions and deaths in the 1960s and 1970s, it was easier to make the case for 
family planning programmes. Although both the Christian Democrat and UP 
governments targeted women in slightly different roles, none of them developed the 
distribution of family planning as a means to break the mould of traditional gender 
roles. The UP had some more progressive reproductive health policies providing easier 
access to abortion services and sexual education. 
The strong biomedical groups involved both in the research and implementation levels 
of the family planning policy since the 1960s, such as APROFA, which re-emerged 
through institutional memory once back in democracy, remain crucial players in the 
field of SRHR. 
                                               47 Op.cit 26. 48 Ibid. 
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The silence of the Church on reproductive health issues and its tacit complicity in the 
initial stages of the implementation of family planning contrasts with the 1980s, when 
the Church’s hierarchy changed, produced a new and more conservative discourse on 
women’s roles and morality. This directly affected the debates on abortion as well as the 
ethics of the use and distribution of contraception. The Church and the Catholic elite 
(including lawyers and doctors) played a key role in the dismantling of SRHR policies 
during the dictatorship and supporting the creation of a new institutional framework in 
the form of the 1980 Constitution. The Constitution set the new “rules of the game” by 
reinforcing a specific gender regime in which abortion and women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights do not exist as such. This legacy was reinforced through the politics 
of consensus. 
The consensus rule is probably the most important informal institution in Chilean 
politics that favoured conservative forces over progressive ones. It triggered and 
maintained self-censorship on many policy issues within Concertación and within the 
women’s movement, namely regarding abortion. Most importantly it prevented the 
inclusion of a SRHR agenda within SERNAM, which has weakened and limited the 
efforts of the women’s movement on those issues. 
Despite the early presence of feminist movements putting forward demands for 
women’s rights, family-planning initiatives have remained a prerogative of the medical 
profession and biomedical organisations. These actors and institutions have had a 
privileged influence over this policy field and preferential access to key policy-makers, 
raising questions on their capacity to work in alliances with women’s groups and vice 
versa. The institutional framework in which feminists have had to monitor women’s 
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rights since then has been a great impediment to the advancement of their agenda. This 
is particularly true for SRHR as will be discussed in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: Mapping the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition – the actors and internal evolution of the coalition over 10 years 
Using Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, this chapter and the next attempt to 
show that in order to understand the role of actors and institutions involved in the EC 
policy process in Chile, the diversity of supporters within each of these coalitions needs 
to be unveiled and the ties linking them explored. In this way we obtain a clearer picture 
of how competing visions on EC and SRHR influence public debates. 
Feminist scholars have highlighted the importance of the “substantive representation” of 
women in politics, which involves looking beyond the formal or “descriptive” 
representation of women’s interest and evaluating how the issues that women and 
feminists advance are taken on board by representatives other than those elected. 
Looking at the actors influencing a policy process is key to such analysis since women’s 
interest can be represented beyond the electoral sphere (Weldon 2002 cited in Mazur 
2009: 332). The introduction of women’s issues during debates before a policy or a law 
highlighting women’s perspectives can itself be seen as a representation (Celis 2009). 
This reminds us of the importance of the “framing” of gender issues because – this 
process is the result of people’s values and beliefs and it is often at this stage that a 
policy becomes gendered and political (Bacchi 2001). 
Moreover, the way elites use gender ideology to affect public opinion on specific 
policies matters because it structures public opinions, and can affect the way in which a 
policy process evolves, including on issues not directly linked to gender (Winter 2005). 
This recalls Htun’s (2003) focus on the role of elite issue networks in policy-making. 
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On the other hand, feminist and non-feminist analyses of the policy process have also 
highlighted the importance of belief systems and values of actors in advocating for an 
issue (Abrar, Lovenduski, and Margetts 2000; P. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
There seems to be a consensus on the need to broaden the “scope beyond political elites 
and interest groups to include social movements and newly politicised grassroots 
activists” to see “change as produced by networks of insiders and outsiders rather than 
exclusively caused by elites in formal positions” (Kenney 2003: 179). This is 
particularly important for evaluating the impact of feminist policy efforts. Abrar et al. 
highlight the need to overcome traditional and “formal policy-making roles”, because 
when “an approach that focuses on the impact of ideas on policy change is used, a 
different picture emerges, one of feminist driven change” (2000: 239). 
People’s belief systems and values matter at both the level of policy framing and 
advocacy. Advocacy requires the capacity to build alliances and accept compromise in 
order to obtain sufficient influence to shape the agenda-setting and policy-making 
process. Celis defines “good” substantive representation as representation that “implies 
recognizing diversity and ideological conflict regarding women’s interests and gendered 
perspectives” (Celis 2009: 95). 
This chapter proposes that the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition that challenged the 
distribution of EC is a tight network, working with a strong belief system founded in the 
most traditional Catholic doctrine promoted by the Vatican. Fundamentalist groups such 
as the Opus Dei, Legionnaires of Christ, and Schoenstatt count on important economic 
resources (Thumala 2007) and are therefore extremely active and influential in Chile 
(Blofield 2006). More importantly, however, their belief system has a clear and 
unquestioning gendered view on women’s roles and rights, often framed in essentialist 
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characteristics such as motherhood, guiding the way these advocacy coalition members 
frame ideas and advocate against reproductive freedom. This gives these actors a unique 
advantage when imposing the terms of the debate on EC and challenging its 
distribution. 
The terms anti- and pro-SRHR are used because the actors advocating in favour or 
against EC are the same actors who over the years have enabled or impeded advances 
on the wider SRHR agenda in Chile. In fact these same actors generally have been, and 
often still are, involved in the discussions regarding adolescents’ rights to sexual 
education, sexual rights, and the increasingly visible agenda on bio-ethics. They 
therefore actively engage with a wider agenda on SRHR that encompasses EC. 
The belief-system of the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition 
The main actors of the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition are a wide and influential 
network with overlapping interests and beliefs. The coalition’s strength is derived from 
the closeness within a tight network of people brought together by religion and class as 
most of them belong to a certain elite. In this coalition there is a single and simple 
understanding of the notions of life – seen as starting from the moment of conception – 
and therefore the perception of abortion as homicide, all based on the teachings of the 
Catholic Church. 
These beliefs are set within a wider belief system regarding notions of society and 
family, and in particular gender roles, where motherhood is a mandatory role for 
women. Moreover Catholic beliefs match politically conservative views around gender 
and society. As Haas explains: 
The Church’s arguments in defense of its traditional perspective on the family, 
women, and sexuality have over time come to echo much of the Right’s logic on 
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these issues. The discourse of both the Church and the Right emphasizes the 
destabilization of society and the moral chaos that ensues if traditional norms of 
sexual behavior or gender roles are liberalized. (1999: 43) 
The main sets of actors within the Anti-SRHR are: a) Church and faith-based 
organisations (FBOs); b) academia (Catholic universities); c) media; d) professional 
individuals; and e) conservative parties. Blofield (2006) argues that these actors have an 
undoubted socio-economic advantage, but the evidence shows that their strength also 
comes from their disciplined and orchestrated modus operandi and praxis of politics. 
This is based on a clear and acknowledged set of beliefs where the “deep core” and 
“policy core” are strongly linked due to the homogeneity and closeness of the actors 
involved in the advocacy coalition. 
Characters and roles are well defined within the advocacy coalition, with many actors 
functioning in a coordinated manner while appearing to act independently. As Dides 
explains: 
… the strategies used by different groups have focused on the media and mass 
communication means, education, research, influencing parliamentarians (lobby), 
intervening in public policies; in addition they have focused on strategies for 
internal coordination, support and alliances among groups. (2006: 104) 
This means that the coalition is highly effective at obtaining political support to move 
forward its political agenda. 
The Church 
The pillar or “core” of the belief system of the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition resides 
within Catholic doctrine regarding women’s rights, SRHR issues, the right to life, and 
current debates on bioethics. Dides argues: 
The presence of conservative sectors of the Catholic Church in the debates 
surrounding sexuality and reproduction has become stronger over the last couple of 
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years. This is not particular to Chile. It is part of processes happening at the 
regional and global levels. (Dides 2006: 67)49 
The Pontifical Academy Pro Vita50 established the Church’s opposition to the use of EC 
in 2000, and called on doctors and pharmacists to become “conscientious objectors” 
against the distribution of the drug, defining its use and effects as “chemical abortion” 
(La Segunda 2000). In 2007, pharmacists played a key role by opposing the 
commercialisation of EC based on their alleged conscientious objection as business 
owners (see Ch. 7). 
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Chile is visible through its Episcopal 
Conference, the institution bringing together all Bishops in the country. The 
Conference, a key player in politics, was particularly vocal against EC. For instance, 
when the Bachelet administration announced the distribution of EC in 2006, it published 
a harsh declaration reminding politicians who were persecuted during Pinochet’s 
dictatorship of a moral debt, since the Church had protected their human rights and their 
right to life when they were in danger (see Ch. 8). 
Since the return to democracy the Church has been granted special treatment by 
Concertación governments because of this. As explained by a High Official of the 
Church, the “minister of SEGPRES meets with the permanent committee of the 
Conference once a month, for breakfast, where diverse issues are addressed”.51 This is a 
political privilege many civil society organisations do not have, particularly feminists or 
women’s groups. 
                                               49 Researcher’s translation. 50 The Pontifical Academy Pro Vita (Pro Life) was founded by Pope John Paul II, and “exists for the promotion and defence of human life, especially regarding bioethics as it regards Christian morality” (Pontifical Academy for Life 2011). 51 Interview with senior official of the Catholic Church, 17.07.09. 
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The leadership of the Church is aware of its social influence and power and has a sense 
of entitlement to its political and social role society. For the hierarchy, the “Catholic 
Church has won its moral authority” not only through its historical role in favour of 
social justice and human rights in Chile, but also through contributions in academic 
work and research.52 Yet, the hierarchy of the Church with which Concertación 
governments have had to engage, is a conservative hierarchy, benefiting from the 
reputation it earned through its social engagements of the 1960s, 1970s and especially 
the 1980s (Haas 1999). The Church in Chile was not always as conservative and 
militant on SRHR issues (see Ch. 4) but, as argued by Haas, it “has found a kindred 
spirit in the political Right”, and “ironically… locating its main support among those 
political elements that were the most supportive of the dictatorship and are most 
ambivalent about the virtues of the democratic process” (Haas 1999: 43). 
Thumala (2007) has shown how the case of Chile contradicts the notion that in modern 
societies religion will be less influential. Rather it provides good examples of how elite 
Catholic groups such as Opus Dei, Legionnaires of Christ and to a certain extent 
Schoenstatt have shaped and guided the renewal of a Catholic ethos in Chilean society, 
in particular among its socio-economic elite (Thumala 2007). 
The Church has an ambivalent relationship with politicians. The High Official 
interviewed emphasised that the Church “does not feel represented by any party” and 
“maintains its freedom”53 while acknowledging having direct communication channels 
with politicians: 
… whether it [the church] has political influence, I believe that indirectly yes, it 
does […] when a congressman calls me to ask for information regarding a research 
                                               52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 
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study that I have carried out for five years, and that I send it to him that evidently 
has a political weight.54 
The new faith-based organisations (FBOs) 
The Catholic Church today has a diversified organisational composition, which grants it 
a strong presence and influence in Chilean society. It is the founder and manager of a 
wide network of NGOs working on diverse issues, from poverty to street children, the 
elderly to single mothers.55 With the privatisation of education the Church has also 
become one of the main providers for primary and secondary education increasing its 
presence in society in this way and progressively replacing the secular state (Blofield 
2006). 
Over the last fifteen years, coinciding with the beginning of the policy initiatives to 
distribute EC, new types of faith-based organisations have appeared, most of them 
linked with ultra-Catholic groups. It is important to consider the close ties and 
institutional affiliations between these groups that initially may not seem connected. It 
is in the background of these actors that we measure the widespread influence of the 
Catholic Church. 
These organisations are often internet-based, and resulting from one person or a small 
group’s initiative. Their aim is to carry out advocacy, influence legislative processes, or 
to influence public opinion. This was the case of Centro Juvenil AGES – the student 
organisation founded at the Opus Dei Universidad de Los Andes (ULA) which was 
                                               54 Ibid.  55 Institutions such as the Hogar de Cristo (the largest FBO in Chile founded by the Jesuits) and María Ayuda (dedicated to preventing single mothers from aborting and to give children up for adoption) all are well endowed through private funds. The public opinion has a positive image of these FBO’s work due to their high visibility and sophisticated marketing campaigns.  
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created with the specific aim of bringing the case of EC to court in 2001, supported by 
an expert lawyer and law professor from ULA (see Ch. 7). 
AGES secured the support of other relatively unknown organisations in order to initiate 
the court case that launched the series of legal and political battles that took place 
between 2001 and 2005 (see Ch. 7), including Investigación, Formación y Estudio 
sobre la Mujer (ISFEM) (Institute for the Research, Training and Studies on Women), 
Centro Internacional para el Estudio de la Vida Humana (International Centre for the 
Study of Human Life), el Movimiento Mundial de Madres (Worldwide Mothers’ 
Movement), la Agrupación Nacional por la Vida-Antuquillen (Antuquillen National 
Pro-Life Organisation), and Frente por la Vida y la Acción Solidaria (Pro-Life and 
Solidarity Action Front).56 
The evidence shows that many of these web-based organisations became extremely 
effective in their use of new internet-based communication technologies, using the web 
as a tool not only to disseminate information and opinions, but also to mobilise and 
organise people. A good example of this is the prominence achieved by certain 
organisations publicly involved against EC during Bachelet’s administration – Muévete 
Chile (Move Chile!), Acción Familia (Family Action), ACONOR (Organised 
Consumers’ Association), and Red por la Vida y la Familia (Pro-Life and Pro-Family 
Network). While the accusations against EC under Bachelet were led by politicians, 
these FBOs took on the role of informal “speakers” on behalf of the Anti-SRHR 
Advocacy Coalition. 
                                               56 Casas (2008) explains that many of these organisations were legally established under the same address as the one legally recorded for AGES. 
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Of all these groups, Acción Familia (Family Action) served as the main umbrella 
organisation for the work of all the other groups over the last ten years. They actively 
participated from the beginning and voiced their resistance to the government’s policy 
plans at every stage of the policy process, but their stance on reproductive issues was 
also tinted by strong far-right conservative political views. In 2004, in their press release 
to right-wing newspaper La Segunda, Acción Familia declared: 
The ruling has reaffirmed the unquestionable coming into force of the principle 
that sustains a right to life from conception, and in this way hinders the incessant 
attempts by Socialists supporting the legalisation of abortion in the country.57 
Acción Familia was so influential and well connected that it was invited to Congress by 
conservative politicians in August 2009 to express its views on the initiative by 
Bachelet and her government to pass a Law on Fertility regulation. The group 
denounced the government’s bill initiative (Acción Familia 2009) on the following 
grounds: 
1. The bill is based on ideological reasons, inspired by a new understanding of 
human rights, which opens the door for “sexual and reproductive rights”, 
and reintroduces the SRHR Bill based on those rights. 
2. The bill is not scientific or medical and contradicts the ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal by trying to reinstate an administrative procedure 
already discarded. 
3. If the ideological assumptions of the bill are accepted, not only will the 
distribution of the so-called ‘next-morning pill’ be legalised, but principles 
leading to the posterior legalisation of practices against morality will also 
be accepted, such as free abortion and homosexual unions.  
                                               57 Researcher’s translation. This declaration was made in the context of the short-lived victory on 2004 that put a halt to the distribution of EC (see Ch. 7).  
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Here the direct connection between these types of advocacy organisations and the main 
Catholic opposition to SRHR in general can be observed, along with their clear 
awareness of SRHR initiatives launched by the pro-SRHR lobby and feminist 
organisations. Also, we observe a clear set of conservative beliefs linked to far-right 
parties in the country. 
These groups’ advocacy work was facilitated by the fact that they divided the work 
among themselves to target different audiences. Groups such as Muévete Chile targeted 
a youth/student audience.58 It was led by active university students who, as part of their 
mission, also train new students via a “School for Catholic Leaders” (Escuela de 
Líderes Católicos). They openly called for a boycott against pharmaceutical groups 
distributing EC, supporting other Catholic consumers’ organisations such as ACONOR 
(Guzman, Seibert, and Staab 2010). But in particular, under the government of 
Bachelet, they extended their presence and outreach to other cities such as Viña del Mar 
and Concepción where Catholic student groups are well organised through conservative 
movements and can rely on the support of other Catholic universities such as 
Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción and Pontificia Universidad Católica 
de Valparaíso. 
In 2007, taking advantage of Bachelet’s visit to the Vatican, Muévete Chile wrote to the 
Pope to denounce the EC policy proposal (Red por la Vida 2007). It produced a 
mapping of all politicians and organisations supporting the pro-SRHR advocacy 
nationally and internationally where they denounced the “gender ideology” behind this 
initiative (Muévete Chile 2010), and in 2009, before the Parliamentary and Presidential 
                                               58 See ¿Qué es y qué hace Muévete Chile?, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kmvCS5U8qw. 
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elections, they produced a table classifying each politician according to their stand on 
abortion, EC and gay marriage, showing the sophisticated and well-informed training 
these youth leaders received within the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition (Muévete Chile 
2009b). 
The third group, ACONOR, was mostly active at the end of the Lagos administration 
and beginning of the Bachelet administration, and intervened when the campaign 
against EC started targeting pharmaceutical companies producing the drug. One of its 
founders is the same student that founded AGES (Casas Becerra 2008). In messages 
targeting international pharmaceutical companies producing the EC drug, ACONOR 
threatened them with legal action if they started distributing the drug in Chile (see 
Ch. 7). This was a new type of advocacy and lobbying tactic by Chilean standards, and 
responded more to what could be considered American models of consumer 
organisations. 
Finally, Red por la Vida y la Familia (Pro-Life and Family Network) is an organisation 
that defines its mission as “channelling and coordinating all pro-life work in Chile; 
informing on all activities undertaken, as well as all institutions and actors 
participating” (Red por la Vida y la Familia 2010b). On its website this organisation 
provides not only information on the topics they defend but also a list of “anti-life” 
groups dealing with these issues.59 In this sense, Red por la Vida y la Familia played an 
important communication role and targeted newspapers to make their opinions more 
visible, keeping its audience alert and informed on all issues affecting the right to life. 
                                               59 These include international organisations, INGOs working on SRHR, as well as feminist and women’s groups advocating for women’s rights (Red por la Vida y la Familia 2010a). 
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As can be seen, the anti-EC advocacy opposing EC was varied but highly coordinated in 
their policy advocacy actions, or “glued” at the core policy level. As Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith state, effective advocacy coalitions are tied by a common set of beliefs, 
which in this case was a Catholic understanding of the right to life and an opposition to 
women’s rights and “gender” as the base to produce public policy. 
The Catholic universities 
Academic work and research is probably one of the most important sources of influence 
for the Catholic Church. Through universities the Church carries out early recruitment 
of followers and supporters among those who will probably become the intellectual and 
economic elite of the country. The Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC) is the 
oldest Catholic academic institution in the country directly linked to the Vatican and has 
always been perceived as the rival to the state-owned and secular Universidad de Chile. 
But with the privatisation of education under the military regime, many private 
universities were founded by the Church, including Universidad de los Andes (ULA), 
which belongs to the Opus Dei.60 
In Chile, besides the Opus Dei, two other important congregations are very active, 
working particularly with youth – the Legionnaires of Christ, and Schoenstatt (Thumala 
2007). All these movements are known to operate in elitist circles, reaching out to the 
youth of middle-class and upper-class families through school or parishes. Opus Dei 
tends to focus on university students and young professional circles. There is a strong 
link between the business elite of Chile and the more elitist movements in the Church 
                                               60 ULA was founded in May 1990 as the country was starting its transition to democracy. Other Catholic universities include the Universidad Santo Tomás, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Universidad Católica Raúl Silva Henríquez.  
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(Thumala 2007). It was in fact a mix of lawyers and doctors from PUC and ULA61 that 
supported the accusations against EC in the courts and the Constitutional Tribunal (see 
Chs 7 and 8). 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have highlighted that “scientists are not necessarily ‘neutral’ 
or ‘policy-indifferent’; instead, they are often members of coalitions” (1999: 128). 
Therefore it was crucial for the anti-SRHR lobby to include/recruit scientists who would 
be able to oppose the pro-SRHR advocacy coalition in court on scientific grounds 
regarding the action mechanisms of EC to support their position that the drug was 
abortive. 
Among the medical professionals involved in the anti-SRHR advocacy, one can 
highlight the public interventions of: Dr Patricio Ventura-Juncá, member of the 
governing council of the Pontifical Academy for Life and Director of the Centre of 
Bioethics at the Medical School at PUC; Dr Fernando Orrego Vicuña, former Head of 
Department at the Medical School of ULA; as well as Dr Patricio Mena,62 Emeritus 
Professor and President of the Ethics Committee of the Medical School at ULA.63 
The first two physicians were particularly proactive and visible in the media, notably 
through television interviews and letters to the editor in newspapers, while the third 
participated in the campaign via scientific articles (Mena 2005) to oppose the results of 
                                               61 PUC is the most influential Catholic university in Chile. ULA, thanks to its vast resources, has progressively started competing for students as well as research and teaching staff with PUC. Competition has been particularly strong in two specific departments – the Law faculty and the School of Medicine – two key areas of influence of the Catholic lobby in society.  62 Dr Mena was also part of the initial group of actors that brought the first case against EC to court. 63 At the medical school of ULA contraception is not part of the curriculum for doctors, following the strict Catholic doctrine’s prohibition regarding the use of contraceptive methods. Therefore, many of the young graduated doctors of ULA, including obstetricians and gynaecologists, need to gain this knowledge elsewhere after leaving university. Interview with Dr Horacio Croxatto, co-founder of ICMER and former researcher at PUC, 07.07.09. 
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research carried out by Dr Horacio Croxatto (see Ch. 6) showing that EC was not 
abortive. In an interview in the news on the Catholic channel Canal 13, Ventura Juncá 
emphasised the scientific credentials of these professionals declaring that EC: 
… is primarily a scientific issue. I come here basically as a scientist. I have won 
three projects on the beginning of life, and have been the coordinator of a group of 
highly competent and distinguished researchers in the fields of biology, 
reproduction, philosophy and also evidence-based medicine. […] We have had an 
exchange of letter in a scientific journal, the main one on these issues, 
Contraception, in which one of the articles in which a well-known Chilean 
researcher participates – Dr Croxatto – tries to prove the hypothesis that EC does 
not have an impact on implantation, and is not abortive. […] the researchers 
replied in a an honest and clear manner that their proofs were not consistent. They 
could not conclude that the pill was not abortive. (Muévete Chile 2009a) 
PUC did everything in its power to counter Croxatto’s arguments – as in the quote 
above – in the media and scientific circles, especially after he was forced to resign from 
his researcher position by the university’s authorities in 2004 for his views on abortion 
and his research on EC. Both Croxatto and Díaz highlighted the strength of this 
ideological battle which at times felt like a personal attack on Croxatto64 (see Ch. 6). 
PUC has many advanced studies and research centres to its name, including the Centro 
de Bioética (Bioethics Centre) that led the technical and medical arguments against EC 
during the judicial processes. The work on bioethics is crucial to understanding the role 
of the Church in influencing the agenda on abortion and the “right to life”, as well as its 
opposition to the wider agenda on both gender and SRHR. 
Most arguments related to the right to life and the role of religion in society within 
bioethics debates are summarised in a publication by the PUC regarding “Ethical 
                                               64 Ibid.; interview with Dr Soledad Díaz, Director of ICMER, 18.01.11. 
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Dilemmas for the 21st century”, in which Archbishop Fernando Chomalí – the 
representative of the Church’s opposition to EC – outlines the importance for the 
Church as “mother and teacher” to guide science in the ethical dilemmas affecting 
modern societies (Chomalí 2005). The rivalry between religion and science – that is, 
between the Catholic Church and secular scientists – on reproductive issues, 
underpinned the ten years of legal and political battles for the distribution of EC. This is 
a historical rivalry that extends beyond the access to contraception to include new 
fertility technologies and IVF, as well as research on the human genome and cloning. 
As explained by Chomalí, the Church’s views are that secularism has led to an 
increasing selfishness and individualistic behaviour in society, and therefore “[s]cience 
must be impregnated with wisdom” (2005: 28). 
Chomalí was a key actor in this policy process since he occupied numerous positions 
that provided him progressively with more influence on both public and politico-judicial 
debates. Before becoming Archbishop, he was a researcher and professor at the PUC 
Bioethics Centre during the judicial challenges under the Lagos administration. In June 
2006, as the Bachelet administration announced the distribution EC through the national 
health system, Chomalí was named Auxiliary Bishop of Santiago by Benedict XVI, 
putting him in a leading position during the judicial case at the Constitutional 
Tribunal.65 This was not a minor position since his role was to ensure all the Church’s 
organisations around the country understood and supported the Church’s official refusal 
of EC. 
                                               65 Chomalí, as well as Juan de Dios Vial (former Vice-Chancellor of PUC), were both ordinary members of the Pontifical Academy for Life at the time of this research. Chomalí, who joined the Academy in 2007, has since become a member of the Academy’s governing council, replacing Dr Patricio Ventura-Juncá.  
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Regarding EC, Chomalí, while still at the PUC Bioethics Centre, published a document 
where he openly challenged: a) EC as a real means of contraception; b) the drug as 
having a therapeutic function; c) the legitimacy of health authorities to distribute it; and 
d) a new government culture by which social debates were being replaced by policies 
enforced through decrees (Chomalí 2007). These four lines of arguments were adopted 
and sustained in a strict manner by all the members of the anti-SRHR coalition up until 
the end of the process (see Chs 6 and 7). 
The official position of the Church was as follows: 
… it is now evident that both EC and abortion are fruits of a same plant. Its 
objective is that if it does not avoid ovulation or fertilisation, it avoids the 
implantation and prevents a human being from living. The distribution of this drug 
makes it explicit that the objective of having sexual relations without the intention 
to procreate, justifies the possibility of eliminating the life of an innocent human 
being in its early days. This is unacceptable from a moral point of view, given that 
every human being, from the very beginning of life, is endowed with such dignity 
as well as the right for its life to be respected, which makes this unviable. The 
existence of a drug that allows the elimination of human lives endorsed by the 
state, is equivalent to denying the principle that all human beings are 
equal.[…]Denying such fundamental equality is opening the door to a new form of 
discrimination of people, based on the categories of wanted and unwanted. 
(Chomali 2007: 7-8)66 
It is likely due to his visible work and constant opposition to EC, and also due to his 
well-known close relationship with Opus Dei, that the Pope ordained Chomalí the 
Archbishop of Santiago on May 2011, although the nomination was not requested by 
the Church (Ramírez 2006). This is the highest position of the Chilean Church after the 
Cardinal, and it shows the importance currently given to bioethics within the Catholic 
dogma and the most conservative circles in the Vatican. 
                                               66 Researcher’s translation.  
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Independent professionals 
A particularity of the processes of advocacy against EC is that these actors want to 
appear to act independently.67 These individuals are often professionals and/or 
academics, who sometimes also work independently in the private sector. It is 
interesting to observe that many of them are lawyers in a country where policy-making 
has given lawyers a unique influence in politics and policy-making regarding 
contentious moral issues and women’s rights (Htun 2003). 
Lawyer R, Francisco Chahuán and Jorge Reyes, initiators of the first series of judicial 
battles, as well as the judge at the Constitutional Tribunal, appeared to be advocating 
against EC on personal grounds and following the Catholic precepts from their personal 
religious convictions. They supported the legal work of groups wanting to challenge 
EC, all the while avoiding mentioning their respective institutions68 or referring to the 
Church. 
All of them being lawyers, they showed no apparent relationship to parties or the 
Church, even if Chahuán subsequently became a well-known member of the more 
“liberal” right-wing party Renovación Nacional (RN), and Reyes worked as close 
advisor to Chahuán (Casas Becerra 2008: 3) and Senator Bombal (UDI). The two 
lawyers interviewed seemed particularly keen to stress their independence. This could 
be easily explained by the fact that many Opus Dei members strongly believe that their 
individual duty as Catholics is to express their faith through their work. 
                                               67 Interviews with Lawyer R, 15.06.09/18.06.09 and Judge F, member of the Constitutional Tribunal, 10.07.09. 68 ULA and the Universidad Santo Tomás. 
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This was also a strategy to present the opposition to EC as coming from diverse social 
groups rather than solely the Church itself, and thereby gain legitimacy. Although the 
Church is politically active and recognised as a political interlocutor in the country, it is 
careful not to appear to be directly influencing politics as Chile is defined as a secular 
state. 
The Church official interviewed also ratified the lawyer and judge’s answers, arguing 
that the Church was not part of the initiators of the court case against EC. When asked 
about the relationship between the Church and the groups challenging EC, he clearly 
stated “none”, and added that the Church was merely appreciative of the individual 
work of good Catholics: 
… we ask them [the lawyers] that whatever they decide to do, it should ultimately 
be truthful.[…] one’s religious beliefs obviously gives one the impulse to behave 
in a different manner than if one did not believe.[…]they feel they have a moral 
duty as Catholics to help us, to help the Catholic Church, with their experience as 
well as knowledge, but from the secular sphere.[…] do I feel myself represented 
by what he [the lawyer] says? Of course, and I support him. But he does not 
represent the Catholic Church when he goes to the Tribunal, and in fact the 
Catholic Church has never actively participated nor presented a law suit or claim, 
nothing. What the Church has done through its universities is presenting reports 
because we are citizens. As Chilean I have a national identity card, so does 
Cardinal Errrázuriz and all the Chilean Bishops, ultimately, let’s say, we are part 
of Chilean society.69 
This shows that all actors within the anti-SRHR advocacy know each other and have 
clearly defined areas of work and advocacy. Each group has its role and the church does 
not need to intervene. Interestingly, most of the independent professionals acting in the 
coalition perceive the politicians supporting their cause as highly unreliable. They 
                                               69 Op. cit. 51. 
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argued that they knew that the logic of politics often forces politicians to “compromise” 
on their values and therefore this made their work all the more relevant.70 Therefore 
these individuals see themselves as guardians of the “deep core” and interact with the 
most political arm of the coalition on a specific base as needed by their tactics.71 
Politicians and political parties 
Party affiliation and political involvement of civil servants and some state institutions 
can provide a way to understand the “gendered dynamics” of parties which affect the 
advancement of the women’s rights agenda (Macaulay 2006). We must therefore look at 
the role of politicians and policy-makers in different branches and levels within the 
executive. A distinction must, however, be made between career civil servants in lower 
rank positions – whose primary role is ensuring the continuity of policies and practices 
within the state – and high level officials who are politically appointed by the 
government in place (such as ministers). The second group holds much more power and 
therefore are under more pressure from political forces and disputes within and outside 
government. 
During both the Lagos and Bachelet administrations, we see confirmation of the idea 
that reproductive issues “engender heated public controversies that crosscut political 
cleavages and internally divide political parties” (Burns 2005 cited in Engeli 2009: 65). 
The anti-SRHR advocacy is not located in a single or specific party, in the same way 
that the pro-SRHR advocates (see Ch. 6) do not fall within straightforward party lines. 
As this research shows, on different occasions during the EC policy process, politicians 
from the same parties and same coalitions behaved in opposing ways due to personal 
                                               70 Op. cit. 67. 71 Ibid. 
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beliefs on reproductive issues, in particular due to religious values, as well as electoral 
reasons. Therefore the possibility of potential allies existing within right-wing and 
conservative parties cannot be automatically dismissed; in the same manner, left-wing 
parties are not to be automatically considered supporters of progressive initiatives on 
SRHR. This echoes recent literature focusing on Europe (Engeli 2009); although in 
some specific cases, it has been said that the presence of left-wing parties in power can 
be allies, as happened in Spain (Blofield 2006). 
Moreover the evidence also confirms previous research by Casas (2008) showing that 
there is cross-party presence of supporters of this coalition at different levels of state 
agencies as well as in Parliament and local governments. A clear distinction must be 
made between party members serving as civil servants, and elected representatives. 
Party members serving as civil servants played a substantial role during the Lagos 
administration, although elected representatives were also present at key electoral 
moments during his administration – mayors in particular. Nevertheless, elected 
representatives and political parties were particularly visible and active during 
Bachelet’s term when they became main actors of the public and legal debates on the 
policy, while civil servants (although less visible) remained crucial supporters for the 
Pro-SRHR Advocacy Coalition. This is due to the Lagos administration facing a series 
of judicial battles, while Bachelet faced an open political confrontation that took the 
form of a court case at the Constitutional Tribunal, ending in Parliament with a bill to 
ensure the legality of the distribution of EC. 
The power and influence of conservative media 
In its first stage (2005-2010), the opposition to EC relied on a few devoted individuals 
from conservative sectors of civil society, such as Chahuán, Reyes and Romero and 
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their allies in the initial legal challenge. Through an analysis of the press, one sees that 
electoral moments shape the way politicians get on board or distance themselves from 
such a contentious issue. In 2001, as the first legal challenge was set to reach the 
Supreme Court, suddenly politicians’ declarations to the media increased. In fact, in 
2001, the legal battle was happening in parallel to the electoral race for parliamentary 
elections taking place in December that year. Chahuán and Reyes remained the public 
speakers of the anti-SRHR advocacy coalition, with a clear objective to lead on the 
attack against politicians on the left of the centre accusing President Lagos of 
politicising the issue for electoral purposes (La Segunda 2001a). 
EC becomes the focus of the editors of the conservative press 
The conservative newspapers La Segunda and El Mercurio widely covered the 
controversy surrounding EC between the months of August and December. In October, 
El Mercurio highlighted how the issues were dividing the governing coalition, splitting 
it into two camps in view of the coming elections, something right-wing parties were 
seeking to exploit. According to the same newspaper, left-wing parties PS and PPD 
wanted to use the “pill” as part of their wider “progressive agenda”, while Christian 
Democrats preferred not to debate these issues in pre-electoral times (Agüero 2001). 
This reflects the ongoing rivalry between the two main confessional parties in Chile, 
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) (also 
known as Democracia Cristiana). 
At the end of the 1990s, the PDC started suffering a steady decline in its electoral vote, 
which was intensified between 2001 and 2005 (Morales and Poveda 2007). For some, 
UDI started to undermine the PDC by competing for the Catholic and popular vote 
(Huneeus 2003 cited in Morales and Poveda 2007). Therefore in view of future 
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elections it was crucial for UDI to divide Concertación parties and to attract the Catholic 
vote by publicly challenging Christian Democrats to make explicit their willingness to 
follow the Episcopal Conference’s position on EC. 
Interestingly, two of the main PDC leaders – Gabriel Valdés and former President 
Patricio Aylwin – confirmed the tension within their party as they expressed different 
point of views on the matter. The first supported the distribution of the drug and was 
openly critical of the ruling of the Supreme Court, while the second said that if the pill 
was in fact abortive, he supported the 2001 decision by the Supreme Court (El Mercurio 
2001a; La Segunda 2001b). This not only confirms that parties are split by moral 
debates and in particular SRHR, but it also indicates that parties are neither closed or 
uniform institutions, and therefore are constantly evolving as a response to inputs from 
the political environment or policy sub-system. 
After the 2001 election, between 2002 and 2003, due to the legal nature of the process – 
involving mostly government health authorities and pharmaceutical companies, and due 
to the technical knowledge required – the EC debate became less visible in the media. 
The conservative press – particularly the conservative newspapers El Mercurio and La 
Segunda – decided to focus on abortion, a debate they tried to put on the political 
agenda mostly through editorial and opinion pieces. El Mercurio published an article on 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) +10 entitled “Alarm for Pro-abortion 
Legislation”, and another piece on the case of a woman with an unviable pregnancy 
entitled “Gladys Pavez, an Excuse to Debate Abortion”, to which it gave a full spread in 
its weekend magazine entitled “The Right to be Born. When a Child Won’t Survive: 
Waiting for Katherine” (Pérez Ferrada 2002). 
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In this same period, civil servants’ influence increased as in 2003, as Bachelet stepped 
down as Minister of Health to become Minister of Defence. She was replaced by Dr 
Pedro García, a well-known Christian Democrat who, although openly Catholic and 
against abortion, seemed open to distributing EC to victims of sexual violence and 
supported the validity of scientific evidence showing that EC was not abortive, in 
particular Dr Croxatto’s research (El Mercurio 2004). Speaking of his beliefs he 
declared to El Mercurio: 
I am here as a Minister of the State. I am not representing a party or a faith. [I 
need] to see the problem in a global manner. […] I hope when I get to the Final 
Judgement… I also fitted IUDs protecting myself on a series of studies showing 
they are not abortive. I know I am in contradiction with the teachings of the 
Church on this, and I do not deny this troubles me, but I also know that there are 
situations in which… A woman who has been victim of rape has been hurt in a 
dreadful manner […] I respect the Church’s position but I also have to respect that 
human being that was created to God’s image and likeness and who stands in front 
of me, terrified to be pregnant as a consequence of a rape. I had to deal with many 
victims of rape… (El Mercurio 2004) 
Thus, in 2004, García belonged to those members of the PDC who stood by the 
government’s position on EC and backed the revision of the Fertility Norms within 
MINSAL, supported by civil society organisations belonging to the pro-SRHR 
advocacy coalition. 
In 2004, the government turned to mayors for backup as the campaign for municipal 
elections approached and the courts ruled against the government’s decision to make EC 
available to victims of sexual violence. Elected politicians at the local level were called 
for support by both advocacy camps, but the Church made sure to publicly call on all 
Catholic mayors to uphold Catholic values (La Segunda Internet 2004c). The legal 
implication of the tribunals’ decisions was also worsened by some mayors’ decision – 
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many of them UDI members – not to distribute EC in their primary healthcare centres, 
openly defying the government. The government responded to this by giving the 
Minister of Health, Pedro García, the task of threatening mayors with legal and 
administrative sanctions if EC was not distributed to victims of sexual violence in 
primary healthcare centres (La Segunda Internet 2004a; La Segunda 2004). 
UDI and RN mayors led the concerted opposition to the government’s policy, accusing 
the government of behaving like a “hidden dictatorship” (Espinosa V. 2004). The 
Church declared that “law isn’t above God’s will” (La Segunda Internet 2004b; La 
Segunda 2004). In retaliation, far-right UDI Congress members also reacted to the 
threats of Pedro García. Anticipating the importance of the presidential race of 2005 for 
García’s Christian Democrat party along with the concern of its leaders with electoral 
results, they demanded that PDC presidential candidate, Soledad Alvear, “clearly and 
categorically stated her opinion regarding the distribution of the abortive next-day pill 
in her government” (La Segunda 2004). 
But surprisingly with the upcoming elections, for the first time, the debate also started 
creating divisions within the right-wing UD–RN alliance (Espinosa 2004). In fact not all 
politicians, in particular Parliamentarians and mayors, agreed with the way UDI had 
mobilised against the reproductive health policy and had hinted at their intention to use 
the Constitutional Tribunal to question the constitutionality of the measure. RN 
members, in particular those who were doctors by profession, felt this was not an agreed 
coalition position and started voicing their concerns or differences in order to highlight 
their liberal values showing the complexity of belief systems within coalitions and for 
people occupying public positions. 
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The “pill” and Lagos: Protecting the consensus within Concertación 
The 2005 presidential election was particularly important because it saw, for the first 
time in Chile’s history, two female candidates running for office: Soledad Alvear (DC) 
and Michelle Bachelet (PS). In March 2005, the MINSAL was ready to publish the 
Fertility Norms. However, in an unexpected turn of events, Minister García – who had 
previously declared his support for the distribution of EC to all women and not just 
victims of sexual violence (El Mercurio 2004) – denied he had authorised the 
publication of the norms provoking the hardest impasse to EC distribution (see Ch. 7). 
The candidacy of Alvear, representative of the most conservative factions at the head of 
the PDC, was at the root of García’s decision. The PDC wanted to protect their 
candidate (see Ch. 7). Lagos was strategically forced to accept and back García’s 
retraction personally in the press, and sacked the Under-Secretary – a PS member – due 
to the agreements made within the Concertación conglomerate in view of the 2005 
elections (see Ch. 7). 
This was the strongest blow for the policy behind the revision of the Fertility Norms and 
the distribution of EC since 2000. According to Mariana Aylwin, the PDC succeeded in 
“putting a halt” to any discussion about EC during the electoral campaign period, which 
was causing much concern and debate within the party due to its “uncertain electoral 
impact”.72 
Luckily the PDC-PS breakdown within Concertación was in some way diverted by the 
favourable Supreme Court ruling for EC in December 2005. Thanks to the low profile 
of the García impasse in March 2005, the government was able to strategically move the 
                                               72 Interview with Mariana Aylwin, former Minister of Education and Deputy, and Coordinator of the Programmatic Congress of the PDC in 2008, 05.06.09. 
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legal case to a more favourable court of appeals that year, securing a legal victory (see 
Ch. 7). 
Conservative politicians and EC under Bachelet 
As Ch. 8 discusses, the election of Bachelet provoked a great deal of concern among 
conservative sectors in Chilean society and in particular among the anti-SRHR 
advocacy coalition since she was the Minister who had introduced EC (Sierra and Hola 
2006). 
With the support of members of Parliament the anti-SRHR groups started a new legal 
challenge at the Constitutional Tribunal (see Ch. 8). Elected politicians therefore 
immediately became important and visible actors of both the anti-SRHR and pro-SRHR 
coalitions. Led and represented by the same independent professionals and lawyers 
involved in the court cases since 2000, the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition secured the 
backing of 32 Parliamentarians who signed their petition allowing them to resort to the 
Constitutional Tribunal (see Ch. 7). The deputies who signed the petition were all 
members of the two right-wing parties, with a majority of UDI members. Not only did 
the majority of conservative politicians support the opposition to EC but many also 
belonged to the “Network of Pro-Life Parliamentarians”, composed of 61 members of 
Parliament, including half of the PDC deputies in Parliament73 (Red por la Vida y la 
Familia 2006). This clearly shows how deep the crosscutting effect of SRHR issues can 
be for parties affecting the composition of advocacy coalitions and their “policy core” 
cohesion, something also observed within the pro-EC coalition (see Ch. 6). 
                                               73 Thirteen out of the 20 PDC elected representatives in the Chamber of Deputies joined the “pro-life bench”, as well as one member of the PRSD. 
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“Consensus” versus Concertación 
Although the most conservative sectors of the PDC – who had requested a summit on 
all contentious and moral issues within Concertación since early 2006 (Salinas 2006) – 
Christian Democrats did not sign the petition that allowed the appeal at the 
Constitutional Tribunal against Bachelet. DC knew this would break the “consensus” – 
the glue that kept the coalition together since 1989. Instead as a sign of disapproval and 
protest, the most conservative sectors within DC that led the party at the time threatened 
Concertación with breaking the government coalition (El Mercurio - Editorial 2006; 
Montalva 2007). 
The distrust of the PDC positions on SRHR and EC within Concertación’s progressive 
parties PS and PPD, led its militants to strategise to avoid the veto power PDC 
politician could have to block EC. As Laura Albornoz (PDC) – then Minister of 
SERNAM – explained, the socialist Soledad Barría, then Minister of Health, had 
informed her of the launch of the Fertility Norms “only the day before”.74 For Albornoz, 
this was because Barría “probably feared” that Albornoz would otherwise have 
informed her party of MINSAL’s intentions. Albornoz commented with a humorous 
tone: 
But there is no doubt that the notification by the Minister of Health responded to 
the instructions by the President to avoid this happening [that DC would be 
informed], and that I should be informed since this would affect women and that 
was part of my mandate.75 
Barría also confirmed that she had informed Albornoz of the launch of the norms only 
the day before as a strategy. She added that following the same logic she only visited 
                                               74 Interview with Laura Albornoz, former Minister of SERNAM of Michelle Bachelet, 2006-2010, 17.01.11. 75 Ibid. 
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Bishop Goic, Vice-President of the Episcopal Conference, on the same morning of the 
launch, albeit in his home outside the capital. Barría stated: “I did it at the very last 
minute to avoid them telling me I could not do so!”76 
As shown, the policy for EC represented a challenge to the internal agreements, as well 
as to the interpretation more conservative sectors within the coalition had of the belief 
system that kept the coalition together and acting as one in the political arena. However, 
EC came to challenge these assumptions, dividing Concertación parties and forcing its 
members to play strategic games with each other to ensure the implementation of 
contentious policies. 
Alvear, a presidential candidate in 2005, categorically refused the distribution of EC to 
adolescents without parental or guardians’ consent. She used identical language to 
Cardenal Errázuriz in her declarations to the press (Contreras 2006) confirming her 
close allegiance to the church (see Ch. 7). Patricio Walker, a DC deputy and 
Concertación speaker in Parliament, went as far as supporting the right to conscientious 
objection by pharmacy owners refusing to sell EC despite MINSAL’s guidelines, 
provoking ire among his left-wing Concertación peers in Parliament who questioned his 
position as Speaker of the Chamber (La Segunda Internet 2007; Terra 2008). 
During the first two years of the Bachelet administration it was therefore clear that 
Concertación was being targeted by the opposition through their centrist ally, PDC, 
which was already experiencing major political divisions amongst its factions on 
internal issues. UDI in the meantime maintained a concerted and structured way of 
operating in Parliament, in courts and in declarations to the press. Nonetheless this 
                                               76 Interview with Soledad Barría, former Minister of Health under Bachelet 2006-2008, 24.01.11. 
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changed in 2007 as a second charge against the President was brought for review at the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
The Constitutional Tribunal ruling and the municipal elections 
Early 2008 marked the beginning of a new electoral year, this time for municipal 
elections, while the Constitutional Tribunal had not yet ruled on the constitutional status 
of the Fertility Norms launched by MINSAL. It was in this political climate that right-
wing politicians progressively started to dissociate themselves from most conservative 
positions against EC. 
When the Constitutional Tribunal made public its decision against the government 
policy, the social uproar took most politicians by surprise. The demonstrations by civil 
society and thousands of citizens supporting the distribution of EC (see Ch. 9) had a 
crucial political impact and sent an important warning in an electoral year to the mayors 
and members of Parliament. 
This produced tension at the policy belief level of the anti-SRHR coalition. While UDI 
politicians such as Deputy Kast, the leader of the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition in 
Parliament, called on authorities to accept the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal and 
respect the law (La Segunda Internet 2008b), Alvear, then President of the DC, called 
on the government and the Minister of Health to take the case and discussion 
surrounding EC to Congress for a wider political debate (La Segunda Internet 2008a). 
Mayors and the pill: The power of local elections 
At the local level mayors became the first line of the electoral and moral battles 
supporting or opposing EC after the government called on mayors to distribute the drug 
in primary healthcare services (see Ch. 9). 
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UDI was unable to maintain discipline among its mayors. In a rather low-income 
municipality of the capital Santiago, UDI mayor Hasbún opted to publicly support the 
distribution of EC to capture the support of its electorate, although emphasising it would 
be for cases of emergency (La Segunda Internet 2008c). Other UDI mayors had opted to 
do the same, although at the national level internal divisions were seen in all parties, 
including those on the left.77 
The 2009 presidential elections: The instrumental value of SRHR and Bachelet’s gender equality agenda 
It was 2009 that proved to be the most important moment for both advocacy coalitions 
as the presidential race started early that year as Frei – the PDC and Concertación 
presidential candidate – made clear in March his willingness to put up for discussion the 
issue of therapeutic abortion. This was despite the fact that PDC members had not 
reached consensus on the topic of therapeutic abortion. In the months previous to the 
announcement of Frei’s candidacy, recognising the value of Bachelet’s legacy on 
gender equality debates, progressive members of the party and in particular gender 
advisors were brought to his campaign team.78 By including therapeutic abortion the 
strategy was obviously to push the right-wing and liberal candidate Sebastian Piñera to 
pronounce himself on these issues, and show that his coalition was much more 
conservative, in particular his UDI allies. 
In parallel to the 2009 presidential elections, Parliamentary elections were also due to 
take place. Candidates therefore used the political battle and debates surrounding the 
distribution of EC to their own advantage and that of their parties. Capturing the youth 
                                               77 Interview with Paulina Reinoso, lawyer at Chilean Association of Municipalities, member of the PDC, and gender advisor of Eduardo Frei’s electoral campaign, 18.05.09.  78 Op. cit. 77, and interview with Dr María Isabel Matamala, gender advisor at MINSAL 2006-2010, 02.04.09. 
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and women’s votes was crucial since they could make the difference. Chapter 8 
discusses how in 2008 feminist groups played an important role in putting candidates on 
the spot regarding their stance on EC, dividing the right-wing “Alianza” and showing 
internal divisions in its parties as well. 
The power of doctors in reproductive issues: Science reclaims its predominance over religion 
In 2008, the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal against the distribution of EC gave 
doctors a central position as opinion leaders regarding the debate on SRHR. Bachelet 
had to introduce a bill to counter the ensuing decision by the Contraloría to prevent 
mayors from distributing EC (see Ch. 9), reaffirming the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
ruling. During the bill process doctors within UDI, RN and PDC joined their colleagues 
on the left, creating a wider “medical bench” in Parliament. For RN politicians, it was 
particularly important to dissociate themselves from ultra-Catholic and conservative 
positions since their presidential candidate, Sebastián Piñera, wanted to appeal to a 
younger centrist, secular and liberal electorate. This was the same electorate Frei and 
Concertación were trying to lure. 
Sebastian Piñera granted freedom of action to all the Parliamentary members of his 
“Coalition for Change”, in a clear attempt to appear liberal and open-minded in his 
presidential campaign, as well as to not further restrict his fellow party members. Karla 
Rubilar (RN) and colleague Osvaldo Palma (RN) who had previously joined their 
Concertación peers to call upon conservative sectors to stop the “terror campaign” 
against EC (Cooperativa 2006) became the visible face of the more liberal option within 
the “Coalition for Change”. 
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But the biggest surprise came from UDI as Juan Lobos, the doctor who had originally 
signed the conservative petition to appeal at the Constitutional Tribunal, and had since 
withdrawn his support for the initiative to act in conscience as a doctor, declared that 
EC could be used “without fear” and that this was an issue of equity in the access to 
health (La Segunda Internet 2009). This led several UDI members to vote against their 
party in Congress (La Nación 2009f). This not only changed the image of UDI as being 
a united and monolithic party, but it also challenged the leadership of UDI 
Parliamentarians such as Kast, who since 2006 had maintained a close relationship with 
the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition, and its civil society members. 
All right-wing doctors insisted on preventing the issue from becoming an ideological 
one “between goods and bads, progressives and reactionaries” (La Segunda Internet 
2009). Doctors’ opinions on this and the electoral climate allowed for more 
Parliamentarians within RN and UDI, as well as PDC, to change their minds and 
become “arrepentidos” (repentants) (La Nación 2009c). The votes of UDI repentants 
permitted to pass the Law on Regulation of Fertility sponsored by Bachelet (La Nación 
2009d). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main actors that compose the Anti-SRHR Advocacy 
Coalition. It has shown how the composition of this advocacy coalition and the 
concerted actions of its members, with well-defined roles as well as a clear core and 
policy beliefs made them especially effective and influential for almost ten years of the 
policy process. The advocacy coalition’s influence and cohesion were only altered 
during specific electoral periods under both Lagos and Bachelet administrations, 
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although the clearest breakdown happened after 2008 with the ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Fertility Bill initiative of 2009. 
Despite having a clear belief system based on the Catholic doctrine as well as the 
resources and the Church’s know-how and lobby groups, especially members of the 
Opus Dei, the coalition failed to block Bachelet’s policy for the distribution of EC once 
the issue reached the public domain and in particular Congress. The strength of this 
advocacy coalition seems to have resided in the tight network of elite actors acting in a 
private manner and through courts. 
The role of political parties through civil servants was particularly visible during the 
Lagos administration although they also influenced the agenda and policy strategies 
under Bachelet. The role played by the Health Ministers, Bachelet (PS) and García 
(PDC), as well as Barría (PS), strongly influenced the policy process showing the 
gendered dynamics of party politics in government. 
Members of Parliament focused on short-term gains and those who were doctors by 
profession weakened the policy core of the coalition, something the government and its 
political allies exploited to their advantage. Doctors as a professional body and opinion 
leaders put their identity close to science before religion, provoking the divisions within 
their parties. The tacit ethical rules of medicine as a discipline, and the sanctions 
attached to it, meant that even some of the conservative doctors could not ignore 
evidence-based data and were under pressure from their peers. This was particularly 
visible with UDI maintaining its internal discipline until almost the very end. PDC 
instead suffered from disputes on the EC policy both internally and within Concertación 
for more than 10 years. This demonstrates that the policy core of a coalition matters, 
and that it is susceptible to changes in the policy sub-system. 
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Although until 2008 the conservative Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition managed to 
frame the issue of EC as abortion and set the discussion in terms of the Catholic 
doctrine, in particular by not referring to or by blocking any mention of women’s rights, 
the government managed to pierce its policy core by strategically reframing the policy 
after 2008 in view of upcoming elections. The new understanding of EC as a gender and 
class issue together with citizens’ uproar over their freedom to choose strategically 
changed the policy sub-system. This and the electoral impact of the reframing brought 
doctors in Parliament onto the pro-SRHR side. Both framing and timing of a policy 
process then affected the policy core of the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition. 
The different election processes – municipal, parliamentarian, presidential – and their 
timeframe between 2008 and 2009 permitted the government to maintain the issue high 
on the political agenda while dividing the anti-SRHR coalition by using the divisive 
power of the debate within conservative and right-wing parties and alliances. 
Finally, the Anti-SRHR Advocacy Coalition failed in its efforts to maintain the Church 
and its doctrine as “mother and teacher” of science and society once the issue was in the 
public domain. 
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CHAPTER 6: Mapping the Pro-SRHR Advocacy Coalition: The actors and the evolution of the coalition since the SRHR Bill 
The previous chapter presented the actors and belief-system of the Anti-SRHR 
Advocacy Coalition, and showed how these actors, whether individuals or 
organisations, come together through their shared conservative views on women’s rights 
based on the teachings of the Catholic Church. This chapter presents the actors and 
belief-system of the Pro-SRHR Advocacy Coalition that also gathers a range of actors 
and organisations who share specific worldviews on gender equality and reproduction. 
The belief system of this coalition is less homogenous than the one uniting the Anti-
SRHR Advocacy Coalition, due to the diversity of its members. The Pro-SRHR 
Advocacy Coalition unites doctors, scientists, lawyers and social science researchers 
often based at universities, thinktanks or biomedical NGOs, all working within a SRHR 
framework. It also includes feminist and political thinktanks working on equality and 
social policy in particular health and gender issues. The state, the engine of the policy 
behind the distribution of EC, is the main agent for defending it through the executive. 
The president’s cabinet, MINSAL and to a certain extent SERNAM, are all part of the 
pro-SRHR coalition. 
This chapter shows that these actors face more difficulty in coming together at the 
policy core level. In fact, their opinion on strategies to influence the agenda on these 
issues, the arguments to be advanced and the timing for advocacy and lobbying vary 
immensely. There is a clear tension between feminists who perceive SRHR as their 
agenda and as coming from long-fought feminist battles, and doctors, lawyers, 
biomedical and social policy NGOs whose primary aim is to advance the SRHR agenda 
in government policies, even if this only leads to gradual change. For feminists, on the 
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other hand, SRHR remain a set of issues that are part of a symbolic struggle that defines 
their movement and requires structural changes, and this makes them suspicious of any 
initiative coming from outside the core of their networks and movement. 
The chapter shows that the generational breach within the feminist network and its 
internal power struggles are the main barriers preventing feminists from sustaining 
strategic and effective advocacy on reproductive issues. Due to a historic tradition in 
health policy (see Ch. 4), doctors and lawyers tend to rally behind the most technical 
aspect of the advocacy work. They usually benefit from direct channels of 
communication with the health authorities while feminists have more of a tense 
relationship both with the government and other institutions such as political parties 
The second section of the chapter discusses an important initiative led by the feminist 
movement in the early 2000s, the SRHR Bill, whose process already brought together 
the same actors involved in the EC policy process. The chapter shows how during that 
policy process, the dynamics and conflicts between feminists and biomedical groups, as 
well as with government and politicians are similar to those that took place during the 
defence of EC. 
Doctors and the biomedical NGOs 
Chapter 4 discussed the importance that the medical profession has historically had for 
public health initiatives and in particular reproductive and sexual health. Two main 
organisations positioned themselves as key players in these fields – APROFA, and 
ICMER. Both organisations became the main engines in civil society for the defence of 
EC throughout the 10-year series of judicial and political battles. 
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ICMER 
It was ICMER and in particular the work of the current Director, Dr Soledad Díaz that 
brought the issue of EC to the attention of health policy-makers in 1996. ICMER is a 
not-for-profit organisation founded in 1985, working on reproductive and sexual health, 
human reproduction and maternal–child health. 
Most importantly ICMER has become renowned for its high-quality research on 
reproductive health issues and family planning methods, including the development and 
international defence of first and second generation contraceptive implants (ICMER 
2014). In many of its research initiatives ICMER has collaborated with internationally 
renowned health and reproductive-health specialist organisations such as the Population 
Council, Family Health International and the World Health Organisation (ICMER 
2014). 
Hence, it is not a surprise that ICMER with its international credentials took the 
initiative to introduce EC as a new contraception method and led the strategic efforts to 
do so. After all EC has become a “global reproductive health technology” which has 
faced global opposition to its distribution (Foster and Wynn 2012). 
ICMER anticipated the fierce debates to come and the organised opposition this new 
reproductive technology could face in the existing Chilean political and cultural 
contexts and set out to create alliances within civil society to create a favourable 
environment to distribute EC (see Ch. 7). 
In 2002, ICMER, APROFA and other civil society groups set up the Chilean 
Emergency Contraception Consortium (CECC), a national section of the Latin 
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American Consortium for Emergency Contraception (CLAE in Spanish).79 The CECC 
brought together a wide range of actors including health, research and women’s 
organisations, academic institutions, as well as service delivery agencies.80 
It was this group that carried out much of the advocacy and information dissemination 
initiatives to increase awareness on the use and benefits of EC. They organised training 
courses with health professionals, lawyers, social scientists and journalists in parallel to 
their work to update the MINSAL’s “Fertility Guidelines”.81 This group as part of the 
CLAE gained knowledge from the shared experiences with other regional consortia on 
the judicial and political attacks EC had been suffering all over the continent. 
The acknowledged research tradition and impact of the work of ICMER meant that 
MINSAL trusted the organisation to carry out the revision of the Norms and it naturally 
led the CECC. Moreover, with their solid credentials, its researchers, Dr Horacio 
Croxatto and Dr Soledad Díaz, were the obvious choice to lead the scientific support for 
the defence of EC. They presented the evidence-based arguments against the allegations 
sustaining that EC was abortive. 
Until 2006, Croxatto was professor at the Pontifical University of Chile while also 
holding the chair of ICMER, but the Church authorities requested to the PUC that he 
resign after he publicly criticised a bill to increase the sanction in cases of abortions in 
Chile presented by UDI MP, Hernán Larraín. He made his opinion public through “an 
                                               
79 Op. cit. 64. Some of the organisations that participated in the initial EC introduction efforts included ICMER, Corporación de Salud y Políticas Sociales, Foro Abierto de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, Instituto de la Mujer, Centro de Medicina Reproductiva y Desarrollo Integral del Adolescente, and Asociación Chilena de Protección de la Familia. 80 Ibid. 81 Interview with Verónica Schiappacasse, Director of Prosalud and former member of ICMER, 17.06.09. 
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expert’s opinion letter from ICMER to Parliament which was subsequently reproduced 
by the conservative newspaper El Mercurio” (Tolerancia Cero 2009). Since Croxatto 
was ICMER’s chair at the time “he was singled out”,82 but resigned only a few years 
later “as his research on the effects of EC on female monkeys clearly started 
demonstrating that EC was not abortive and the PUC felt uneasy with his scientific 
evidence” (Tolerancia Cero 2009). 
Croxatto briefly joined the Opus Dei when he was a student at the PUC during the 60s, 
and was therefore aware of the influence of the most conservative groups of the 
Catholic Church within the PUC.83 He explained that he had left PUC as he felt the 
“dogmatic framework of the doctrine of the Church was too strong within the 
university”.84 Díaz also declared she once “had been an active Catholic militant”,85 and 
had started working “on these issues of sexual and reproductive health... because I 
believe in women’s rights and people’s freedom. And we must find the means and 
spaces to let people exert their freedoms, which are very few”.86 
Díaz, who led the strategy to advocate and lobby for the distribution of EC, had worked 
closely with Croxatto at PUC and left “because of the emergency contraception issue”87 
at the same time as he did. She explained that “after working 40 years at the Catholic 
University” they had a strategic advantage – they knew the conservative scientific 
opposition they would face in the courts well, since “in the biomedical arena we all 
know each other”.88 Díaz and Croxatto founded ICMER, and maintained a close 
                                               82 Op. cit. 64. 83 Op. cit. 63. 84 Ibid.  85 Op. cit. 64. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 
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relationship after he left. This meant the Pro-SRHR Advocacy Coalition could count on 
a world-class expert on reproductive health methods. 
Croxatto argued that “none of the people from the PUC” who tried to contradict his 
findings “was a specialist and were all driven by their Catholic beliefs”.89 Their strategy 
“aimed at raising a doubt in the public opinion by lying and misinterpreting or ignoring 
the existing evidence showing that it was not abortive”.90 For him the Anti-SRHR 
Advocacy Coalition was made up of “fundamentalists, who thought they could start a 
Catholic crusade against sexual and reproductive rights by opposing EC, which was a 
lost cause since in the 1960s when people started using birth control”.91 The way in 
which they linked EC to abortion without any scientific evidence was in his opinion a 
shrewd and “effective strategy”, since “saying ‘The pill is abortive’ was a soundbite 
easy to believe for mainstream public opinion”.92 
Croxatto and the ultra-conservative scientists trying to undermine his work debated 
most of the time through professional elite networks and in newspapers. This often kept 
the scientific arguments away from mass communication channels with a few 
exceptions. Interviewed on television right before the EC Bill was approved in 
Congress, he was challenged by a conservative journalist on the fact that there were two 
sides of the story scientifically speaking and this led the judges of the TC to rule against 
EC and evoke a possible “doubt”. He energetically responded: “No sir, we presented 
evidence based on hard data. The others presented conjectures, which is not the same” 
(Tolerancia Cero 2009). 
                                               89 Op. cit. 63. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 
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ICMER was thus aware that the battle in the courts was only one side of the strategic 
effort to support EC. The government’s backing and political commitment was equally 
important, particularly in order to reframe the issue as a right. Díaz as a doctor had 
strong connections with government health officials, which she carefully maintained 
and used, in particular once Bachelet – a doctor herself – became president. Yet, the 
authorities only sought scientific advice on the matter reluctantly during the legal 
actions in the courts (see following chapters). Croxatto was invited only twice to 
MINSAL during the 10-year-long political and judicial battles surrounding EC.93 
Díaz was also well known among the advocacy coalition actors. She and Verónica 
Shicappacasse were very active within the Consultation Council, the formal space 
created by the state and MINSAL for the participation of civil society. From there 
ICMER constantly monitored the advances of the EC bill despite the lack of 
responsiveness from public officials.94 This led them to confront the authorities at 
different stages on the progress made on the EC policy, in particular for its 
implementation after the Norms were approved: 
… we always asked to the Consultive Council “listen here you have a President 
that is fully backing SRHR since she was a Minister, that supports these Norms, 
who is brave and published them, and you do not react to this. Why?” There was a 
period of time, between the moment when the Norms were launched and the 
ruling, when MINSAL did nothing. It did not disseminate the Norms, train 
professionals, or continue to distribute EC although it was legal. It was as if they 
were paralysed […] This said, MINSAL was more supportive because SERNAM 
has done nothing.95 
                                               93 Ibid. 94 Op. cit. 81. 95 Ibid. 
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Díaz also maintained a close relationship with the international networks working on 
these issues and facing similar issues elsewhere in Latin America. This helped her in the 
slow and hard process of building alliances that could play a key role for the advocacy 
and lobby pro-EC, despite the lack of a wider strategy and resources from civil 
society.96 
APROFA 
After experiencing problems with funding and the downsize of its programmes over the 
1980s (see Ch. 4), in the late 2000s APROFA as the Chilean section of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), entered another phase of transition towards the 
“rights-based work IPPF was carrying out as internationally defined in their advocacy 
strategy”.97 This was “not an easy shift” for an organisation that had spent decades 
under the medical influence surrounding family planning and maternal health 
discourses.98 
According to APROFA’s former Executive Director, before 2001 APROFA “had not 
worked closely with other actors like ICMER or the feminist movement”.99 In fact, it 
was only after “taking stock of its limited capacity for political influence” that 
APROFA developed a strategy to “progressively increase its actions through coalitions 
with other civil society actors”.100 Two events provoked this decision: the first was the 
frustrated attempt to publish the Fertility Norms under Lagos, and the decision by his 
Health Minister to block the work APROFA and ICMER had done for more than three 
years. APROFA realised that it needed stronger presence in the policy process to protect 
                                               96 Ibid.  97 Interview with Juan Bastías, former Policy Officer at APROFA, 03.07.09. 98 Interview with Zulema Contreras, former Executive Director at APROFA, 11.06.09. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 
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and promote its work. The second event was the SRHR Bill initiative that took place in 
the early 2000s and which was never discussed in Congress despite the wide support, in 
which APROFA also participated (Ch. 6).101 
During the EC process that started in 2006, APROFA was therefore keen to be part of 
alliances and worked closely with ICMER and feminist organisations, joining the 
feminist and civil-society Movimiento por la Anticoncepción de Emergencia 
(Movement Pro-EC). However, the relationship with other organisations, especially 
feminist ones, proved tense since feminists did not work with a step-by-step approach 
for change (see Ch. 9), an approach preferred by biomedical NGOs.102 
An important aspect of the work done by the NGOs involved in the advocacy coalition 
was their own internal accountability systems, which are generally “towards their 
donors and funded programmes”.103 According to Bastías, during the challenge to EC 
under Bachelet APROFA worked through alliances,104 but feminists wanted to retain 
control of the process (see Ch. 9) and some felt “uncomfortable with his presence 
because he was a man”.105 Bastías explained that “being there as representative of a 
biomedical organisation was complicated! I attended meetings with feminists where you 
had 20, 30, 40 women, and there was no chair for me. They assumed that because I was 
a man I was patriarchal”.106 
                                               101 Ibid. 102 Op. cit. 97, 98. 103 Op. cit. 97.  104 Ibid. 105 Bastías Ibid., and interview with Antonella Caiozzi, young feminist, 11.07.09. 106 Op. cit. 97.  
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APROFA also faced internal tensions, especially regarding “the rights-based approach 
set by the IPPF for its affiliates”.107 APROFA, at the time of the EC policy under 
Bachelet, was preparing scoping work on the liberalisation of abortion in Chile “in line 
with the objectives of the IPPF worldwide”, which included working for the legalisation 
of abortion.108 However, since historically APROFA “had been close to the Christian 
Democrat Party, that project and anything that could put their institutional reputation in 
a difficult position was discarded, and the research on abortion was stopped”.109 
Academia and social science organisations 
Academics from universities and social science organisations, such as the lawyer Lidia 
Casas and social scientist Claudia Dides, were crucial in the work of the pro-SRHR 
advocacy coalition. 
Lidia Casas is the most prominent lawyer working on sexual and reproductive rights 
from a women’s rights perspective in Chile. She got involved with the EC legal process 
in 2001 and was part of the litigation team until the very end. Casas played a crucial 
role in coordinating the litigation strategy from civil society that was joined “at specific 
moments by a lawyer from APROFA”.110 Like Soledad Díaz, Casas maintained close 
links to the CLAE in which she frequently presented the legal aspects and efforts made 
in Chile to distribute EC. Casas also worked hard with Soledad Díaz to try to get the 
UNFPA support and advice on the legal and scientific aspects of EC to the government, 
which were not considered by the legal teams at the Moneda.111 
                                               107 Ibid.  108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Op. cit. 81, and interview with Lidia Casas, lawyer in charge of the defense of the EC since 2001, and law professor at the Human Rights Centre, Universidad Diego Portales, 01.06.09. 111 Casas, Ibid. 
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Claudia Dides, former gender coordinator at FLACSO, was also a long-standing 
member of the pro-EC lobby. She had joined the policy process from the beginning in 
2000 while she worked for CORSAPS. Although Casas and Dides highlighted their 
feminist beliefs as drivers of their work, they are not formally considered part of the 
feminist movement. This did not stop them from carrying out the work on EC from a 
women’s rights perspective, trying to influence the state from the public policy field. 
Explaining the origins of the work on EC, Dides said: 
So this starts in 2000… EC was mainly introduced by biomedical organisations. 
The medical world. With the help of some people who consider ourselves feminists 
but were not part of the [existing] groups, we were not among the autonomous, nor 
members of political parties, or the women’s movement in Chile; in fact we worked 
within the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Forum. But we had great 
differences and we left the forum. There is an important breakdown there… 
because we had decided then to start the project on the SRHR Bill. 
Thus, these independent professional actors maintain close ties to the rest of the 
advocacy coalition’s actors and institutions. Their work is well known and they are 
considered main players in the field, including by feminists, despite not belonging 
officially to any network, collective or NGO linked to the feminist movement. 
The feminist and women’s movements 
Marcela Ríos Tobar has shown that the women’s movement in Chile has suffered from 
both “decentralization and organizational diversification”, which was accompanied by 
“thematic diversification and specialization” (Ríos Tobar 2009a). Ewig and Ferree 
(2013) suggest looking at “feminist organizing” to better determine the level of 
influence of feminists. During fieldwork it was difficult to refer to a homogeneous 
feminist movement since the feminist activities one could observe were the result of 
small groups and networks of feminists sometimes operating in an independent manner. 
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Rather than a movement, feminists appeared as a wide network of organisations divided 
by location, age, type of work, size and resources. Most of the organisations that have 
been studied in Chile over the last two decades regarding feminism and the state in 
Chile belong to the circle of the “históricas”, or the most established feminist 
organisations, many of them NGOs and thinktanks monopolising most of the funding 
available for gender equality work because of their professional skills. 
At the time of the EC policy under Bachelet, feminist organising was happening via 
networks composed of a series of new “colectivos” populated mainly by young 
feminists who used artistic expression as a way to put forward a feminist discourse in 
the public space. Others were “colectivos” of young feminist professionals working 
from within academia and who were linked to other intellectual groups such as the 
Colectiva Mujeres Públicas.112 There was also a strong regional division, mostly 
between the feminist networks from Valparaiso (cultural) and Concepción (politically 
driven on the radical side) and networks of the capital Santiago, where the leadership is 
still in the hands of the “históricas” (historical founders of the feminist movement) and 
the “institucionales” working in NGOs.113 
The composition of the feminist networks was causing significant difficulties for 
feminists trying to join a wider advocacy coalition and have some impact. Indeed, the 
fact that there is no structure or hierarchy among feminist subjects within the network(s) 
meant that other actors considered them to be poorly organised and divided. At the time 
of this research, the feminist movement had met for the last time in 2005. The tension 
between the regional organisations and those in the capital – where most of the political 
                                               112 Interview with Patricia Zamora, young feminist member of Colectiva feminista mujeres públicas, 09.07.09. 113 Op. cit. 105, 112, and Interview with Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, 08.04.09. 
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and economic power is concentrated – was visible. The generational divide also became 
visible, with older feminists being accused of still being attached to second wave 
feminism, while many of the new youth-led movements identified with third wave 
feminism and wanted to look at the SRHR agenda beyond just reproductive rights to 
address issues of sexual rights and sexual diversity.114 
Young feminists work with a strong deconstructivist view on gender relations as being 
different from a women’s rights issue only (which some “historicas” still uphold) and 
are less resistant than their older compañeras to working with men (see Ch. 9).115 Many 
of their movements are cultural and often linked with literature and theatre, as well as 
visual arts.116 Some are based in universities, although there are many groups with a 
strong commitment to social justice coming from the poorest and more populous 
neighbourhoods of the main cities in the country.117 They also are also often 
professionals whose militancy is not linked to NGOs or women’s organisations, giving 
them independence because they “do not live out of feminism”.118 As Caiozzi 
explained: 
… we have a different identity, we do not work in feminism, for them [older 
feminists], feminism is their work, it’s their personal identity, their militancy, 
their ideology, it’s everything. We have jobs and lives. […]Feminism is one of 
our identities, but it is not everything, it is important of course but we also do 
other things.119 
Many young feminists felt angry that, while during the process that led to the 
mobilisation of people marching throughout the country to demand the right to EC they 
                                               114 Op. cit. 105, 112. 115 Ibid.  116 Op. cit. 105. 117 Op. cit. 105, 112.  118 Op. cit. 112. 119 Op. cit. 105. 
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were included and given space, once the issues of visibility in the media started they 
were pushed aside, particularly since they felt they led the social networks and ICT 
campaigning with new ideas and skills that older feminists did not have (see Ch. 9). 
This marked an important breakdown of trust within the feminist movement. Patricia 
Zamora pointed to the fact that “this breakdown was something many feminist leaders 
belonging to the históricas and institucionales acknowledged”.120 
Indeed, this was something that came up many times during the interviews with the 
more established leaders of the feminist movement. Gloria Maira strongly opposed the 
idea that young feminists were keen on “generational renewal” declaring “one does not 
retire from feminism!”121 This feeling was present among many of the leaders I 
interviewed, albeit also crossed with a sense of guilt and responsibility from some of 
them who regretted the internal disputes the movement suffered.122 Teresa Valdés 
explained that during the mobilisation “the leadership of that movement entered the 
classic tension [where] some sectors want to control everything and are not open to 
alliances; they are not open to give up leadership, and to make the necessary 
transformations for that”, adding: 
That is unfortunately a classic case of tension within the women’s movement 
where some of its leaders say: “this thing is mine”, “it is not theirs”. Right? And 
the whole thing is dismantled. So the amount of people who stopped attending the 
meetings […] and I stopped attending too.123 
                                               120 Op. cit. 112. 121 Op. cit. 23. 122 Op. cit. 25, and Adriana Gómez, well-known feminist, Communications’ Officer at RSMLAC, 01.04.09. 123 Op. cit. 25. 
184 
Politicians and Parliamentarians 
Most of the interviewees agreed that the political parties were not important players 
during the policy process behind EC, at least not directly, with the exception of the 
conservative UDI.124 Instead, parties were more influential through civil servants (see 
Chs 5 and 7). Zulema Contreras explained that they never saw the parties as such – 
“they are isolated voices, parties have influence within the ministries where you find a 
lot of [people speaking of] ‘my institution’, ‘my brand’, ‘my people’”.125 For Dides, 
parties appeared in the press throughout the 10 years of political debates, yet their 
presence was limited to statements to the press and their opportunistic appearance at the 
“Píldorazo” march in 2008 (see Ch. 9).126 Schiappacasse emphasised that “more than 
parties it is people within parties” who provided their support. As EC became a headline 
in the press there were “statements by the chairs of parties”, and the movement “held 
press conferences where you had the all the presidents of the parties against the petition, 
or against the ruling” but most initiatives were supported only “by a few 
Parliamentarians”.127 Schiappacasse explained: 
… we always know we can count with María Antonieta Saa, Adriana Muñoz, and 
they are able to unite [other parliamentarians] […] with the petition by the UDI 
against the Norms, María Antonieta Saa became part of the process with the 
support of around forty parliamentarians supporting the Norms, so there you had a 
big movement [...] Parliamentarians from almost every party. […] EC I believe 
went beyond party lines; it was beyond political banners, so that so that I even 
heard UDI parliamentarians and mayors saying they agreed with the morning-
after pill.128 
                                               124 Op. cit. 26, 64, 81, 97, 98, 110, and Iinterview with Claudia Dides, gender advisor at FLACSO, former member of CORSAPS, 12.05.09. 125 Op. cit. 98. 126 Dides, op. cit. 124. 127 Op. cit. 81. 128 Ibid. 
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Visible support of EC by politicians was diffuse and did not reappear until late into 
public support of the issue, and especially during electoral years (see Chs 7 and 9). 
Contreras explains that because the politics of the policy were left to civil servants 
representing their parties within government, “the inclusion of civil society in the policy 
process was done according to their rules and priorities”.129 In fact the meetings and 
agreements between health authorities and civil society “were not binding, freeing civil 
servants from any accountability”.130 This was the case with the posters episode that 
ICMER faced after Minister García blocked the Fertility Norms (see Ch. 7), when no 
one gave direct responses to either Díaz or Schiappacasse on the location of those lost 
dissemination materials.131 
Some of the interviewees also complained about the way in which MINSAL under 
Bachelet placed a former member of the feminist movement from the Gender Unit to 
play gatekeeper towards the Minister, in particular with the biomedical organisations 
and their lawyers.132 This presence institutionalised the historical mistrust that feminists 
had towards medically-led initiatives, making the work of the pro-SRHR advocacy 
coalition tense and riddled with small disputes between these two sets of actors (see Chs 
7, 8 and 9). 
When EC became a key electoral issue, the short-lived Pro-EC movement secured an 
important victory as it targeted the mayors before the municipal elections of 2008 (see 
Ch. 9). The movement put pressure on candidates to make their views on EC public and 
                                               129 Op. cit. 98.  130 Ibid.  131 Op. cit. 81. 132 Op. cit. 98, 110. 
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its distribution within the local primary healthcare system.133 Together with the 
Píldorazo march of April 2008 these were two main victories for the movement, which 
unfortunately dissolved quickly (see Ch. 9). Some interviewees explained that the 
movement lacked strategic planning to assign each member specific roles and be more 
effective in lobbying and advocacy, and that the internal disputes among feminists led 
biomedical organisations to leave the movement (see Ch. 9).134 
However, the role of politicians was crucial once the President reacted to the ruling of 
the TC by sponsoring the Fertility Bill by the state. Here the “emblematic” female 
politicians named by my interviewees, María Antonieta Saa and Adriana Muñoz, 
became the face of the legislative defence of the bill to secure its approval at all stages 
within Congress. Together with the executive’s support via SERNAM and MINSAL 
and their respective ministers, the Fertility Bill was given urgency status by the 
President and was quickly discussed and approved in Congress (see Ch. 9). 
 
The Ley Marco de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos (SRHR Bill) 
“Our society is not open to dialogue on the daily realities that involve affection, desire, and the sexuality of men and women of all ages.” – Claudia Dides (2002: 182) 
During the UN international conferences of the 1990s, the Chilean government invited 
representatives from political parties as well as members of civil society organisations 
to join its official delegation. The Chilean delegation to Beijing included around 60 
                                               133 Op. cit. 81. 134 Op. cit. 81, 98. 
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women from this sector.135 This initiative opened a series of opportunities for 
collaboration among these actors over the years to come. 
This special relationship proved particularly crucial in starting to build strategies and 
coalitions to ensure the implementation of the international commitments taken by the 
Chilean government, and in order to advance women’s rights. It was at this time that the 
Grupo Iniciativa, a broad NGO network, was formed as an umbrella organisation for 
many women and feminist organisations in the build-up to the Beijing conference 
(Franceschet 2003: 32). Beijing provided the space for these organisations to publish a 
document setting out their expectations regarding women’s status and what needed to 
be done to achieve this new status for Chilean women (Grupo de Iniciativa Chile 1994). 
Their work influenced the first talks on SRHR not only in Chile but also internationally 
(Solimano 1994). 
Among the ideas coming out of those international conferences, the Ley Marco de 
Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos (Saa et al. 2000) – or SRHR Bill – marks a unique 
example of participatory initiative by civil society to take legal action to promote a 
framework to ensure the sexual and reproductive rights of all Chileans (Dides 2002: 
181).136 As Dr Matamala explained, the initiative stemmed from those organisations 
who attended the Hague Forum on the Implementation of the Cairo Program of Action 
in September 1999, where the “group was constituted” after speaking with “Fanny 
Pollarolo who at the time was a deputy[…] and civil society worked for a year, in a 
participatory way, elaborating this project”.137 
                                               135 Op. cit. 72. 136 The draft process of the bill and the consensus building as well as the outreach work started in June or July 1999 and culminated in August 2000 (Dides 2002: 181).  137 Matamala, Op. cit. 78.  
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For feminists and the women’s movement, the bill still represents a unique effort, in the 
history for the fight for SRHR in Chile, particularly because the initiative was born 
within the women’s movement that worked in a coordinated way, strategising and 
negotiating to obtain the support from politicians to introduce the bill. The bill was 
often mentioned during the interviews. Matamala said that the alliance “stemmed from 
the [women’s] movement” and “led to a consensus with Parliamentarians which made it 
their duty to introduce it in Congress […] a milestone in the history of sexual and 
reproductive rights in our country”.138 
Indeed since the early 1990s women had begun interacting with the historical medical 
argumentations prevalent in reproduction and maternal health debates within ministries 
and their public policies. Most policies targeted “women as mothers and as a way to 
prevent and reduce their children’s problems, without considering them as subjects, or 
making completely visible the risks affecting their health and the importance to widen 
their decision-making capacity over their sexual and reproductive lives” (Solimano 
1994: 9). 
The concept of SRHR needed to be disseminated and developed (Gysling 1993; T. 
Valdés and Busto 1994), and this was done almost “from scratch” (T. Valdés and Busto 
1994). Valdés and Gysling from early on pointed at the challenge to put women’s point 
of view and gender disparities at the centre of the debates (Solimano 1994: 8). 
For feminists at the time it was crucial to start positioning SRHR as feminist concepts 
on the political agenda and they saw in these international agreements a starting point to 
hold the Chilean government accountable. Matamala explained that in the early 2000s 
                                               138 Ibid. 
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women’s organisations felt they needed “to be more on the offensive on those issues 
that were not yet on the agenda”: 
… we still did not speak of sexual and reproductive health, we spoke of maternal 
health, sexual and reproductive rights were in some way recognised but not fully; 
MINEDUC did not allow you to speak about them, neither did SERNAM, and this 
explained that there was this urge to enable the incorporation of new concepts. 
And I think that was extremely important.139 
This is how, in 1999, the SRHR Bill project came to the front of the agenda and 
feminists decided to support the initial idea of Fanny Pollarolo140 introducing a bill in 
Congress: 
… Fanny who as a deputy was interested in these issues, we all together 
summoned the other organizations who were very active in the defence of 
women’s rights – and more specifically sexual and reproductive rights, to give a 
report of what had taken place in The Hague […] Fanny took advantage of the 
occasion to […] and extended the invitation to participate and the [health] 
“Forum” accepted the invitation getting involved from the start.141 
The SRHR Bill has a special value for feminists because “this was done in absolute 
autonomy, without establishing a dependency or subordination let’s say from medical 
criteria and rather this is built from and by civil society and legislators”.142 
One of the strengths of the process was the presence in the “core working group” of 
civil society actors – also named “Grupo de Trabajo Palacio Ariztía”143 (Dides 2002: 
181) – of policy actors such as research centres, and NGOs in the social and biomedical 
                                               139 Ibid. 140 Fanny Pollarolo was a Deputy for the Socialist Party from 1994-1998 and 1998-2002, covering both the Frei and Lagos administration. 141 Interview with Josefina Hurtado, Director of Conspirando, 16.04.09. 142 Op. cit. 78.  143 This name comes from the name of the building of the former Congress in Santiago – Palacio Ariztía – where most deputies meet when they are in the capital.  
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sciences including FLACSO, CORSAPS, ICMER. Some of these organisations were 
also part of the wider feminist initiative of the time, the Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres, 
whose main strategy was “to monitor state actions and to lobby the state to fulfil 
commitments to women that are embodied in international agreements”, including 
SRHR (Franceschet 2003: 33). The issue therefore was legitimised as a concern of the 
women’s movement as a whole. 
The SRHR Bill was a year-long process during which, after initially working with a 
small number of actors from civil society, the Foro and Pollarolo, the “working group”, 
slowly started extending their invitation to a wider network of feminist NGOs to make 
this process an inclusive and bottom-up one. The idea was that these organisations 
would gain ownership of the process over time and make it their own priority, 
potentially including it as part of their strategic plan.144 
Dides explained that the SRHR Bill initiative had three main aims. The first was to 
create a cultural shift in the notion of citizenship by introducing sexual and reproductive 
rights as part of people’s entitlements as citizens. This included having the possibility as 
right bearers to position new issues affecting sexuality and reproduction on the public 
agenda giving them visibility. The second was to consolidate and mobilise individuals 
and organisations working on SRHR, in order to develop their collective capacity 
around these issues. And the third was to produce a legal initiative for the introduction 
of a bill on sexual and reproductive rights in Parliament (Dides 2002: 183). 
As Hurtado explained, there was a clear strategy of inclusion and information diffusion 
for more buying-in for the bill initiative. This included a solid strategy to have an 
                                               144 Op. cit. 141. 
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impact on different regions throughout country. The strategy was in fact divided in three 
main lines of action: 1) try to reach out to the scientific community, and gain support 
from visible and well-known members of that community; 2) have a strong 
communication and diffusion strategy, allowing the integration of these new 
organisations, especially from other regions; and 3) a strong emphasis on lobbying 
parliamentary representatives at the regional level.145 Thanks to the Cairo processes, the 
Foro Red was able to secure financial support from UNFPA and the Ford Foundation.146 
This helped to achieve many of the goals set by the core group behind the strategy and 
bill initiative, although not all organisations achieved their expectations in terms of 
commitment, nor did they manage to put in place as many outreach and lobby activities 
as desired, nor always secure the support needed for their success.147 
The SRHR Bill not only obtained wide support across civil society but also across the 
spectrum of political parties, thanks to the early engagement of Fanny Pollarolo as well 
as the clear intention of the women’s movement strategy to obtain political backing to 
position the issue. As explained by Hurtado: 
We looked for and had the intention for this project to get backing by a wide 
range of political parties and with representatives from all political positions […] 
we always looked for this project to be backed by all political strands. And we did 
particularly well with Renovación Nacional.148 
One important aspect of the political and advocacy process surrounding the SRHR Bill 
was certainly the presence of key allies inside Parliament, namely feminist politicians 
sensitive to the issue. According to Mariana Aylwin, the issues surrounding SRHR 
                                               145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 
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were, and have remained more appealing to female politicians than to male 
politicians.149 She felt these types of sensitive issues, including divorce, and violence 
against women, have always been promoted by female politicians in Parliament: 
… between 1994 and 1998 there was a group of us women, and were very super 
powerful in putting these issues on the agenda. There was María Antonieta Saa, 
Fanny Pollarolo, Martita Werner, myself, and I truly think that this was a topic set 
by us women.150 
This is not to say that some men or right-wing politicians did not support these issues. 
In fact, two of them – Carlos Ominami (PS) and Osvaldo Palma (RN) – both influential 
figures151 within their parties, were key actors throughout the SRHR Bill process, 
participating and moving the agenda forward. Lily Pérez (RN) is another right-wing 
female politician cited by many interviewees. She actively participated and supported 
Pollarolo and the women’s movement during the year-long preparation process of the 
SRHR Bill. This was sustained, permanent and targeted work in alliance, including 
frequent meetings of all these actors.152 
One possible reason that could explain the wide support for the bill is that the most 
controversial issue in reproductive rights – abortion – was simply left out before the 
project even started. After all, feminists had left the abortion issue and debate aside since 
1990 with the arrival of the Concertación to power in order not to jeopardise the chances 
of the Concertación gaining power in the transition to democracy (Htun 2003). This 
poses problems for building alliances since, as explained by Shepard, this “self-
                                               149 Op. cit. 72. 150 Ibid. 151 Their sensibility could come from the fact that the first lived in exile for long in France where he was exposed to debates around sexuality and reproduction including abortion, and the second is a doctor by profession. 152 Gómez, op. cit. 122. 
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censorship among women’s NGOs in Chile in the case of divorce operates even more 
strongly in the case of abortion advocacy, and so some of the major women’s NGOs are 
not willing to join the Forum153 or its campaigns” (Shepard 2006: 25). 
Secondly, it was clear that any motion on abortion would have killed the initiative 
before reaching Congress due to the pressure of the Church and Conservative groups, 
especially after the experience of Deputy Adriana Muñoz who lost her parliamentary re-
election in 1993 for trying to restore the right to therapeutic abortion in Congress in 
1991.154 As for other politicians, the electoral cost was simply too high. This meant that 
politicians would have stayed away from the bill for image and electoral reasons. 
The year-long working process of the bill, although participative and inclusive, was not 
without tensions and issues.155 Trying to work from a core group while expanding the 
process to a wider network, from the capital to other regions meant the “grupo 
ampliado” and the “core group” sometimes had difficulties coordinating the initiatives 
and meeting each other’s expectations.156 
Trusting politicians, and maintaining a strong, fluid relationship was also part of the 
process. But, for many, leaving abortion aside was felt to limit the scope of their work 
and the SRHR Bill from the start. Dides argues that this pre-made “deal” or agreement 
to exclude the issue of abortion, simply contradicted the spirit of consensus and open 
participation the SRHR Bill was trying to promote in its vision of a citizenship 
                                               153 This refers to the Open Forum on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights. 154 Adriana Muñoz was stigmatised in the press and by conservative groups after her initiative (that included the support and signature of other four fellow party-members). Among the opposition were many members of the Concertación’s other party, the PDC. Her party in fact did not show any public support. Many consider this led to her losing the parliamentary re-election in 1993 (Haas 2006). 155 Op. cit. 141. 156 Ibid. 
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empowered to engage and challenge political, social and cultural barriers on the topics 
affecting people’s lives (2002: 185). 
Among politicians, opponents of abortion were, and still are, to be found across the 
political spectrum, but within the Concertación the PDC has long been known for 
having the most conservative members on these issues due to their historic proximity 
with the Church. However, it was not the only party. Camilo Escalona – then president 
of the Socialist Party – was also openly anti-abortion.157 According to Adriana Gómez, 
María Antonieta Saa “did not, and still does not, want to talk openly about abortion”.158 
The SRHR Bill was officially registered in the Chamber of Deputies on 19 October 
2000 (Saa et al. 2000), with the support of 10 deputies, eight of whom belonged to five 
different parties, and two independents (see App. 5). It entered the Health Commission 
that same day. Unfortunately, the bill was quickly stuck in the legislative process and 
remained in that situation for eight years, until July 2008, when it was be quickly 
modified and reintroduced to Parliament by Maria Antonieta Saa, taking advantage of 
the political situation surrounding the EC debate, without success (see Ch. 9). 
The scope of the original SRHR Bill was more than just to ensure the recognition of 
sexual and reproductive rights and health; it was also to produce a constitutional reform 
and constitutional guarantee for sexual and reproductive rights (Espinosa 2006), and by 
doing so establish sexual and reproductive rights as human rights. This was new for 
Chilean legislation because it implied that the bill would not only promote and 
guarantee freedom and autonomy but also equality and the principle of no-
discrimination, leading to responsibilities and sanctions to be assumed by the Chilean 
                                               157 Op. cit. 122. 158 Ibid. 
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state in numerous international human rights’ treaties159 (Dides 2002: 187-188). As 
expressed by Dides, legally-speaking the SRHR Bill was quite ambitious: 
The implementation of this project will make it possible to set a milestone in the 
legislative history of the country, in that it seeks to express and conjugate the 
diversity of actors and realities involved in the experience and practice of sexuality 
and reproduction, promoting the agreement between civil society and the state as 
set in international agreements and covenants the Chilean government has 
subscribed to.  (2002: 183) 
Yet, there was little or no interest or motivation in the Chamber of Deputies to move the 
SRHR Bill forward and since the project did not have the executive’s support, it was not 
granted urgency. According to Mariana Aylwin, the SRHR Bill – due to the nature of 
the topics addressed and the political environment with a strong Catholic Church and 
conservative forces – simply needed the executive’s approval. She saw the process as 
similar to that of the divorce law under Lagos to highlight the importance of the 
executive’s backing: 
… the divorce law was passed when the government came on board. It is as simple 
as that, and as long as the government is not on board it will not be approved. And 
the government was not on board then because in the end it does not want to have 
bad relations with the Church. Because the political committee which is only 
composed by men […] does not consider the issue as relevant…160 
Haas highlights the increase in Chile’s legislative proposals since 1995 and how the 
numerous issues that are considered to be core preoccupations of the women’s and 
feminist movements have slowly permeated political debates and been at the origin of 
legislative initiatives (2006: 204). An important point regarding legislative proposals, 
                                               159 This includes Teheran 1968, Bucharest 1974, Vienna 1993, Cairo 1994, Beijing 1995 as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  160 Op.cit. 72.  
196 
however, is that the success rate of those initiatives by law-makers and that of the 
executive (both have legislative initiative rights under Chilean law) shows that between 
1990 and 2001 the executive had a much higher success rate than Parliamentarians,161 
confirming the opinion of Aylwin on the bill. 
According to Haas, the executive’s greater success can be explained both by the 
incentives present in the institutional bargaining power given to both the executive and 
Congress under Chile’s constitution and to the over-representation of conservative 
parties who benefitted from the electoral structure legacy of the dictatorship. So in fact, 
both the rigidity and bias of Chile’s political institutions affected the outcomes of 
policy-making (Haas 2006: 205). 
Rigidity and bias also affect the way in which the legislative agenda and the priorities 
the executive has to make compete for initiatives. In 2000, when the SRHR Bill was 
submitted to Congress, Lagos had just assumed office as President and Bachelet as 
Minister of Health. Lagos had arrived to power trying to push his own agenda, which 
included two main initiatives: the divorce law; and the AUGE Plan – the most important 
reforms to the Chilean Health System since 1990.162 This plan was far from popular 
with all sectors of the Concertación, which meant Lagos had to maintain a high level of 
discipline in his ranks (Sierra and Hola 2006). 
                                               161 In fact, Haas shows that the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM), the women’s machinery, although having presented only nine projects over the 1990-2001 period, had a success rate of eight out of nine. Parliamentary initiatives instead, while having originated 38 congressional bills only had success on eight occasions (Haas 2006: 204).  162 Plan AUGE (Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas en Salud), is a plan for “universal access to health based on explicit commitments” by the government to provide free and expedite medical attention and treatment for a determined number of diseases considered the most common and most pressing ailments in the population (Ministerio de Salud de Chile 2014). 
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The AUGE health reform included important legal reforms and Bachelet was 
responsible for one of them: the “Ley sobre derechos y deberes de los pacientes” (Law 
on the Rights and Duties of Patients), which was introduced to Congress on 12 June 
2001. This proved to be a controversial piece of legislation since many conservative 
politicians saw it as a disguised plan to pass the right to euthanasia. This piece of 
legislation and EC won Bachelet a reputation among conservative groups as a hard 
“radical” threat to Catholic and conservative values (Sierra and Hola 2006). 
In April 2001, aware of the political barriers for the Bill, and as part of the monitoring 
commitments taken with the “Grupo Ampliado”, deputies Pollarolo and Saa met with 
the Minister Secretary General of the Presidency under Lagos, and requested the 
“urgencia” motion from the executive for the bill (El Mercurio 2001b, 2001c). 
Nonetheless, nothing happened, and Bachelet, who was Minister of Health at the time, 
remained cautious in public declarations, even if she did acknowledge the positive 
intent behind the initiative (El Mercurio 2001b). 
This could be explained by the fact that 2001 also saw two new important and polemical 
reproductive rights’ issues – voluntary sterilisation and EC – appear on the political 
agenda and in public opinion, fuelling the ire of conservative groups, the Church and 
some Parliamentarians within Lagos’ own coalition (Dides 2002: 189). Both issues 
were part of the government’s programme and the direct responsibility of Bachelet. 
Resolution No. 2326, which came to modify the existing regulation and guidelines of 
the health services on voluntary male and female sterilisation, was announced by 
Bachelet at MINSAL in November 2000 (Ministerio de Salud de Chile 2000). The 
“offensive” on EC, as many of the interviewees qualified it, started to get much of the 
attention since it was a well-coordinated and solidly built legal action against the 
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distribution of EC by the national health system, as well as its private distributors such 
as family planning groups and pharmacies (see Ch. 7). 
During this process, feminists and women’s organisations began to have their first 
major disagreements with other SRHR advocates on how to proceed. First, the 
competing legal initiatives and new policies affecting women’s rights forced the 
different members of the “grupo ampliado”, from autonomous feminists to NGOs and 
research centres, to refocus their forces elsewhere to respond to the strategic challenges 
being posed by the conservative lobby (C. Dides 2002). 
Secondly, biomedical and social science’s organisations realised that the work to move 
the bill forward required much engagement with politicians, something feminists did 
not always agree with. In order to have an impact they felt it was important to work in a 
more technical manner to provide solid arguments and create stable lobby channels with 
politicians. Dides explained that the bill process made them “realise that without 
arguments and evidence it was impossible to negotiate with political parties” and so: 
… CORSAPS, APROFA, the Bioethics centre, and ICMER, started to think our 
fight is built on arguments, on the discourses based on different paradigms. Unlike 
the women’s movement… this was also a political issue, they had more a 
discourse of demands, of demonstrations […] but they lacked the arguments. So 
we decided to start working more closely with political parties through 
parliamentarians.163 
This way of operating – that is, building alliances with political parties and specific 
Parliamentarians through the provision of technical knowledge – is something that was 
very much present at the time of the EC policy process. Biomedical and social science 
                                               163 Dides, op. cit. 124. 
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organisations provided the key arguments to help politicians lobby for EC. This led to a 
closer relationship with specific politicians and policy-makers during both the legal and 
political battles (see following chapters). 
In March 2004, MINSAL announced the free distribution of EC to victims of sexual 
violence, accelerating the series of judicial challenges (see Ch. 7). The SRHR Bill was 
therefore competing for political support with both the EC process and the divorce law. 
Passed in 2004, the divorce law became the symbol of the incipient detachment by the 
government and the Concertación from the direct influence of the Church. There was an 
open offensive of the Church on the law. But, supported by polls suggesting that at least 
80% of Chileans backed the legalisation of divorce, the PDC played a critical role in 
unlocking the debate and political process which had been a core concern and agenda 
item for other Concertación parties, in particular President Lagos’ party, the Socialist 
Party. 
As shown, the work of SRHR advocates and the women’s movement on the SRHR Bill 
was directly affected by the legislative agenda of the government. The competing 
agendas between government branches affected the priority given to projects and the 
way authorities committed their support to them. Civil society organisations were under 
pressure during these competing initiatives to provide the necessary manpower to have 
an impact. 
By 2005, the SRHR Bill was still stagnating in Congress. Therefore when Bachelet 
entered the presidential race, it was perceived as a window of opportunity for the 
women’s movement, feminists and female deputies who lobbied her from early on to 
make sure she included the SRHR Bill in her manifesto, which she did. 
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Considering the participatory and consensual nature of the bill, and since abortion was a 
censored demand under the consensus rule, having the SRHR Bill in the presidential 
programme seemed to many of the bill’s supporters to be the best compromise that 
could be achieved. Unfortunately, the hopes of pushing the bill through Congress 
quickly failed, mostly due to the different political challenges Bachelet had to face from 
the beginning of her administration. Among these very sensitive issues were the new 
conservative challenges on the policy for the distribution of EC. 
In 2009, according to Matamala, the SRHR Bill sponsors outside and within 
government, had requested at least three times for President Bachelet to give the SRHR 
Bill an “urgenct” legal status, but were still waiting to get an answer from the 
President’s office.164 Gómez explained that despite the pressure and follow-up on the 
SRHR Bill to obtain its urgency, the usual response by the Minister Secretary of the 
Presidency under Bachelet, José Antonio Viera-Gallo,165 was “you have to do your 
lobby with the PDC, I suggest directly with the presidential candidate Frei, or Soledad 
Alvear...”166 
In 2008, “the April 22nd mobilisations provided an opportunity” and Saa and Casas 
decided to reactivate the SRHR Bill, provoking mixed reactions among members of the 
feminist movement who “knew this would happen, that there would be a reaction from 
the parties especially those closer… more committed to these issues”.167 
                                               164 Op. cit. 78. 165 Viera-Gallo, a preeminent socialist militant since the time of Allende, when persecuted after the Coup of 1973, found refuge in the Apostolic Nunciature, where Angelo Sodano (former Vatican Secretary of State and currently Dean of the College of Cardinals) helped him to fly into exile to Rome. In an interview as newly appointed member of the Constitutional Tribunal he spoke of his close relationship with the Church (Poder360 2010). 166 Op. cit. 122. 167 Op. cit. 141. 
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Yet Saa’s initiative was received with caution by feminists. Hurtado explained that “at 
first there was suspicion to see how far she will go and take risks”, to see “if it was only 
a spur of the moment”, then after new conversations “we decide to make the effort and 
support Antonieta. There were a few press conferences, and other initiatives in the street 
and at the Palacio Ariztía… and the movement for the defence of emergency 
contraception included some of this”.168 
Despite these efforts the bill was not discussed in Congress. In 2009, the Bachelet 
government put all its effort in pushing forward the Fertility Law that put an end to the 
EC saga. Laura Albornoz said the SRHR Bill “was too generic” and it still raised 
concerns amongst “some that it could open the door to other contraceptive methods 
such as abortion”169, despite the fact that the SRHR Bill had been written to discard this 
issue. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped out the Pro-SRHR Advocacy Coalition, and looked at the 
actors involved in the process behind the defence of the EC policy between 2000 and 
2010. Biomedical organisations, and the doctors and lawyers and professionals linked to 
them, are all united by a great commitment to sexual and reproductive freedoms. These 
actors first worked with feminists on these issues through the SRHR Bill, which 
happened in parallel to the judicial and political battles on EC under Lagos. They 
experienced the frustrations of seeing how the competing agendas in the legislature and 
the executive hindered the SRHR Bill progress. Feminists and SRHR advocates were 
both affected by this experience and the political process surrounding it. Biomedical 
                                               168 Ibid.  169 Op. cit. 74. 
202 
organisations and social science organisations took a conscious decision to become 
more professional in the lobby they carry out with politicians which led them in a 
different direction from the more militant work of the women’s movement and 
women’s organisations. This explains how, despite sharing the same core values on 
sexual and reproductive rights, in practice these groups have struggled to work in a 
concerted manner to promote SRHR along other civil society actors. 
The chapter also discussed the difficulties feminists face due to important internal 
divisions. There is an important divide between generations of feminists, made visible 
by the tensions and disputes that led to the dismantlement of the Movement Pro-EC at 
the end of 2008. Moreover, feminists felt Bachelet had a debt towards the movement at 
the beginning of her administration through the bill for SRHR. This explains why they 
did not immediately engage with the EC policy that they did not consider a direct result 
of their agenda, while biomedical groups led that side of the work. We observe therefore 
a preference for the legislative versus the step-by-step policy channels to advance the 
SRHR agenda between these two groups. 
Both the SRHR advocates and feminists have faced the weight of the “consensus” rule 
in the way their projects, the SRHR Bill and the Fertility Norms were stopped owing to 
internal tensions within the governing coalition. In fact, Concertación did not act 
automatically as a champion of SRHR. The political world has been divided since 2000 
by the issues surrounding sexual and reproductive health. The participation in favour of 
EC or the SRHR Bill was more the result of individual initiatives by Parliamentarians; 
similarly, politicians progressively supported EC as the issue gained an electoral profile. 
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CHAPTER 7: The Judicialisation of EC under Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 
This chapter uses the literature on judicialisation and FI to analyse the legal battles that 
surrounded the legalisation of EC in Chile between 1998 and 2005. The aim is to show 
the gendered impact of different institutions on the women’s movement and civil 
society organisations that have mainstreamed sexual and reproductive rights in Chile 
since the early 1990s. By doing so, it evaluates the weight of feminist discourses in 
these debates, as well as on the way SRHR is addressed by government institutions, 
tribunals, judges and other civil society actors. 
The policy initiative to distribute EC by Bachelet, who was then Lagos’s Minister of 
Health, faced two strands of opposition: the political one, led by conservatives within 
Concertación itself; and the legal one, organised by a strong and well-connected 
conservative lobby made of individuals and NGOs linked to the Catholic Church. A 
strong resistance to the EC policy as health policy through an ideologically-driven 
campaign can be seen in both political battles. Although they seem to be independent 
from each other, one observes in the discourses used by conservative actors that the two 
fronts of opposition are linked by the Catholic doctrine and its views on sexuality and 
reproduction. 
The political battle against EC, however, was strongly influenced by the power of the 
“consensus rule” that kept the Concertación parties together and which demanded that 
no contentious issue should be addressed (see Ch. 4). This required a self-censorship 
within government regarding reproductive issues, including EC. This chapter shows 
how this was executed by replacing progressive policy-makers with more conservative 
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ones whose mission was to keep the status quo. For Lagos, this was particularly 
important at the end of his six years in government as the new electoral process started. 
The chapter highlights how from lower courts up to the Supreme Court, we observe the 
key role played by judges and legal strategies to uphold the conservative narrative that 
EC is abortive. Here the shaping of the anti-EC advocacy coalition and the pro-EC 
coalition, together with their respective roles and strategies, was key to the legal process 
that took place between 2001 and 2005 and that set the ground for the judicialisation of 
the issue that lasted more than ten years. 
The chapter also introduces and analyses the use of the market as a gendered institution 
by the conservative campaign to target pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies 
selling or producing EC. This campaign overlaps with the Lagos and Bachelet 
administration, showing the intensity of the conservative lobby. The literature has 
highlighted the importance of the economic power of the conservative lobby to 
influence reproductive health initiatives (M. Blofield 2006). The chapter explains that 
this existing power advantage is reinforced by the capacity of conservative groups to 
make the best use of all institutions where they have power and influence. This includes 
not only the market, but also the courts where they benefit from the post-authoritarian 
institutional framework limiting reproductive rights that has been in place since 1989. 
The origins of the policy and the political opposition to the Fertility Norms 
The origins of EC as a reproductive health policy are linked to an initiative at the end of 
the 1990s to review the internal protocols regarding fertility issues within the Ministry 
of Health (MINSAL). The initiative did not come from within MINSAL, however, but 
from civil society through the lobby of SRHR advocates. In 1996, Dr Soledad Díaz, 
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Director of the Instituto Chileno de Medicina Reproductiva (ICMER),170 considered it 
was time to revise MINSAL’s “Normas Nacionales sobre Regulación de la Fertilidad” 
(Fertility Norms), the existing guidelines for the regulation on fertility, to put them in 
line with international standards and in particular women’s reproductive rights.171 
The Norms thus were a technical initiative stemming from the biomedical lobby rather 
than the women’s movement; this recalls the historic importance of the medical 
profession in matters of reproductive health in Chile (see Ch. 4). At the time Díaz and 
ICMER decided to introduce EC as a public policy considering the poor state of 
adolescents’ reproductive health and rights in Chile, as well as the high rates of teenage 
pregnancy in a country where abortion is still not legal (Dides 2006: 36). 
In a strategic move to ensure an effective lobby, ICMER invited APROFA to 
collaborate on the project, and together they convinced MINSAL to pursue this work.172 
A Fertility Norms “working group” was formed to conduct exploratory research on the 
receptiveness and acceptability of EC in Chilean society with stakeholders (ICMER 
1999). The positive results of the initial research opened the path to a strategy for its 
introduction and the legal and policy changes needed according to the state of sexual 
and reproductive rights at the time (Dides 2006: 36). Díaz explained that from the 
beginning SRHR advocates gave priority to alliance building: 
… the most adequate strategy was to establish a network with all the other NGOs 
working on SRHR, as well as a network between academics and researchers that 
                                               170 ICMER, the Chilean Institute for Reproductive Medicine, is an NGO carrying out research on reproductive medicine and health, as well as doing advocacy and dissemination of information on these issues. 171 Op. cit. 26. 172 Ibid.  
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could become advocates and explain this contraceptive method, and include 
journalists who could inform the authorities and start lobbying the authorities.173 
ICMER forged an alliance with CORSAPS (Health and Social Policy Corporation) – to 
develop joint advocacy campaign targeting health authorities, sensitising them to the 
need to introduce EC as part of a policy to prevent unwanted pregnancies and abortion 
(Dides 2006: 37). The alliances eventually expanded to include NGOs working on 
women’s rights and adolescents’ reproductive health and rights, such as the Instituto de 
la Mujer, the Foro Abierto de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, CEMERA and other 
NGOs and academic groups (CLAE 2004). 
One of the first goals of the strategy set by Díaz was to lobby for the distribution of EC 
in cases of sexual violence. This started in 1996 because “EC was not distributed to 
women victims of sexual violence […] a violation to women’s rights big as the 
Everest”, and “all groups invited to discuss the acceptability set as first priority women 
who had been raped”.174 Díaz therefore drafted a new “protocol for the prevention of 
pregnancies and STDs after a rape” which she sent to “40 key policy-makers within 
government, from different ministries and departments, including health, justice, 
SERNAM, and the Service of Forensic Medicine”, yet “only three people replied”.175 
ICMER’s advocacy strategy and lobbying eventually paid off since MINSAL’s 
Protocol for the Intervention in Cases of Sexual Violence in Emergency Services 
(Protocol on Sexual Violence) was published in 1998 (Dides 2006: 37). The protocol 
included the main demands made by the biomedical institutions, and in particular the 
provision of EC for girl victims of sexual violence. Yet, this same success was at the 
                                               173 Op. cit. 64. 174 Ibid.  175 Ibid. 
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origin of the rise of the conservative opposition at the political level and their 
monitoring of public policies on reproductive health. 
Not long after the publication of these guidelines, the document which was already 
printed and distributed was amended with an erratum by the PDC Minister of Health, 
who simply erased EC and denied having been aware of its inclusion in the document 
beforehand (Dides 2006: 37). Díaz argued that the Minister had “received a call from a 
representative of the Ethics Committee of the Pontifical Catholic University” opposing 
the measure, and thus decided to act according to his personal religious beliefs.176 
Interestingly, there was no public debate on this incident despite the irregularity of the 
final decision (Meirik 2001). 
This was the first of a series of frustrated attempts by the group of SRHR advocates to 
make EC available while facing strong conservative pressure on health authorities prior 
to the legal and political battles that took place over the next decade. This episode also 
represents the beginning of a sophisticated strategy to promote EC since ICMER 
realised that they needed to pursue parallel strategies: 
… it was obvious that within the government one group would oppose this, a 
group in power positions and close to the Christian Democracy which was 
vulnerable to the Church’s influence. So we decided to use another road. Dr 
Croxatto and I contacted a local pharmaceutical company to obtain the drug 
authorisation. Since we could not move forward via the authorities, we would try 
to move forward making the drug available. This was a strategy that had come out 
of the scoping research on the acceptability.177 
                                               176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 
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This process would start the judicialisation of the distribution of EC that 
happened in parallel to the political struggles for the Fertility Norms. 
The Fertility Norms and the political opposition to EC 
In 2000, with the election of Lagos and the appointment of Bachelet at the head of 
MINSAL, many thought the conditions were right to push for the revision of the 
existing Fertility Norms and introduce the distribution of EC. For Matamala “Lagos did 
not give much importance […] to SRHR, it’s the Ministry, when Michelle became 
Minister, she put SRHR and EC on the agenda”178 and opened the space for SRHR 
advocates, namely ICMER and APROFA, to work on the revision of the Norms. 
According to Galán the “work was a long process” and Díaz “undertook the review of 
the scientific aspects”, including the latest research available to which she had access 
through her links with the WHO”.179 Díaz and Galán worked closely with Castro – 
MINSAL’s Chief of the Women’s Health Programme – to draft and publish the 
Norms.180 
However, when the time came to seek support for the official approval of the Norms, 
Bachelet had left MINSAL to become Minister of Defence, and the balance of power 
between political forces within MINSAL had changed. The new Minister of Health 
Pedro García, a gynaecologist and Christian Democrat, was well known for his Catholic 
beliefs. Galán explained they needed García’s signature and went to see him: 
                                               178 Op. cit. 78. 179 Op. cit. 26. 180 Ibid. 
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… and at that point he said “I find it great, and I will approve it as long as you 
take out EC and the chapter on the confidentiality for the delivery of contraception 
to adolescents”.181 
Díaz explained that as they told the Minister they “would not accept to remove those 
sections”, he replied: “I do not have to ask for your approval, because the Ministry’s 
norms are published by the Ministry anyway it wants to.”182 Galán argued that this 
pushed APROFA and ICMER to “register the norms under copyright to insure they 
could not be modified”.183 Schiappacasse argued that this was driven by a real “fear that 
the Ministry would publish the norms as its own work while taking out the whole 
section on EC, especially after… the ‘erratum’”.184 The copyright protected the Norms 
and forced MINSAL “to adapt the document if they wanted to publish it”185 and was a 
“tool for negotiation with the Ministry”.186 
From a civil society perspective, the relationship with García after Bachelet was a 
difficult one. Díaz explained that Bachelet had given civil society organisations all her 
support: 
… [Bachelet] was deeply involved in the registration process of EC, she was the 
one who authorised it […] we had plenty of contact with her as Minister of Health 
and she engaged with all the data, with the studies, she is a nerd… she read the 
documents, read the publications on the mechanisms of action, so it was truly 
her… she was on top of it.187 
                                               181 Ibid. 182 Op. cit. 64. 183 Op. cit. 26. 184 Op. cit. 81. 185 Ibid. 186 Op. cit. 64. 187 Ibid. 
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Bachelet had also created thematic working groups188 through which women’s 
organisations and biomedical groups shared knowledge and information regarding the 
Fertility Norms. According to Schiappacasse they often met with Infante, and Castro 
and the Norms were “distributed for feedback” and they were fully “approved by health 
professionals, midwives and doctors, as well as the [women’s] movement”, thus it “was 
very democratic”.189 SRHR advocates held meetings with the women’s movement when 
they realised the “launching of the Norms was taking longer than expected [and] we 
asked the Under-Secretary and Castro to make an announcement”.190 
At the end of January 2005, the Norms eventually received backing from the Minister 
and EC was included in the final document. But as the Norms were on the verge of 
being published, a political and communicational incident put a halt to the process. On 8 
March 2005, during an event for International Women’s Day, the Under-Secretary of 
Health, Infante, was asked by a journalist whether the norms would make EC more 
available. Infante answered that EC from then on was to be considered “like any other 
contraception method” and would be “available not only to victims of rape but any 
woman who had unprotected sex and is at risk of having an unwanted pregnancy” 
(Radio Cooperativa 2005b). 
After the statement García immediately requested for Lagos to remove Infante from his 
position, to which he agreed and Infante resigned. This case received much media 
attention since no one expected that such a short public statement could create a 
controversy and be sanctioned so quickly. Clearly, the President was keen to avoid any 
                                               188 The working groups served as an open space for the participation of civil society that was created under a “Decreto exento” by Lagos and Bachelet when she became Minister of Health. Op. cit. 81. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid. 
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political spillage from this public declaration and prevent the more conservative 
members of Concertación from raising their voices and criticisms in an electoral year. 
This was a perfect example of how the “consensus rule” was applied in practice within 
the government and how such an institution had clear sanctions attached. During the 
research interviews, when asked what had happened, some interviewees saw Garcia as 
simply a Christian Democrat,191 or simply a conservative Catholic “who must have 
spoken to the Bishop before this”.192 For Adriana Gómez, García’s reaction was just 
another example of the PDC being a barrier to any initiative affecting the sexual and 
reproductive rights agenda.193 As for Josefina Hurtado, this was the reflection of the 
predominant self-censorship applied by the government on these issues to prevent 
conflicts within Concertación: 
And this means that some sectors within the Concertación parties, are more 
Catholic than the Pope and resort to self-censorship to avoid problems in other 
issues.194 
Schiappacasse denounced the “self-censorship, because it was Lagos himself who 
publicly announced that this was not true, removed the Under-Secretary and disavowed 
the Norms”.195 She added that “the Norms had been approved for months” but the 
government had always wanted to launch them in a “low profile manner, because they 
had already had a bad experience with the norms on violence […] The idea was to send 
                                               191 Op. cit. 122. 192 Op. cit. 26. 193 Op. cit. 122. 194 Op. cit. 141. 195 Op. cit. 81. 
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it to health services and heads of health departments and medical staff via internal 
channels and then once they were launched start the trainings and dissemination”.196 
Infante summarised what happened behind doors as the clear result of electoral politics. 
In March of that year, Bachelet (PS) had announced that she would run as one of the 
internal presidential candidates of the Concertación against Soledad Alvear (PDC)197 (El 
Periodista 2005), and so there was: 
… a very strong internal debate between the Christian Democrats and the more 
progressive parties […] PS and the PPD. In this debate the Christian Democrats 
accuse the PS-PPD bloc of having set this up [Infante’s announcement] and 
premeditated it, and [implied] that what is behind all this, is the intention to put the 
Christian Democrat candidate [Soledad Alvear] “on the spot” […] so the Christian 
Democrat world interpreted this public declaration […] as if I was part of a 
conspiracy of the PS-PPD sectors […] and in this way kick-start the debate on the 
values’ agenda […] and they requested from the President my ousting […] he 
always warned us that we were ‘fuses’ – obviously he opted to take me out because 
in that way he was able to ease the situation, and Minister García […] showed a 
detachment which I admire and would not have managed myself, and declared that 
there had never been an agreement to make [the norms] available... 198 
Castro, a PDC member, added that Infante had left on vacation and “when he came back 
he did not realise how the political environment around the electoral race had evolved 
over that month with the pre-candidacies”,199 thus was caught in the party rivalries 
within Concertación and the consensus rule. Castro confirmed the PDC’s concerted 
decision to: 
                                               196 Ibid.  197 Soledad Alvear is a historic member of the PDC and well known for belonging to the most conservative and Catholic wing of her party. 198 Interview with Dr. Antonio Infante, former Under-Secretary of Health under Ricardo Lagos, 2000-2005, 23.06.09. 199 Interview with Dr René Castro, Head of the Women’s Health Department, MINSAL, under Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, 21.07.09. 
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… protect or safeguard the candidacy or pre-candidacy of Soledad Alvear and of 
course […] the rumour is that the pressure by the Christian Democrats must have 
been so strong that the President had to let Infante go.200 
After Infante’s resignation the relationship between García and the biomedical NGOs 
and women’s groups working on the Norms deteriorated. García told them “there will 
be no more talk about EC in this government, [wait] until the next”.201 ICMER and 
APROFA had long debates on whether “to denounce the Minister was lying, or to shut 
up”.202 What annoyed feminists and research and biomedical associations alike was 
first, the “denial of the work done on the Norms through the working group on 
sexuality” as well as the “disappearance of ten thousand posters” ICMER had sent to 
print as part of the campaign to disseminate the information on EC.203 ICMER paid for 
them with “a foreign grant” and with “the approval of MINSAL […] which accepted to 
keep them in its depot”.204 At the time of this research the issue was still unresolved and 
the biomedical advocates had not been given any formal explanation from MINSAL 
under the Bachelet administration.205 
Hence, as can be seen in the middle of a much disputed electoral year, issues affecting 
women’s rights, were at the centre of political deals to keep Concertación united. The 
commitment to women’s rights the government may have had at the time was 
subordinated to the logic of political survival, and to the threat of sanction imposed by 
the “consensus rule”. 
                                               200 Ibid.  201 Op. cit.81. 202 Ibid.  203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid., op. cit. 78. 
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In fact, by 2005, important issues had gained priority in Concertación’s political 
agenda: first, the Constitutional Reforms that Lagos had negotiated with the opposition 
(see Chs 5, 6 and 8) meant he needed a united front to ensure that Concertación would 
count them as part of their legacy; secondly, Concertación needed a solid candidate to 
run for president and by dropping the publication of the Norms and ousting Infante, 
Lagos wanted to keep Bachelet free of controversy before the presidential race. Finally, 
Lagos needed to complete the legislative agenda set for his mandate. Besides the 
Constitutional Reforms, in July 2005 he was able to pass the “Ley de Filiación” (Radio 
Cooperativa 2005a), which required much negotiation and lobbying with the Church 
and conservative sectors. In November, Lagos also tried to introduce a presidential veto 
into the “proyecto ley de genóma humano” (human genome), which had been 
introduced in 1997 and threatened to restrict people’s access to reproductive 
technologies. The Church and conservative forces, including the same ones involved in 
the legal battles against EC, were all mobilised around the issue (Teletrece Internet 
2005). 
Under Lagos, thus, the political battle for the Norms was strategically detached from the 
parallel process put in place to legalise EC and to allow its distribution in pharmacies. 
These efforts resulted in the judicialisation of the issue, which took the form of different 
judicial challenges against the drug. 
The first judicial battles against EC 
March 2001 marks the beginning of the first series of judicial initiatives that underlined 
the debates and controversy surrounding the distribution of EC in Chile for the next 
decade. This first stage, which coincides with the Lagos administration, was played out 
in the regular courts, but as the issue slowly evolved into a more ideological quarrel, the 
215 
case was brought twice in four years to the Supreme Court. These episodes show how 
the different judicial institutions played an important role in advancing or hindering the 
distribution of EC depending on the ideological influence of the courts. They also show 
the evolution of the conservative offensive and the subsequent defence by the state and 
SRHR advocates. 
EC part I (2001): The birth of a visible and militant conservative lobby 
In 1998, Díaz and ICMER decided to establish a second strategy to promote EC, and in 
this way avoid the formal party power struggles affecting policymaking. Following one 
of the findings that transpired from the scoping research carried out on the distribution 
and acceptability of EC in Chile, ICMER invited the pharmaceutical company Silesia to 
apply for the license to distribute EC.206 But as soon as the government and the Instituto 
de Salud Pública (ISP) (Institute of Public Health) authorised one brand of EC, they 
faced a strong and organised conservative opposition. 
In March 2001, Bachelet – then Minister of Health – announced that MINSAL was 
considering allowing the distribution of EC through the national health system after its 
due legal authorisation by the authorities. It was then that a group of NGOs decided to 
present a “recurso de protección”207 against the legal authorisation of Postinal, the first 
authorised brand of EC to be produced in Chile by the ISP.208 
                                               206 Op. cit. 64. 207 A “recurso de protección” is a constitutional action “that enables an applicant to challenge a regulation that is alleged to violate a constitutional right” (Melzi 2005: 263). 208 The ISP is an autonomous medical authority within MINSAL, responsible for insuring the quality of goods and services provided within the public health system and in public health initiatives, including the authorisation of all drugs (Instituto de Salud Pública de Chile). 
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The actors 
The first in a series of judicial challenges against EC were brought forward by students 
belonging to the Opus Dei ULA organisation under the name of AGES; their aim was to 
judicially challenge the validity and legality of the authorisation and distribution of EC 
in Chile. AGES was supported by Alejandro Romero, law professor at ULA. 
However, there were more than students behind this first judicial initiative in front of 
the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the actors behind the petition were quite diverse in their 
profiles and political affiliations. Some of them were linked to the right-wing 
opposition, while others were close to parties belonging to the government coalition, 
namely the PDC (Casas Becerra 2008: 3). 
The case was brought to court by Sara Philippi Izquierdo on behalf of ISFEM, Patricio 
Mena González on behalf of the International Centre for Human Life, Elizabeth Bunster 
Chacónon on behalf of the World Movement of Mothers, Francisco Chahuán on behalf 
of the NGO Frente por la vida y la acción solidaria, Juan Jara Opazo on behalf of the 
Centro Juvenil AGES, and Gonzalo Patricio García Palominos on behalf of the 
Movimiento Nacional por la Vida “Antü-Küyen” (see App. 4). 
There was a clear and concerted strategy from early on, trying not only to fight on the 
public policy front but also to have an impact on the commercial interests of 
pharmaceutical corporations. The judicial claim brought about by these conservative 
and pro-life groups and individuals had two main targets – Bachelet and the ISP. It 
aimed to put a halt on the initiative to distribute EC and to revoke its inclusion in the 
national registry of drugs due to the alleged abortifacient effect of EC. Jara Opazo, 
García Palominos and Chahuán, however, also brought the legal claim against the 
217 
pharmaceutical company Laboratorio Médico Silesia S.A that produced the first brand 
of EC in Chile, Postinal. 
The defendants’ case was made up of the government through Bachelet, the Director of 
the ISP, and the lawyer representing the pharmaceutical company Silesia. Women’s 
organisations and biomedical NGOs as well as party militants also joined the defence of 
EC (Casas and Contesse 2006: 15). The main NGOs involved included APROFA and 
ICMER, and the feminist organisations Instituto de la Mujer and Corporación la 
Morada. 
Abortion as the core issue of the petition and the strategies of both petitioners and respondents 
From the beginning it was key for the conservative anti-EC lobby to set the parameters 
of the debate by imposing their discourse on the links between abortion and EC. By 
doing so, they knew they had an important legal advantage, which was the right to life 
of the unborn, which had been included in the 1980 Constitution. Thus, the case against 
EC had an important constitutional component, and the tactics behind this first legal 
requirement were based on a three-pronged action to: a) impede the distribution of EC; 
b) declare EC’s main component, Levonorgestrel, illegal; and c) give public recognition 
to the right to life of the unborn (Casas and Contesse 2006: 9). The petition stated: 
… against the Institute of Public Health and the minister of Health, and […] against 
the Medical Laboratory Silesia S.A.[…] on behalf of those yet to be born in Chile, 
of their mothers and fathers, and especially on behalf of all women, potential 
victims, for their right to life, that the petitioners consider threatened by the 
arbitrary and illegal initiative of the health authorities, who accepted to process and 
then authorise the commercialisation of the drug Postinal [….] Requesting the 
constitutional illegality of the drug Levonorgestrel to be established, and the right 
to life of the unborn to be upheld from the moment of conception… (Corte de 
Apelaciones de Santiago 1 2001) 
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The language used in this introductory paragraph of the initial petition shows the 
ideological commitment that pro-life groups felt to speak on behalf of all society, 
especially the unborn and women who in their eyes were victims of public policies 
forcing them to get abortions. The appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality was 
based on the alleged abortive action of the drug Postinal, and the defence of the right to 
life contained in the Chilean Constitution, as well as the American Convention on 
Human Rights, thus referring to both national and international law (Casas and Contesse 
2006: 11; IIHD 2008: 48). 
The conservative lobby therefore responded to the fear that the legalisation of EC was 
an indirect means of making abortion legal in the country. What is more, the motivation 
of this legal action by organisations was also presented as an individual initiative by the 
petitioners, showing that these individuals had so deep a belief that they needed to 
intervene in person: 
… [the petitioners] Sustain their appeal on the fact that the mentioned drug, which 
has been authorised under the form of a pill of 0.75 mg., contains the drug named 
Levonorgestrel […] which is abortive and aims to prevent unwanted pregnancies 
[…] The petitioners consider the legal action they have undertaken legitimate in 
that it is coherent with the ends pursued by each of the organisations they represent, 
although they also act on their own behalf. (Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago 1 
2001) 
In March 2001 the Corte de Apelaciones (Court of Appeal) agreed to review the case. 
The petitioners used mostly experts’ opinions provided by doctors working at ULA and 
PUC to support their claims in front of the judges, showing their links with the Catholic 
institutions and doctrine (Casas and Contesse 2006: 10). Since the penal code does not 
contain a definition of abortion most of the petitioners’ argumentation tried to make the 
case for an understanding of abortion as the destruction of the product of conception 
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independently from the gestation stage the product is at. By doing so they could argue 
that the pill was having an impact on the product of the gestation and therefore 
threatened its survival and development (Casas and Contesse 2006: 7), these are 
generally the arguments advanced by the Catholic Church. 
The distribution and legal regulation of EC according to Casas and Contesse lacked the 
full political support of the ruling coalition despite being the public policy of MINSAL 
(Casas and Contesse 2006: 7). This was reflected in the way in which the defence of EC 
was built. Díaz argued: 
… after these three years [working on EC] we knew where the opposition lied and 
all the resources it could deploy. We trusted [the government] to have a good 
litigation. Yet the lawyer who represented the ISP refused to medicalise the issue 
[…]Lidia Casas, Claudia Dides and I had been working for a while on this and 
therefore were convinced that the focal point would be the action mechanism […] 
and luckily based on the scoping research we had studied the mechanisms. So when 
the debate started in 2001 we had [scientific] evidence.209  
Casas and Díaz insisted that it was important for the defence “to address the 
mechanisms of action, and include international legal instruments including those on 
reproductive rights” but the government’s lawyers replied these “were not relevant” for 
the argumentation.210 
Both MINSAL and the director of the ISP did not feel comfortable defending the 
introduction of the drug in terms of SRHR, leaving that responsibility to civil society 
(Casas and Contesse 2006: 12). Instead, the state focused on the presentation of 
technical arguments to support technical decisions that nobody could question. The 
                                               209 Op. cit. 64 210 Op. cit. 110. 
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government’s language thus remained as far away as possible from the rhetoric of 
women’s rights to favour a language that was “politically correct and conservative” 
(Casas and Contesse 2006: 12). Even Bachelet underlined the importance for MINSAL 
to keep a role as a public health institution trying to provide solutions for the whole 
population in matters of public health (Casas and Contesse 2006: 12). 
We observe that state and health officials were therefore acting in line with the tradition 
of health authorities that had historically treated reproductive and sexual issues as 
public health concerns rather than people’s or women’s rights (see Ch. 4). Quoting the 
then director of the ISP, Casas and Contesse explain that the government, including its 
more progressive factions, had a utilitarian approach since its concern was to maintain 
the unity of the government coalition, and to not upset the Church (2006: 12-13). If that 
meant ignoring SRHR and women’s rights, that was a price the government was clearly 
ready to pay. It ensured that any success could only bring a victory on the technical and 
political front and not to women’s rights (Casas and Contesse 2006: 13). 
In order to maintain its position as a public health authority, the technical defence of the 
government worked exclusively from technical and medical arguments, and only when 
faced with the dilemma of treating the unborn did they take a stand refusing the idea 
that an unborn can be considered a person. The defence also spent much time explaining 
that in order to be an abortion there must be a pregnancy, and therefore, since the EC 
operates at the ovulation stage it cannot be abortive (Casas and Contesse 2006: 13). 
They also spent much time insisting that the tribunals needed to focus more on 
establishing whether the government’s policy violated any superior law rather than 
entering moral and philosophical debates on the beginning of life, which is outside the 
judges’ competence (Casas and Contesse 2006: 14). 
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The presentation and defence of women’s rights and people’s sexual and reproductive 
rights were left to civil society organisations that argued from this position and 
defended the right to physical and mental health of women, as well as their access to 
scientific advances.211 While the conservative lobby insisted on talking about the right 
to life and the beginning of life, for the socialist party respondents this judicial action 
went against modernity and was an attack on freedom of conscience, which is 
guaranteed by the Constitution (Casas and Contesse 2006: 15). 
The case was eventually dismissed by the judges after they resolved that no social 
organisation could claim the right to speak and claim in the name of all unborn, and this 
was based on the understanding that the constitutional appeal (recurso de protección) 
did not have a general or popular character attached to it, but rather an individual one. 
Through this decision the court confirmed the legality of the commercialisation of 
Postinal (Casas and Contesse 2006: 16). 
The second appeal 
In May 2001, however, the Court of Appeal refused to ratify the petitioner’s appeal 
stating that the “recurso de protección” requires the existence of a “specific person or 
entity” as petitioner, and therefore the different groups appealing on behalf of the 
unborn, their parents, and the possible women victims of EC, did not qualify as 
petitioners (Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago 1 2001). 
On 30 August, the petitioners decided to appeal to the Supreme Court, which 
surprisingly decided to accept their petition granting them procedural legitimacy, and 
ruled in their favour, producing an unexpected outcome. This could be explained by the 
                                               211 Ibid. and op. cit. 64. 
222 
fact that in Chilean law, the doctrine of stare decisis – or binding precendent – does not 
apply. Previous rulings are only a “reference” body of jurisprudence to provide a new 
case with a framework, but in no case may they determine the outcome of a new case 
(Bascuñan 2004: 44). 
The petitioners’ presentation was the same as in the previous judicial stages, and still 
had as its main goal to revoke the ISP’s authorisation for commercialisation of the drug 
Postinal, granted in March 2001. But surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s justification in 
accepting the case went beyond the effect of the drugs to actually enter the debate 
regarding the rights of the unborn and the real effects of the drug Levonorgestrel on the 
uterus walls, possibly affecting or not the implantation of the egg. The court argued that 
“the unborn – no matter the stage of its pre-natal development – has a right to life, 
meaning, it had the right to be born, since the constitutional norm did not make any 
distinctions”, and therefore “preventing the implantation of a fertilised egg was in the 
light of all constitutional and legal norms and conventions a synonym of abortion which 
is penalised as a crime” (IIHD 2008: 51). 
This shows a clear bias and dismissal by the judges of the defence’s scientific 
arguments and their insistence on the necessity to first establish that abortion is an 
interruption of pregnancy, which does not start until the egg is implanted in the wall of 
the uterus. It also ignores scientific evidence presented regarding the lack of 
effectiveness of EC once the implantation of the egg has started, and the absence 
therefore of any risks for pregnancy (IIHD 2008: 50). 
It could be argued that the judges’ ruling reflected a way of interpreting the law that 
followed a very conservative notion of life and one extremely close to the Catholic 
credo. For Bascuñan (2004), purely from a legal point of view within Chilean law, the 
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foundations of the court’s ruling on the eligibility of the petitioners to appear in court 
(which had previously been refused), the extension of the “recurso de protección” to a 
collective action (also previously denied), as well as the interpretation of the right to life 
being extended to a “right to life of the unborn irrespective of its gestational stage”, are 
all highly questionable. 
Bascuñan criticises many details of the court’s lack of precision in its final ruling 
including how in the same sentence the court recognises a right of the foetus as a person 
while also pointing out that the unborn acquires all its attributes and rights as a person at 
birth (2004: 48). 
Everything seems to indicate that the Supreme Court’s handling of the appeal rested on 
dogmatic and conservative views, as well as questionable legal procedures. By using a 
definition of life as starting at the moment of fertilisation or “conception”, while 
ignoring scientific evidence arguing the opposite, the court established that the alleged 
effects of a drug after conception made it abortive (Casas and Contesse 2006: 17-18). 
The court’s ruling even went as far as to pronounce a judgement on scientific matters, 
arguing that possible variations in the uterus’ wall lining due to the effects of the drug 
also interrupted the development of a life with “a unique genetic profile”, giving it yet 
again a status of person (Casas and Contesse 2006: 18-19). To support its claim of the 
defence of life from conception, the Supreme Court referred to the San José Pact using 
international law, albeit this legal instrument does not provide the backup for the 
argument in the way the court was presenting it, nor did it establish an equivalence 
between the right to life of a person and that of the unborn (Bascuñán 2004: 73-74). 
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What most surprised the public and actors of the judicial battle was that, before the 
Supreme Court made its ruling public, the government unexpectedly passed a second 
authorisation by the ISP for a new EC drug called Postinor-2, made by the 
pharmaceutical company Grünenthal. This short-circuited the court’s ruling and 
annulled any policy and legal repercussions. For Lawyer R, “it was clear that someone 
had warned the government of the outcome of the appeal to the Supreme Court”,212 and 
since the ruling only applied to the first drug that had been authorised by the ISP – 
Postinal – the government was able to distribute the new drug without any problem. 
EC part II (2002-2005) 
By approving a second drug produced by a different pharmaceutical company despite 
the ruling of the Supreme Court, not only had the government cleverly avoided any 
major impact on its policy, it had also managed to neutralise the judicial victory of the 
anti-EC lobby. 
This is why immediately after the ruling of 2001, the petitioners tried to ask for it to be 
expanded to include the newly approved EC drug, Postinor-2. They considered that this 
new drug was identical to the first one, both in its components and effects. The Supreme 
Court, however, referred the case back to the Court of Appeal. The same court that had 
originally rejected the anti-EC petition decided that the new appeal could not be 
accepted, based on the previous judicial rulings and that the effects of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in 2001 could not be extended to challenge the authorisation for the 
distribution of Postinor-2 (Casas and Contesse 2006: 22). This decision was also 
appealed by the petitioners in front of the Supreme Court that had ruled in their favour 
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on Postinal, but this time the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and did not extend its sentence to Postinor-2 (Casas and Contesse 2006: 22). 
In January 2002, two new legal actions were initiated by the anti-EC lobby, this time 
involving the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República),213 the body 
in charge of auditing and monitoring the legal aspects of all actions by the civil service. 
The petitioners brought a case to the Contraloría against the ISP for bad practice in its 
authorisation of a second brand of EC right before the Supreme Court’s ruling. The 
second action – this time based on a consumer’s rights perspective – intended to target a 
number of pharmacies in one municipality (borough) of Santiago which were selling 
Postinor-2. Nevertheless, since Chilean consumer law “has a clause against the misuse 
of this type of action”214 – which establishes that local police courts are accountable and 
responsible for dealing with this type of issue – the pro-life petitioners quickly 
abandoned their legal action. They realised that this could open multiple cases in 
different municipalities around the country for which they did not have the legal 
capacity to respond to (Casas and Contesse 2006: 24). 
The Contraloría, however, had to rule on the first case, since it directly supervises the 
ISP, but found the ISP had all the authorisations and power to extend licences based on 
technical decisions. As for the second license extended to Postinor-2, they saw no 
apparent irregular conduct by the ISP allowing them to “sustain that the ISP’s behaviour 
was against the Law” (Casas and Contesse 2006: 24). 
At the end of 2002, the youth organisation AGES, which had been involved in the case 
against Postinal, was led once again by Jara and Romero from ULA, seeking to start 
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new legal action that would allow the involvement of more actors than previously 
through a petition of nulidad de derecho público. The case was based on the outcomes 
of the 2001 Supreme Court’s ruling, and it was filed on the grounds of the 
unconstitutional and illegal actions of the ISP in the approval of Postinor-2 (Casas and 
Contesse 2006: 26). 
This time the participation of civil society organisations, in particular women’s 
organisations, was not straightforward. Casas explained that she had to insist many 
times in front of the judge to accept the eligibility of these groups but the judge kept 
refusing “without any reason”. According to Casas, Romero was arguing that since 
“they had no chance” of winning, women’s groups could not be included, and was 
pretending not to know women had been previously involved in order to avoid 
collective actions.215 For Casas, this showed “how easy it was to manipulate a court”.216 
The new case emphasised the way in which the ISP abused its functions and power by 
approving Postinor-2 but overall their arguments closely resembled those presented at 
the case of Postinal.217 The government’s defence in the first instance focused on trying 
to question whether AGES could really be representing the women and people they 
claimed to be representing. It went on to present similar technical and scientific 
arguments to those used during the first series of legal actions (Casas and Contesse 
2006: 24), arguing that EC did not violate any rights granted by the Constitution. 
During this legal action the lack of understanding of the potential gendered impact of 
the issue at stake by government lawyers and the gendered-blind litigation brought 
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forward was patent. For instance, the ISP maintained that life started at conception until 
birth, contradicting the previous positions held by the government as well as the Chilean 
civil code (Casas and Contesse 2006: 29). Casas highlighted that the relation between 
SRHR advocates and the government’s lawyers over the different judicial battles was 
not always smooth. The prominent lawyers hired by the government were not specialists 
in SRHR and often made mistakes in the arguments used by not taking in consideration 
the suggestions put forward by civil society actors and SRHR organisations.218 
The incorporation and participation of civil society, through the organisations and 
individuals who were able to be part of the process as authorised by the court, was 
therefore difficult. The absence of concern with gender issues and women’s rights from 
the government and their defence put an important amount of responsibility on these 
actors’ shoulders. In all of their interventions submitted in writing, they confirmed and 
argued that EC is not abortive and is safe.219 They highlighted the right to choose for 
women, coming from a strong sexual and reproductive rights legal foundation, and that 
EC was part of the Norms and, since this was a technical matter, the ISP was suited to 
decide on the authorisation for the commercialisation of Postinor-2 (Casas and Contesse 
2006: 24). 
Despite the obvious procedural barriers to their contribution in the litigation process, 
these individuals and NGOs found the space to argue from a women’s rights 
perspective, referring to the right to choose, the right to health, the right to freedom of 
conscience and to access scientific development; they also referred to the international 
frameworks supporting those rights. SRHR advocates, in particular biomedical NGOs 
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and researchers, also emphasised the lack of scientific evidence regarding the effects of 
EC on the uterus lining, and therefore insisted that it could not be affirmed that EC was 
abortive (Casas and Contesse 2006: 30). 
The ruling in this case came out in June 2004, two months after the announcement by 
the Minister of SERNAM that the government would distribute the pill free of charge in 
primary care centres at municipal level for victims of sexual violence.220 Casas 
explained that this was “a strong shook [sic] up for the relationship between MINSAL 
and SERNAM and after that the EC case speeded up”.221 
The court ruled against the ISP and the distribution of Postinor-2, insisting on the 
abortive effect of EC. Once again the role of the judges and their beliefs was at the 
centre of the debate, despite the fact that it is generally agreed that courts are not to rule 
on scientific matters. The female judge who delivered the ruling pointed to the lack of 
scientific agreement on the effects of EC in the lining of the uterus as a way of 
supporting her decision. By doing so, she openly extended her legal knowledge and 
expertise to scientific matters. 
Lidia Casas explained that the whole legal process with this judge had been marked by 
irregularities and arbitrary decisions regarding the participation of the parties, but also 
deadlines for submission of support materials and experts’ testimonies.222 She declared: 
We had told the ISP lawyers something strange was happening and from then on 
neither they nor we had access to the case file […] we never knew what was 
happening […] she had a peculiar way to set the deadlines, and so the ISP missed 
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the opportunity to request the experts’ reports. […] She named the experts and she 
pronounced sentence before the experts submitted their reports. Apparently she 
had spoken to some of the experts, something that is unusual. The reports were 
only available after the ruling, and the most interesting thing is that out of five 
only one report said EC was abortive. All the others say they cannot demonstrate 
what the petitioners are arguing…223 
Additional irregularities happened after the case was closed. The judge “who at this 
point had no legal authority to continue to decide anything” accepted a petition “by the 
lawyer from ULA” asking her “to send an order of requisition of all the EC products 
available in the National Health Systems […]because the government had already 
bought the drugs for the victims of sexual violence”.224 Casas showed much frustration 
with the lack of transparency and amount of irregularities civil society and the 
government faced. Although she was not able to prove that the judge was under 
pressure, this seems to be a plausible explanation to such erratic behaviour by a judge, 
together with possible close connections with conservative groups.225 
These events coincided with the process to publish the new guidelines for the care of 
victims of sexual violence earlier that year. It was SERNAM’s Minister Pérez who 
announced the decision to launch the guidelines in April 2004 during a public event. 
According to my interviewees, this was because Pérez was committed to the work on 
EC and after that MINSAL “felt under pressure and published the norms”.226 This of 
course created significant tension since Minister García had been delaying the approval 
of the Norms, and conditioning their publication to the removal of EC from the 
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document. This shows how the confrontation between progressive and conservative 
forces within the government coalition had become tangible. 
In May 2004, Fundación21, a thinktank close to the President’s party, published a poll 
showing that 82% of respondents said they supported the government’s decision to 
distribute EC at the municipal and primary health care level. Another 86% of 
respondents said they would recommend EC to a female relative in the case of rape and 
most respondents thought the government’s main argument justifying their decision to 
distribute EC in terms of public health was correct (Fundación Chile 21 2004). Public 
opinion was therefore behind the government on this issue. But the legal challenges in 
court and the political disputes from within the Concertación by the PDC reflected the 
formal and informal power of the conservative elite and the Catholic Church. It showed 
concerted action on both fronts by political and civil society actors holding conservative 
views. It also showed that self-censorship on these issues by the government was the 
result of political calculus as a strategy for survival for Concertación and a general lack 
of concern with the gendered impact of their decisions. 
After the ruling against the government, the case was eventually brought to the Court of 
Appeal by the ISP and the authorities to reverse the previous judgement. NGOs and 
government officials feared it would jeopardise the government’s wider policy on 
reproductive health.227 Thus, for the litigation the government hired prominent lawyers 
including Davor Harasic.228 Casas explained that this is when the relationship between 
women’s groups and biomedical organisations started deteriorating since the appeal had 
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“a limited number of days to be accepted”, and the lawyers of ICMER and APROFA, 
including Casas, had to work intensely “to prepare the appeal”229: 
… there was a breakdown with the other [women’s organisations] because we 
were fully secluded trying to get the appeal ready.[…]while we worked we 
watched the news and everyone was out there speaking of what they were doing 
[…] you heard a female lawyer that you had never seen saying “we are appealing 
this case”, and we were thinking that she did not even know the case!230 
As explained by Casas she sustained “a long conversation with Díaz because she 
felt exhausted” and had the impression that whenever “there was an opportunity 
to be on TV then everyone was supportive but when we had to do the work we 
were very few”.231 
In December 2004, as the Lagos administration was entering its last year in power and 
Bachelet was about to become the Concertación’s candidate for the presidential race, 
the Court of Appeal finally reversed the previous ruling, confirming the opinions given 
in 2001 regarding the ineligibility of the pro-life petitioners to bring the cases to court. 
Most importantly, the court declared that it was not up to courts and tribunals to resolve 
philosophical, religious or moral disputes and rather that this should be left to society to 
deal with (Casas and Contesse 2006: 33). For Lidia Casas, this last legal opinion is 
extremely important since this distinction between the role of judges and lawyers on 
scientific matters would be constantly overrun in judicial actions that followed,232 in 
particular with the Constitutional Tribunal under Bachelet. 
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This last decision clearly favoured the government but it did not take long for the pro-
life lobby to appeal to the Supreme Court, through a new “recurso de casación”. After 
the 2001 ruling this was the second time the Supreme Court was asked to decide on the 
future of the government’s reproductive health policy. The conservative lobby’s 
preparation of this new judicial challenge took place after Infante was sacked and the 
electoral race had started. 
The Supreme Court ruled in November 2005, as Lagos was leaving office and elections 
were to be held. The court ruled that the petitioners had not proved their claim, that EC 
was abortive and therefore ruled in favour of the government. This was a crucial 
element of the legal ruling, because the principle that those bringing a case to court 
should prove their accusations was not respected in the subsequent court battles. 
In its ruling the Supreme Court also referred to the way in which the issue had been 
handled by the lower courts, pointing out that at that stage it had been resolved using 
general principles, which did not apply through a “recurso de casación” like the one the 
court was ruling on (Casas and Contesse 2006: 36). Based on all this, it denied the 
illegality and constitutional violation of EC and gave a major victory to the government. 
Lawyer R explained that the anti-EC lobby was very disappointed with the sentence, but 
mostly because “this happened with a majority of Catholic judges!”233 
Pharmaceutical companies under pressure 
In January 2006, and in direct response to the Supreme Court’s favourable verdict on 
EC and its commercialisation, the same students’ group that brought the first case to 
court in 2001, AGES, decided to start a new judicial offensive, this time against the 
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pharmaceutical companies producing EC: Grünenthal, maker of Postinor-2; and 
Recalcine, maker of TACE. AGES was once again advised by Alejandro Romero from 
ULA, who had substantial experience dealing with corporate litigations (Morales 2006). 
The case was finally only brought against Grünenthal as the government was 
distributing their product Postinor-2, and not TACE which had been legalised 
subsequently (Morales 2006). The main argument to challenge the distribution of 
Postinor-2 then was the possible effect of levonorgestrel on the implantation of the 
fertilised egg in a woman’s uterus, which was interpreted as having an abortive effect. 
This was based on information obtained from the US Food and Drugs Administration 
via the bioethics centre of the PUC.234 The accusation was also based on the information 
provided by Grunenthal’s own informational leaflet for users of Postinor-2, where the 
company acknowledged a possible risk for the “implantation”,235 an argument used in 
2004 in the sentence in favour of the conservative lobby. 
The new offensive, surprisingly, proved highly effective with Grünenthal. Despite 
holding the legal authorisation to distribute Postinor-2 from the ISP, the pharmaceutical 
company decided to renounce this authorisation because the new owner of the company 
felt that other drug companies would back off from its distribution due to the fear of 
judicial actions (Casas and Contesse 2006). 
Lawyer R explained he and his fellow anti-EC campaigners were particularly proud of 
the tactics and judicial strategy to threaten pharmaceutical companies. In fact he was 
aware that by introducing his petition during the early days of January – the beginning 
of the summer vacation time in Chile and as the presidential election was taking place – 
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the firm would be taken by surprise “and the lawyers made a mistake”.236 Grünenthal’s 
lawyers did not react in time and allegedly left for their vacation and only on February 
15 did they call announcing they would withdraw Postinor-2 from the market and 
renounce its distribution license. For Lawyer R the lawyers of Grünenthal “were given 
enough time to think about it” and “translate” the necessary documents, “but they did 
not take it seriously” and “a few lost their jobs!” 237 
According to Lawyer R, the real reason behind Grünenthal’s decision to withdraw from 
selling the EC pill, and to put an end to its contract with a Hungarian company in charge 
of producing Postinor-2, was that Grünenthal wanted “to avoid an economic disaster”238 
after so many years of legal action against the drug. Grünenthal “feared that this product 
could create problems for its other products”, especially because “[we] threatened 
[Grünenthal] with a possible boycott of its other drugs by doctors”.239 Pro-life doctors 
belonging to well-known medical faculties and institutions had in fact been supporting 
the argument regarding a “doubt” on the effect of the pill through the media as well 
(ACI 2004). 
This point of view was shared by Casas, who pointed out that Grünenthal this time 
would have had to fight alone since the legal action was only directed at them and not 
the government.240 It was then clear that the pressure on the pharmaceutical companies 
was also part of the conservative campaigning around EC. According to Lawyer R, after 
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this episode no other laboratory had tried to produce the drug in Chile, which he 
considered a success.241 
Yet Grunenthal’s decision to stop producing Postinor-2 had no major impact since at the 
time the government had already approved TACE.242 Moreover, in 2005, the 
government had bought 30,000 doses of EC for the planned massive distribution needed 
according to the government’s fertility guidelines, producing a large stock in 
MINSAL’s depot (Casas Becerra 2008: 5). Grünenthal’s withdrawal on the other hand 
created a natural monopoly, increasing the price of the drug, which almost reached 
US$18, a high price for the local consumer (Casas Becerra 2008: 2005). 
For Lidia Casas, during this episode between 2005 and the beginning of 2006, there was 
constant pressure from the pro-life lobby on private companies against the 
commercialisation of EC.243 This is a very important aspect of the influence these 
conservative groups have in Chile since they are closely linked to the economic and 
social elite. The pressure exerted by the conservative lobby on pharmaceutical 
companies and pharmacies worsened the already existing difficulty in accessing EC in 
pharmacies. 
The pressure increased in March 2005 when the government included EC as part of the 
“Formulario Nacional”, the national registry listing the drugs that pharmacies across 
the country must keep in stock by law (Casas Becerra 2008: 6). With this measure the 
government displayed its two-pronged strategy to make EC available: first, ensuring 
that it would be available in pharmacies through the “Formulario”; and secondly, to 
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make it available free of charge in the national health system via the Norms. The 
conservative lobby thus decided to fight back on both fronts. 
In January 2007, the process at the Constitutional Tribunal had already started, and 
Minister Barría declared there had unfortunately been “social pressure by some opinion 
powers which has resulted in that [EC] has almost disappeared from pharmacies”, 
highlighting in this way the seriousness of the issue (La Nación 2007a). 
In order to unlock the situation, that same month – and just a few days before Bachelet 
announced her decision to pass a decree to support the Norms (see Ch. 8) – APROFA 
applied for a license to import “Optinor”, its own brand of EC (La Nación 2007b). This 
was a deliberate action planned to counteract the conservative lobby as it could not 
pressurise an NGO dedicated to the defence of SRHR and with a long history 
distributing and providing contraception in the country in the same way it had with 
private companies. APROFA, however, was only granted a provisional permit to import 
50,000 doses of EC from the Indian pharmaceutical company ICON, providing a more 
affordable option of EC than pharmacies at 5,000 CLP (approx. US$10) (Colegio 
Médico 2007). 
The direct threats of legal action against the pharmaceuticals became evident when the 
pharmaceutical company ICON received a letter signed by the consumer’s association 
ACONOR, mentioning the abortive effect of the pill and explaining how this matter had 
already been judicially sentenced in Chile, and that the company was therefore exposing 
itself to be brought to court if they insisted on selling their product in Chile. In the letter 
the conservative groups behind the legal threat referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling of 
2001, which ruled against the government, but deliberately ignored the sentence of 2005 
that reverted this thereby allowing the distribution of EC. Moreover, they explicitly 
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used Grünenthal’s withdrawal from the market as an example of what could happen to 
them (Casas 2008: 6-7). 
ICON alerted APROFA, which informed the other SRHR advocates and organisations. 
They realised ACONOR was an ad-hoc entity created to start a campaign of dissuasion 
against the corporations and its legal address was the same as one of the petitioner’s 
against Grünenthal, and AGES’ founder Juan Jara Opazo (Casas 2008: 6). 
The campaign against pharmacies 
The aggressive “threats” campaign of the pro-life groups did not limit itself to the 
pharmaceutical companies. As explained by Barría: 
… pressure groups forced its [EC] removal from pharmacies, pharmaceutical 
companies stopped selling it, we had to go abroad to import the pill to make sure it 
was available to women. I truly think this was a small showcase of the level 
ferocity ultra-conservative groups can reach in our country.244 
Using the market, a new campaign was directed against the distributors of EC. As a 
reaction to the government’s decision to make EC a mandatory drug to be kept in stock 
in all pharmacies, ACONOR targeted the main pharmacy chains of Chile which control 
90% of the market (Casas 2008: 8). The pro-life campaign once again operated via 
letters showing a clear attempt at threatening businesses in a legal as well as a moral 
manner, stating: 
The purpose of this letter is to warn you ahead of time, that we are gathering the 
evidence to start a suit […] against all pharmacy chains that will take part in such 
flagrant infraction to consumers’ rights […] in order to avoid incurring the costs of 
starting a suit for compensation for false advertising and costly public campaigns  
to warn consumers […] we request that you abstain from continuing to be a part of 
this illegal act. (ACONOR 2007)  
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Between 2001 and 2006, pharmacies had sold EC, but in 2007 there was an important 
change in behaviour that confirmed the power of the direct campaign pro-life groups 
were sustaining. The government realised there was a problem buying EC in pharmacies 
when women who generally used private health services started going to public health 
services to obtain EC (Casas 2008: 8). There was also the fact that once the government 
reacted to this reality and decided to become the main supplier of EC in the country – 
buying more doses of the Colombian brand, Postday, through MINSAL’s National 
Supply Centre (CENABAST) – pharmacies still refused to buy EC for their stocks 
(Casas 2008: 8). 
Lawyer R openly spoke about the letters, and emphasised that he considered them key 
in the lobby to dissuade pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies that the government 
was thinking of attracting to work in Chile, threatening them with the risk of being 
brought to court or boycott.245 This argument is very effective for companies trying to 
make profits and who perceive law suits as a financial loss to their business. The letter’s 
episode shows how a tight network of highly-skilled people were working on different 
fronts through legal actions trying to block the governments’ initiative and also efforts 
from pro-choice supporters and organisations such as APROFA to make EC widely 
available for women. 
At the end of 2007, as the government was in the middle of new judiciary actions 
started by the same pro-life groups at the Constitutional Tribunal, MINSAL and the 
government decided to put an end to the commercial boycott of EC using the most 
powerful tool they had – law enforcement. MINSAL imposed harsh fines of 33 million 
CLP (US$66,000) on pharmacies that did not comply with the law that made it 
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mandatory for them to have EC in stock (Morales 2007). In case of further disobedience 
they were warned that the fines would double, or they would be brought to court. 
Pharmacy owners replied invoking their right to “conscientious objection”, opening a 
new battle field between the Concertación and the right-wing opposition, but most 
importantly also between the most conservative elements of Concertación, namely the 
DC and the more progressive left-wing members supporting Bachelet. 
Patricio Walker (PDC), President of the Deputies Chamber at the time, called to respect 
the conscience of everyone (La Segunda 2007c), while the government’s speaker, 
Ricardo Lagos Weber, emphasised the pharmacies’ duty to comply with the law. It was 
symbolic that Walker would lead this battle since, in an interview with El Mercurio 
earlier that same year, he had declared that 2006 had probably been the “worst year of 
Concertación” (Montalva 2007), accusing many left-wing party members to have 
provoked the PDC with sensitive issues including euthanasia, EC and a bill on 
therapeutic abortion introduced by PS and PPD deputies, which Walker personally 
censored, declaring the mere act of debating it as unconstitutional (Radio Cooperativa 
2006a). 
The support to pharmacies also came from the conservative thinktank Libertad y 
Desarrollo – close to UDI – who declared that the government’s fines set “a negative 
precedent related to any economic activity more or less related to health issues” and 
added that businesses could only be “forced by laws and not regulations” (La Segunda 
2007d). For Libertad y Desarrollo, by fining the three main pharmacy chains, the state 
was “violating the freedom of action and conscience” since it had no right to “impose 
on pharmacies to sell any product” (La Segunda 2007d). 
240 
The Catholic Church also reacted through Cardinal Alejandro Goic who openly 
condemned the government’s enforcement of the fines on pharmacies. Speaking to the 
media he used a similar language as the conservative politicians and thinktanks while 
declaring that “no one can force me by law to act against my own conscience, and if I 
have any doubt that this pill may be abortive I cannot contribute to wrong-doing” (La 
Segunda 2007a). To which Bachelet herself had to reply publicly that her role as 
President was to provide all the conditions to “guarantee citizens’ individual freedoms” 
and that “in democracy no one could force anyone to do anything, and therefore no one 
was violating someone else’s conscience” (La Segunda 2007a). 
All conservative actors in this dispute followed the argument of “conscientious 
objection” in a concerted manner. According to Casas and Dides, the use of “normative 
language with such power of moral persuasion regarding human rights” – and the 
invocation of conscientious objection “in order to not carry out one’s professional 
duties” – reflects the tension emanating from the appearance of new technologies and 
scientific discoveries, in particular regarding reproduction, which come to challenge 
conservative and religious views on these issues (2007: 205). 
Casas and Dides highlight the implications of the use of conscientious objection for 
policy implementation and service delivery, explaining that what is important in any 
case is that in what could be perceived as a zero sum game, user’s and citizens’ rights 
must be protected (2007: 205). The authors explain that the objection involves “the 
regulation of the exemption to fulfil a fundamental legal obligation, normally derived 
from labour relations or civil service (work contract or civil servant status); it is directed 
to public institutions and to individuals and is always related to a personal obligation” 
(2007: 205). 
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However, in the case of the pharmacies, the objection was raised by owners of private 
businesses, based on personal religious views despite its repercussions for citizen’s 
rights in practice. In Chile the objection took the form of civil disobedience from the 
private sector, moving a whole discussion that would normally take place within the 
private sphere of individuals or within the state apparatus into the wider public domain 
and with the support of the Church. The disobedience was sustained on entrepreneurial 
freedom, and the private religious perspective of company’s owners. For a brief period 
the case of the pharmacies brought a whole new understanding to the debates around 
secularism and private responsibilities in Chile, challenging the legal ground of public 
policies launched by the state when applied to the private sector. 
The government’s strategy eventually paid off. In the end only one of the three 
companies fined persisted in their position (La Segunda 2007e). The two others 
requested a meeting with Soledad Barría, the Minister of Health, to solve the matter. 
During that meeting it was agreed that both companies would now comply with the 
legal obligations they had, and surprisingly when asked why they had not complied 
until then, no moral or religious reference was made.246 The answers provided instead 
pointed at problems in the supply chain of the companies producing EC (La Segunda 
2007e). 
This change in attitude indicates a fear of negative publicity and the possible economic 
costs for the companies. The conservative newspaper El Mercurio qualified the 
government’s strategy as a successful “checkmate” whereby the companies only had 
two options in the short-term – selling the pill or facing bankruptcy as a product of the 
                                               246 The owner of one of the companies is a well-known entrepreneur belonging to the Opus Dei. 
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multiple fines (El Mercurio 2007).247 In any case, it was a victory for Bachelet and 
Barría, and the progressive sectors of Concertación, as this deflated the tension that had 
been building up between the private sector and the State, reminding the wealthy 
conservative elite in the private sector that the State would use all its power to enforce 
the law. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the political and legal battles that affected the distribution of 
EC during the Lagos administration. It has been shown that from its beginning EC was 
an initiative by SRHR advocates working in biomedical organisations, some of them 
historically renowned such as APROFA, and some new such as ICMER. The influence 
of international discourses on SRHR and women’s rights was at the heart of these 
policy initiatives, yet in the political and judicial processes these concerns took a 
secondary position as the Lagos government defended its actions in a technical and 
legalistic manner rather than using these instances to promote women’s rights. 
The conservative lobby leading the anti-EC offensive on the other hand had a clear 
ideological agenda in which they wanted to maintain the status quo on the 
understanding of the right to life included in the 1980 Constitution and the illegal status 
of abortion. In the discursive battle surrounding EC, the conservative lobby also openly 
questioned the existing scientific evidence following a strategy to allow judges to 
consider the lack of certainty as a way to dismiss the scientific evidence presented to 
them. The judges during this process showed that their personal beliefs played an 
important role in the way they ruled and considered the evidence presented to them. The 
extension of their legal knowledge to making rulings on scientific matters opened the 
                                               247 The fines were quickly multiplied by the number of branches of each company violating the law.  
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space for a new informal way for conservative actors in the judicial system to oppose 
any advances on the reproductive rights front. 
Biomedical groups and feminist organisations, although they knew each other well and 
worked together in the first stage, eventually parted in a tense manner due to 
perceptions of lack of commitment by biomedical advocates. The judicialisation of an 
issue had clear effects on the participation of feminist advocates since they did not have 
the technical knowledge of doctors and lawyers. There was therefore a direct impact on 
the alliance building among civil society actors on reproductive rights issues. There 
were also tensions between government officials and biomedical groups as the state 
through the government seemed to always defend EC from its own interests and state 
rationality, rather than linking the issue to women’s rights and gender equality. 
Throughout the four years in which EC was challenged legally, the political debates 
surrounding it were constantly linked to the politics of consensus among politicians. 
The role of the PDC within Concertación proved to be ambivalent showing the 
importance of this informal rule of “consensus”. The rule was particularly applied in the 
political battle that took place against the publication of the Fertility Norms, and the 
sacking of the Under-Secretary of Health for mentioning them. The weight of electoral 
politics showed the limited commitment by the President with the issue. He favoured 
maintaining a good relationship with the PDC over the defence of the Fertility Norms. 
The role of the judges during this process was also crucial. There were specific episodes 
marked by irregularities, which were used by the anti-SRHR lobby to advance its own 
interests. Meanwhile biomedical groups and feminists within their organisations carried 
out the legal and scientific work to support the government’s registry for EC. 
244 
Although the drug was challenged though its distribution and sale via consumers’ 
organisations, we know that these were the same actors behind the legal and political 
challenges. The use of the market, however, was something extremely effective since 
we know the conservative forces in Chile also hold much economic power in Chile. Yet 
despite their sophisticated campaign and the support of the Church through the press for 
the case of “conscientious objection”, we observe that the Bachelet administration was 
prepared to face this type of challenge and showed a strong political will to stop this 
boycott to EC by directly targeting the owners of pharmacies with expensive fines and a 
communicational campaign through the press. This political commitment by Bachelet 
herself became patent with the challenge at the Constitutional Tribunal that is discussed 
in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 8: Emergency contraception under Michelle Bachelet – the President, women and the Constitutional Tribunal 
This chapter analyses the political and judicial processes that surrounded the 
distribution of EC in Chile under the Bachelet administration as it reached the 
Constitutional Tribunal. The chapter shows how the strength and tenacity of the 
conservative and anti-EC lobby only increased with the arrival of Bachelet. 
Focusing on the policy and judicial processes and institutions involved, as well as on the 
actors and their advocacy strategy and tactics, the chapter argues that the EC judicial 
processes were connected by the conservative opposition’s use of EC and contraception 
as a way to indirectly oppose any changes to the status of abortion in Chile. This 
responds to the historical opposition to family planning by conservative groups and the 
Church since the dictatorship years (see Ch. 4). By framing EC as abortive, the 
conservative lobby tried to shift the debate to morality and initiate a discursive battle to 
maintain the status quo on reproductive rights linked to the 1980 Constitution, favoured 
by the powerful impact of the “consensus” rule applied to politics since 1989. This was 
visible in the sophisticated legal and political strategy that brought EC to the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
Using the literature on judicialisation, the analysis focuses on the power of the 
Constitutional Tribunal as a post-authoritarian institutional legacy, and how it is a 
reflection of the weaknesses of Chile’s democratic institutions and political system 
since the return to democracy. In doing so it explores the role played by the court and its 
judges, and the impact of their beliefs within the TC as a post-authoritarian institution. 
According to Barros, the TC is the institution with the highest influence in the Chilean 
poltical system because it positions itself as a referee between the three state powers in 
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disputes over constitutional matters (2002: 234). This has led over the last decades to a 
strong judicialisation of politics in Chile, where the courts, including the TC have 
tended to rule in a very conservative manner maintaining the status quo (Couso and 
Hilbink 2009: 1). Although in 2008 the TC played a key role “determining a number of 
hot-button policy issues” (Couso and Hilbink 2009: 2), it would maintain its 
conservative mandate when ruling on the distribution of EC. Therefore the gendered 
nature of the transition to democracy and the origins of the TC in the 1980 Constitution 
are discussed to explain the gendered impact of the judicialisation. 
Recently it has been said that feminists had little to do with Bachelet’s arrival to power 
and that their high level of internal division affected their political impact (Ríos Tobar 
2009: 22-23). This research confirms that feminist groups as political actors played a 
limited role during the legal process to defend the EC policy while feminist individuals 
in key power positions, including Bachelet, provided a crucial support to the issue. The 
power of feminists as a movement at the time of the research was clearly diminished. 
This and the fact that the legal process gave priority to actors belonging to “elite 
networks” (Htun 2003) possessing technical skills such as scientific and legal 
knowledge explains the lack of impact and visibility of feminists during the process. 
The chapter therefore highlights how the work for the legal defence of EC was led by 
the government supported by the biomedical NGOs and thinktanks that historically have 
been involved in SRHR and were given a role as technical advisers. Here, feminists 
within NGOs, research centres and government played key roles through their 
professional work to advance the EC agenda. 
Finally, the evidence discussed in this chapter indicates that what made the most 
significant difference in advancing the EC policy was the concerted strategy set by 
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Bachelet and her government ministers. Bachelet’s personal commitment to the issue 
and her determination to intervene at crucial moments and push it through while 
constantly providing her ministers with support and access was a defining factor for the 
success of the policy. 
Bachelet comes to power: Alarm bells for the conservative lobby 
Bachelet became president after winning the second round of the elections on 16 
January 2006. The anxiety and concern of conservative factions of Chilean society did 
not take long to manifest. Within her own coalition, the PDC made their expectations 
very clear before and after supporting her. 
On the day before her election, Adolfo Zaldívar, president of the PDC, gave an 
interview to the conservative newspaper El Mercurio. He highlighted the PDC’s 
confidence that Bachelet would win and the importance of this as a historic moment. 
Yet, regarding the values’ agenda he declared: 
… the DC will support Michelle Bachelet through our values and principles… We 
will make our voice heard on these issues, we are in politics because of our values. 
She [Bachelet] has been clear: no to abortion, yes to life, from conception to death. 
Regarding EC we can discuss if it is abortive or not. She has been clear that 
marriage is the union of a man and a woman […] Michelle has a secularist view of 
life and is very tolerant. In practice, with her own life experience, with her gestures 
and attitudes, she has shown love for her neighbour in a more Christian manner 
than many Christians. (Correa 2006) 
In a similar tone, the day before she took office on 6 March 2006, El Mercurio 
published an interview with one of the bishops recently appointed by the Vatican (Pérez 
2006). When asked whether Bachelet represented a threat to the Church he said “Mrs. 
Bachelet is open to dialogue” and therefore there was no reason for conflict since the 
country had “a Congress and things are reached through consensus” (Pérez 2006). He 
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added that he also admired former President Lagos because “he sustained that in the 
same way he opposed torture, he also opposed abortion” (Pérez 2006). 
Thus from the beginning the Church voiced its concerns and sent a message to the new 
government via the press. The symbol of a female president was clearly a worrying 
novelty and the conservative lobby and the Church felt they needed to put abortion on 
the political agenda. More importantly, the Church seemed to imply they were direct 
partners of the political “consensus” rule. This is because the institution of “consensus” 
(see Ch. 4) also included a status quo on women’s reproductive rights as part of the 
prevalent conservative and Catholic gender regime in the country. 
This is illustrative of the positions that would be sustained by the anti-SRHR lobby 
throughout Bachelet’s presidency, and that this research found during the interviews. 
Concern would often arise as politicians within the Bachelet government, or the more 
progressive parties of the Concertación, brought up issues considered as sources of 
tension in the political arena since 1989 – namely women’s rights and sexual and 
reproductive rights. 
When Bachelet was elected the Concertación had been in power for 16 years and 
“Bachelet inherited a consensus that was starting to show wear” (Borzutzky and Weeks 
2010: 12). It is not surprising then that one of the greatest challenges to Bachelet’s 
decision to implement the EC policy came from the Concertación’s own ranks, as the 
more Catholic factions of the DC openly opposed the President’s initiative. The 
Christian Democrats and the right-wing conservative opposition clearly stated that they 
considered this policy as breaking the “consensus” that had allowed them to remain a 
political coalition for so long. This shows that from the beginning the opposition to EC 
was cutting across the political spectrum and party lines. 
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Bachelet also faced new challenges such as a shorter presidential term which made any 
legal reform very difficult, and there were growing signs of discontent and social 
conflict in the country (Borzutzky and Weeks 2010: 13). Yet, despite the numerous 
criticism and open challenges to her decision, unlike Lagos Bachelet remained 
committed to change, and fearless of the pressure from the Church and conservative 
lobby. Not only did she take the decision of pushing forward the EC policy, but she also 
imposed a parity measure within her own government distributing the ministerial and 
sub-ministerial positions on a 50-50% base between men and women (Valdés 2010: 11). 
Her commitment to women’s rights and women’s reproductive health is probably better 
illustrated in her choice of Minister of Health, Soledad Barría, an old friend and fellow 
doctor, supporter of the right to abortion and passionate defender of the EC. 
The Constitutional Tribunal 
We know from the literature on judicialisation that Chile has a “politically cautious” 
and “change-averse judiciary” (Huneeus 2010: 119). In fact Chilean courts are known 
for shying away from “constitutional review”,248 which interestingly was introduced 
under the military regime through the 1980 Constitution (Couso 2004). According to 
Javier Couso this was likely a survival strategy due to the historic evolution of the 
judiciary and its institutional learning deriving from its historic role within the check 
and balance order (Couso 2004). This resulted in weak legitimacy for judicial review at 
the beginning of the democratic transition (Couso 2004), since the TC was granted the 
power to “rule on whether individuals and political parties represented a threat to the 
institutions and functioning of democracy” (Heiss and Navia 2007: 166). Moreover the 
                                               248 For the purposes of this thesis, “constitutional review” is understood as the process through which specific courts – often constitutional courts – hold governments accountable through their power to review the actions of the legislature and the executive. 
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members of the Constitutional Tribunal were then partially appointed by the military 
who had secured their presence in democracy through the National Security Council 
(Heiss and Navia 2007: 167). 
The Constitutional Tribunal was strongly shaped by the 1980 Constitution which was 
conceived as a guardian of Pinochet’s conservative regime (Couso 2004). The 
Constitution was shaped by lawyers who “employed natural law arguments to both 
support and steer the political and legal transformations sought by the Junta”, including 
for the first time in Chile’s constitutional history “an explicit mention of the right to 
life”, which confirms the way in which Catholic principles were then translated into 
legislation (Muñoz León 2014: 130). 
The TC was included in 2005 as part of the main constitutional reforms negotiated by 
Lagos and Concertación with the opposition in order to remove most authoritarian 
enclaves inherited through the 1980 Constitution (Fuentes 2006: 21). These reforms 
included not only the composition of the tribunal but also its functions, which included 
an expanded availability for constitutional review and in particular affecting individual 
freedoms (Fuentes 2006: 21) also known as the “writ of non-applicability” (Couso Salas 
and Coddou MacManus 2010).249 By introducing these changes Lagos and the 
Concertación were hoping to change the rules of the democratic game and the nature of 
its institutions. 
The nature of Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal is similar to that of many  constitutional 
courts around the world which are “typically delegated ‘enormous discretionary 
                                               249 The writ of inapplicability was previously a type of legal action vested in the Supreme Court (Couso Salas and Coddou MacManus 2010). During the 1990s the courts almost systematically refused to take on constitutional review cases against government action (Couso 2004). 
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authority’ to provide a check on government power” (Stone Sweet 2000: 96 cited in 
Carroll and Tiede 2012: 85), often letting them determine the applicability of laws 
according to constitutional principles, which provides them with “quasi-legislative 
functions” (Carroll and Tiede 2012: 85). In fact courts may “aggressively check 
government authority or exercise their accountability function more selectively or 
deferentially” (Scribner 2010: 73). As explained by Scribner: 
The TC is a quintessential agent of horizontal accountability – its purpose is to 
resolve constitutional conflicts regarding the limits of legislation and executive 
power and, until constitutional reforms in 2005, its jurisdiction was accessed 
exclusively by the other branches of power. (2010: 73) 
Therefore a new power of the TC was to accept cases presented by citizens, leading one 
to expect some expansion of constitutional rights via review. These new powers 
together with the previously granted power for pre-emptive control of bills and decrees, 
granted the TC strongly controlled power in constitutional supremacy cases (Couso 
Salas and Coddou MacManus 2010). This should have represented a departure from the 
historical tendency of the courts to retreat from using its constitutional review powers 
and contribute more to building democracy and upholding human rights. Couso has 
warned, however, that the presence of a “consolidated democracy, constitutes a 
necessary condition for the proper introduction of judicial review” (2004: 89) 
confirming in this way that the judicialisation of politics might not always be positive 
for democracy if the right conditions are not given (Sieder et al. 2005: 2). 
Recently it has been argued that the TC de facto has legislative power and that its 
rulings are final, so that neither Congress nor the President can reverse its decisions, 
presenting serious challenges to the Chilean democratic regime (Mac-clure 2011: 172). 
In her analysis of the doctrine of the Constitutional Tribunal through its rulings between 
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1990 and 2005, Scribner highlights how “the TC has shifted the balance of power in the 
policy-making process and augmented its influence within the political system” (2010: 
71). Scribner’s analysis is centred on conflicts affecting the separation of powers within 
the state, also known as “law vs. decree controversies” (2010: 73). Scribner explains 
that “[t]hese cases concern the reach of presidential decree power and are referred to the 
TC by legislators (primarily by opposition parties)” and “constitutional conflicts are 
undeniably political as policy disputes (usually economic) are judicialized and elevated 
to fundamental constitutional questions about the separation of powers” (2010: 73). 
Moreover “law vs. decree referrals feature starkly competing constitutional 
interpretations of legislative authority (law making power) and executive authority 
(decree-making power)” (2010: 73). 
Accepting a case of law vs. decree for constitutional review is therefore a political 
decision. After the reforms of 2005 it had to be expected that the right-wing and 
conservative opposition would use this form of judicial challenge with political ends 
more frequently, since the reforms included the elimination of another key institution of 
the post-authoritarian legacy – the designated senators, whose designation by the 
leaving military regime: 
… gave the political heirs of the regime control over the senate, which forced the 
new democratic government (la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia to 
negotiate every piece of legislation it wanted to pass with the opposition. (Couso 
2011: 1534) 
As Couso (2011) explains, this is why the TC showed “deference” to the other political 
and elected powers for so long, making it unnecessary for the opposition to seek 
favourable judicial adjudication to win political disputes. After 2005 then, the TC 
increased its political power due to its a posteriori control of the constitutionality of 
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legislation while many of its judges remained close to the military regime legacy and 
the Catholic Church (see Table 1 below).In Chile after the reforms of 2005, the TC 
increased its members from seven to 10.250 All judges are appointed and cannot be 
removed during their terms. Officially the TC is not accountable to anyone. According 
to the Constitution the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed in the 
following manner: three by the President; three by the Supreme Court (from its own 
judges); two by the Senate; and two others by the Senate but nominated by Parliament. 
They are nominated for nine years. Hence out of 10, only four members are scrutinised 
publicly and appointed by elected bodies. The other six members remain at the 
discretion of the president who, albeit elected, takes a personal political decision in the 
appointments. The TC that reviewed the EC policy, since the case was brought to the 
court in 2006 and the constitutional reforms had been approved in 2005, included some 
members that had been appointed prior to the reforms, as shown in Table 1 below. 
  
                                               250 Before the 2005 reforms the composition was: three appointees by the Supreme Court; one by the President; one by the Senate; and two by the National Security Council.  
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Table 1: Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal ruling on EC case 
Names Year Appointed by: 
Enrique Navarro Beltrán 
 2006-2012  Supreme Court 
Francisco Fernández Fredes 
 2006-2015  Supreme Court 
Hernán Vodanovic Schnake 
 2006-2015  Senate 
Jorge Correa Sutil 
 2006-2009 President (Lagos) 
José Luis Cea Egaña 
 2002-2010  National Security Council 
Juan Colombo Campbell 
 2005-2010  National Security Council 
Marcelo Venegas Palacios 
 2006-2013  Senate 
Mario Fernández Baeza 
 2006-2011  Senate 
Marisol Peña Torres 2006-2009 (and 2009-2016) 
 Supreme Court 
Raúl Bertelsen Repetto 2006-2015 (and 1997-2005)  Senate 
 
Most judges were appointed in 2006 or ratified in their positions that year, with two of 
them named before 2006. Their profiles came to the attention of the public as the EC 
controversy became the centre of attention of the media and public opinion. In the 
middle of the controversy the conservative newspaper El Mercurio published a report 
with the biographies of the judges showing the strong presence of conservatives among 
them (El Mercurio 2006) (see Table 2 below).  
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Table 2: Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal 2006-2009 
 José Luis Cea was Professor of Law at the Pontifical Catholic University, close to the 
Christian Democratic Party and was well known for being close to Catholic organisations. 
 Raúl Bertelsen was the former Dean of the Opus Dei Universidad de Los Andes, and 
was closely involved in the writing of the 1980 Constitution. He was also well known for 
being a member of the Opus Dei and having close ties with the extreme-right party UDI. 
 Juan Colombo Campbell was Professor of Law at Universidad the Chile and had been 
working at the TC since 1980 as a lawyer, and was eventually appointed by the National 
Security Council. 
 Jorge Correa, former Christian Democrat and law scholar on the other hand was named 
by Ricardo Lagos after serving as Sub-secretary of the Interior. 
 Francisco Fernández was a former member of the Socialist Party, which he renounced 
to become judge at the TC. 
 Mario Fernández, another former Christian Democrat who renounced his militancy after 
serving as Minister of Defense of Ricardo Lagos, well known for his Catholic beliefs and 
ties within the DC. 
 Enrique Navarro had family ties with the Supreme Court and was the sibling of a former 
Sub-secretary of Justice of the military regime. 
 Marisol Peña, the only female member, was also a Law Professor at the Pontifical 
Catholic University with close ties to the military institutions with whom she worked 
closely on defense issues. 
 Marcelo Venegas was close to the most conservative leaders of Renovación Nacional 
and part of the right-wing thinktank Instituto Libertad. He had also worked in the 
Pinochet government. 
 Hernán Vodanovic, a former socialist senator, with long militancy in the PS, but also 
with close friendships with DC leaders.  
 
Table 2 shows that in this male-dominated TC the presence of conservative values was 
obvious though the profile of most its members, with the exception of the few socialist 
sympathisers. In fact the appointment of the conservative judge Bertelsen was the result 
of negotiations at the end of the Lagos administration to secure the appointment of 
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Vodanovic, a socialist (Muñoz León 2014: 154). Yet it is in the process dealing with the 
constitutional accusation against Bachelet that it can be seen how this conservative 
influence manifested itself in the actions of the tribunal. 
EC is back: “Caution” is the new name of the game 
In March 2006, only two weeks after Michelle Bachelet had officially assumed the 
presidency, Barría, the Minister of Health, announced the government’s intention to 
ensure the universal distribution of the EC in line with their electoral promises and 
government plan. The main argument used to justify the move was the need to fight the 
socio-economic inequity in the access to the drug. In order to explain the government’s 
motivation and reaffirm their stance, the Minister declared, “this is not a values’ issue. 
The pill is not abortive and is already being sold in pharmacies” (La Nación 2006b). 
The announcement happened exactly one year after Dr Infante was sacked by Lagos 
after his declaration regarding the free distribution of EC in 2005 (see Ch. 7). Initially, 
there was a confusing reaction by the President’s cabinet who acted as if Barría’s 
announcement had taken them by surprise. The Minister Secretary General, Lagos 
Weber, called Barría to a meeting and just five hours after the first announcement they 
both called a press conference where she de facto retracted from the earlier 
announcement, saying that although the distribution of EC was in the President’s 
agenda as well as in her government’s programme there was no set timeframe yet to 
implement the policy because it was not the main priority (La Tercera 2006c). 
Barría insisted that she was not retracting from the announcement, and Lagos Weber 
supported this position clarifying that the EC distribution policy would not be 
implemented in the short term since Bachelet’s government had other public health 
policy priorities (Radio Cooperativa 2006b). The government thus felt the need to 
257 
reaffirm its commitment to the “consensus rule” presumably to reassure the PDC, and 
through its speaker declared: 
All the projects that we will send will come out of the government’s programme. 
But, also, we will insure that these do not affect in any way the essence of any of 
the political parties within Concertación. (Yañez 2006) 
This episode illustrates the existing tensions within the governing coalition and the 
careful approach the government was taking in moving forward on the EC policy. 
Lagos Weber and Barría knew that the most conservative factions within the 
Concertación – probably the PDC under the Catholic Church’s influence – were 
watching and could oppose the policy. Some sectors of the media close to conservative 
institutions targeted public officials to hold them accountable for their commitment to 
the consensus in front of the public. Barría explained that as soon as she was appointed 
Minister “the first thing that appeared in the press was a challenge to me for being, it 
did not say abortionist, but supporter of abortion. I was leaving on vacation when a 
journalist from an important newspaper called me to ask about the abortion issue… a 
real harassment… wherever I went!”251 
Therefore any faux pas could put a halt to the EC distribution by MINSAL, which 
represented a high political cost in the early weeks of the Bachelet government.252 In 
fact in the first months of the administration the government announced a significant 
number of new initiatives potentially making the government more cautious in the way 
it handled public communications.253 Bachelet’s government wanted to avoid any 
                                               251 Op. cit. 76. 252 Ibid.  253 Bachelet had made some announcements on the rise of pensions and the government did not want any distractions or polemic issues on the public agenda that could provide the opposition with arguments to provoke a crisis (La Tercera 2006c).  
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scandal that could upset the Church, which was a key ally on social policy issues high 
on Bachelet’s agenda (La Tercera 2006c). 
This cautious “step-by-step” approach with the media was a way for the President’s 
cabinet to protect Barría as well as the EC policy,254 showing a coordinated action 
between the executive’s branches from the beginning. Barría, Díaz and Albornoz all 
agreed that the President trusted and delegated this work to her ministers.255 Albornoz 
highlighted that “the President was involved in the debate and was concerned by the 
evolution of the debate on the pill, and she directly did follow-up on these issues”,256 
while Barría explained that Bachelet “knew about the announcement” and “she never 
had a doubt about this”: 
It had been discussed by the government… and she was so worried about the 
administrative procedures’ issue because she had been Minister of Health too and 
they mattered to her. She was always supporting us and present… Absolutely 
committed, completely!257 
Civil society actors, in particular feminists and the biomedical groups, were all 
optimistic since the Norms were part of the President’s programme. Díaz declared once 
she became elected President Bachelet told her “give me a hundred days and the norms 
will be out!”258 
Despite the careful steps taken by the government, the expected ferocious opposition by 
the conservative forces quickly emerged. The reactions in the newspaper were 
immediate both in favour and against EC. For the following week EC was constantly in 
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the press. El Mercurio published a report on Bachelet and her initiatives entitled “The 
Revenge of Doctor Bachelet” in its weekend edition, stating: 
Since she became Minister of Health, two obsessions wandered in the mind of 
Michelle Bachelet: distributing massively the “morning-after pill” and regulating 
the so-called “dignified death”. These were the proposals that the doctor tried to 
include as priorities in the health policy agenda of President Lagos. (Sierra and 
Hola 2006). 
This report not only singled out Bachelet for pushing forward a personal agenda, it also 
emphasised the way in which Bachelet was not as cautious as Lagos in trying to avoid 
clashes with the Church. The newspaper sustained that with the way having been 
“paved” by her liberal predecessor; she could now push a whole agenda on issues not 
addressed under the previous administration (Sierra and Hola 2006). Thus, via the press, 
the conservative lobby was sending a warning to the government not to ignore the 
sacrosanct rule of consensus dictating Chilean politics that favoured their value system 
through the prevailing gender regime in place. 
EC on the bench 
The strategic initial retraction by Minister Barría on the EC policy proved effective in 
avoiding attracting attention or public opposition to the government’s work on EC for 
the first semester of 2006. This allowed Barría on 1 September to make public her 
decision to officially promulgate the Normas Nacionales sobre Regulación de la 
Fertilidad (Norms) via Resolución Exenta No 584 del Ministerio de Salud. 
The framing of the policy 
Htun and Weldon (2010) have argued that policy change is determined by the nature of 
an issue more than its framing. They argue that the more doctrinal and class-based the 
issues are the more opposition they will face, and the success or failure of actors’ 
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strategies is shaped by the political and institutional environment in a policy change 
initiative takes place. 
Following this classification EC seemed to be a particularly challenging issue because 
its links to the abortion debate made it doctrinal, and since it required the funding from 
the state for its distribution free of cost through the health system, it was also a class-
based issue. 
Indeed, the Fertility Norms and the distribution of EC were presented from the 
beginning as a public health priority. Barría declared to the press that at the centre of 
this argument one found a health policy concerned with the impact of teenage 
pregnancy that disproportionately affects the lives of poorer young women and girls (La 
Tercera 2006d, 2006e). MINSAL statistics showed “the inequality in the access 
between municipalites” and that a great number of new pregnancies in Chile were 
happening to girls and young women below 20 years old. Girls from wealthier 
backgrounds had disproportionate access to EC compared to girls in more deprived 
areas of the capital: 
… We had a brutal inequality in teenage pregnancy, out of 100 pregnant women, 
20.3 were below 20 years old in the Pintana, and only 2.3 in Vitacura. And every 
year another 35,000 young girls became pregnant. 35,000! A whole city!259 
Therefore Minister Barría and the President’s cabinet working with a clear 
understanding of the gender differentiated impact of this health policy established a 
clear communication strategy in which the defence of the Norms and the inclusion of 
EC for all women above 14-years old were to be understood as a measure to tackle 
inequality. For Barría this was also a way to defend the capacity of the decision of 
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women.260 This line of argument was adopted as the official communication message 
within government and the President’s cabinet, and SERNAM followed the same line of 
defence.261 
However, with the legal challenge at the Constitutional Tribunal new lines of 
argumentation appeared. The opposition’s focus on refuting adolescents’ right to access 
EC and their right to confidentiality in health services contained in the Norms, shifted 
the focus to the alleged abortive effect of EC, reframing the issue as highly doctrinal. 
This put the government in a defensive position where they suddenly had to justify that 
EC was not abortive, rather than the petitioners proving that it was. The new framing 
used at the TC favoured the conservative agenda, threatening the progressive health 
policy views of the government. 
More importantly this had the effect of displacing any arguments regarding women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights or the impact of the policy on the women affected by it. 
This partly explains the gender-blind approach of the constitutional review made 
evident by the reticence of judges and lawyers to uphold women’s reproductive rights 
and the deliberate decision to not refer to the existing body of international and regional 
legal instruments available. The debate at the TC was quickly reduced to scientific and 
technical debates in the hands of lawyers and doctors while feminist groups were 
excluded ab initio. 
The constitutional review had one additional key concern for the government’s defence 
team, which was that this constitutional review challenge was weakening the state’s 
historic capacity to dictate and implement health policies through the legislative 
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prerogatives of the executive such as a resolución exenta.262 Francisco Díaz, who then 
worked at SEGPRES, emphasised that the decision was “first to defend the MINSAL’s 
prerogative to dictate these type of norms”, to “have the flexibility to regulate the 
different matters of public health through decrees” and thus “there is a decision [by the 
government] to protect itself”. And “second you have the firm decision by the President 
and MINSAL to continue to promote the morning-after pill” knowing that if they lost 
they “would push through other means”.263 
Barría confirmed this organisational perspective, explaining that “for us as public health 
institution this was complicated”.264 The government thus had a double reason to fight 
at the TC, but gave priority in the court case to its power to make public policies over 
other aspects because they knew they could promote EC through other means. Although 
in line with the historic role played by public health authorities in the country, this 
reasoning from a state’s perspective caused much tension with civil society’s SRHR 
advocates who felt women’s rights were not on the government’s agenda, affecting the 
work carried out in alliance to defend EC. 
2006: The first petition to the Constitutional Tribunal 
Despite their success under Lagos in pressuring pharmaceutical companies to withdraw 
from the market, the conservative lobby decided to plan for a new legal action to stop 
the effective distribution of EC by the state. This was motivated, according to Lawyer 
R, by their perception that since the Supreme Court’s ruling, there had been a “void of 
power and political influence on the issue within political parties” who had no longer 
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been involved with EC anymore thus allowing the government to carry on working on 
the Norms.265 
The resolución exenta (exempt resolution), the legal administrative measure used by the 
government, was supposed to allow MINSAL to implement a public policy and be 
exempt from the overview by the Contraloría, the institution in charge of checking that 
all state actions comply with the constitution and laws of the country. Exempt 
resolutions have been historically used by MINSAL to promote its public policies, in 
particular reproductive health policies since the 1960s.266 Yet this time it was at the 
centre of a judicial dispute between the legislative and the executive in a good example 
of constitutional review of a decree by the TC. 
According to its mandate, the TC could not consider a dispute over a “technical norm” 
unless requested by a quarter of the Parliament members or the President during the 
legislative process or days after a norm had been approved (Mac-clure 2011: 180). This 
is why in September 2006, and at the request of 31 members of Parliament267 mobilised 
by conservative Deputy José Antonio Kast (UDI), the TC accepted the petition to look 
into the matter after a divided decision vote (six-to-four), stating their concern with the 
substance of the resolución exenta (Casas Becerra 2008: 22). 
For Lawyer G, the TC’s decision to accept to review the case was “an ideological 
decision” because they “wanted to engage with the heart of the matter”.268 Yet Judge F 
justified the TC’s decision based on the fact that the resolución exenta had the potential 
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to affect constitutional rights – such as the right of parents to educate their children and 
the right to life – which is what the conservative lobby argued. Deliberately ignoring the 
historic use of exempt resolutions in health policies he argued that the government’s 
motivations behind using a resolución exenta was strategic since the “constitution does 
not allow the Constitutional Tribunal to deal with ‘resolutions’. It has to deal with 
decrees”. He added, “you can try to disguise a law as a decree but it will be a law. And 
the Tribunal decided that it could deal with the issue”.269 
Thus, the TC argued the content was equivalent to that of a bill. In this way the TC was 
able to legally justify its intervention and de facto put a halt to the implementation of 
the Norms and the distribution of EC, showing the real political power and motivation 
of the tribunal. The government therefore was given no option but to obtain a 
presidential decree. 
The role of judges and their beliefs 
During both this first judicial episode at the TC against the resolución and the following 
episode dealing with the Decreto, the role and beliefs of the judges became visibly 
important to the way the judges ruled and their decisions could affect the outcomes of a 
constitutional review. This conflictive situation caught the attention of the press, 
scholars and actors involved in the policy. The pro-EC camp denounced irregularities 
regarding the procedures of the tribunal, including the judges’s partiality and the 
application of personal beliefs in their ruling.270 
Judge F deliberately ignored the fact that the resolución exenta was the administrative 
procedure historically used by MINSAL for its policies, and insisted on a political 
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reading of its use as a strategy by the government to avoid public scrutiny and pass the 
Fertility Norms in a low-profile manner.271 Arguably, Judge F was right in that 
MINSAL wanted to pre-empt any possible destabilising measure to the announcement 
considering the aggressive reaction the policy to distribute EC had prompted only a few 
months before, yet the use of the resolución according to both Soledad Barría and 
Francisco Díaz remained MINSAL’s regular channel to launch any set of new norms272 
since the “law grants MINSAL the capacity to regulate the different health policies via 
decrees”.273 
Judge F acknowledged that the use of the resolución annoyed him on a personal level 
because he considered that the government should have sent a bill to Parliament to 
discuss the issue: 
… I have been part of the Concertación’s DNA since its creation. So this is what 
really annoyed me! […] It was said here that this is an essential issue for the 
women of Chile and the poor. Well then, why wasn’t this same claim not 
expressed in the means chosen to resolve the matter? […] [the government chose] 
a clandestine way […] this norm was inserted in the middle of an enormous 
booklet...274 
The anger of Judge F was evident. He felt the government was trying to do things in an 
underhanded way, which he considered unacceptable. Yet his views on the EC case 
seemed to result more from his personal convictions. He openly declared himself a 
practicing Catholic who applied his faith to all the spheres of his life and in particular 
his work, and this included EC: 
… in relation to our dilemma […] I opted for a pro-life criteria, pro-human, my 
criteria was pro-life. […] So here I’d rather put up with all I have to endure but not 
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let a baby get killed. […] That is my point! Do not kill a baby. Because I have that 
obligation, the Constitution orders she has to be protected.275 
The importance of religious beliefs and the close relationship of some judges with 
institutions linked to the Catholic Church was a recurrent issue during the constitutional 
case at the TC, especially during the second accusation. 
2007: Bachelet and the Decreto Supremo 
The ruling of the TC on 14 January 2007 was a defeat for MINSAL. The TC ruled that 
the government needed to issue a Decreto Supremo or “Supreme Decree” if the Fertility 
Norms were to be approved. For this Minister Barría needed the President’s signature, 
which required Bachelet to put all her political power and commitment behind the issue. 
That same day the government announced its intentions to send a Decreto Supremo. 
Barría emphasised that the President “was strongly committed to the issue. Immediately 
she took the decision when the ruling was announced that a decree had to be sent, 
within half an hour she announced the decree”.276 
The move was immediately qualified as being the result of “the ideology of 
confrontation” or the wilful behaviour of government (capricho) by the right-wing 
opposition (Solinas 2007) who threatened to challenge the decree at the TC if this 
happened. 
Meanwhile the announcement was received as proof of Bachelet’s courage and 
commitment by civil society and her Ministers, who during the interviews conducted as 
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part of this research affirmed that she “went for it” (“La Michelle se la jugó”),277 
confirming once again the President’s unconditional support for EC. As explained by 
Schiappacasse: 
… regarding the Norms, the president went for it. She signed a Supreme Decree, 
she fought at the TC. Maybe she did not choose the best lawyers, the best 
advisors… But she went for it.278 
For Barría this was particularly true because “for governments, constitutional 
accusations are not just another accusation”. And in this case, the constitutional 
challenge: 
… was a complex issue from a health policy perspective […] health policies had 
always been adopted via resolutions by the ministry and not through laws. So the 
fact that the tribunal said that from now on these had to be done through law 
decrees, which have a different logic, makes the work of the Ministry of Health 
more difficult.279 
Bachelet signed the Decreto Supremo Reglamentario No48/2007 del Ministerio de 
Salud on 30 January, starting the second phase of the judicial battle in front of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
The new petition 
In order to request the Constitutional Tribunal to review the constitutionality of the 
Decreto Supremo the conservative lobby needed once more the signatures of at least 
one third of the members of Parliament. It was José Antonio Kast (see App. 6), member 
of the UDI and a well-known member of the elite Catholic movement Schoenstatt, who 
took the lead in Parliament and collected the signatures of 36 of his fellow MPs. The 
                                               277 Op. cit. 25, 76, 81, 110, 254: “se la jugó” is an expression meaning “she went for it” despite the opposition and risks.  278 Op. cit. 81.  279 Op. cit. 76. 
268 
signatures included 33 male and three female MPs, most of them members of the far-
right UDI but also some RN members (see App. 6). 
A key difference between the 2006 petition and this challenge was that this time the 
conservative forces made public a clear agenda against SRHR and not only EC. The 
anti-SRHR agenda was visible in the extension of the legal challenge to other 
contraception methods besides EC (Casas 2008: 22), to include IUDs (intrauterine 
devices using copper or levonorgestrel), as well as most common hormonal 
contraception containing levonorgestrel that could allow the use of the “Yuzpe 
Method”.280 If successful the petition would ban 75% of the most common 
contraceptive methods used by the majority of Chilean women. The petitioners also 
questioned the capacity of medical professionals to provide the adequate counselling 
and contraception services to youth without the consent of their parents (Casas 2008: 
23), challenging the sexual and reproductive rights of adolescents. 
The petitioners’ demand had three main components: 
1. to declare hormonal contraception and IUDs unconstitutional for having an 
abortive effect based on the presence of its levonorgestrel component; 
2. to declare the government’s policy to distribute EC to adolescents 
unconstitutional because it was challenging parents’ preferential right and duty 
to educate their children; and 
3. to recognise that EC has an abortive effect and violates the constitutional right to 
life, making the Fertility Norms unconstitutional too. 
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Acccording to Judge F, of the three above-mentioned grounds for the accusation, the TC 
immediately decided it would only consider the third for constitutional revision. The 
first was not accepted because the contraceptive methods included in the demand had 
been authorised 40 years ago and the TC would not review a sentence that had already 
been passed. As for the right to education the TC ruled that the Norms did not interfere 
with parent’s choices on how to educate their children nor did they limit their right to do 
so.281 The TC therefore decided to centre all its attention on the alleged accusation of 
“violation to the right to life”.282 
An important aspect of this new legal challenge at the TC is that this was “one of the 
first cases in which the Constitutional Tribunal opened its doors to civil society” both in 
favour and against the pill who although “technically not official part of the case [they] 
attended the hearings”.283 
Indeed in an “unprecedented manner, several organisations and women requested to be 
part of the case” (Casas Becerra 2008: 23). Yet in the case of feminist organisations the 
“Tribunal did not grant these petitioners the status of party”, making their participation 
very difficult while mostly experts’ opinions were favoured during the hearings. Casas 
explains that the tribunal listened “to presentations and defence statements by members 
of Congress in favour of the National Norms” and “physicians also presented scientific 
evidence in favour and against the legal claim (2008: 23). This exclusion represented a 
great blow for feminists who felt distanced from the legal process and defence of EC. 
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The TC accepts to review the Supreme Decree 
Referring to Bachelet’s decision to go ahead via Decreto Supremo, Judge F sustained 
that the government “by sending the decree the government knew it would be 
challenged” because “the resolution had already been contested”. And although the 
decree could not be declared unconstitutional by the Contraloría, it could now be legally 
reviewed by the TC, giving a new opportunity to the opposition to impeach Bachelet’s 
decision. This is something the conservative lobby had also counted on. Judge F 
considered the government was “trying to spark a conflict” because it “felt it could win 
since it had popular support”: 
… they throw this knowing this will cause a conflict […] via the media, not a 
judicial one […] After all, what were we [the TC judges] accused of?: ‘these 
gentlemen are meddling with the bedroom affairs of the Chilean citizens’.284 
As explained by lawyer G, the legal defence team of SEGPRES saw the tribunal’s 
decision as a political move since the TC: 
… requested that we promulgated the supreme decree but it did not request that we 
modify the content, it requested to modify the legal instrument. Yet, the Tribunal 
declared itself competent to review it. […] It wanted to engage with the content.285 
Aware of this the executive decided to carry on, counting on the fact that the President 
gave all her support and all the Ministers involved were coordinated legally. Albornoz 
praised the “determination of President Bachelet not to step down from the issue”, 
adding: 
… the President was able to manifest in an explicit manner the government’s 
wishes […] we had a presidential cabinet in favour, but also the explicit wishes of 
                                               284 Judge F, op. cit. 67. 285 Op. cit. 267.  
271 
the President to at least guarantee this right, or these norms to ensure the state 
could comply with its obligation.286 
Bachelet’s former advisor, Francisco Díaz, and former ministers, Soledad Barría 
(MINSAL) and Laura Albornoz (SERNAM), all agreed that the government had a legal 
strategy that considered the implications and possible outcomes each legal step could 
have politically.287 Barría explained: 
…when these things of so much relevance happen a government creates possible 
scenarios. You work on these things […] in fact the [Supreme] decree came out 
very fast […] because we worked with different scenarios.288 
The government also knew that there was increasing popular support as the court case 
evolved and the media kept giving it coverage. Díaz sustained: 
We knew the opposition would be strong. But we had a double feeling: first that 
this was correct […] on the other hand there was the political consideration that the 
majority of the citizens were in favour of the morning-after pill. Therefore we 
could not allow ourselves to be captive of maybe respectable but conservative 
positions by some organised groups. Thus, we made the decision to move forward, 
and confront people from our own coalition.289 
Both sides therefore carried out similar political calculus, counting on specific judges as 
possible allies within the TC. Once the TC accepted the new petition by the 
conservative lobby the position of each judge on the matter was quickly established, or 
as Lawyer P explained: “It was clear who would vote in favour and who would vote 
against it.”290 A majority of the judges were against EC leaving those holding more 
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progressive and moderate opinions on the policy in the minority to establish a fair 
debate.291 
Although the TC’s decision to focus on determining whether EC was abortive or not 
confirmed the presence of strong champions of natural law constitutionalism within the 
TC wanting to uphold the teachings of the Catholic Church, in particular its pro-life 
stance (Muñoz León 2014: 133), it also opened up a space to review scientific evidence, 
which was perceived by the more centrist judges as a chance to express more moderate 
views and influence a final vote.292 
This interestingly was a good mirror of the “consensual” politics present in the political 
arena. By looking at the composition of the TC and the profile of its judges (see Tables 
1 and 2 above) one sees that the former party members of the PDC and PS were 
outnumbered by the more categorical pro-life opinions among their peers. 
The recusals’ controversy 
One of the first great causes of concern for the pro-EC lobby was the uncertainty of 
counting on impartial judges to ensure proper procedure of the judicial process, which 
could subsequently affect the outcome. The TC rules establish that if any of the 
ministers has previously emitted a legal opinion publicly or ruled on the matter 
submitted for discussion, and considers his impartiality could be affected, the judge 
must inform the rest of the tribunal, at which point it is up to the rest of the ministers to 
decide on the need to disqualify the minister or not – a process known as “implicancia” 
(Tribunal Constitucional n.d.). 
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This is why the government, a group of Concertación senators and the SRHR lobby 
argued in favour of disqualifying two of its ministers, Bertelsen and Navarro (Casas 
2007; La Nación 2008c). Both judges were accused of having previously issued their 
opinions on the EC matter. Bertelsen, the former head of ULA, together with Navarro 
had worked on an amicus brief on EC presented by AGES during the judicial process on 
the legality of EC in 2004. As indicated by Muñoz León, the “amicus was highly 
partisan, describing the distribution of the pill as ‘an assault on the Constitution’” 
(Muñoz León 2014: 153). 
While Navarro acknowledged there might have been grounds to disqualify him, 
Bertelsen did not and reaffirmed his belief that he could be impartial leaving the final 
decision in the hands of the tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional 2007). The TC decided to 
accept Navarro’s auto-withdrawal, but considered that Bertelsen was qualified to remain 
part of the tribunal in this case (El Mostrador 2008; La Nación 2007c; La Tercera 
2008b; Tribunal Constitucional 2007). The decision was the result of a divided vote, 
where Judges Cea, Colombo, Fernández Baeza, Venegas, and Peña refused Bertelsen’s 
recusal, and Correa, Vodanovic and Fernández Fredes voted in favour (La Nación 
2007c; Tribunal Constitucional 2007). 
According to Lawyer P, when the issue first reached the TC “the majority of the 
tribunal wanted to vote against the pill… they knew Bertelsen was a card against the 
pill” and “need him to secure a majority vote”.293 But this was likely also due to the 
profile of Bertelsen who was an influential and renowned scholar with close ties to 
conservative political groups and religious groups, namely the Opus Dei (Muñoz León 
2014: 154). Not only had he helped to draft the Constitution of 1980 but he also had 
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maintained strong political ties that secured his re-appointment to the TC in 2006. As 
argued by Muñoz León, “Bertelsen’s religious and academic affiliations reflect the 
hegemony of natural law constitutionalism in the legal system” (Muñoz León 2014: 
155) and in particular within the post-authoritarian TC the principles emanating from 
the Catholic doctrine. 
The decision sent a terrible message regarding the judges’ impartiality within the TC. 
As Couso argues, the TC having been invisible to the public for so long, this case gave 
the institution a bad reputation since the TC judges are the only judges in the Chilean 
judiciary who cannot be held accountable, while their rulings are unchallengeable; 
consequently they need to maintain an impeccable behaviour to guarantee the 
impartiality principle in the delivery of justice (Expansiva 2008). Not respecting this 
principle has a direct impact on the legitimacy of the sentence (Contesse Singh 
2007: 394). 
Yet, according to Judge F, all legal procedures had been respected since the rules of the 
TC regarding the “implicancia” were clear: first, only the judges affected or members of 
the TC could bring up a case of “implicancia”, leaving any part external to the TC out of 
the debate and decision; secondly, only the TC could decide if a judge’s self-
implication, or nomination by someone else was acceptable.294 According to Judge F, it 
was not the external pressure that brought about the two cases of “implicancia” – 
Navarro came forward on his own and Bertelsen, who denied the accusation, was 
nominated by a fellow-judge he preferred not to mention.295 Judge F argued he did not 
understand why the TC accepted Navarro’s dismissal and not Bertelsen’s. Personally he 
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considered that since the report on which both judges had worked was not the “exact” 
same matter none of the judges should have been disqualified.296 
Although following a logical argument, Judge F was clearly omitting the importance for 
the TC to have a transparent image in the way they proceed and most of all to ensure the 
basic principle of impartiality. If anything, his opinion gave the impression that the TC 
does in fact work in an opaque and hermetic manner, not accepting or taking seriously 
any request by the parts involved, and where the judges are spared from accountability 
regarding the judicial processes they undertake. 
Constitutional justice as a first and last resort 
The second important issue that arose during the pleading Casas made in front of the TC 
was that the TC was accepting to review a case that was clearly linked to the series of 
judicial challenges initiated by the same petitioners in 2001, including some deputies 
(Casas 2007). This was essentially a critique on the use of the TC as a “last resort” 
judicial instance, making the judicial institutions more vulnerable and allowing 
politically motivated cases to bypass the usual rules established within the judicial 
system. But despite her plea, the TC accepted to rule on the petitioner’s demand to 
review the alleged violation to the right to life by the Norms based on EC’s alleged 
abortive effect. 
Together with the cases of “implicancia”, these were not minor issues that mattered only 
for transparency and formal impartiality – it mattered for the results of the sentence due 
to its effect on the political power balance within the TC. Although the tribunal’s judges 
must renounce any political links and affiliations before assuming their position, their 
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political sensitivity is publicly known. It was public information that the tribunal that 
ruled on the Decreto Supremo was composed of six conservative sympathisers 
(Venegas, Bertelsen, Peña, Cea, Colombo and Navarro), two centrists or moderates 
(former PDC members Fernández Baeza and Correa who could vote either way), and 
finally two left-wing/socialist sympathisers (Vodavonic and Fernández Fredes). 
The loss of two votes would have left the conservatives with only four certain votes 
against EC. But with only the loss of Navarro, the TC had nine judges left. This allowed 
the final sentence to be backed by a 5-4 vote where Fernández Baeza in a move that 
took everyone by surprise joined the conservative vote. Because the TC must always 
have clear majority on a final vote for its sentence to be valid, if Bertelsen had been 
excluded then only eight judges would have remained and, according to Judge F, 
without Bertelsen the score would have been a , annulling the case and refusing the 
petitioners’ demand. This would have granted the government and President Bachelet a 
major political victory over the Church and its conservative lobby. 
The conservative lobby and the Constitutional Tribunal 
The new challenge brought to the TC revealed powerful connections the different actors 
had within the anti-EC advocacy coalition. Scholars, politicians and judges within the 
conservative lobby exerted power and influence by working in a coordinated manner 
using the same line of Catholic arguments on the right to life. Yet the relationship 
between these different actors started to experience some tension as the judicial case 
became openly political and the actors were increasingly under the media spotlight. 
The many episodes and processes leading to the decision of the government to send a 
Decreto Supremo was closely followed by Lawyer R who had challenged EC over the 
last decade. He had also helped the deputies who had brought the initial case to the 
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Constitutional Tribunal. This time Lawyer R worked closely with the ultra-conservative 
lawyer Jorge Reyes (see App. 4) who was close to key far-right UDI MPs. Both lawyers 
worked on the petition for the group of Parliamentarians who agreed to challenge the 
Decreto Supremo at the Constitutional Tribunal.297 Yet, during the interviews, Lawyer 
R did not want to appear to be close to Reyes or anybody else for that matter. He 
sustained: 
Sometimes it is better to keep a low profile, and I like to fight battles from the 
trenches […] of course we know each other and we have called each other in 
specific moments but we have not acted in the same instances.298 
Lawyer R insisted that he was moved only by his faith and had no political affiliation. 
He emphasised that he worked “on his own” and “from his own convictions”. For him 
EC was “like a missile. You don’t see who dies […] It’s more massive”.299 
Reyes, who is considered the visible face of the pro-life movement in Chile for the past 
decade also emphasised that he worked independently in the media: 
I do not belong to any movement, only to the Catholic Church, totally lay and 
regular. Not to Fiducia nor Opus nor Acción Familia. I know them, I respect them 
very much, but there are many things in their methodology that we have discussed 
internally and that I do not agree with. […] I have never even joined a political 
party. 
Yet, Lawyer R considered Reyes more of a militant on these issues because Reyes 
maintained a closer relationship with the UDI. He emphasised that politicians, including 
conservative ones, could not be trusted since they were ready to sell their Catholic 
moral principles at any moment for some votes. He criticised both the UDI and PDC 
                                               297 Lawyer R, op. cit. 67. 298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. 
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“because they don’t take a clear stance and they don’t dare to defend the right to life as 
they truly should if they are Christians”.300 
It was Reyes who saw the strategic opportunity to appeal to the TC, as he knew they 
could count on his political links to secure the support of members of Parliament. As 
explained by Lawyer G, the strategy to bring EC to the TC was later used in a crucial 
case against the Bachelet during the controversy of Transantiago.301 Despite its close 
political ties, Reyes also publicly denounced the “unacceptable opportunism” of leaders 
of the UDI who progressively tried to disassociate themselves from the EC case as polls 
showed public opinion to be strongly in favour of its distribution (Aravena B. 2008). 
Lawyer R also explained that, although he had worked with Reyes on the petition for 
the TC, he had questioned Reyes on the necessity to add all the other forms of 
contraception in the request. Lawyer R allegedly “did not consider this necessary” since 
most other methods had been legally approved in the 1960s and were “materia juzgada” 
(a closed case), and from his moral beliefs they represented “less maliciousness”.302 
Reyes motivations were based on the belief that the Fertility Norms were a way to 
promote abortion through contraceptive methods. On the day of the final sentence by 
the TC he declared to the press: 
… we will firmly oppose abortion in Chile… the copper-T is abortive. And if it is 
demonstrated from a medical perspective, we will initiate legal actions against the 
authorities, because they are accomplices of abortion. (La Tercera 2008a) 
                                               300 Ibid. 301 For more on Transantiago and the political implications of the failed implementation of this transportation reform, see Navia (2008). 302 Lawyer R, op. cit. 67. 
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This declaration shares the view held by Judge F who stated that he always saw the EC 
case as a “first step for the debate on the abortion law, whoever becomes president”.303 
The Catholic Church 
The active influence of the Catholic Church on the TC during the whole process against 
EC was clear although not necessarily visible. Its hierarchy played a big role in public 
announcements and in the relation with the media, but it was not officially represented 
in front of the TC. The Church did not need to be directly involved since it could count 
on a wide network of institutions and individuals to make its voice heard. 
Romero and Reyes who led the case, specialists in constitutional law and procedural 
law respectively, as well as the doctors who presented scientific arguments during the 
hearings such as Ventura Juncá and Mena, were linked to the Church’s main academic 
institutions ULA and PUC. Throughout the judicial process the PUC Bioethics Centre 
provided key information to the anti-EC coalition. The Catholic lobby was thus 
prepared and strategically organised and made use of all its ties to the political world 
through the presence of renowned figures from the PDC and UDI,304 such as Patricio 
Zapata (see App. 4) and José Antonio Kast. 
Bishop Chomalí, who was the Catholic Church’s appointee for the EC battle, attended 
some of the tribunal’s hearings as a “guest” of some of the TC judges. This deeply 
annoyed women’ groups and other civil society actors who saw his presence as a direct 
intervention in the legal process but also showed the important role of institutions in the 
process. As explained by Dides: 
                                               303 Judge F, op. cit. 67. 304 Díaz, op. cit. 254. 
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… when we were at the Constitutional Tribunal the three big institutions were in 
front and we had to sit behind, we were the only women. There you had Chomalí 
with his cross: The Church; The lawyers, the Tribunal; Science and the doctors. It 
was not the women seated in front, so that is very symbolic.305 
The acceptance by the TC – or at least of its most conservative members – to review the 
issue, was without any doubt a direct consequence of the Church’s Episcopal 
Declaration that month, which was the most aggressive and harsh in content and 
vocabulary ever published since the return to democracy (Comité Permanente de la 
Conferencia Episcopal de Chile 2006). In it the Catholic Church, through its Cardinal 
and bishops, accused the government of promoting public policies that were 
“reminiscent of the policies established by totalitarian regimes where the State expects 
to regulate the private lives of people according to authoritarian principles lacking any 
consensus” (Comité Permanente 2006). The Church also reminded politicians that it 
was raising its voice in favour of the “dignity of life”, in the same way it had done “at a 
time when the life of political opponents was persecuted and threatened”, referring to 
their support for left-wing politicians during the political persecution of Pinochet’s 
dictatorship (Comité Permanente 2006). 
What could be considered a low blow and aggressive blackmailing by the Church was 
openly divulged via the press and given a wide coverage. This declaration had a direct 
impact on Judge F who emphasised that when he voted against the government he had 
acted according to the principles raised in the Episcopal Declaration.306 
                                               305 Op. cit. 124. 306 Judge F, op. cit. 67. 
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The politicians opposing and supporting EC 
It is difficult to categorise the defence of and opposition to EC according to party lines. 
Not all members of the governing Concertación agreed with its distribution, and many 
key figures of the opposition showed their support. Doctors in particular played a key 
role across parties. 
Although most MPs who were openly against EC came from the opposition they were 
also joined by some members of the Concertación, mostly Christian Democrats linked 
to the Opus Dei or other elite Catholic groups. Many of them were members of the 
“bancada por la vida” (“pro-life benchers”) an alliance between UDI, RN and PRSD, 
DC Parliamentarians. For Deputy Saa (PPD), ally of the feminist movement, this 
organised and concerted space gave these Parliamentarians a strong advantage over 
their more progressive colleagues in Parliament: 
There is a militant conservatism [in civil society] which has its equivalent in 
Parliament […] they manage to form an active group here. And it is not just the 
UDI because you have Deputy Olivares who was Christian Democrat and now is 
part of the PRI, and Deputy Sabag who is a Christian Democrat and belongs to the 
Opus Dei. So you have the creation of a militant group here.307 
These same politicians were also active across key commissions such as the Health or 
Family Commissions where feminist or progressive voices often found themselves in a 
minority when defending initiatives to reintroduce the debate on therapeutic abortion 
but also most matters on sexuality and reproduction. Saa declared, “lately the 
conservatives have appropriated our [family] commission”.308 
                                               307 Interview with María Antonieta Saa (PPD), a well-known feminist politician and member of Parliament, 03.06.09. 308 Ibid.  
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Yet the conservative opposition was not exempt from its own dissensions. Many 
Parliamentarians as well as mayors, mostly from Renovación Nacional (the more liberal 
right-wing party), manifested their disagreement with their coalition and supported the 
government’s initiative with some conditions, but overall broke the ranks from the 
conservative coalition. High profile politicians such as Lily Perez (RN), Osvaldo Palma 
(RN), Karla Rubilar (RN) (La Segunda 2007b), all expressed their liberal views on the 
matter stating that medical reasons were to be taken in consideration, despite the fact 
that “Carlos Larraín the [RN] president is a very conservative person”.309 Palma and 
Rubilar, both of them doctors, made their opinion that EC was not abortive public and 
often joined forces with fellow Concertación deputies as part of the “medical bench”. 
Juan Lobos (UDI) became the most prominent dissension in the conservative camp 
when he came out “publicly as a doctor” to withdraw his signature from the 
conservative petition to the TC which included “all contraception methods, and as a 
doctor he realised this was too much”.310 The case of Lobos caused much controversy 
among the medical establishment in Parliament and the executive, as well as in civil 
society. Barría explained that what surprised her “most about the challenge brought to 
the Constitutional Tribunal” was the “fact that those right-wing deputies who were 
doctors signed without reading”, “they did not know what they were signing and that 
Juan Lobos told me that it was not true he had signed against the IUDs”.311 
Thus the presence of doctors and the importance of medicine as an informal institution 
was key during these debates where doctors were judged by their peers and sanctioned 
for going against scientific evidence and medical ethics. 
                                               309 Ibid. 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid. 
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The reaction of PDC within and outside government 
Alvear – who since her defeat by Bachelet for the presidential race had become the 
PDC’s President – openly opposed the government’s decision to publish the Fertility 
Norms and to distribute EC to teenagers above the age of 14. She declared to the press 
that on this matter she considered that “the government had taken the easy way out” and 
that “she personally would not have liked to see her own kids become sexually active at 
age 14” (La Tercera 2006b), leading her party to publish a harsh declaration that 
contained extremely conservative language, and evidently mirrored the Catholic 
Church’s position on the EC debate. The declaration highlighted that “women’s 
freedom was expressed in the right to take a pregnancy to term”, and emphasised the 
argument on “legitimate doubt” regarding the abortive effect of EC and showed a 
concern with fertility rates in the country (La Nación 2006a). 
This harsh stand by the Christian Democrats was a clear depiction of the deep divisions 
the Concertación and government coalition were suffering between its most 
conservative and most progressive members. PPD and PS politicians came forward 
strongly supporting Bachelet and Barría, making the case for individual freedom and 
equality. Furthermore, those deputies who were doctors by profession and belonging to 
the “medical bench”, came forward together with doctors from the opposition, mostly 
RN, to support EC. This would become more frequent as the judicial battles reached 
key stages, and would contribute to making the divisions on moral grounds within the 
opposition Alianza more visible (La Segunda 2006c). The confrontation through the 
press then became a window for most Parliamentarians to showcase their support to the 
President and her cabinet, but also to publicly position themselves in support of or 
against SRHR. 
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Within government Albornoz, Minister of SERNAM, and Velasco, Minister of the 
Interior, both Christian Democrats, stepped forward in defence of the government’s EC 
policy, openly distancing themselves from their party’s public position. Albornoz said 
the Church’s declaration had to be read and considered with respect, yet “it is the 
government that makes the decisions and has to govern” (La Tercera 2007), while 
Velasco added that “the government does not impose conducts but it gives people 
choices… we have to take responsibility for the reality of our society” (La Tercera 
2006f). There was an obvious attempt by the Bachelet administration to put an end to 
the public display of crossed messages and aggressions on these issues, damaging the 
image of unity of the Concertación. 
The highly ideological confrontation between the government and the Church was 
creating cross-party divisions on these issues. The PDC held its Fifth Ideological 
Congress in 2007 and gender issues, including abortion and the pill were high on the 
agenda. Both topics were brought up by Albornoz, as well as people linked to 
SERNAM and some female members working in grassroots organisations of the 
PDC.312 In the final document there is an explicit approval of the distribution of EC and 
tackling the issue of abortion, yet the language remains conservative and somewhat 
blurry, stating that for the PDC the “defence of life” must “contemplate the 
strengthening of the family and programmes of sexual education”, therefore “the focus 
on abortion is not enough” and “inequality is not resolved exclusively through the 
access without restriction to contraceptive methods” (PDC 2007: 2). Hence, referring to 
the PDC’s support for family planning policies in place since the 1960s, it stated: 
We support the rapid access of women in fertile age to methods that allow them to 
regulate their maternity but, at the same time and without violating the individual 
                                               312 Albornoz, op. cit. 74. 
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conscience of each woman, the progressive diminution in the use of methods that 
could interfere with the embryonic development, such as IUDs and post-coital 
pills. (PDC 2007) 
During this process the youth of the party in particular felt cast aside by the leadership 
and according to Reinoso “there was a debate on the issue and the conclusions were in 
favour of the distribution of the pill”, but Alvear the party leader declared the 
distribution of EC “in the case of adolescents they had to be in company of their 
parents”.313 Aylwin, coordinator of the Congress, confirmed that the discussions in the 
commission working on these issues focused on the “role of parents, and you could find 
very conservative positions” but she thought they “managed to adopt a common 
position and pushed the boundaries”, although the PDC “remains strongly influenced by 
the Church on these issues”.314 
The mayors: Opposition and support for EC at the implementation level 
With health policies being autonomous at the local level in Chile and emergency and 
primary healthcare centres depending on municipalities, mayors became key political 
actors during the court case at the TC from 2006 onwards (Casas 2008: 18-22). From 
early on the press widely covered how EC had become a political symbol for mayors 
belonging to the opposition as well as the Concertación (La Segunda 2006a, 2006g, 
2006h; La Tercera 2006a). The conservative opposition was led by mayors from 
important and populous boroughs of Santiago, as well as from other important cities 
around the country (La Segunda 2006h). Mayors used the press to voice their concerns 
and became vocal in confronting each other in support of or against the government (La 
Segunda 2006f, 2006h; La Tercera 2006a). 
                                               313 Op. cit. 77. 314 Op. cit. 72. 
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Both the opposition and Concertación referred to the use of judicial channels to defend 
their point of view. Deputies from the PPD’s medical bench threatened to bring to court 
municipalities that refused to distribute EC (La Segunda 2006f), while deputies from the 
cross-party medical bench asked to put a halt to “the terror campaign” initiated by some 
mayors and opponents to EC (Cooperativa 2006; La Segunda 2006c). This was a direct 
reaction to the fact that UDI’s Pablo Zalaquett (Mayor of Puente Alto) openly refused to 
distribute EC and, together with Carolina Plaza (Mayor of Huechuraba),315 brought the 
state to court in September 2006. The matter was quickly resolved, but they managed to 
effectively interrupt the distribution of EC by the government (La Segunda 2006d, 
2006e) at a time when the pharmaceutical companies were starting to boycott its sale 
(see Ch. 7). 
The Court of Appeals eventually refused the appeal presented by Pablo Zalaquett (La 
Segunda 2006b). This whole process, however, reveals the political determination and 
confidence these individuals and political actors had, indicating they also felt that they 
were being backed by a strong conservative coalition and media. Most importantly, 
there is an evident overlap of common arguments and tactics as well as division of 
labour in the way the conservative lobby organised itself on different fronts. 
The pro-SRHR lobby and the government’s defence of EC 
The early decision by the Constitutional Tribunal to accept to review the case against 
the Norms, and to not allow women’s groups to be official parts in this process led to 
tension and conflict within the pro-SRHR camp – feminists felt excluded, the 
government decided to focus on the defence of the prerogative of the state to carry out 
                                               315 Both are low-income boroughs of the capital Santiago. 
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public policies, while the SRHR advocates within biomedical NGOs felt the technical 
work fell on their shoulders. 
From the beginning, the legal defence was led by SEGPRES, which as Lawyer G 
explained is the Ministry in charge of “coordinating the legislative and political work of 
all ministries […] and coordinate a political strategy”.316 MINSAL and SERNAM 
therefore reported to SEGPRES, which was responsible for the legal documents of the 
case.317 As the lawyers of the legal division of SEGPRES do not carry out the defence 
statements in court, the work was done by a lawyer hired externally, “Harasic who had 
worked on the the ISP defence”.318 
According to Schiappacasse, the SEGPRES dismissed any offer of help during the first 
petition against the exempt resolution, and concentrated all channels of information and 
legal work.319 According to Casas, the government “never thought they would have to 
litigate” despite the fact that this first chapter at the TC was “the more complex”.320 
Lawyer G explained that although “this case had a particular relevance” because “in the 
long run our concern was that this type of resolutions could not be challenged at the 
Constitutional Tribunal” because “the ministries pass a thousand of these resolutions 
each year” and the government wanted to ensure that “the authority MINSAL has to 
pass such resolutions without the intervention of the Constitutional Tribunal was 
respected”. 321 
                                               316 Op. cit. 268. 317 Ibid.  318 Ibid. 319 Op. cit. 81. 320 Op. cit. 110. 321 Op. cit. 268. 
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The logic of the government and that of the SRHR advocates were therefore very 
different from the outset. Although state lawyers included the argument that “the 
Constitution did not forbid abortion” in the litigation, they had first an institutional 
concern to defend the prerogatives the executive has to carry out public policy, while 
the biomedical groups were concerned with EC itself and the arguments to challenge its 
distribution. For some time the lawyers representing the biomedical groups chased the 
government without success.322 In fact, the biomedical and feminist NGOs working on 
these issues and who participated actively in the MINSAL’s “Consejo consultivo” 
initially couldn’t do more than inquire via the consejo about any progress.323 
After the challenge to the Supreme Decree was presented, Casas analysed the 
composition of the TC and realised that “they had the composition which allowed them 
to win. And two members had to be disqualified” through an accusation for recusal. 
Casas “started ringing persistently the lawyers who were in charge of the defence of this 
case in La Moneda” but “they never returned a single call”.324 She tried personal 
contacts to reach SEGPRES’s Minister Veloso without success. Therefore she called 
Deputy Saa, to inquire about the case, who explained Concertación politicians “had 
instructions from the Minister of Health to let things calm down”.325 
Casas and Díaz decided then to meet with Saa and explain that there was an “active and 
strong strategy of litigation and the case would be lost” unless “progressive members of 
Parliament… took a decision”.326 The biomedical organisation then decided “to lobby 
                                               322 Op. cit. 81, 110. 323 Op. cit. 81. 324 Op. cit. 110. 325 Ibid.  326 Ibid. 
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intensively to speak to Minister Viera Gallo and see what they were doing on the 
defence of EC”.327 
Casas and Díaz were eventually able to meet with the Minister and Head of the Legal 
Department of SEGPRES in a “meeting arranged by Deputy Saa”, where the 
government showed them their “defence document that was almost finished”: 
Soledad looked at it, and she couldn’t believe her eyes, she told them they were not 
presenting properly the biomedical arguments, and told them “you can’t submit 
this, I will look at it and send it back”. 
According to  Schiappacasse, the government’s defence engaged with the debate 
regarding when life and pregnancy start, when it was “very clear [that] here you have no 
foetus, no embryo, nothing!”, and what mattered was arguing that “this is a 
contraceptive method that does not even affect fertilisation” and defending “the action 
mechanism which has been proved by science which was the position sustained by 
ICMER”.328 
After the meeting, government officials saw the urgency to work strategically and in a 
concerted manner. This new legal challenge in front of the Constitutional Tribunal 
brought about a new episode in civil society’s legal and political activism. In order to 
face the complex new challenge the NGOs working in social and biomedical sciences 
created a new working group composed of FLACSO, APROFA and ICMER. A strategy 
to face the legal challenge from civil society was designed, and it was decided that the 
challenge would be tackled through a three-pronged approach involving one lawyer per 
organisation to maximise their impact and representation power and visibility.329 
                                               327 Ibid.  328 Op. cit. 81. 329 Op. cit. 110. 
290 
Furthermore, since the two main issues brought to court were the mechanisms of action 
of EC and the right of parents to determine the access of adolescents to contraception, it 
was agreed ICMER would focus on the hard scientific arguments in favour of EC, with 
Díaz and Croxatto leading on that arena, and APROFA, represented by Casas together 
with Dr Galán, would focus on denouncing the inequity of access to contraception 
methods for adolescents and the violation of their rights (APROFA 2010). 
But as Casas pointed out, as the three NGOs had all been involved in the previous legal 
battles, by then they were running out of energy and lacked funding. Moreover, when 
they most needed some strong backup to keep the morale high, communication with the 
government started failing.330 Despite being at the forefront of the defence of a 
government policy, the working group had trouble accessing the authorities. Casas 
explained they “were not able to have a dialogue with the Minister of Health. We did 
not have access to speak to her. This was very different when Bachelet held that 
position”.331 This was allegedly due to the fact that Minister Barría’s gender advisor, “a 
longstanding member of the feminist movement, who did not think much of these 
technical or biomedical organisations […] stopped the communication channel with the 
Minister”.332 For Casas this was the result of a longstanding rivalry between feminist 
organisations and more technical and biomedical NGOs working on these issues. 
Allegedly, the advisor to the Health Minister like other members of the feminist 
movement disagreed since the early 2000s with Díaz, ICMER, and APROFA’s 
progressive approach to lobby for the reinstatement of the right to abortion by working 
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291 
first on therapeutic abortion.333 This is a position considered not feminist enough by 
some sectors of the feminist movement who consider it as settling for the minimum 
rather than fighting for abortion as a right. Díaz was aware of this tension and argued 
that Chile “in matters of sexual and reproductive rights, faced a stepladder”, thus “we 
must ensure each step”. She added that “strategically I do not believe it is adequate to 
ask for everything because we won’t get it”, thus: 
We must consolidate each stage […] it is a more pragmatic approach, from a 
public health perspective, not only a rights one. If you take a rights’ perspective it 
is everything. But if you take a public health perspective you put priorities in 
context […] this process has taught me that things are much slower, and power is 
exerted in many ways.334 
Gómez pointed at the “intensification of public policies” under Bachelet as a main 
factor of exclusion of women’s organisations.335 But in the case of EC, the nature of the 
policy was also part of the reason why the women’s movement had reacted somewhat 
late. She sustained: 
EC and abortion have been parallel processes. And this caused more problems than 
anything else. The attention required to defend the EC and contraceptive methods 
finally demobilised the abortion issue. It was a cost we accepted responsibility for 
but it was very high.336 
This situation worried Casas and the other SRHR advocates supporting the litigation 
efforts because from their previous experiences defending EC for the last seven years, 
they knew how aggressive the pro-life lobby would be and therefore access to the 
authorities was key. The tension between the NGOs and feminists or women’s 
organisations would not decrease since while the legal process in front of the TC was 
                                               333 Ibid. 334 Op. cit. 64. 335 Op. cit. 122. 336 Ibid.  
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taking place feminist and women’s organisations were perceived as being very slow to 
react and provide support to the working group doing the legal work. 
Casas, Schiappacasse and Dides all agreed how late feminists came on board during the 
judicial battles. Casas explained that “during the series of hearings at the TC there was 
no visible mobilisation outside the court”: 
… the women’s movement was so absent that […] the second day we presented, 
Monseñor Chomalí [the Bishop] was sat in the first row looking at all the Ministers 
with his huge crucifix. And outside you see no one […] feminist organisations did 
not realise the magnitude of what was coming. And only when it [the sentence] 
becomes imminent [...] they organise this massive thing that culminates with the 
march of around ten thousand people.”337 
The leaders of the feminist movement acknowledged this but tried to justify it 
explaining their lack of resources and limited numbers, both problems affecting their 
capacity to mobilise. As explained by Gómez, “the lack of leadership in the women’s 
movement and the lack of resources made the movement be reactive”.338 
They also pointed at the government’s own absence in explaining to the public and 
women what was at stake if the EC was banned by the TC. Despite the request from 
feminists to create a public awareness campaign the government remained silent, and 
feminist organisations felt that this responsibility was thrown at them. Gloria Maira 
argued “it was left to us, as usual”, in the beginning it was hard because “we were five 
or 10, and we were doing this information work face-to-face with pamphlets [and] 
people looked at us as if we were crazy!”: 
… we started mobilising in front of the Constitutional Tribunal. The first day there 
were five of us, the second day ten, then twenty and this was like a snowball until 
                                               337 Op. cit. 110.  338 Op. cit. 122. 
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we closed the street [in front of the TC], there were three hundred of us by then… 
what changed was the public outrage about this.339 
In the meantime, government officials had been working on their own without 
communicating clearly with civil society about their intentions. According to Casas, 
who openly complained about the governments’ lack of transparency, the government’s 
lawyers did not count on the necessary knowledge on SRHR to defend EC. Dides 
argued that the government “lacked seriousness” and “the lawyers had no idea of these 
issues, they even used arguments in line with pro-life groups”. Thus the SRHR 
advocates “felt very little support at the Constitutional Tribunal by the government and 
the Concertación”.340 
Therefore, it was not until civil society was able to have access to the documents that 
they rectified much of the content, adding progressive language including references to 
international legal instruments protecting SRHR.341 Casas argued that communication 
with the government’s lawyers improved in the last steps of the judicial procedure, 
during public hearings in front of the TC.342 
The frustration of the biomedical institutions is understandable, especially because they 
had technical knowledge that gave them a strong advantage over the women’s 
movement and the more activist discourse to advocate on these issues. On the other 
hand, NGO lawyers had strong legal expertise on the issue within national and 
international frameworks that could prove challenging for the government’s lawyers. 
Moreover, because they had been involved with the Norms since its beginnings, the 
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NGOs held a valuable amount of accumulated knowledge on the arguments and tactics 
that were likely to be used against them. 
The feminist movement also felt some level of detachment from biomedical NGOs 
dating from the 90s when they worked together on the SRHR Bill and had many 
differences of opinions. As discussed in Ch. 6, this led to biomedical NGOs focusing 
more on gradual reforms while politically lobbying using their technical skills, 
especially within MINSAL, where there is a history of collaboration. They opted for 
specialising in these issues beyond simple advocacy work.343 Feminists on the other 
hand had preferred their relation and historic link with SERNAM to push their agenda, 
despite often facing barriers and disappointments. 
However, because the feminist movement arguably saw EC initially as a distraction 
from the work on abortion, they were late to get on board. Leaders of the feminist 
movement openly complained referring to the way in which work on the SRHR Bill had 
never received the promised support of Bachelet’s administration. As Gómez explained: 
… it is an undeniable fact that the SRHR bill is in the programme of the Bachelet 
government. […] we feel betrayed because the Bachelet government was a hope, it 
raised expectations among women’s organisations. And many issues have been 
resolved positively it is true, in particular around labour issued, which is where you 
see more advances, issues such as crèches, nurseries...all less controversial of 
course!344 
Despite the lack of direct involvement in the legal process, the women’s movement and 
feminist organisations would play a crucial role in the mass demonstration after the 
TC’s sentence in 2008.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the judicial process and political confrontation that took place at 
the Constitutional Tribunal, and the role played by different sets of actors and advocacy 
coalitions, and in particular the judges. It showed that the petitioners at the TC were the 
same actors involved in the EC saga since 2001, and were therefore not isolated 
civilians fighting from personal convictions as most of them tried to sustain. 
The chapter has shown the way in which two post-authoritarian institutions of the 
Chilean political system – the Constitutional Tribunal and the “consensus” rule – had 
the power and influence to limit the advancement of women’s right, in particular their 
reproductive rights. These are good examples of how formal and informal institutions 
interact. The decision by conservative forces to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal – 
after the ruling of the Supreme Court which is the last decision-making court in Chile’s 
judiciary – was a political and strategic one. The conservative lobby wanted to resort to 
the Constitutional Tribunal to reinforce the status quo on reproductive rights moved by 
a conviction that the result of this political strategy could be favourable. This due to the 
weight of conservative forces and the controversial institutional framework of the TC 
within Chile’s democratic political system. 
The importance of informal institutions was visible throughout the judicial process in 
the action of the judges. The nature and functioning of the tribunal makes it an opaque 
institution where judges are not accountable for their decisions. This created an 
ambiance of distrust from civil society actors and reinforced the political struggle 
initiated by members of Congress. 
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The exclusion of women’s groups as party in the judicial process affected their 
relationship with other civil society actors, but most importantly this decision reinforced 
the signal that the debate on EC was not a women’s rights issue. It affected the way in 
which the defence was built, and the way in which the government lawyers 
communicated and cooperated with biomedical organisations. It also favoured the 
strategy followed by the government to protect its own capacity to create policies on 
reproductive issues, leaving women’s rights aside while strengthening the public policy 
arguments. 
Doctors and SRHR advocates maintained close links with the executive even if the legal 
teams of the government did not always listen to them and their experience from the 
previous judicial challenges on EC. Yet the biomedical groups succeeded in the end as 
the government incorporated their scientific arguments. Biomedical groups, and in 
particular the work of Díaz and Casas, were strongly influenced by a commitment to 
SRHR. 
The conservative lobby intervened at different stages in a concerted manner, often 
working on parallel processes and challenges in courts or against private businesses. 
The Church despite being highly visible in the media clearly favoured the strategy of 
letting Catholic institutions and individuals challenge the government policies while 
maintaining a formal distance with politics. Nonetheless the content of the discourses 
and arguments used both by politicians and conservative groups in the media and the 
courts, reveal the deep and pervasive impact of the Church’s influence and teachings 
among a certain elite. This opposition to EC was based on the battle against abortion 
and women’s bodily autonomy. 
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Finally, Bachelet and her personal commitment were decisive to overcome the legal 
challenges posed by the tribunal. Bachelet was skilful in making her own government 
and coalition carry the flag of sexual and reproductive issues. She incorporated the 
feminist and biomedical agenda on EC and SRHR, and by appointing key ministers 
such as Soledad Barría she was able to push her agenda. While she did not necessarily 
appear personally at all stages of the political and judicial battles she granted a constant 
support to her ministers maintaining a sustained communication with them. 
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CHAPTER 9: The Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling – from the courts to the streets and all the way to Congress 
This final chapter analyses the ruling of the TC against EC, and discusses its gendered 
impact. The chapter focuses on the different reactions to the ruling and the role of civil 
society and the state in overcoming the legal impasse resulting from the ruling. In doing 
so it pays particular attention to the way the executive sought a political way out for its 
policy through legislative means, while both feminists and the SRHR lobby were key 
players in the creation of the Movement for the Defence of EC, bringing about a 
mobilisation on reproductive issues previously unseen in democracy. It also looks into 
the role played by politicians in Congress and discourses surrounding the approval of 
the Fertility Bill. 
Following the literature on judicialisation and its emphasis on understanding the role 
judges can have on the political use of the courts and the impact of their decisions, this 
chapter argues that the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal was highly ideological. It 
responded to the ultra-conservative views of the judges that the policy for the 
distribution of EC was the first step towards the legalisation of abortion. The judges 
used their power to reaffirm their beliefs regarding the Constitution’s protection of the 
unborn, going as far as granting it legal rights. This was possible due to the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s post-authoritarian institutional legacy. Its conservative judges 
responded to the expectations of the anti-SRHR lobby that brought the case to this 
specific court because of its conservative profile and power to counteract the power of 
the executive. 
The literature on women’s movements in Chile has highlighted their weakness and lack 
of visibility since the return to democracy. This chapter discusses the shortcomings of 
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the women’s movement and the feminist movement despite their crucial role in the 
creation of the Movement for the Defence of EC and the mass mobilisation of 22 April 
2008, also known as the “Píldorazo”. Using the concept of “feminist organising” (Ewig 
and Ferree 2013), the chapter analyses how the convergence of young and old feminists, 
as well as SRHR advocates, permitted the inclusion of a wider array of social actors and 
social movements that mobilised under the banner of the Freedom to Choose for All. It 
shows how internal weaknesses of the feminist movement and in particular 
intergenerational tensions explain why this successful movement was short lived. 
The success of bills regarding gender equality is directly related to the support of the 
executive and SERNAM (Haas 2010). This chapter argues that the role played by 
Bachelet and her strategic inclusion of SERNAM in the process of drafting and passing 
a bill to grant the state the right to produce public policies on reproductive issues were 
key to its eventual success in Congress. This was a deeply political decision, showing 
the President’s conviction and resolution to see the EC policy through before the end of 
her mandate and as part of her legacy. Bachelet and the government reframed the 
discourse surrounding EC, moving the debate away from a values issue and towards an 
inequality and women’s rights issue. The constant commitment to reproductive rights 
provided a political atmosphere that lifted politicians’ fears around EC. Finally, the 
presence of doctors in politics represented an informal institution that permitted an 
easier progress, both during the legal battle at the Constitutional Tribunal and in 
Congress. Politicians who were also doctors became vocal about their support for the 
President’s policy and EC, granting their political support to pass the Fertility Bill. 
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The Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling 
On 2 April 2008 – three weeks before the official date set for the ruling – the news that 
the TC had ruled against President Bachelet’s Decreto Supremo reached the media and 
the supporters of the EC policy. Lidia Casas explained there was a leak from the 
Constitutional Tribunal regarding the ruling against the government and “you had many 
rumours going around, and in March El Mercurio rang me to tell me ‘you’ve lost’, and 
they wanted an interview”.345 
This judgment by the TC has been the study of many scholars, in particular from the 
legal studies arena (Beca Frei 2008; Bordalí Salamanca and Zuñiga Añazco 2009; Mac-
clure 2011; Muñoz León 2014; Nogueira Alcalá 2008; Vivanco Martínez 2008) as well 
as the medical arena (Ugarte 2008). Most scholars agree that the ruling represents a 
milestone in legal terms particularly with regards to the role of the TC and 
constitutional disputes. It is also considered as “the most controversial ruling of the 
Chilean Constitutional Tribunal since its reestablishment in 1980” (Muñoz León 
2014: 158). 
The text of the ruling is a confirmation that, despite many hearings and experts pleading 
in front of the tribunal, the judges of the TC had decided to agree with conservative and 
non-scientific arguments aiming to link EC to abortion. The position of the tribunal 
stated that the arguments brought forward by doctors on both sides, “whether in favour 
or against the ‘morning-after pill’… are equivalent in that both sides sustain with 
similar vigour and conviction, their specific point of view” (Tribunal Constitucional 
2010: 353). However, the TC added that there was no equivalence between the 
                                               345 Op. cit. 110. 
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arguments on both sides since the implications of one set of arguments could lead to a 
unconstitutional result (Tribunal Constitucional 2010: 353). 
Thus, quoting the report by PUC’s Centre for Applied Law and Ethics establishing the 
meaning of the principle of “duda razonable” or reasonable doubt, the TC sustained: 
Therefore, the doubt – which is reasonable, since this judging body cannot 
question the reasoning of those who are experts in medical sciences, implies […] a 
possible infringement to the Fundamental Charter. (Tribunal Constitucional 2010: 
353) 
Through this ruling the TC entered a new legal arena giving the product of fertilisation 
the status of persona. By giving the status of persona to an embryo or product of 
fertilisation (nasciturus), it was granting it a right to life, and therefore all norms 
affecting the possible development of the embryo had to be declared unconstitutional 
(Bordalí and Zuñiga 2009: 177). 
Bordalí and Zuñiga point to the fact that in many countries with constitutional courts, 
these are never given review power over administrative norms. This is to avoid tribunals 
assuming a form of “superpower”, as is the case in Chile (2009: 176). Moreover, the 
authors highlight that the revision of Decretos Supremos has generally been an initiative 
of the political opposition showing that “far from discussing if they affect citizens’ 
concrete rights or interests” it “appears as a mere instrument of political struggle 
between government and opposition” (2009: 176). 
This political power of the TC was evident in the manner in which it required the 
President to send a Decreto Supremo. It was also evident in the way the judges agreed 
to look exclusively into the right to life and how it was affected by EC, which the 
petitioners’ sustained was abortive. In this way, they avoided creating wider controversy 
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with a ruling that could have forbidden all forms of contraception available to women 
and impede the government to put in place health policies affecting adolescents. 
Moreover, the common principle in law that requires that petitioners prove their claims 
was simply not respected in this case (Beca Frei 2008). On the contrary, it was up to the 
defendants – the government with the support of the SRHR advocates – to prove that 
EC was not abortive. Instead of demanding that the petitioners show alternative 
research, the TC allowed them to use methodology disputes to question the validity of 
scientific research accumulated over more than 10 years. As Croxatto mentioned, one of 
the arguments used against his studies was that the tests were carried out on animals, 
knowing well that most drug test trials that have an ethical conflict cannot be carried out 
on humans.346 Moreover, generally tests on animals are considered sufficient to confirm 
the suitability of drugs to be used on humans.347 
The defence was asked to prove at 100% – “a certainty that does not exist in the 
sciences” – that the EC would not have any impact on the product of fertilisation.348 No 
matter the amount of scientific information that the pro-SRHR lobby provided, the 
ruling clearly shows that the judges gave preference to the Catholic conservative notions 
of “life from conception” and the right to life of the nasciturus as a persona. The ruling 
talks significantly about the starting point of life in order to determine if it starts with 
fertilisation or later at the implantation stage (Beca Frei 2008). 
Finally, arguably one of the most important aspects of the political content and use of 
the information to produce a ruling by the TC resides in its own legal arguments, as well 
                                               346 Op. cit. 63.  347 Ibid.  348 Op. cit. 26, 198. 
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as lack of references to human rights and the link with the conservative and 
authoritarian legacy of the Constitution. As explained by Nogueira Alcalá, the way in 
which the TC argued in favour of the right to life raised questions as to whether it is 
given such a central role in the constitutional system or if it was trying to establish a 
hierarchy among rights, which “from a human rights perspective is highly questionable, 
since they all stem from human dignity and must be optimised and not one cancelling 
the other” (2008: 371). The author also highlighted that the TC made too many 
references to the “Comisión Ortuzar” – the constitutional commission of the 
dictatorship – but little reference to the democratic institutional framework of the time 
(2008: 371). 
The political bias of the ruling was also obvious in its failure to incorporate women’s 
rights. For Bordalí and Zuñiga, the ruling showed a deficit in its human rights 
component, particularly when it treated women as rights’ bearers; instead of granting 
women with rights of their own and analysing the conflict of interest between the 
woman and the nasciturus, it focused on the barrriers to the nasciturus’ right to life 
(2009: 177). For the authors, the omission of all mention of women’s rights was not a 
casual one. It was done purposefully to maintain the status quo of traditional roles 
predominant in Chilean social and cultural norms (2009: 179). 
From the right to protect people’s private lives to the right to physical integrity and 
health and equality, none was referred to, and the CEDAW (Convention for the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) was simply ignored. This 
was clearly due to longstanding resistance from conservative sectors in Chile who were 
afraid that if they ratify CEDAW’s Optional Protocol they would open the door to 
abortion as a right (Bordalí and Zuñiga 2009: 180). 
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The Píldorazo and the Fertility Bill 
Despite all the legal details and repercussions of the TC ruling, for the public the most 
immediate and visible consequence of the TC ruling was that the government would not 
be able to distribute EC free of charge to women above the age of 14 through its 
national health system. In addition, it created a legal and political conundrum – while 
the distribution of EC free of charge by the health authorities was illegal, its 
commercialisation for a higher price in pharmacies remained within the law. This 
directly reinforced the inequality in access between poor and richer women. This 
situation provoked an unforeseen wave of vehement reactions and protests by 
politicians, public servants, civil society organisation and unions alike. On the morning 
following the ruling hundreds of people, predominantly women belonging to NGOs and 
civil society organisations, protested in front of the TC and later submitted a letter to the 
President rejecting the ruling (La Segunda 2008e). The protests ended in clashes 
between the police and the protesters, with many people arrested (La Segunda 2008e). 
The President immediately ordered ministers to “start looking for options to reverse the 
ruling” (La Segunda 2008d). The government quickly reacted and came up with its own 
interpretation on the application of the ruling, which they determined affected the 
national health system but not the distribution of EC at the municipal level. 
Minister Barría declared she was relieved that at least the main contraception methods 
available in the country remained untouched, adding “we are more relaxed but not 
satisfied” (La Segunda 2008a). She added that in order to solve the legal impasse the 
government was considering: a) including the pill in a new bill which could be the 
SRHR Bill; b) appealing in front of the TC; or c) looking into a constitutional reform 
that could allow the inclusion of EC and its free distribution within the national health 
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system (El Mercurio 2008). The Church through Msgr. Chomalí declared the efforts to 
revert the ruling of the TC was “a sign that in Chile there are people who want to make 
abortion legal” (La Segunda 2008b). 
Through its declarations the authorities started the process of reframing the policy and 
the language of inequality began permeating its messages. The government’s speaker 
declared “this is not only an issue about people’s freedoms… it is also an issue of 
obscene inequality… a decision applauded by the Right, where a woman with money 
gets the pill, and a woman without money doesn’t” (La Segunda 2008d). Politicians 
from all parties appeared in the media stating their refusal of the TC’s decision. 
Members of the PDC declared the ruling was “an unforgivable mistake… [...] aberrant, 
inconsistent and hypocritical resolution. The Tribunal rules in favour of inequity” (La 
Nación 2008a). Members of the Socialist Party bench in Parliament even declared they 
would take the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) (La Segunda 
2008c). The government itself suggested that a group from civil society should consider 
doing so using previous jurisprudence whereby women’s groups had already applied for 
their reproductive rights (El Mercurio 2008). At the time of fieldwork, civil society 
organisations were preparing the case to be brought to the ICHR in case there was no 
other solution nationally.349 
The attention of the media and public opinion suddenly focused on the TC judges as 
politicians and accused them of interfering with people’s private lives. For the 
Concertación, the blame fell on Mario Fernández, the former PDC Minister of Defence 
under Lagos, and personal friend of Alvear. Politicians on the left and from his own 
party accused him of treason and also asked for sanctions. The youth section of the PDC 
                                               349 Op. cit. 26, 82, 111, 125, and interview with Paulina Vidal, feminist and SRHR advocate 11.05.09.  
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asked for the suspension of his militancy, even if Fernández had renounced it before 
joining the TC (El Mercurio 2008). 
The Movement for the Defence of EC 
While feminists were pushed aside during the judicial challenge by the Constitutional 
Tribunal, they became key players as the women’s movement mobilised to create the 
Movimiento para la Defensa de la Anticoncepción350 (Movement for the Defence 
of EC). 
The Movimiento was born among what Gloria Maira called “las de siempre” (the usual 
ones) – that is, well-established NGOs whose leaders are considered part of the 
feministas históricas, incuding the Red Chilena Contra la Violencia Doméstica y 
Sexual, the Red de Salud de Mujeres Latinoamericanas y del Caribe, the Foro Red de 
Salud y Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, and the Movimiento pro Emancipación de 
la Mujer Chilena (MEMCH).351 But the históricas were also supported by las jóvenes, 
smaller organisations and individuals linked to young feminists’ networks that played a 
crucial role. 
As Maira explained:  
the young feminists of the Movement were in charge of organising other young 
people; they forged alliances with student unions, political collectives and the 
youth of the Concertación parties. They also worked on the inclusion of 
technology (email, distribution lists, blogs and webpages) for mobilisation and 
political action. Meanwhile, the organisations working on reproductive health were 
in charge of relations with the unions and institutions specialised in health, such as 
the Confusam,352 the Union of Midwives, the Medical Association, Cemera353 and 
                                               350 http://movimientoanticoncepcion.blogspot.co.uk/  351 Op. cit. 23. 352 Confederación Nacional de Funcionarios de Salud Municipalizada. 353 Centro de Medicina Reproductiva y Desarrollo Integral del Adolescente (Universidad de Chile). 
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the Chilean Association of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, among others.” (2010: 
134) 
As Antonella Caiozzi, a young feminist, explained, the women’s movement had started 
organising at the end of March after initial leaks and rumours indicating the ruling of 
the TC could be negative, although feminists reacted late: 
… someone sent an email [saying] “People, this is serious”… nobody had done a 
follow up of the issue and suddenly someone realised […] and these are people 
who work on these issues in NGOs, who get paid for doing this, a sort of 
remunerated feminism […] the issue just popped out like that “listen this is getting 
bad, these idiots want to forbid even the [copper]T” […] and there was a moment 
of panic and a ton of emails started circulating…354 
The first public success was the mobilisation of around 500 people in front of the 
Constitutional Tribunal to protest against the ruling (La Segunda 2008e), followed by 
other stunts such as the symbolic closing of the tribunal with a lock (La Nación 2008d) 
(see App. 7) and the mass apostasy letters “with the signatures of 500 people throughout 
Chile, 400 in Santiago, that we submitted to the Bishop to cancel our baptism, to be 
considered apostates”.355 Slowly the movement started gathering more and more 
support from different individual actors and organisations, including university 
students’ federations, unions and politicians. As explained by Caiozzi, this “was an 
issue that summoned more people than just the feminists, which is not the case with 
abortion for example”.356 
 As the movement grew, young feminists, many of them from the former “coordinadora 
de las feministas jóvenes” played “an increasingly leading role, beyond the initial call, 
                                               354 Op. cit. 105. 355 Op. cit. 112. 356 Op. cit. 105. 
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as a way to widen the movement and make it something not exclusively feminist”.357 
The Colectiva feminista mujeres públicas358 participated in the activities of 8 March 
with the feministas institucionales or feminists NGOs, and decided to join after “a 
conversation regarding the ruling, [feeling that] we needed to protest and mobilise civil 
society”.359 
The idea was that a protest would be organised for 22 April when the TC was initially 
expected to announce its ruling. The Movimiento for several weeks was able to 
maintain people mobilised through the use of new information and communication 
technologies as a “new form of political action” (Flores 2009), including social 
networks. Patricia Zamora explained that young feminists were able to provide such 
crucial support because: 
… we have great management and administrative skills, because we have formal 
training, a solid training […] this was an important factor in the success of the 22 
April mobilisations, […] we and Natalia Flores from the Observatorio de Género 
introduced the idea of using the ICTs for social agitation, and therefore we 
managed to make the issue visible, and encourage the formation of groups at the 
national level that remained mobilised […] and the climax of all this was the 
march in support of EC…360  
The march of 22 April: The Píldorazo361 
«¡Alerta! ¡Alerta ciudadana! ¡Ahora los jueces se meten en tu cama ! »362 
« ¡Nosotras parimos. Nosotras decidimos ! »363 
                                               357 Ibid.  358 Op. cit. 112; the colectiva was born within the Department of Social Sciences of the Universidad de Chile and brought together sociologists, anthropologists, lawyers, midwives, historians. It was composed of around 20 people, see http://colectivamujerespublicas.blogspot.com/  359 Op. cit. 112. 360 Ibid. 361 This is the way the press nicknamed the unexpected impact and turnover of the mobilisation. See App. 7. 362 “Alert! Citizen’s alert! Now the judges are getting in your bed!” 363 “We give birth, we decide!” 
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« ¡Chilenas, chilenos, salgan a marchar, para que sus hijas no tengan que 
abortar ! »364 
« !Ahora, ahora, ahora quieren vida, cuando en la dicatadura mataban con la 
DINA ! »365 
– Chants of protestors during the 22 April demonstration 
On 22 April 2008 between 15-20,000 people366 marched through the Alameda – the 
main avenue of Santiago – as well as in other provincial cities of Chile, to protest 
against the ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal. The march ended in a rally of citizens 
in front of La Moneda – the presidential palace – where protestors voiced their 
opposition to the TC’s ruling. 
This was a massive march by Chilean standards, and the biggest mobilisation for 
feminists since the return to democracy, which surprised civil society groups, as much 
as government and political bodies, by its amplitude and by the diversity among its 
participants. People of all ages, class, gender and social backgrounds joined the march. 
The march represented for the Movimiento and young feminists a “crucial moment 
gathering the greatest number of people” and not only “grassroots, or feminist 
networks… you had student federations, members of political parties… people from 
other social movements, and in that process we the young feminists played a key role 
through our university networks and people”.367 The members of the Colectiva Mujeres 
Públicas had: 
                                               364 “Chilean women and men, come out and march so that your daughter won’t have to abort.” 365 “Now?! Now you want life, when under the dictatorship you killed with the DINA (secret police of Pinochet).” 366 This was almost three times the number of people that marched against “femicides” on 22 November the year before.  367 Op. cit. 105. 
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… grassroots links within the Universidad de Chile [and] the student’s movement 
leadership […] and summoned the militants within the University and there was 
support from the Law and Chemistry Department who mobilised a great contingent 
of people…368  
Moreover, this march was “the first mass demonstration that people nationwide joined 
in favour of a profoundly feminist demand, which is a demand for sexual and 
reproductive rights and the battle flag was the freedom to choose”.369 The march for 
feminists had a symbolic and political impact in that it expanded “beyond what you 
could imagine… and the success was that we managed to generate a discourse, change 
the social discourse regarding the issue, we made it visible, more powerful”.370 It also 
has to be seen “in the context of the march of the Pinguinos”,371 since in the last months 
“there was a great sense of social excitement” leading to “a greater disposition to 
demonstrate”.372 
Yet despite the success of the march and the mobilisation of so many people the 
Movimiento had a short life undermined by tensions, rivalries and power struggles. The 
first tensions were related to the issue of visibility, ownership and deciding who gets to 
stand “behind the banner”. The relationship with politicians was a main obstacle 
because, according to Adriana Gómez there were no “consistent working alliances” and 
those parties that participated “jump[ed] on board because they knew something was 
coming, a successful mass mobilisation of citizens”. In fact during “the press 
                                               368 Op. cit. 112 369 Ibid. 370 Op. cit. 105. 371 This was the massive demonstration organised by secondary schools’ students which represents for many the return of social movements in Chile. 372 Interview with Moisés Russo, youth SRHR activist of APROFA/IPPF, 23.06.09. 
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conferences, and during the march they wanted to be in the front row”, taking “electoral 
advantage of the movement in a utilitarian manner […] to get a picture”.373 
Gloria Maira highlighted the importance of and the difficulties “to secure the centre 
stage position of women and sustain the feminist discourse” during this process. She 
explained that the concern was: 
… to maintain the autonomy of the Movement from political parties and their 
attempt to make of the citizens’ mobilisation a pro-Concertación rally […] From 
the movement we reached agreements to insure that the centre stage was reserved 
for women and the citizens’ profile of the social mobilisation. (2010: 135) 
Deputy Saa acknowledged these tensions but was also critical of the way in which the 
movement operates and the fact that feminists and “The Movement pro-EC […] should 
have capitalised on the march”: 
It should have continued, but they are absent. I know it is hard, it is exhausting, 
But you don’t see them continuing, their attitude over time is […] as if they are 
discouraged. But they – civil society – should have capitalised on it. […] But they 
also fear us [female politicians] They are afraid that we will take credit for things 
[done by] civil society, so then you have these contradictions […] even on 
violence issues they don’t want us to join the marches…374 
The fights for prominence among leaders of the Movement were also perceived 
negatively by the SRHR advocates, who were disappointed by the internal fights and 
the opportunism of politicians. Claudia Dides explained that for her the march “was a 
very sad moment and at the same time a very happy one”, because “as we joined we 
saw how the old [feminists] were fighting for the banner in front”. She also felt SRHR 
advocates had been ignored: 
                                               373 Op. cit. 122. 374 Op. cit. 307. 
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… and nobody called us – the ones who wrote, the ones who had spoken to the 
press… so it was hard to observe how people fought […] you saw how politicians 
started to appear […] the communists who have never cared about EC […] the 
PPD and the PDC, all trying to squeeze in […] simple opportunism […] on the 
other hand so many young people and that made us feel good, made us happy, we 
could say this was […] an issue people cared about, an issue that was on the 
agenda but with little participation from the parties…375 
Casas declared that Díaz “who is the key actor that triggered all this process, was never 
even invited to be among the women who initiated the march”, adding: “She and her 
team were at the end [of the march] like any other citizen.” Meanwhile: 
… you saw all these feminist organisations fighting; they fought with politicians 
[…] they did not want the políticas at the front, even though those políticas were 
the ones who had obtained the signatures of 49 deputies [in favour of EC].376  
Many of my interviewees pointed at internal issues of the movement as an explanation 
for its shortcomings. Some highlighted the “reactive” nature of the movement.377 “We 
are reactive, we don’t put forward proposals”, said Adriana Gómez, adding: “We are 
ideological actors, we have all the ideology, but we are not political, we are not political 
actors. The movement lacks political incidence.”378 
For Gómez this was a failure related to lack of financial means “that would allow us to 
be more structured and become more institutionalised […] It is also difficult to be a 
leader when you don’t have a salary. It is hard to go and protest on the streets if you 
don’t have the means for transportation”.379 Josefina Hurtado argued in a similar line 
that the short lifespan of the Movement was “an impulse and a ‘letting go’, and it has to 
                                               375 Op. cit. 124. 376 Op. cit. 110. 377 Op. cit. 122, 124. 378 Op. cit. 122. 379 Ibid.  
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do with capacities but also current leadership”.380 Gómez agreed that the feminist 
movement was missing “internal leaderships… there is a crisis of leadership”. Yet 
Hurtado insisted that the Movement was born because there still are: 
… leaders within women’s organisations who still believe […] that something can 
be done together and have an impact, but you also have the sensation of so much 
effort for little success. So these are spaces that get exhausted […] we thought we 
could sustain it but then each one goes back to their daily reality of work and lives, 
and it gets dissolved.381 
By early 2009 the Movement was no longer active. Leaders of the Movement and the 
SRHR lobby all pointed to the internal disputes that happened before and after the 
mobilisation of 22 April. The first was a break-up between old feminists and young 
feminists and the second with the SRHR advocates. 
Despite being considered the “engine of the movement” young feminists left after 
several “arguments over who gets to be in the spotlight […] and the arguments could 
last a whole meeting”.382 Some thought the problem was that the old leaders “do not 
recognise that the strength that this movement had to mobilise people to march was the 
result of the strategies by the young feminists to use technology, something the older 
members are not familiar with”.383 For Zamora, the problem lay in the fact that the 
practices of old leaders were “vertical” or top-down, which provoked much “elbowing 
between the organisations and tensions during the coordination”.384 Moreover, as 
explained by Caiozzi, the old leaders: 
… have some trouble with the inclusion of men on these issues […] with the idea 
of compromise on issues related to the body […] the main thing is that there is an 
                                               380 Op. cit. 141. 381 Ibid.  382 Op. cit. 81. 383 Ibid. 384 Op. cit. 112. 
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issue of struggle for prominence where they are not ready to compromise, it has to 
do with egos beyond any political consideration […] It is also understandable, 
because these are people who have worked on these issues all their lives, and when 
things like this happen they feel they have the right to be in the front, they 
effectively do. But sometimes this goes against the objectives pursued […] egos 
diminish you, weaken you…385 
Zulema Contreras highlighted how older feminists “did not understand that they started 
the movement but after the ruling it did not belong to them anymore” and by “excluding 
the youngest feminists and the incorporation of new topics [such as sexual 
diversity/inclusion of men] the result was a “viejocracia” (female gerontocracy)”, 
because some people “want to retire doing this”.386 
Generational conflicts thus represented a unique challenge for feminists. This was “a 
pending debate” for the feminist movement according to Maira: 
… some youth groups […] speak of generational change within feminism. There is 
no generational change in feminism! This is not a job where you retire and go 
home! […] the debate is about the power distribution among feminists […] this is 
a pending debate! But as for generational change, I told them “you can forget it! I 
am not retiring!”387 
For Bastías, the link of older feminists with NGOs and donors affect their way of 
building alliances, because the young feminists “know what they want, […] and are 
ready to go for it. Instead the older leadership, since they belong to international 
networks, […] the issue is the competition for resources and preservation of status”.388 
Teresa Valdés added: 
The leadership of that movement entered in the classic tensions among my dear 
friends from certain sectors who want to control it all and do not open up to 
                                               385 Op. cit. 105. 386 Op. cit. 98. 387 Op. cit. 23. 388 Op. cit. 97. 
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alliances, don’t relinquish power to transform things […] This is unfortunately a 
classic display of the tension issues within the women’s movement where some 
leaders say “this is mine, not theirs”. And everything crumbles.389  
Thus young feminists felt there was a lack of recognition for their work and the fact that 
they had come up with the slogan “For the freedom to choose”390 that rallied so many 
people on 22 April. Zamora explained that the “top-down” relation with old feminists 
was at the origin of a malaise since young feminists considered they “joined that space 
as comrades, as equals, but when it came to taking decisions, old feminists had a vision 
of movement-building we did not understand […] we felt disrespected […] we are no 
one’s labourers!” Thus they left even “if the cost was to break the movement”.391 
After the departure of the young feminist groups, the Movement was still receiving 
emails and messages from its supporters,392 but the “digital campaign was 
interrupted”393 since it was these young leaders who held the accounts of most social 
media networks and tools. 
The dispute between young and old feminists went beyond the organisational aspects of 
the Movement – it was also about ideological differences as to whether feminist praxis 
was based on a focus on women or gender equality, and the inclusion of men. Zamora 
explained that there was “a fight regarding whether this was a women’s and feminist 
mobilisation or from society in general”, adding: 
We as a colectiva considered that it was vital for the strategy that the call to protest 
was as society in general, that we as feminists did not need to appear as the great 
mobilisers, especially because there is a great resistance to feminism in society… 
                                               389 Op. cit. 25. 390 Op. cit. 105. 391 Op. cit. 112. 392 Op. cit. 81. 393 Op. cit. 98. 
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We preferred to empower the social mobilisation calling out to mean and women 
saying that this was for the right to choose of men and women…394  
Biomedical organisations and other SRHR advocates also lost patience with the internal 
disputes of the women’s movement. Schiappacasse explained that she “stopped 
attending the meetings” because she felt she “had given enough time and […] I could 
not continue to attend meetings where we never reached agreement and went 
nowhere”.395 She added that there was the intention to keep the momentum for the 
Movimiento but this was not possible because when young feminists left “there was a 
breakdown”: 
… after the ruling we knew it would disappear and we wanted the movement to 
become pro-choice, but that was too wide, it went much beyond the right to access 
[contraception] methods and included for example abortion. Many organisations 
left. Because abortion is not an issue that many organisations have on their agenda 
[…] Abortion still divides.396 
It became evident with the experience within the Movement that the work of “alliance-
building is a challenge” and the “more classic and historic movements need an 
upgrade”.397 Contreras argued that “feminist demands want to reach very high in one 
day. And there are many internal power struggles”, they have “a short-term vision”, and 
“fight for resources and see each other as enemies”.398 This was particularly true 
regarding the positioning of organisations on abortion because “supporting therapeutic 
abortion “is considered being lukewarm, feminists only recognise the total right to free 
                                               394 Op. cit. 112. 395 Op. cit. 81. 396 Ibid. 397 Op. cit. 98. 398 Ibid. 
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abortion”.399 Schiappacasse highlighted that the demands of feminists and biomedical 
organisations are often at odds since: 
… many of us and our organisations consider that this like a stepladder, you have 
to go up step by step. You cannot think that abortion will be decriminalised or 
legalised for all women and under any circumstances. We just managed to get EC! 
Let’s go step by step! Let’s first secure therapeutic abortion for specific cases […] 
So there’s always been conflict, which is understandable. You should expect the 
Foro and Red de Mujeres to want the total right to abortion.400 
Juan Bastías who represented APROFA within the Movimiento explained that 
the participation of the biomedical organisation and his presence as a man were 
also sources of tension: 
There was something whenever we had to negotiate, the idea of appearing next to 
APROFA posed a problem for some organisations, and in particular for the 
feminist movement. […] Something to do with APROFA, with the medical side, 
with the institution, with the political positioning of APROFA made the alliance-
building very complicated.401 
Schiappacasse considered that the “great conflict is that the oldest feminists want to 
continue to work with women for women, and younger feminists want to include men. 
Because they think it is a job and a fight they both have to give”.402 Zamora explained 
that “there is an internal issue within feminism regarding working with men, to which 
we, as a colectiva, always answer that we work for gender equity and we will keep 
working with men as many times as necessary, because for us this is no 
impediment”.403 She also highlighted that during the meetings Juan Bastía “could not 
                                               399 Ibid. 400 Op. cit. 81. 401 Op. cit. 97. 402 Op. cit. 81. 403 Op. cit. 112. 
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even raise his hand”, and was never allowed in the core working group “made of Gloria 
Maira, Claudia Pascual, Adriana Gómez, Rosa Yañez and Rosa Ferrán”.404 
Thus as can be seen the social movement that had provoked so much change in the 
perception of public opinion on SRHR and gender issues and women’s rights, suffered 
from serious internal conflicts that impeded its sustainability over time. 
The aftermath of the ruling and the march 
Such was the intensity of the debates and social outrage regarding the distribution of EC 
that Bachelet included the issue as a key component of her speech on the state of the 
nation on 21 May, declaring: 
My constitutional responsibility consists in insuring that exercise of the freedom to 
decide happens in conditions of equality […] This is why in the debated case of the 
morning-after pill and in respect of the decision by the relevant judicial 
institutions; I will ensure equality is applied as far as my competences allow me to. 
The drug is available for those needing it in each municipality. It will be up to each 
mayor to decide whether to make it available to citizens. They will decide if they 
make the decision for people or they let people decide. Let the country be the 
judge. (SEGPRES 2008: 53) 
This speech showed Bachelet’s determination to make EC available. One of the main 
concerns was that the legal interpretation of the ruling was only applicable to the 
national health system depending on MINSAL. This meant the pill would still be 
available at the local level in each emergency and primary healthcare centre of the 
municipalities. This interpretation of the ruling and the extension of the law put many 
mayors in an uncomfortable position since the elections were coming up shortly and EC 
played a major role in the electoral debates. 
                                               404 Ibid.; both Claudia Pascual and Gloria Maira are now at the head of SERNAM, as Minister and sub-Director respectively. 
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Feminists and the mayors 
In 2008, a year of municipal elections, the attention of the media turned to mayors and 
local authorities as many politicians and the government itself warned then that the pill 
“could contaminate the municipal elections” (La Segunda 2008f). 
Many feminists and SRHR advocates left the Movement and started working with the 
National Association of Municipalities of Chile (ACHM) to support the government’s 
contention that EC could be distributed at the local level. At the time of the TC ruling, 
the ACHM was led by a PPD mayor who was personally in favour of the distribution of 
EC and who decided that the association needed to “collaborate with those local 
authorities who wanted to distribute it [EC]”, in particular to clarify the legal status of 
the distribution.405 Shortly before the municipal elections, feminists working with the 
ACHM were given “a stand at the [ACHM] Conference” and were able to evaluate the 
mayors’ position in relation to EC, and realised “there was a lack of information, some 
were convinced they would continue to distribute it, others were waiting for the 
Contraloría’s decision”.406 
The ACHM first carried out a scoping review of the reality of distribution of EC at the 
local level, which indicated that around 70% of the local authorities were distributing 
the drug. Following this positive initial result the ACHM and FLACSO launched wider 
research including 320 out of 345407 municipalities in the country. As explained by 
Reinoso, the result showed that the “majority of the municipalities only provides EC in 
                                               405 Op. cit. 77. 406 Op. cit. 81. 407 Only 320 were considered since 25 of the municipalities did not have a municipal health system and therefore depended from the national health system, which automatically disqualified them for providing EC. 
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cases of rape, and does not provide it as a method as a free request by users”408 therefore 
more work needed to be done to insure EC’s free distribution. 
Feminists and the ACHM kept working intensively, anticipating the political weight of 
the rulings by the TC. The Contraloría was asked to clarify the matter in 2008 but did 
not immediately give an answer. Mayors at the time were therefore concerned that “they 
would commit an infraction that the Contraloría would then sanction”.409 As explained 
by Reinoso “this happened during the municipal electoral period, all the mayors that 
were candidates became cautious”.410 It quickly became clear that: 
… there is fear, and the distribution or no distribution happens across party lines. I 
mean you have parties within Concertación, [people] within the PPD, the PS, the 
PDC and the Alianza that distribute it, and you see that the same parties […] do 
not distribute it.411  
This would be something that the women’s movement would in fact use that year to 
maintain the issue of the pill high on the agenda. Many organisations of the women’s 
movement decided to carry out a campaign indicating to voters what their mayors 
thought of EC. Based on the polls published by Corporación Humanas (2008) right 
before the elections, 64% of women declared they would not vote for a candidate that is 
against the distribution of EC, and 69% said they would not vote for a candidate that 
was against the right to abortion to save the life of a mother. 
The Contraloría 
In 2009 the abortion issue reappeared on the agenda with the impending ruling by the 
Contraloría (General Comptroller) regarding whether the applicability of the TC ruling 
                                               408 Op. cit. 77; only 100 municipalities had services for emergency primary care (SAPU) and were therefore distributing EC in cases of sexual violence.  409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid. 
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also applied to municipalities. The Contraloría is an autonomous branch of the 
executive granted audit power over the executive’s initiatives by the Constitution, to 
check their legal validity.412 It therefore holds much political power. Its General 
Comptroller at this time, Ramiro Mendoza, was known as a right-wing sympathiser who 
taught law at Universidad de Los Andes (El Mercurio Online 2007), which led many to 
think that it was not a coincidence the EC case was brought to him for audit. Feminist 
and biomedical groups organised protests outside the Contraloría to pressure the 
Comptroller (see App. 7). 
On 18 June 2009, the Contraloría announced its decision that extended the TC ruling to 
municipalities (La Segunda 2009a). Most importantly, it also extended the ruling to 
private or public institutions that maintained any contract with the national health 
system. This meant that NGOs such as ICMER and APROFA, as well as private clinics 
would have to stop EC distribution. The ruling created a worse situation than expected, 
clearly making it evident that only women who could afford to get a doctor’s 
prescription would be able to buy EC in pharmacies. 
The social uproar to the news was such that, on the very same day the Contraloría ruled, 
all presidential candidates spoke against the ruling and condemned the legal situation 
and socio-economic injustice created by the ruling. The language of inequality once 
again appeared as the leitmotiv – Carolina Tohá, the government’s speaker, declared it 
was “particularly painful” that “wealthier people can continue to buy the pill in 
pharmacies, while the distribution through the national public health system is 
forbidden” (La Nación 2009b). 
                                               412 It is led by a General Comptroller designated by the President with the approval of three fifths of the senate. It has increasingly become a political actor due to its capacity to hold the executive branches, both organisations and individuals, accountable for their actions.  
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While Eduardo Frei qualified the repercussions of the Contraloría’s decision as “odious 
and cruel discrimination”, Sebastián Piñera declared the decision was “absurd” and 
“The majority of the deputies of the Allliance will support my position which is to allow 
the distribution of the pill, leaving it to each person’s freedom of conscience” (El 
Mercurio 2009; La Nación 2009e). Piñera was under pressure to demonstrate as the 
candidate of the right that he was a liberal man despite being allied to the same groups 
that were linked to the Church and had led the country to this legal impasse. All 
candidates, including Piñera who was facing internal pressure from the UDI, gave their 
support to the government’s initiative to send a bill to congress to not only re-establish 
the legality of EC but also ensure the right of the state to lead on reproduction and 
fertility health policies (La Segunda 2009b). 
SERNAM and the Fertility Bill 
The speed with which the bill was brought forward was the obvious result of the 
preparation over the last months by the government to an imminent negative decision on 
EC. Although more than a year had passed since the TC ruling, it was obvious that the 
President had made sure the government had options to react once the matter was 
resolved. The responsibility of seeing the bill through fell to SERNAM’s Minister 
Albornoz who said SERNAM had already started participating in the fight to reframe 
the EC policy as a problem of inequality that brought “popular support for the 
government’s stand”: 
… we managed to refute a political argument […] used by the Right and the 
Church, which was “that there are issues that are the exclusive domain of families” 
[…] we refuted it with another principle above that one which is the inequity that 
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produced on poorer young girls, this was a fight of political arguments not 
technical ones.413 
Albornoz explained that the work was quick and coordinated because “on gender issues, 
the women [Ministers] had a direct access to the President”, and this was particularly 
strong with SERNAM. But the bill also received a strong political support since 
Albornoz was “called to integrate the Frei commando for everything in relation to 
therapeutic abortion” for the electoral campaign.414 This was perceived with distrust 
from the SRHR advocates and feminists. Matamala argued: 
What happened for the PDC to change its attitude? Because Frei continues to say 
he is a Catholic […] the Minister of SERNAM is a Christian Democrat and she has 
never wanted to discuss SRHR with civil society. Civil society does not want to 
hear of her anymore…415 
Soledad Díaz also emphasised that “unlike Cecilia Pérez before her”, Albornoz initially: 
… was less committed to these issues, her interests were elsewhere, in other areas, 
that are more important like labour issues […] She really got on board the issue of 
the bill […] this last year of the government she was very committed to the 
issue.416 
In fact, many feminist activists were present next to SERNAM’s Minister at the 
announcement of the bill sent to Congress by the President. This despite the fact that 
since early 2009 there was a lack of visibility of the feminist movement in the media. 
The conservative lobby’s reaction took the form of strong declarations by the UDI 
leaders and the Church against the Fertility Law prepared by the Bachelet cabinet. This 
obviously produced tension within the right-wing coalition supporting Piñera. UDI 
                                               413 Albornoz, op. cit. 254. 414 Op. cit. 78. 415 Ibid. 416 Op. cit. 64. 
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Parliamentarians gave strong declarations in interviews with the press speaking of 
“ideological imposition” by the government with the aim of destabilising Piñera’s 
candidacy (La Nación 2009a). The declarations of the Church would also remain 
frequent and along the same line as the UDI. 
Congress, doctors and the Fertility Bill 
Finally, on 30 June 2009, Bachelet signed the Ferility Bill to be sent to Congress, and 
gave it a “suma urgencia” or urgency status for its quick revision by legislators. On 13 
July, the Health Commission with the vote of all deputies belonging to the 
Concertación, but most importantly with the support of Juan Lobos (UDI) and Karla 
Rubilar (RN) belonging to the Alianza – both of them doctors by profession – approved 
the bill. This allowed the vote to take place in the Chamber of Deputies on 15 July. 
Outside Congress, the Church and the UDI had also mobilised their supporters – mostly 
young boys, likely students from Catholic schools and universities (see App. 7). The 
gender, class and age bias of the pro-lobby was evident. The session that day was one of 
the most agitated the deputies had attended in a long time; the pro-EC and anti-EC 
groups spent at least an hour chanting and demonstrating outside Parliament before 
entering. As the session started there was a great deal of confusion in the balconies 
overlooking the Chamber of Deputies. The police separated the two camps in two 
different sectors trying to avoid any direct confrontation at the demand of UDI deputies. 
After many speeches by deputies in favour of the pill mostly on the left, with a few 
Christian Democrats opposing the President’s initiative, the most surprising support to 
the pill came from the deputies belonging to RN, many of them as doctors. Osvaldo 
Palma declared: 
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… the problem is not the EC pill; it is much more than that. What we are 
discussing is the freedom to choose, the non-discrimination, the right of women, 
the right of families, the right to choose freely and informed when and how many 
children one wants and can have; the right to decide on something as personal and 
intimate as their bodies, their free self-determination, their sexual freedom.[…] 
This is a medical and people’s rights’ issue. It seems to me that this discussion 
should never have been brought to Congress […] On the other hand, with what 
right some call themselves “pro-life”, as if those of us who do not think like them 
were “pro death”. No one is against life!” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 97) 
The most tense moment in the Chamber occurred as Deputy Karla Rubilar (RN) spoke 
and declared passionately: “I am a doctor, I am a Renovación Nacional deputy and I 
prescribe the morning-after pill” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010). Her intervention was 
met by a violent outburst by from the anti-EC supporters, mostly young men in their 
teens who shouted at her “Asesina!” (“Murderer!”), and the session had to be 
interrupted (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 119). 
Kast who had led the group of deputies who brought the judicial case to the 
Constitutional Tribunal, displayed many empty boxes of drugs in his hands and 
declared: 
We are told that it is essential to have access to the pill. Aren’t there any other 
types of contraception methods? Don’t other methods to regulate fertility exist that 
are not abortive by any chance? Here I have dozens of contraception pills, vaginal 
rings that women should know and use, condoms that are also used. In addition 
you have contraceptive implants for people who do not know them; contraceptive 
injections, spermicides and natural methods.” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 92) 
Ignoring once again all scientific evidence on reproductive health, as well as the fact 
that EC was just one method among many within the Fertility Norms, Kast insisted that 
EC was a “hormonal bomb”, that its use “increases the number of abortions and 
pregnancies in the adolescent population”, and also led to more “veneral diseases 
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because condoms are not used” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 92). He also made a 
direct attack on Dr Croxatto’s scientific credentials, declaring “no one has mentioned 
that he is also in favour of abortion until the eighth week of gestation” (Biblioteca del 
Congreso 2010: 93). 
Deputy Cristi (UDI) suggested that the President’s use of “urgency” was “ideological, 
almost a whim by the government” probably to fulfil promises made “behind the back” 
of the Congress “to international organisations” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 131). 
Deputy Sabag (PDC), a member of Opus Dei, accused his own coalition declaring that 
the “pluralism of the Concertación is betrayed” (Biblioteca del Congreso 2010: 102). 
After this discursive confrontation, the final vote took place in the middle of a display 
of images of foetuses by conservative UDI deputies, opposed by Chilean flags and 
many more placards from the Concertación deputies supporting the right of women to 
choose, such as “Free Access to the Pill!”, “I vote for the right to choose”, “The 
decision is ours”, “This is the Chile I like” (see App. 7). When the vote was finally cast 
– with 73 votes in favour, 34 against and three abstentions – it was met with screams of 
happiness on one side and of anger on the other, a reflection of the strong feelings 
people had accumulated over the last weeks and over the last year in this final stage of 
the EC saga. Deputies Saa and Muñoz, the most renowned feminists in Congress, lifted 
a placard stating “No to discrimination, the pill now!”, saluting the feminists and 
women’s groups in the audience as they chanted (see App. 7). 
The vote of the EC Bill was more than the approval of a health policy. It was the 
symbol of the crumbling of the formal and informal institutions behind the consensus, 
and its gendered agenda. That day progressive Concertación Parliamentarians were able 
to vote freely because the threat of sanction maintained by the “consensus rule” was 
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absent. As pointed out by René Castro, EC was important “because in the end it breaks 
the monolithic cohesion of the Right, and curiously managed to put Concertación in 
line. […] the debate on the pill was resolved in two weeks but after eight years”.417 
The long judicialisation of the distribution of EC – an initiative considered essential by 
a large section of the population – had obviously taken its toll on politicians who 
considered themselves progressive but who had followed the “consensus”. Whether the 
vote was more genuine than merely being the opportunity to appear in the media in the 
middle of the electoral year is obviously difficult to judge, but the vote in the Chamber 
that day clearly gave many Parliamentarians the opportunity to vote on one of the most 
controversial pieces of legislation in the last couple of years, even if this was far from 
being the most progressive piece of legislation on SRHR – after all the SRHR Bill 
remained untouched in some filing cabinet. 
After the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, the bill had to be approved by the 
Senate and its commission of health. As the elections approached, the end of 2009 saw a 
long process in which at each stage of the debates and legal procedures to pronounce the 
law, the Church and the UDI tried to disrupt the bill’s approval by all means. The law 
had to be sent back to the TC for its approval. This time, however, the pressure on the 
TC was higher due to the participation of the UDI in Sebastián Piñera’s campaign and 
which represented the possibility for the conservatives to get back to power for the first 
time since 1988. But it was also an institutional change in Chilean politics since “the 
consensus that was reached in Parliament, was something new for the Constitutional 
                                               417 Op. cit. 199. 
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Tribunal too. Now they could not argue there was any reasonable doubt when almost 
two thirds of Parliament had voted in the Chamber”.418 
Mario Fernández was in fact the only judge who once again voted against the bill. 
Fernández had nothing to lose and felt no pressure to do otherwise since his former 
coalition had the upper hand in the political process of the bill. This shows the political 
component of the initial TC ruling, which was possible as long at the TC was not under 
the media spotlight and the political environment allowed it. Therefore the real 
independence and impartiality of its judges can truly be questioned. 
Conclusion 
The Ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal was deeply ideological. It was a final attempt 
by the judges to maintain the status quo on reproductive issues in place since 1989. This 
was done by imposing their interpretation of Chile’s Constitution as a guarantor of the 
right to life of the unborn. There was a clear concern among the judges that EC was just 
the first chapter in a strategy to legalise abortion, and therefore they had to stop its 
distribution. The legal procedures and the justification of the judges to give their verdict 
has been established as irregular by most specialists in constitutional law, including the 
deliberate attempt by the judges to ignore women’s rights, and in particular all 
international instruments that could refer to SRHR. Although the legal process was 
focused on the scientific debates regarding the effects of EC, the ruling of the judges 
openly ignored most of the scientific evidence produced over the past two decades 
presented to them. Instead it used the politically charged tool of “reasonable doubt” to 
enter a scientific debate rather than a legal one. 
                                               418 Ibid. 
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Until the ruling, the impact of the women’s movement was minimal since the court 
refuted their eligibility to participate. Nevertheless, the women’s movement and 
feminists played a crucial role in the Píldorazo, and the creation of the Movement Pro-
EC. Unfortunately, the divisions within the women’s and feminist movements, 
particularly between young and older feminists, but also with the SRHR advocates, put 
an end to one of the greatest mobilisations called by feminists in democracy. Feminists 
were visibly able to influence a political debate for women’s rights at a crucial time in 
history, and in particular to convey the urgency of the issue. Despite the clear presence 
of dynamic feminist organising, feminists were not able to keep the Movement alive, 
and did not capitalise on the political gains of the march. 
The Bachelet government won the discursive battle to reframe EC as a public health 
priority, highlighting the social injustice and inequality it represented for poor women 
and youth. In doing so the government managed to dissipate the weight of the pro-life 
arguments and lift the “consensus rule” that maintained a censorship on reproductive 
issues. Women’s rights became more visible towards the end of the policy process and 
feminists and civil society marched under the banner of the “Freedom to choose for all” 
showing how Chilean society had started embracing more liberal principles. It was this 
reframing of the issue that permitted to lift the strong self-censorship that had 
surrounded reproductive issues in Chile since 1989. 
Bachelet navigated the political process in a strategic manner by letting the formal 
institutional process follow its due course. She included SERNAM at a key moment 
taking advantage of the electoral politics in 2009, and was able to easily pass the final 
bill to distribute EC. The President and her cabinet worked in a coordinated manner 
pushing for the fast approval of the bill in Congress. Albeit neither perfect nor fully 
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comprehensive and progressive, the bill ensured the protection of the historical capacity 
of the state to produce and implement policies for public health while securing the right 
of women to access EC. Despite the obvious direct attacks on her for supporting a more 
progressive agenda, Bachelet saw her policy through and in doing so managed to 
include both the feminist and biomedical actors who had fought so hard for it. 
Through the legal and political battles behind the distribution of EC, Chilean society 
was able to start a debate on abortion and the non-existent right to choose. This was 
possible thanks to the work of feminists within biomedical and social science groups, 
their medical allies within government, and the final push by doctors who are members 
of Parliament from across the party spectrum. This in many ways followed the 
longstanding tradition of SRHR initiatives born in the medical circles (see Ch. 4). The 
role of doctors in Chilean politics, including Bachelet, and in particular in the field of 
SRHR, is a great demonstration of an informal institution at work and affecting 
women’s rights. 
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CHAPTER 10: Conclusions 
Linking institutions, the policy process and feminist activism on SRHR 
This thesis began with the aim of establishing the role played by institutions on policy 
processes and feminist efforts to advance sexual and reproductive rights. The fieldwork 
of this research included five months in Chile mapping out the actors of the EC policy 
process and trying to speak to them to determine the extent to which the advocacy 
coalitions had influenced the policy process for more than ten years. The immediate 
findings revealed the disarticulation of the feminist movement and the importance that 
the courts and judges had had in the process, in particular in the late stages at the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
The politicisation of the courts, also known as the judicialisation process, had clearly 
extended to the field of sexual and reproductive rights. This gave conservative actors 
and institutions a greater influence in the process, drastically limiting the access of the 
feminist movement to the justice system. The weakness of the feminist lobby was 
confirmed during my interviews, in the meetings I attended as a participatory observant 
and through the press review I carried out. This forced me to think beyond the policy 
process to give a greater role to the weight of institutions. 
At the time of fieldwork, feminist literature on gender and politics had started to engage 
with new institutionalism in a more direct manner. Feminist Institutionalism provided 
the appropriate lens to look at this policy process and in particular to understand the 
strength and limitations of the feminist lobby. The existing work on judicialisation in 
Latin America provided a stronger understanding of the importance of looking at the 
politicisation of the courts and the role of judges to unveil the gendered nature of 
judicial rulings and their impact. Finally it was clear during my field research that the 
332 
role of Bachelet proved to be key to advancing women’s reproductive rights. The 
institutional weight of having a female president committed to reproductive issues 
during the whole policy process confirmed the power of the presidency in Chilean 
politics described in the literature. 
In order to bring to light the role played by institutions in the EC policy process and 
feminist efforts to promote women’s sexual and reproductive rights, the thesis was 
guided by these research sub-questions: How did formal and informal institutions 
influence the EC policy process, in particular during the judicialisation process? How 
did actors see their ideas reflected or ignored during the policy process? What was the 
impact of ten years of legal and political battles for the distribution of EC on feminists 
and other civil society groups? What do we learn about their capacity to mobilise and 
the efficacy of women and feminist networks trying to influence the SRHR agenda in 
Chile? How did the presence of a feminist and first female president impact on the 
outcomes of the policy process? 
This thesis has argued that institutional constraints set by the unfinished democratisation 
process of the electoral and political representation system affect the way in which 
women and feminists are able to position their issues on the wider political agenda. This 
is particularly true for sensitive issues falling into deep ethical and moral debates such 
as SRHR. As explained throughout the chapters, these institutional constraints are both 
formal and informal. 
Chapter 4 showed how the military dictatorship created a unique and enduring 
constitutional framework which was maintained in democracy by the formal acceptance 
of the 1980 Constitution, but also through the informal institution of the “consensus” 
that centre-left governments applied to policy-making and legal initiatives. This 
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framework had a direct impact on the SRHR agenda in democracy since women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights have been captives of the consensus, which has impeded 
any effort to reintroduce women’s right to abortion. Concertación has simply not 
wanted to bring up difficult issues that could affect their relationship with the Church, 
particularly SRHR. 
However, this self-censorship has not only applied to parties, it has also affected social 
movements and in particular the feminist movement. Despite many feminists having a 
double militancy as members of a political party as well as of the women’s movement, 
or women’s NGOs, they have rarely been able to raise SRHR issues within those parties 
more sympathetic to their agenda. The SRHR Bill initiative (discussed in Ch.6) shows 
how the exclusion of abortion from the bill briefly permitted advances and a greater 
participation of politicians from across the political spectrum. Yet for over 20 years the 
movement itself has failed to agree on how to confront SRHR issues with one voice in 
the public and political arenas. Abortion and SRHR were in fact NGO-ised, limiting 
until recently the discussions on these issues to an elite group of feminists and 
organisations working on health policies. These are topics where feminists also have 
competed against the influence of biomedical NGOs, limiting their capacity for alliance 
building as shown in Chs 6, 7 8 and 9. Biomedical groups and feminists share the 
“core” beliefs on SRHR and abortion, yet differ profoundly at the “policy core level” on 
the type of strategies to follow especially regarding the dilemma between full or 
incremental demands on SRHR. 
This research has shown how the consensus was a perfect example of the gendered 
impact that an informal institution can have on a policy process. Chapter 7 discussed 
how in 2004 after the departure of Bachelet from MINSAL, the new minister gave the 
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order to put a halt to the publication of the Fertility Norms and requested the resignation 
of the policy-maker in charge of the Norms. Many consider that the consensus rule was 
crumbling by the end of the Lagos administration, and this could explain why 
conservative actors felt it was important to use the power available to try to block 
initiatives they found threatening. Bachelet’s election also represented a major threat for 
the defenders of the status quo protected by the consensus, and those same conservative 
actors obviously felt they would lose control over policies affecting sexuality and 
reproduction. This shift in perceptions by actors within the governing coalition and the 
opposition was obvious in the statements to the press before and in the first weeks of 
Bachelet’s arrival to power. 
What is more, the thesis has shown the way in which the weight of the enduring 
consensus led to the judicialisation of sexual and reproductive rights. Conservative 
actors found in the courts the perfect way to avoid the spotlight of an open political 
battle while advancing their strategies in a friendly institutional environment. The 
emergency contraception debate, policy development and ensuing political process 
within the Chilean legal and judicial systems all showed how the rigidity of the political 
system forced civil society groups to interact with the executive in new spheres, from 
lower courts to the supreme and constitutional courts. In the case of the opposition, the 
aim was to counter the power of an initiative backed by the executive and presidency; 
for the pro-EC coalition, it was to open new ways to distribute EC and avoid political 
vetoes within government. This is because the consensus discouraged any progressive 
party to become the champion for women’s and sexual and reproductive rights, while 
the opposition had a clear agenda to maintain the status quo and benefitted from the 
consensus. 
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The conservative opposition to SRHR was a cross-party issue. It would take the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling ten years into the policy process to see that the support 
to EC and SRHR was also to be found across party lines. This then confirmed the 
difficulty for all political actors to engage with SRHR issues within the Chilean political 
system due to the power of the sanctions attached to the informal and formal rules of the 
game, which were eventually lifted during the approval of the Fertility Bill (Ch. 9). 
Clearly political parties did not engage with EC until the very end, once they perceived 
that the political cost of doing so had diminished and the executive backed the bill in 
Congress. 
The findings of this research also show how the post-authoritarian institutional legacy 
disproportionately benefited the smaller yet more powerful, cohesive and strategic 
conservative groups in civil society, most of them close to the Catholic Church. 
Members of these groups tend to be highly-educated professionals, many of them 
lawyers who know their way around institutional rules, including how to lobby judges 
and politicians in key positions. In fact this research has highlighted the existence of a 
clear and visible judicial strategy by the conservative lobby that benefitted from their 
close access to institutions linked to the Catholic Church, including universities and 
research centres in their crusade against EC. This gave the conservative actors the upper 
hand to lobby and carry out advocacy on reproductive issues to influence public 
opinion. 
Furthermore, the thesis also highlights the role of gatekeepers played by formal 
institutions created to maintain the status quo, as was the case of the Constitutional 
Tribunal. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 established the importance of informal institutions visible 
in the role played by judges ruling from personal beliefs and gendered views on 
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reproduction and women’s roles while ignoring international treaties on women’s rights. 
In the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, this was possible due to the nature of the 
institution itself, which under the military regime was given a great power of oversight 
while making judges unaccountable for their actions. Similarly, the thesis showed how 
the internal rules and procedures of the Constitutional Tribunal became a powerful set 
of invisible rules of the game providing judges with opportunities to remain 
unaccountable. This was mainly discernible in the case of the judges involved in the 
recusal controversy at the TC. 
This policy process was also shaped by the use of a new institution against SRHR – the 
market. Conservative groups were keen to use the market as a tool to maintain the 
gender status quo in their threats to pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies. 
Emergency contraception and feminists 
Inherent to the analysis of the judicialisation process in this thesis was the impact the 
political and judicial processes had on the feminist movement. The EC debates, policy 
application and consequent political process within the legal and judicial systems reveal 
that a lack of leadership and cohesion among feminist groups has left the issue to be 
defended by a small number of advocates for sexual and reproductive rights in the 
courts. The SRHR advocates, coming mostly from the biomedical NGOs and research 
centres working on reproductive issues, had to face a sometimes reluctant executive, 
wary of the different tactics of the conservative opposition and its possible political and 
electoral consequences for the government. The feminist movement was left to watch 
most of the judicial process affecting EC from “the bench” while other SRHR advocates 
took centre stage of the litigation in defence of EC. 
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The lack of strength and visibility of feminists observed during the EC legal and judicial 
processes is explained by a lack of leadership as well as a lack of consensus on how to 
promote SRHR, in particular regarding abortion, and also that EC was initially 
perceived as a distraction from “real” feminist work. Chapter 6 highlighted that there 
has never been a consensus on abortion amongst feminists and it was difficult for 
feminist networks to come up with a unique and coherent discourse as one movement 
when EC was linked to the abortion debate. 
This thesis consequently maintains distance from previous arguments advanced by other 
authors linking the feminist movement’s weakness mostly to a lack of resources and 
funding. This research has unveiled the complexity of the relationship between feminist 
networks and favoured a focus on their internal dynamics as suggested by Ríos Tobar 
(2003a), to evaluate their capacity to organise an build alliances. In this sense, it 
highlights the importance of the generational divide between the “historicas” – mostly 
second wave feminists who fought the dictatorship – and younger feminists organised in 
“colectivos”, who maintain a strong sense of autonomy. 
The generational divide within the feminist movement became evident during the build-
up towards the 2008 march in favour of EC. As explained in Chs 6 and 9, the feminist 
movement benefitted from the work done by young autonomous feminists from 
professional “colectivos” who used their personal networks to build alliances with other 
social actors including student unions, workers’ unions, youth sections within parties 
and so on. These young feminists not only provided their skills in the use of new 
internet and communication technologies which proved crucial to rally thousands of 
people around the country, they also provided the movement with a deep understanding 
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of the new political environment and ways to communicate with different sets of actors 
in society permitting key alliance-building opportunities. 
What made their intervention so effective was the way in which they understood how 
Chilean society had changed to become more liberal and rallied people under the notion 
of “freedom to choose” for all genders. Paradoxically, this historical success for the 
defence of women’s rights produced tensions within the movement, as older members 
potentially felt threatened and tried to retain control of the process by pushing out these 
young leaders. This led to a breakdown between Viejas and Jóvenes, widening the gap 
between generations of feminists. 
As described in Chs 6 and 9, young feminists saw their relation with feminism and 
activism as part of their multiple identities rather than work, seems to be the main 
explanation for their different political engagement during the EC process. Their 
capacity to build relations and alliances with diverse social actors was also determined 
by them not being tied to specific NGOs and so they did not feel the need to showcase 
their work as a way to report to funders. Younger feminists are truly politically engaged 
and see their work as part of a collective effort, not an organisational or individual 
effort. They are also freer from the ghost of the mobilisations of the 1980s, allowing 
them to redefine the sort of movement they want to create. 
The Jóvenes not only relate in a different manner with discourses on sexuality and 
reproduction by following postmodern and queer theories, they also have a different 
understanding from the Históricas regarding feminist praxis. In fact, they put gender 
rather than a women-only focus at the centre of their analysis and praxis, and favour the 
inclusion of men as feminist allies. This research argues that this makes evident the 
presence of a third wave of feminists within Chilean feminism that has been sidelined 
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by the historic leaders of the movement who have not understood the nature of the new 
feminist engagement. Furthermore, this could explain the internal tensions the 
movement is experiencing at a time when youth are leading the rebirth of social 
movements in Chile. This is a topic for future research. 
The feminist movement’s ability to mobilise and create alliances with other actors in 
civil society remains a great concern for the evolution of the movement and its capacity 
to have an impact on Chilean politics. In this sense, the Píldorazo, the mass protest in 
support of EC policy called by the feminists and their allies in 2008, was a key moment 
for the movement that had not experienced this level of social mobilisation under their 
banners since the early 1990s. Hence, one could argue that there was a pre-Píldorazo 
and a post-Píldorazo effect, especially for young feminists who did not experience the 
1980s’ repression by the military regime. 
There is, however, something to be said regarding the way we look at feminist praxis 
and mobilisation. This thesis engages and agrees with Ríos Tobar (Ríos Tobar, Godoy, 
and Guerrero 2003; Ríos Tobar 2009a, 2009c) who has described the feminist 
movement in Chile as weakened and scattered. Yet this thesis also considers that 
looking at feminist impact through the exclusive lens of movements might not give the 
most accurate account of feminist presence in politics in Chile. There is no doubt that 
feminists suffer from important internal divisions. Yet by using Ewig and Ferree’s 
concept of feminist organising (2013) we obtain a different picture. Feminists were 
present all along the policy process and in different spaces, albeit through weak 
alliances. One could add the key role played by those feminists working in biomedical 
and social science organisations that initiated and led the work on EC. It would also 
include the constant involvement of feminists in politics, such as Ministers, policy-
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makers, and Parliamentarians. And it could incorporate the crucial work done by many 
men who supported the EC policy along the way from a feminist perspective. There is 
therefore a necessity to reconsider the lenses through which we look at the impact of 
feminists in policy-making. 
Bachelet – the President and the person 
Finally, this thesis has shown that Bachelet’s access to the highest position of power as 
President, while being a feminist politician and doctor, provided civil society with new 
opportunities to advance their agendas on reproductive health and rights. Previously, as 
Minister of Health under Lagos, Bachelet had opened key spaces of dialogue with the 
feminist and women’s organisations beyond the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer 
(SERNAM). They provided important support for gender issues, yet some feminist 
advocates considered them tokenistic, state-led spaces and quickly abandoned them. 
Bachelet was also able to secure the support of her political coalition in crucial moments 
to advance the debate on the distribution of emergency contraception and used the 
electoral race of 2009 to her advantage, letting the opposition become, in the eyes of the 
public, a barrier to achieve social and economic justice for women and young girls. 
Bachelet’s longstanding political career in the socialist party as well as her previous 
experience as Minister of Health and Defence, undoubtedly gave her a deep 
understanding of the formal and informal political rules and sanctions of the political 
game. She was therefore able as President to navigate the norms from government and 
in the interaction with parties, as well as the legislative and judicial powers. Her 
“parity” system and appointment of feminist advocates to key positions in government 
allowed her to pursue her agenda while resisting political pressure and opposition. She 
tried to honour most of her commitments to the feminist agenda to which she personally 
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adhered, especially while working at MINSAL. Yet she also demonstrated a great sense 
of political pragmatism by moving forward the agendas that needed her presidential 
backing. This for instance resulted in the SRHR Bill being set aside in order to control 
the political environment and opposition to implement EC and the Fertility Norms. 
The emergency contraception debate, policy implementation and consequent judicial 
and political battles confirmed the importance of “presidentialism” in Chile – which 
grants many policy and legal initiative prerogatives to a president – as well as the 
capacity of leadership and commitment coming from a president. Having a female 
president with strong feminist and secular ideas, but who is also a doctor, was an 
opportunity to produce cultural, social, economic and political changes for the 
advancement of women’s rights. 
Engaging with the literature 
This study established itself within the Feminist Institutionalist analysis of the gendered 
aspects of institutions and their functioning. The research has highlighted the informal 
role played by judges within the judiciary and how their role was strongly gendered. In 
this sense the power balance between feminist organisations and the judiciary was 
always unequal, the formal institutions of the judiciary granting the judges much 
gender-neutral unaccountability to produce their rulings. 
The formal presence of the President in the legal and political battles shows the formal 
and informal face of the role of a president and its personal attributes. While Bachelet 
was cautious to never appear to be leading on the EC agenda, likely as a tactic to protect 
the EC policy efforts, she was a constant support within government to her ministers but 
also to organisations such as ICMER whose director she knew well. They were both 
doctors and had worked together when Bachelet was Minister of Health. 
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Similarly, the Church as an institution exploited all the formal and informal channels of 
influence it had available, and was able to count on key support throughout the political 
and judicial processes. Reinforcing the consensus rule was clearly its first priority since 
the gendered nature of the consensus maintained the status quo on the societal vision of 
the Church on SRHR. 
Htun (2003) highlighted in her work that the nature of the issues advocated by feminists 
explains the level of resistance faced and the space for reforms or policy-making. It is 
therefore important to analyse gender issues separately. This research confirms the 
importance of the nature of gender issues. From the beginning EC was considered 
contentious and provoked strong opposition confirming the challenge feminists face 
since the transition to redefine SRHR as issues of equality and human rights (Haas, 
2010). Even though this research agrees with Htun on the need to look at gender issues 
separately, it shows that EC was contentious because the conservative lobby won the 
discourse battle initially by linking it to abortion. Over the next 10 years EC was never 
separated from the abortion debate, forcing public health officials and the government 
to seek new ways to reframe EC to counteract this narrative. 
Yet, because historically Chile had had a successful experience in framing difficult 
issues as public health priorities, the institutional memory of MINSAL brought back the 
discourse on EC as a public health policy and helped to reframe it in public opinion. 
More importantly, thanks to the success of the feminist efforts behind the Movement 
Pro-EC, Bachelet’s policy-makers were able to reframe EC shifting the discourse battle 
to equality and women’s rights, making it in this sense a priority for the social justice 
agenda. Here the research engages with Htun and Weldon’s (2010) framework for sex 
equality policies, and the importance given to the “doctrinal” nature of an issue over its 
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framing. Although their framework helps us to understand the initial level of opposition 
an issue can face according to the specific perception of its doctrinal and class-based 
component, this research shows that it is in the discourse battle and reframing of a 
policy that the advancement of gender issues lies, as long as this is part of strategic 
planning by advocates of gender issues. 
In the case of EC, the institutional environment affecting the policy shifted from one 
administration to the other. This was strongly influenced by the progressive loss of 
importance of the consensus rule for the Concertación, provoking therefore a strong 
response by the conservative lobby and the Church. As was discussed throughout the 
chapters, the conservative lobby was linked to the economic elite of the country. Yet, in 
the case of EC, their power resided more in access to different institutions in a formal or 
informal manner and their capacity to influence from the inside to maintain the status 
quo. 
Here this research differs from Blofield’s (2006) point of view that gives more 
importance to the economic power of the elites. This research shows that although class 
and economic inequality dimensions are still very present, they seem insufficient to 
explain the power of some actors over others within institutions such as the judiciary. 
Moreover, EC not only addressed the issue of class but also individual liberties 
affecting both the middle and upper class, as much as the working class, and had also a 
generational dimension absent in Blofield’s analysis. 
The conservative construction of a new political system for Chile contained in the 1980 
Constitution gave unique power to the conservative forces within the judicial, executive 
and legislative powers. Their economic power played an important role in their attempt 
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to threaten pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies trying to distribute EC, but their 
real impact was palpable in the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal against EC. 
The judicialisation of EC was therefore a direct result of the political environment and 
institutions involved. The way civil society actors, in particular biomedical 
organisations, strategised to carefully promote the distribution of EC via the political 
approval of the Norms, while also working closely with pharmaceutical companies for 
the licensing of the drug, shows a clear understanding of the difficulties and barriers to 
the advancement of SRHR in the country. The creation of strategic alliances proved to 
be an effective strategy for EC. However, despite all efforts to mobilise and get the 
necessary buy-in for the policy, the institutional framework of the Chilean political 
system and the institutional environment surrounding SRHR proved to be harder to 
overcome. 
Here, the thesis seeks to contribute to the wider Feminist Institutionalism literature by 
analysing the Chilean case within the Latin American context. While much has been 
said on the Colombian successful initiative to legalise abortion (Cook 2007; 
Reuterswaerd et al. 2011), and the progressive ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal, 
this thesis shows the importance of looking at institutions within a historic and local 
context. It agrees with the work of Reuterswaerd et al. (2011) who argue for the need to 
focus more on judicial processes as key players in gender policy reforms. 
We know that the rules of the game that create institutions are gendered, therefore the 
way in which judicial institutions operate and the impact of their decisions reflects a 
certain gender regime. Thus one cannot assume that the same type of judicial institution 
in different places can play the same role in the advancement of gender policy reforms. 
Rather, the institutional environment – as well as the weight of the original rules of the 
345 
game that created an institution and set its attributes – matter and need to be explored 
with more attention. Unlike Colombia, Chile had a very conservative Constitutional 
Tribunal because of the influence of the 1980 Constitution in its mandate. Colombia’s 
Constitutional Tribunal and Constitution are more recent institutions, both of them 
results of the democratic process of a national constitutional assembly and elections in 
the early 1990s. As discussed in this thesis, Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal and 
Constitution are legacies of the dictatorship, and of a deeply gendered transition 
(Waylen 2007, 2010). One could argue that the ruling by the TC was a confirmation of 
Couso’s (2005) idea of the rights’ revolution that never was – in this case the lost 
chance for a women’s rights revolution. 
This thesis therefore highlights the role of Bachelet in the final positive gender outcome 
for the EC policy. Like her predecessors, she faced a conservative institutional 
environment. Siavelis has argued that the presence of informal institutions in politics is 
related to “the inability of actors to solve problems or effect change within the context 
of informal institutions” (2006: 51) giving much power to consensus and “behind-
closed-door” agreements between the elite in Chile’s political system. Thus, that 
Bachelet was able and willing to use all her formal power as President to face the 
judicialisation process, and defend a difficult policy such as the distribution of EC, 
demonstrates both a political and personal commitment to the issue. 
Reflection on the methodology 
The methodology chosen for this research was committed to applying a gender lens to 
the methods chosen to research political processes and agents that form the subject of 
this research, including the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The stage of mapping the 
actors was crucial for this research since mapping required looking at all available 
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information – from interviews to printed materials such as the press – to identify those 
who had played a significant role in the EC policy process. Some of the actors 
interviewed in the research were not visible through the first mapping exercise carried 
out from the UK. It was once in Chile when I could speak to key feminist actors in well-
known NGOs and within government that I was able to identify the young feminists and 
the policy advocates in NGOs who made such a difference for the work of the pro-EC 
Movement, and their understanding of gender equality and SRHR. In this research, 
gendering the research methods came to mean identifying the power struggles amongst 
the actors involved to create or impede such important gender policy change, and 
analysing the impact this had on policy as part of a wider agenda for gender equality. It 
also meant prioritising the spending of time with feminist groups and advocates, as well 
as SRHR advocates at events where all these actors met. Only by becoming a 
participant observer was I able to see and understand some of the conflicts and tensions 
that made the pro-SRHR advocacy coalition stronger or weaker at different stages of the 
policy process. 
This focus helps to explain an obvious shortcoming of this research process, which is 
the lack of access to the conservative actors and organisations opposing EC. Having 
more access to these actors could have cast more light on the motivations and 
interactions between the actors of the anti-SRHR advocacy, together with their political 
means to influence the policy process. It would also have shed light on the internal 
divisions and tensions within a coalition that for almost nine years retained its 
ideological cohesion. It would have been particularly useful to interview politicians, 
especially those who were also the doctors who dissented from opposing the EC Bill. At 
the end of my research some timid voices within the Church also began to manifest their 
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dissent but there was no time to explore this. Access to conservative actors would be 
essential for extending and amplifying the research covered in this work. 
Finally the timeframe in which the research was conducted became a crucial factor in 
the limitations of the methodology applied, since the political tension caused by the 
electoral process in 2009 affected the interviews as much as the speed of the changes in 
the policy process. Therefore timing is something that needs to be addressed in the 
research planning of any work focusing on policy processes. 
Future research 
In Latin America there is relatively little research on the judicial processes involving EC 
in different countries and their impact on feminist initiatives for the advancement of 
women’s rights, in particular SRHR. The judicial and political battles behind the 
distribution of EC in Chile mirror strategies and political initiatives that have also taken 
place elsewhere in Latin America (Argentina, Peru) and North America (US, Canada). 
As the present research is based on one case study, there is still much scope to further 
explore the importance of judicial processes in the region in comparative perspective. 
Also, since EC and abortion are constantly linked by conservative groups opposing the 
progression of SRHR initiatives, it would be interesting to explore if elsewhere in Latin 
America the framing of these issues or their nature have had an important impact for 
gender policy reforms. 
Finally, this research has examined the role of feminists and SRHR advocates in these 
political and judicial processes to promote EC. There is a need to further explore how 
the alliances between these two groups of actors have evolved in response to the 
coordinated offensive against women’s SRHR in the continent by the Catholic and 
Evangelical Church, and the conservative groups linked to these religious institutions. 
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There is much to be learned from the successful experiences in the region for both 
women’s movements and the feminist praxis, as well as for biomedical SRHR 
advocates. The international dimension of these debates provides an excellent 
background to look more in depth at epistemic communities as well as at the impact of 
the diasporic experiences of those, for example, who have lived abroad or in exile and 
once back in their countries apply knowledge and promote ideas that they acquired 
somewhere other than their country of origin. 
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Appendix 1: Table of interviewees 
 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
Inte
rvie
w
Nam
e
Cat
ego
ry
( Ad
voc
acy
 Co
alit
ion 
/Oc
cup
atio
n/R
ole*
)
Sta
tus
(CIP
 (Co
ndu
cted
 
in 
Per
son
)/Lo
cati
o
n)
Sou
rce
(Re
ferr
ed b
y 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
(RB
I)/ 
Refe
rred
 by 
Per
son
al 
Con
tact
 
(RB
PC)
/ 
Sam
ple 
Sele
ctio
n (S
S)
For
mat
(sem
i-str
uctu
red
 
(SS)
/ op
en-e
nde
d 
(OE
)/ P
arti
cipa
nt 
obse
rvat
ion 
(PO
) / 
con
fere
nce
 (Co
nf))
Len
gth
 
Rec
ord
ing
(aud
io (
A) /
 wri
tten
 
note
s (W
N) /
othe
r 
/sky
pe)
Tra
nsc
ript
/Co
nf
iden
tial
ity
(tra
nscr
ipt 
ava
ilab
le (
TA)
 
or 
con
fide
ntia
lity 
requ
este
d (C
R))
Dat
e
(DD
.MM
.YY)
1.   
   A
dria
na G
óme
z
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t
CIP
/ At
 NG
O
RBP
C
40 m
ins 
& 4
5 m
ins 
A &
 WN
TA
01.0
4.09
2.   
   L
awy
er R
Con
stitu
tion
al L
awy
er / 
Ant
i-
EC 
Coa
litio
n
CIP
/ At
 wo
rkpl
ace
SS
20 m
ins 
& 6
0 m
ins 
 W
N
CR
15.0
6.09
/18.
06.0
9
3.   
   A
nton
ella
 Ca
iozz
i
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t 
CIP
/ In 
a ca
fé
RBI
1h0
1 m
in
A &
 WN
TA
11.0
7.09
4.   
   C
ami
la M
atur
ana
 
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
CIP
/ At
 NG
O
SS
47 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
19.0
5.09
5.   
   C
atól
icas
 por
 el 
Der
ech
o a 
Dec
idir
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
CIP
/ ho
me
SS
1h4
2 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
08.0
4.09
6.   
   C
laud
ia D
ides
Fem
inist
 Sch
olar
 - T
hink
 Tan
kC
IP/ 
wor
kpla
ce
SS
57 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
12.0
5.09
7.   
   A
nton
io In
fant
e
For
mer
 Mi
nist
ry o
f He
alth
 
Bur
eau
crat
CIP
/ ho
me
RBI
59 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
23.0
6.09
8.   
  Gu
iller
mo 
Galá
n (D
r)S
RH
R A
dvo
cate
 and
 
Pra
ctiti
one
r
CIP
 wo
rkpl
ace
 
RBI
50 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
24.0
6.09
351 
 
  
Inte
rvie
wee
 
Inte
rvie
w
Nam
e
Cat
ego
ry
( Ad
voc
acy
 Co
alit
ion 
/Oc
cup
atio
n/R
ole*
)
Sta
tus
(CIP
 (Co
ndu
cted
 
in 
Per
son
)/Lo
cati
o
n)
Sou
rce
(Re
ferr
ed b
y 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
(RB
I)/ 
Refe
rred
 by 
Per
son
al 
Con
tact
 
(RB
PC)
/ 
Sam
ple 
Sele
ctio
n (S
S)
For
mat
(sem
i-str
uctu
red 
(SS)
/ op
en-e
nde
d 
(OE
)/ P
arti
cipa
nt 
obse
rvat
ion 
(PO
) / 
con
fere
nce
 (Co
nf))
Len
gth
 
Rec
ord
ing
(aud
io (
A) /
 wri
tten
 
note
s (W
N) /
othe
r 
/sky
pe)
Tra
nsc
ript
/Co
nf
iden
tial
ity
(tra
nscr
ipt 
ava
ilab
le (
TA)
 
or 
con
fide
ntia
lity 
requ
este
d (C
R))
Dat
e
(DD
.MM
.YY)
9.   
  Ho
raci
o C
roxa
tto 
(Dr
)
SRH
R R
esea
rche
r an
d 
Adv
oca
te 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
40 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
07.0
7.09
10. 
  So
leda
d D
íaz 
(Dr
)
SRH
R R
esea
rche
r/Ad
voc
ate 
 
and
 NG
O P
ract
ition
er
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
SS
1h2
0 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
18.0
1.11
11. 
  Fu
lvio
 Ro
ssi 
Left
-Wi
ng M
emb
er o
f 
Par
liam
ent 
(PS
)
CIP
/ Pa
rliam
ent
RBI
35 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
07.0
7.09
12. 
  Gl
oria
 Ma
ira
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
CIP
/ ho
me
RBP
C
1h3
8 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
06.0
4.09
13. 
  Jo
sefi
na H
urta
do
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBP
C
45 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
16.0
4.09
14. 
  Ju
an B
astí
as
SRH
R P
ract
ition
er
CIP
 / pa
rk
RBI
1 ho
ur
A &
 WN
TA
03.0
7.09
15. 
  La
ura 
Alb
orno
z
For
mer
 SE
RN
AM
 Mi
nist
er
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBP
C
1h5
3 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
17.0
1.11
16. 
  Lid
ia C
asas
 
Fem
inist
 Leg
al S
cho
lar 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
58 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
01.0
6.09
352 
 
  
Inte
rvie
wee
 
Inte
rvie
w
Nam
e
Cat
ego
ry
( Ad
voc
acy
 Co
alit
ion 
/Oc
cup
atio
n/R
ole*
)
Sta
tus
(CIP
 (Co
ndu
cted
 
in 
Per
son
)/Lo
cati
o
n)
Sou
rce
(Re
ferr
ed b
y 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
(RB
I)/ 
Ref
erre
d by
 
Per
son
al 
Con
tact
 
(RB
PC)
/ 
Sam
ple 
Sele
ctio
n (S
S)
For
mat
(sem
i-str
uctu
red 
(SS)
/ op
en-e
nde
d 
(OE
)/ P
arti
cipa
nt 
obse
rvat
ion 
(PO
) / 
con
fere
nce
 (Co
nf))
Len
gth
 
Rec
ord
ing
(aud
io (
A) /
 wri
tten
 
note
s (W
N) /
othe
r 
/sky
pe)
Tra
nsc
ript
/Co
nf
iden
tial
ity
(tra
nscr
ipt 
ava
ilab
le (
TA)
 
or 
con
fide
ntia
lity 
req
uest
ed (
CR)
)
Dat
e
(DD
.MM
.YY)
17. 
  Lu
is C
one
jero
s 
Jou
rnal
ist -
 Co
mun
icat
ions
 
Adv
iser
 PD
C
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBP
C
1h0
4 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
10.0
6.09
18. 
  M
aría
 An
toni
eta 
Saa
Left
-Wi
ng M
emb
er o
f 
Par
liam
ent 
(PP
D)
CIP
 / P
arlia
men
t
RBI
45m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
03.0
6.09
19. 
  M
aría
 Isa
bel 
Mat
ama
la
Fem
inis
t an
d M
inist
ry o
f 
Hea
lth B
urea
ucra
t
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h1
6 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
02.0
4.09
20. 
  M
aria
na A
ylw
in
For
mer
 Mi
nist
er a
nd P
oliti
cian
 
(DC
)
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBP
C
45 m
ins 
A &
 WN
TA
05.0
6.09
21. 
 Law
yer 
F
Con
stitu
tion
al T
ribu
nal 
Jud
ge
CIP
 /  w
ork
plac
e
RBP
C
2h1
0 m
ins
A &
 WN
CR
10.0
7.09
22. 
  M
oisé
s Ru
sso
SRH
R A
ctiv
ist
CIP
 / ca
fé
RBI
45 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
23.0
6.09
23. 
  Ch
urch
 Off
icia
l
Chu
rch 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
SS
52 m
ins
A &
 WN
CR
17.0
7.09
24. 
  La
wye
r P
Con
stitu
tion
al T
ribu
nal 
Law
yer
CIP
 / vi
a sk
ype
RBP
C
1h1
2 m
ins
A &
 WN
CR
18.1
2.12
353 
 
  
Inte
rvie
wee
 
Inte
rvie
w
Nam
e
Cat
ego
ry
( Ad
voc
acy
 Co
alit
ion 
/Oc
cup
atio
n/R
ole*
)
Sta
tus
(CIP
 (Co
ndu
cted
 
in 
Per
son
)/Lo
cati
o
n)
Sou
rce
(Re
ferr
ed b
y 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
(RB
I)/ 
Ref
erre
d by
 
Per
son
al 
Con
tact
 
(RB
PC)
/ 
Sam
ple 
Sele
ctio
n (S
S)
For
mat
(sem
i-str
uctu
red 
(SS)
/ op
en-e
nde
d 
(OE
)/ P
arti
cipa
nt 
obse
rvat
ion 
(PO
) / 
con
fere
nce
 (Co
nf))
Len
gth
 
Rec
ord
ing
(aud
io (
A) /
 wri
tten
 
note
s (W
N) /
othe
r 
/sky
pe)
Tra
nsc
ript
/Co
nf
iden
tial
ity
(tra
nscr
ipt 
ava
ilab
le (
TA)
 
or 
con
fide
ntia
lity 
req
uest
ed (
CR)
)
Dat
e
(DD
.MM
.YY)
25. 
  Pa
trici
a Za
mor
a 
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
55 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
09.0
7.09
26. 
  Pa
ulin
a R
eino
so
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t NG
O
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
50 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
18.0
5.09
27. 
  Pa
ulin
a V
idal
Fem
inist
 Sch
olar
 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
53 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
11.0
5.09
28. 
  Re
né C
astr
o 
Civi
l ser
van
t - M
inist
ry o
f 
Hea
lth
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h0
1 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
21.0
7.09
29. 
  Ro
sa F
erra
da 
Fem
inis
t Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
 - 
SRH
R
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h1
0 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
08.0
6.09
30. 
  Ro
sa Y
añe
z
Fem
inis
t Ac
tivis
t - N
GO
 - 
Wo
men
's R
ight
s
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h2
3 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
02.0
6.09
31. 
  So
leda
d B
arrí
a
For
mer
 Mi
nist
er o
f He
alth
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
SS
1h1
1 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
24.0
1.11
32. 
  Te
resa
 Ma
ffei 
Civi
l ser
van
t an
d Fe
min
ist -
 
Min
istry
 of P
lani
fica
tion
 
(MI
DEP
LAN
)
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBP
C
53m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
29.0
5.20
09
354 
 
  
Inte
rvie
wee
 
Inte
rvie
w
Nam
e
Cat
ego
ry
( Ad
voc
acy
 Co
alit
ion 
/Oc
cup
atio
n/R
ole*
)
Sta
tus
(CIP
 (Co
ndu
cted
 
in 
Per
son
)/Lo
cati
o
n)
Sou
rce
(Re
ferr
ed b
y 
Inte
rvie
wee
 
(RB
I)/ 
Refe
rred
 by 
Per
son
al 
Con
tact
 
(RB
PC)
/ 
Sam
ple 
Sele
ctio
n (S
S)
For
mat
(sem
i-str
uctu
red 
(SS)
/ op
en-e
nde
d 
(OE
)/ P
arti
cipa
nt 
obse
rva
tion
 (PO
) / 
con
fere
nce
 (Co
nf))
Len
gth
 
Rec
ord
ing
(aud
io (
A) /
 wri
tten
 
note
s (W
N) /
othe
r 
/sky
pe)
Tra
nsc
ript
/Co
nf
iden
tial
ity
(tra
nscr
ipt 
ava
ilab
le (
TA)
 
or 
con
fide
ntia
lity 
requ
este
d (C
R))
Dat
e
(DD
.MM
.YY)
33. 
  Te
resa
 Va
ldés
Fem
inist
 Ac
tivis
t NG
O 
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h0
4 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
17.0
6.09
34. 
  Ve
róni
ca 
Sch
iapp
aca
sse
Fem
inist
 and
 SR
HR
 
Pra
ctiti
tone
r
CIP
 / w
orkp
lace
RBI
1h3
1 m
ins
A &
 WN
TA
17.0
6.09
35. 
  Zu
lem
a C
ontr
eras
SRH
R P
ract
ition
er
CIP
 / ca
fé
RBI
1h
WN
TA
11.0
6.09
36. 
  Fr
anc
isco
 Día
z
For
mer
 Ch
ief A
dvis
er f
or 
Pub
lic P
olic
y  -
 SE
GPR
ES
CIP
 / vi
a sk
ype
RBP
C/R
BI
44 m
ins
A &
 WN
CR 
/ as
ked
 to r
evie
w q
uote
s
20.0
7.12
37. 
 Law
yer 
G
For
mer
 Law
yer 
- SE
GPR
ES
CIP
 / ca
fé
RBP
C
1h0
3 m
ins
A &
 WN
CR 
/ as
ked
 to r
evie
w q
uote
s
03.0
3.14
355 
Appendix 2: Topics for interviews and sample of interview questions 
Topic list 
o Political parties and their position vis-à-vis EC 
o NGOs participation (and role) 
o Church (role and activities) 
o Judicial process (description, actors and impact) 
o Political strategies (of actors/organisations/institutions) 
o Power and influence (forms and manifestation) 
o Spaces of power and resistance 
o Alliances 
o Concertación (and its practices) 
o President and government (Bachelet v Lagos) 
Example of interview questions to civil society actors (feminists and biomedical groups) 
o Tell me what was the origin or the political intention behind the decision to 
promote emergency contraception under the Lagos administration? 
o Who were the main actors during those years? 
o What would you say was the role of parties on this issue? 
o Which methods of influence do the different actors have? 
o What was the strategy to advance the issue of EC? 
o What was the role of the medical establishment during this process? 
o How is the EC policy process related to the issue abortion and the agenda on 
SRHR? 
o How was the relationship among the actors involved in the policy process? 
o What role did feminists play during the policy and judicialisation processes? 
o Could you describe the way in which the legal defence at the Constitutional 
Tribunal took place? 
o How was the relation with the State and with MINSAL more precisely? 
o What would you say was the role of Michelle Bachelet during the judicialisation 
process? 
o What would you say was the role of SERNAM? 
o When did the parties have a strong influence? 
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Appendix 3: Email in response to my request for an interview by Conservative MP 
 
Presentación y posible entrevista para investigación de doctorado 
3 messages 
 
Carmen Sepulveda <Carmen.SepulvedaZelaya@sas.ac.uk> Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 9:41 PM
To: macristi@congreso.cl 
Estimada Diputada Cristi: 
 
Mi nombre es Carmen Gloria Sepúlveda Zelaya, soy estudiante de doctorado en ciencia política y me 
permito dirigirme a Ud. en el cuadro de mi investigación de doctorado. 
 
Soy candidata al PhD en el Institute for the Study of the Americas (ex ILAS), de la Universidad de 
Londres. Soy cientista política de formación, graduada de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, y 
cuento además con MPhil en Development Studies, del Institute of Development Studies de la 
Universidad de Sussex. Actualmente, me encuentro como investigadora en visita del Instituto de 
Ciencia 
Política de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 
 
Le escribo ya que me encuentro en Chile por unos meses, para llevar a cabo mi investigación de terreno 
hasta Julio próximo. En mi proyecto doctoral estoy interesada en investigar como ha progresado la 
agenda de los derechos reproductivos en Chile, y más específicamente en qué modo los partidos 
políticos y sus miembros han moldeado y/o influenciado la agenda y debates que rodean estos derechos 
desde el gobierno de Ricardo Lagos. Esto incluye iniciativas como la Ley Marco de Derechos Sexuales 
y Reproductivos, así como también el más reciente proceso jurídico-legal entorno a la contracepción de 
emergencia. 
 
Es por esto que me gustaría tener la oportunidad de conocer y entrevistar a los diferentes actores que se 
han visto envueltos y afectados por las iniciativas políticas y legales que tocan a los derechos 
reproductivos en Chile. Dado a su cargo actual como Diputada de la República y Presidente de la 
Comisión Familia, además de su larga trayectoria como miembro de Renovación Nacional es 
que me pareció esencial contactarla. 
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Me gustaría por lo tanto saber si Ud. tendría tiempo para fijar una entrevista conmigo y así conversar un 
poco acerca del trabajo que Ud. ha llevado a cabo en estos temas durante sus cargos legislativos y como 
militante y dirigente político. Al contar yo con una agenda más flexible sin duda que la suya, estoy a su 
disposición y a la espera de su respuesta. No tengo problema con desplazarme a Valparaíso si es 
necesario. No dude en escribirme si tiene cualquier duda o pregunta. 
 
Muchas gracias de antemano por su preocupación y tiempo. 
 
Atentamente, 
 
Carmen Gloria Sepúlveda Z. 
 
-- 
Carmen Gloria Sepúlveda Zelaya 
PhD Candidate 
Institute for the Study of the Americas 
School of Advanced Study 
University of London 
 
 
H.D. María A. Cristi <macristi@congreso.cl> Mon, Jun 8, 2009 at 11:07 PM
Reply-To: macristi@congreso.cl 
To: carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com 
Estoy en total desacuerdo con la promoción de los Derechos Reproductivos. Incluyen El Aborto y estoy 
por "LA VIDA". 
 
-----Mensaje original----- 
De: carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com 
[mailto:carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com] En nombre de Carmen Sepulveda 
Enviado el: Martes, 02 de Junio de 2009 16:42 
Para: macristi@congreso.cl 
Asunto: Presentación y posible entrevista para investigación de doctorado 
[Quoted text hidden] 
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Carmen G. Sepulveda Zelaya <carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com> Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 3:01 PM
Reply-To: carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com 
To: macristi@congreso.cl 
Bcc: angelicasz@gmail.com 
Estimada Diputada Cristi: 
 
Muchas gracias por su respuesta. Quizás no logré expresar bien el fin de mi investigación académica. 
Mi interés desde la ciencia política es ver como un tema que causa mucha tensión por estar dentro de la 
agenda valórica es tratado dentro de las políticas públicas, y cómo los partidos y sus miembros 
reaccionan frente a tales iniciativas. Por ser esta una investigación de doctorado, el uso de terminología 
como derechos reproductivos se refiere al modo en el cual el tema es tratado dentro de la literatura. 
Entiendo que mucha gente se opone a esta terminología pero es justamente por eso que me hubiese 
gustado poder conversar con Ud. más tranquilamente acerca de cuales son sus motivaciones, en su 
función parlamentaria, para aliarse con otros parlamentarios que se declaran a favor de la vida frente a 
estos temas de reproducción. Me permito escribirle nuevamente ya que tras entrevistar a María 
Antonieta Saa y Mariana Aylwin, se me sugirió que sería importante contar con su opinión y recoger su 
experiencia 
política. He estado tratando de entrar en contacto con parlamentarios de todos los sectores políticos para 
conversar estos temas ya que mi análisis es sobre políticas públicas e iniciativas legislativas. 
 
Espero que esto aclare un poco más el tema de mi investigación y la motivación tras mi esfuerzo para 
contactarla. Me gustaría pedirle nuevamente, y respetuosamente, que por favor considere darme una 
entrevista si su agenda lo permite. No dude en escribirme si tiene cualquier pregunta adicional. 
 
Muchas gracias de antemano por su consideración. 
 
Atentamente, 
Carmen Gloria Sepúlveda Zelaya 
 
 Carmen Gloria Sepúlveda Zelaya 
 PhD Candidate 
 Institute for the Study of the Americas 
 School of Advanced Study 
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 University of London 
 
2009/6/9 H.D. María A. Cristi <macristi@congreso.cl>: 
[Quoted text hidden] 
carmensepulvedaphd@googlemail.com 
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Appendix 4: Conservative organisations and individuals behind the court cases against EC 
Sara Philippi Izquierdo – a well-known pro-life campaigner, with a longstanding 
participation in Catholic social and charity initiatives – is also the founder of ISFEM, 
“Investigación, Formación y Estudio sobre la Mujer”, a pro-life NGO dedicated to promote the 
presence of female conservative voices in the debates around abortion, the right to life 
and the family, and whose work has included monitoring the work done by feminists on 
sexual and reproductive rights. See http://www.isfem.cl/, last visited 02/06/10.  
Dr Patricio Mena is part of the pro-life medical foundation “Porta Vitae”, a network of 
specialists in gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics who claim to have found together 
with their families the a special vocation to “realize a synthesis between science, faith 
and family life”. See 
http://portavitae.cl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=17, last 
visited June 2, 2010.  He also was part of the Chilean experts who in 2002 took  part in 
the Second International Congress “For Life and the Family” hosted by the Pontifical 
Catholic University in Santiago and the pro-life network “Anónimos por la vida” (an 
institution dedicated to prevent women from seeking an abortion and instead convince 
them to carry the pregnancy to term, see http://www.anonimosporlavida.cl/) (El 
Mercurio 2002b). 
E. Bunster Chacón is also a founding member of the Catholic Church’s NGO “Proyecto 
Esperanza” (Project Hope) created with the aim to provide spiritual support to those 
women and men “suffering from a post-abortion syndrome”. The project was supported 
by the Bishop of San Bernardo, Juan Ignacio González Errázuriz, one of the most 
conservative bishops of the Chilean Church, member of the Opus Dei. González 
Errázuriz is well known for considering the use of any contraception method a sin and 
to deny women the baptism of their children unless they have their IUDs removed. He 
has also publicly supported political candidates who were against the EC pill in 
municipal elections. The lawyer in charge of processing this demand against the EC pill 
– Jorge Reyes – was also made the legal representative of this NGO (La Nación 2008b). 
See also “Proyecto Esperanza” (Proyecto Esperanza). The World Movement of Mothers 
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with its headquarters in France and which has UN status has long been identified as a 
right-wing conservative and anti-abortion group (Druelle 2000: 4). 
Francisco Chahuán was head of the NGO “Front for Life and Solidarity Actions” from 
2000 to 2004. A descendant of an influential Christian Palestinian immigrant family, 
Francisco Chahuán studied law at the University of Valparaíso and is well known for 
having conservative religious views. He has been a permanent member of the right-
wing party Renovación Nacional, since the early 1990s; he was one of the party’s youth 
and then regional leaders. He eventually became deputy in 2005 and senator in 2009. 
Chahuán was head of the NGO “Front for Life and Solidarity Actions” from 2000 to 
2004. 
Juan Jara Opazo was then a student of Law at the Universidad de los Andes, an 
institution belonging to the Opus Dei and created the AGES youth group for the 
purpose of this legal action. Jara Opazo was also vice-president of the youth section of 
the far-right and ultra-conservative Unión Democrata Independiente (UDI) (El Mercurio 
2002a). He became deputy in 2009 as an independent for the Christian humanist 
movement of Chile but with the support of Sebastián Piñera’s “Coalition for Change”. 
See Movimiento Humanista Cristiano, at http://mhcchile.cl/web/, last visited June 3, 
2010. 
Gonzalo Patricio García Palominos was then a young militant close to the Christian 
Democrat Party that belongs to the Concertación government coalition (Casas Becerra 
2008). The Movimiento Nacional por la Vida “Antü-Küyen” seems to have been an ad 
hoc creation for the judicial challenge since there is no trace of its existence or activities 
elsewhere. 
Alejandro Romero is a Law professor at Universidad de los Andes where he teaches 
Procedural Law. He also works at a corporate law firm. He was behind the judicial 
challenges against EC since 2001. He provided the key support to the students behind 
AGES to bring the cases against EC, pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies. 
Jorge Reyes – who had been part of all the judicial challenges since 2001 and been a 
flag bearer for anti-choice groups – is famous for having brought to the Supreme Court 
the case that tried to forbid the screening of Martin Scorsese’s film “The Last 
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Temptation of Christ”, one of the most controversial cases on censorship in Chile since 
the return to democracy. The case reached the Inter-American Court of Human Right 
that condemned the Chilean State and Supreme Court’s decision to censor the film in 
2001. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Sentence, Caso “La Última 
Tentación de Cristo” (Olmedo Bustos y otros) Vs. Chile (5 February 2001), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_73_esp.pdf, last visited June 18, 
2010. He was the advisor of former UDI Senator Carlos Bombal for 14 years (Urzúa 
and Vasquez 2008). 
José Antonio Kast is a longstanding member of UDI. Kast’s father, Miguel Kast, was a 
well-known economist belonging to the “Chicago Boys” group of technocrats who 
carried out the economic reforms under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. He was 
also a famous university leader at the Pontifical Catholic University, part of the Catholic 
elitist Schoenstatt movement, and the “gremialista” ultra-conservative political 
movement led by Jaime Guzmán from the Opus Dei, who would become the main 
civilian advisor to Pinochet. 
Patricio Zapata is a renowned Constitutional Lawyer, who teaches at the PUC, worked 
with many officials in the Aylwin administration, as well as with PDC representatives 
in Parliament, and was actively involved in the accusation against EC at the TC. He was 
advocating the conservative position in universities at the time (Universia 2008). 
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Appendix 5: List of Deputies that supported the SRHR Bill (2000) 
 
 
Name  Region represented 
District 
number 
Party 
affiliation 
Isabel Allende Bussi RM Región Metropolitana N°29 PS 
Gabriel Ascencio Mansilla X Región de los Lagos N°58 PDC 
Rosa González Román I Región de Tarapacá N°1 Independent 
Carlos Abel Jarpa Wevar VIII Región del Bío Bío N°41 PRSD 
Víctor Jeame Barrueto VIII Región del Bío Bío N°43 PPD 
Jaime Mulet Martínez III Región de Atacama N°6 PDC 
Osvaldo Palma Flores VII Región del Maule N°39 RN 
Fanny Pollarolo Villa II Región de Antofagasta N°3 PS 
Marina Prochelle Aguilar X Región de los Lagos N°55 Independent 
María Antonieta Saa Díaz RM Región Metropolitana N°17 PPD 
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Appendix 6: List of Deputies who petitioned the TC against the “Decreto Supremo” (2007) 
 
1 Claudio Alvarado  UDI 
2 Gonzalo Arenas  UDI 
3 Ramón Barros  UDI 
4 Eugenio Bauer  UDI 
5 Sergio Bobadilla  UDI 
6 Alberto Cardemil  INDEP/exRn 
7 Sergio Correa  UDI 
8 María Angélica Cristi  UDI 
9 Francisco Chahuán  RN 
10 Roberto del Mastro  RN 
11 Andrés Egaña  UDI 
12 Enrique Estay  UDI 
13 Marcelo Forni  UDI 
14 Pablo Galilea  RN 
15 René García  RN 
16 Alejandro García-H  UDI 
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17 Javier Hernández  UDI 
18 Amelia Herrera  RN 
19 José Kast  UDI 
20 Juan Lobos  UDI 
21 Rosauro Martínez  RN 
22 Juan Masferrer  UDI 
23 Patricio Melero  UDI 
24 Cristián Monckeberg  RN 
25 Nicolás Monckeberg RN 
26 Iván Norambuena  UDI 
27 Carlos Recondo  UDI 
28 Roberto Sepúlveda  RN 
29 Marisol Turres  UDI 
30 Jorge Ulloa UDI 
31 Gonzalo Uriarte  UDI 
32 Ignacio Urrutia  UDI 
33 Alfonso Vargas RN 
34 Germán Verdugo RN 
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35 Gastón Von Müllenbrock  UDI 
36 Felipe Ward  UDI 
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Appendix 7: Pictures and oother vvisual ssupporting mmaterials 
 
Demonstrations in front of Contraloría and MINSAL (Santiago, June 2009) 
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PÍLDORAZO, Headline in Las Últimas Noticias (3 April 2008) 
 
 
370 
Demonstrations in front of the Constitutional Tribunal (April 2008 ) 
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Pictures of Demonstrations and Parliament Session on EC (Valparaíso, July 2009) 
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Graffiti in Valparaíso (June 2009) 
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Posters and advocacy materials from feminist organisations 
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